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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
Traditionally, international law was the relations between sovereign states and since 1648 
treaties of Westphalia the world has been divided between sovereign states.
2
 The concept of 
sovereignty is central to international law and refers to a sealed territorial space within which 
there is supreme authority for governance.
3
 In other words, in the international system 
sovereignty is manifest in the state.
4
 In a neat theoretical classical world, however, there were 
no provisions for non-state actors such as non-state armed groups (NSAGs).
5
 In order to 
understand the concept of non-state actors (particularly as in the case of NSAGs) it would be 
useful to define statehood according to international law.
6
 The classical criteria of statehood 
(ex factis jus oritur) was adopted in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States (1933), which lays down four characteristics that an entity should possess to 
be considered a state, namely; (i) a permanent population; (ii) stable boundaries or a defined 
territory; (iii) under a functioning government; and (iv) engage or having the capacity to 
engage in formal relations with other states.
7
 Additionally, the notion of a state actor could be 
extended to organizations or individuals directly connected and responsible to that state.
8
 On 
the abovementioned Convention Brownlie states: ‘this brief enumeration of criteria is often 
adopted in substance by jurists, but it is no more than a basis for further investigation.’9 
Harris is of the opinion that the Montevideo Convention merely codified existing legal norms 
and its principles as well as restatement of customary international law which does not only 
apply to signatories but to all subjects of international law.
10
 Nevertheless, recognition by 
                                                 
2
 H. Kelsen, ‘Principles of International Law’, Rinehart & Co., 1st ed., 1952, pp. 18-19.  
3
 D. Philpott, ‘Revolution in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations’, Princeton U.P., 
2001, p. 254.  
4
 Sovereignty has been described as central to the modern international law associated with a particular bundle 
of characteristic: a defined territory, recognition by other sovereign states, exclusive authority within a defined 
territory, and effective internal and trans-border control. See S. Krasner, ‘Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy’, 
Princeton U.P., 1999, p. 227; M. Fowler & J. Bunck,’Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and 
Application of the Concept of Sovereignty’, Pennsylvania State U.P., 1995.  
5
 The term non-state actors encompasses “a range of organizations that bring together the principal, existing or 
emerging, structures of the society outside the government and public administration” (Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee Participation of 
Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy (Brussels, 07.11.2002, COM (2002) 598 final). For text: 
<http://www.zpok.hu/img_upload/f880a7b608b6eaa8411125e501dc0547/ec_ong_eu.pdf>.  
6
 Generally see J. Crawford, ‘The Creation of States in International Law’, Oxford U.P., 2nd ed., 2006, p. 45.  
7
 For text: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp>; for these criteria see J. Crawford, ‘The 
Creation of States in International Law’, 2nd ed., Oxford U.P., 2006  
8
 ibid 
9
 I. Brownlie, ‘The Principles of Public International Law’, Oxford U.P., 7th ed., 2008, p. 70. 
10
 D.J. Harris, ‘Cases and Materials on International Law’, Sweet and Maxwell, 6th ed., 2004, pp. 99. 
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other states plays a pivotal and crucial role in creation of a new state.
11
 Although an in-depth 
analysis of the notion of statehood in international law is beyond the remit of this study it 
suffices to say that the above criteria provide a yardstick as to the concept of statehood in 
international law. Therefore, the term non-state actor constitutes an actor in the international 
arena that is not an entity according to the definition provided above or responsible to a 
particular state.
12
 In today’s world, at the one end of the spectrum are 193 sovereign states 
and on the other a wide range of non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) such as Green Peace International, as well as NSAGs variously described as rebels, 
guerrillas, freedom fighters, insurgents, terrorists, armed opposition groups, and national 
liberation armies.
13
 
 
1.1 Non-State Armed Groups: a working definition 
 
For this study it is of paramount importance to arrive at a working legal definition in which 
the issue of NSAGs could be addressed. Today the term NSAGs covers a great variety of 
armed groups, ranging from the well-armed militias such as Hezbollah in southern Lebanon 
and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), to small groups of bandits and criminal gangs levying 
taxes in remote roads in Africa and South America. However, due to the controversial and 
politically oriented nature of NSAGs there is no general consensus on how to define these 
organizations or what their legal obligations are.
14
 Furthermore, the sheer number of such 
armed groups’ in armed conflicts globally makes it even more difficult to devise a clear and 
comprehensive definition. This is in the light of the fact that they operate in different regions 
of the world and may have different structures, motives, resources, political and social 
agendas. Historically, a member of NSAG (irregular or guerrilla fighters), was an individual 
who fought by asymmetrical means against an invading force.
15
 This is not surprising since 
most of the conflicts prior to the second half of the twentieth century were of international 
                                                 
11
 P. Malanczuk, ‘Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law’, Routledge, 7th ed., 1997, pp. 82-83. 
12
 M.E. O’Connell, ‘Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors through a Global War on Terror?’, 43 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 435 2004-2005, p. 437.  
13
 H.F. Spirer, ‘Accounting for Human Rights Violations by Non-State Actors’, in ‘Non-State Actors in the 
Human Rights Universe’, G. Andreopoulos & Z.F. Kabasakal-Arat (ed.), Kumarian Press, 1st ed., 2006, p.44 
14
 A. Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors’, Oxford U.P., 2006, especially Chapter 7, pp. 
271-316. 
15
 Quoted in Telford Taylor, ‘Foreword’ in Leon Friedman (ed.), ‘The Laws of War: a Documentary History’, 
Vol. 1, New York, Random House, 1972, p. xvi 
15 
 
nature or inter-state wars, and civil wars were not covered by the laws of war, nor were they 
as commonplace and prominent as today.
16
 
In traditional international law in order to qualify as a NSAG, four conditions had to be 
satisfied namely: (i) some level of hierarchical structure or organizational coherence; (ii) the 
use of violence for particular political ends; (iii) certain degree of independence from state 
control; and crucially (iv) some degree of territorial control.
17
 After the experience of major 
civil wars such as the Spanish Civil War, in the first half of the twentieth century, Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 was the very first international instrument to 
deal with the issue of civil war, to extend a minimum standard of humanitarian protection to 
the parties involved: ‘…in the case of armed conflicts not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one the high contracting parties, each party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply as a minimum…’ The article goes on to describe what provisions shall apply 
in this situation. But it does not specifically provide a definition for armed groups involved in 
those conflicts. The very first influential definition of NSAGs can be found in the Additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Convention of 1977 which refers to groups involved in: 
…conflicts taking place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed 
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under 
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them 
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
protocol.
18
  
It is fair to say that this definition is considerably stricter than the definition provided in 
Common Article 3 and it requires an effective control over a certain part of the territory of 
the parent state by the said NSAG, whereas Common Article 3 requires no such prerequisite. 
But the strictest definition of “armed group” is found in regard to prisoner of war status, for 
armed combatants to be granted prisoner of war status in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions (1949) they have to be (i) under a command structure responsible for its 
subordinates; (ii) have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable from a distance; (iii) carry their 
arms openly; and (iv) adhere to customs and rules of war.
19
      
At this stage, it is worth noting that there is also a great deal of reluctance on the part of 
sovereign states to admit the applicability of the Geneva Conventions more specifically the 
                                                 
16
 See SIPRI Yearbook, ‘armament, disarmament and international security’, Oxford U.P., 2005 and 2006, p. 83 
& p. 108.  
17
 R.H. Shultz, D. Farah, I.V. Lochard, ‘Armed Groups: a Tier-One Security Priority’, Occasional Paper 57, 
USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy Colorado, 2004.  
18
 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 1949, Part I, Article 1(1).    
19
 See Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 1949, art. 43-47. 
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Additional Protocol II, fearful of recognizing NSAGs’ legitimacy, as they would consider 
them as mere “rebels” or “terrorists”.20 This is in the light of the fact that tacit admission by 
states may ultimately encourage these groups to claim that they are engaged in internationally 
recognized armed struggle and no longer come under the ambit of the domestic criminal law 
mechanism of those sovereign states in which they are operating.
21
 The above scenario is 
especially true in many less developed parts of the world, which in the aftermath of achieving 
independence through the process of decolonization, could no longer maintain law and order 
in their territories due to weak central governments. This has created a situation in which 
NSAGs based on distinct national and ethnic affiliations are formed and flourish in those 
fragmented states.
22
 However from political and legal point of view such armed groups lack 
the formal recognition previously awarded to national liberation armies who were exercising 
their right to self-determination and engaged in wars of national liberation against alien 
occupation, colonial domination or racist powers.
23
      
The more contemporary working definition of NSAGs has been articulated by organizations 
which strive to hold such armed groups to respect and adhere to humanitarian norms. 
Organizations such as Geneva Call (GC) which aims to get NSAGs to adopt “deeds of 
commitment” to stop the use of landmines refer to such organizations as non-state actors. 
According to GC the non-state actors engaged in armed conflict refers to: ‘any armed actors 
operating outside state control that use force to achieve its political/quasi-political objectives, 
such actors, include armed groups, rebel groups, liberation movements and “de facto” 
governments’.24 Some scholars consider depiction of NSAGs as non-state actors in this 
context as erroneous usage of the term. In the opinion of the author, the term non-state actor 
is rather general and puts armed groups together in the same category as other non-state 
actors such as the ICRC, Geneva Call and Human Rights Watch.
25
 The International Council 
on Human Rights on the other hand has developed a broader definition for NSAGs which 
                                                 
20
 See L.F.E. Goldie, ‘Profile of a Terrorist: Distinguishing Freedom Fighters from Terrorists’, 14 Syracuse 
Journal of International Law and Commerce, 1987, pp. 125-139.  
21
 M.E. O’Connell, ‘Reshaping Dogs of War’, AJIL 446, 2003, p. 454, (as in the case of the British Government 
which always maintained the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was a criminal organization and the IHL did not 
apply to the crisis.  
22
 See P.B. Rich, ‘Warlords in international Relations’, Palgrave Macmillan, 1st ed., 1999; see also A. Hills, 
‘Warlords, Militia and Conflict in Contemporary Africa: Re-Examination of Terms’, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 35-51;  
23
 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, Part I, art. 1(4), see also D. Kay, ‘The 
Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations the UN Political Process’, International Organization, 21 (1967), 
pp. 786-811; General Assembly Resolution 3103 (XXVIII).   
24
 <http://www.genevacall.org/about/about.htm>.  
25
 <http://www.armedgroups.org/sites/armedgroups.org/files/AGP_Working_Paper_5_-
_Policzer__March_05_.pdf >. 
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depicts such groups as those which are: ‘armed and use force to achieve their objectives and 
are not under state control’.26  This fluid definition was developed under the premise that 
such armed groups are motivated by political ideologies, religious extremism and economic 
objectives which excludes organizations that pursue private agendas such as criminal 
organizations, drug cartels, mercenaries as well as private military firms.
27
 
It is interesting to note that in the more recent definitions provided above there is an apparent 
lack of emphasis on holding of a certain part of territory of a state by NSAGs which is a 
prerequisite set in Additional Protocol II. Indeed, this is a fair reflection of the fact that many 
NSAGs are not in control of certain part of territory of the state they are operating in but pose 
as much threat to law and order as the case of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) operating in 
south eastern Turkey and the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan in Iran in the twenty-first 
century clearly illustrate. As will be made clear below, although, PKK does not hold any part 
of the Turkish territory, however, it has been able to engage the might of the Turkish national 
army since 1984, one of the most powerful armies in the region and member of North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
28
 
Indeed this marks quite a departure from traditional International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
which has made a clear distinction between NSAGs that control part of the territory of the 
host state, and in reality act as de facto administration of that territory, and organizations that 
do not meet these criteria.
29
  
It is obvious that in the current globalized world the dichotomy between state and non-state 
coercive use of force is somewhat outdated.
30
 It should also be made clear that in the twenty-
first century some of these groups have turned their attention to criminal activities to generate 
much-needed funds. Hence, the distinction between groups with clear political programs and 
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criminal organizations is somewhat eroding. As a result, the new approach adopted by 
organizations such as International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) reflects this ever-
changing nature of NSAGs. According to ICRC: 
‘Amongst armed groups, the distinction between politically-motivated action and 
organized crime is fading away. All too often, the political objectives are unclear, if not 
subsidiary to the crimes perpetrated while allegedly waging one’s struggle… Are we 
dealing with a liberation army resorting to terrorist acts, or with a criminal ring that 
tries to give itself political credibility? Are we dealing with a clan-oriented self-defence 
militia relying heavily on criminal funding, or with a Mafia-like gang whose 
constituency is strongly intertwined with ethnic communities?
31
 
Consequently, the present author is of the opinion that the definition of NSAGs adopted by 
this study should reflect the ever-changing nature of NSAGs in the wider global setting which 
inevitably reflects the very nature of the NSAGs under consideration in Kurdistan. As will be 
seen below, the Kurdish NSAGs’ development from purely tribal fighting groups in the 
aftermath of the World War I and their revolts against the newly established sovereign states 
to highly organized NSAGs is indicative of this concept. For the purpose of this study the 
author is of the opinion that a clear distinction has to be made between NSAGs that pursue a 
political or religious ideology, are capable of mounting major military operations, and have 
considerable support within their communities and smaller loosely organized band of armed 
groups devoid of a clear political program which resort to criminality to survive on the other. 
For the NSAGs based in Kurdistan under consideration in this study, a political goal is of 
paramount importance and an end in itself, not a secondary instrument for advancement of 
other interests such as accumulation of wealth. The NSAGs in question are groups which 
operate in a certain territory, who resort to violence for specifically political ends with 
ultimate ambition of overthrow, seizing power, supplant the central government or else to 
secede and form a separate state for a certain part of that territory or as the recent trend 
indicates having more political and minority rights within the existing sovereign states. 
Therefore, to avoid partiality and ambiguity in this study the term NSAG is used as a generic 
label, used as a lieu which encompasses all non-state irregular forces such as rebels, 
guerrillas, freedom fighters, insurgents, terrorists, armed opposition groups, national 
liberation armies as well as de facto administrations. 
                                                 
31
 International Committee of Red Cross, ‘Holding Armed Groups to International Standards: An ICRC 
contribution to the research project of International Council on Human Rights Project (ICHRP)’, ICRC, 1999, 
pp. 2-3. 
19 
 
It has to be emphasised that individuals or groups which are not acting on behalf of a state are 
non-state actors. Therefore, a non-state actor does not act under the control of a state and is 
not part (de facto or de jure) of any state apparatus and maintains its identity and existent 
independent of the state.
32
 However, as in the case of NSAGs in Kurdistan and the wider 
Middle East, it is argued that they maintain links to a particular state mainly due to 
ideological basis or becoming a pawn in the geopolitical chess game of the region. 
Throughout the 1960s and 70s the Shah’s regime in Iran directly supported (under the 
auspices of the US administration) the insurgency of the Kurdish NSAGs under Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani.
33
 To off-set this the Ba’athist regime under Saddam Hussein in Iraq, in turn, 
actively supported the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-Iran).
34
 Further, it has been 
a well-known fact that the PKK was provided generous financial and logistical support by the 
Assad regime in Syria and other interested states in the region such as Greece and the Islamic 
Republic regime in Iran.
35
 
For the purpose of this study I will adopt the following definition depicting the Kurdish 
NSAGs under consideration. They are groups which challenge the authority of the state they 
are operating in, challenge the rule of law of those states, however, not necessarily exercise 
control over part of the territory of the host state as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations, use violence in unconventional asymmetrical ways to achieve 
their aims, as well as operating across state boundaries, and make use of factional schisms 
that effect their ability to operate effectively.
36
 But crucially they all have a political agenda 
which is ultimately aimed to achieve statehood. The most significant aspect of Kurdish 
NSAGs is that they operate within the territories of the sovereign states under consideration 
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and extraterritorially as in the case of PKK in Turkey and the Party for a Free Life of 
Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iran.  
 
1.2 The three Kurdish entities of Iran, Iraq and Turkey 
 
What makes the question of Kurdistan compelling as a recognized geographical entity, in 
spite of the fact that the regional states may deny its reality, is the fact that it does exist 
according to relatively well defined limits in the minds of most Kurdish political groups.
37
  
The concept of armed conflict has always been part of the Kurdish way of life throughout 
their history especially since the end of the World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. For nearly a century, Kurdish people have been embroiled in armed conflicts against 
the central governments of Iran, Iraq and Turkey resulting in enormous loss of lives. This is 
hardly surprising since the three aforementioned states throughout the twentieth century were 
ruled by quasi-military regimes which never tolerated any challenge to their authority. The 
situation of armed conflict in Kurdistan is not unique in the world. However, it does indicate 
a trend in armed conflicts that globally involves NSAGs. There are many examples of 
conflicts involving a distinct population taking up arms against the central government of a 
sovereign state for a variety of reasons. However, what makes the case of the Kurdish 
example compelling is the fact that the Kurdish populations are spread across the borders of 
five countries in the Middle East, namely, in eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, and north-western 
Iran and in smaller populations in northern Syria and Armenia.   
The reason for selection of the three Kurdish regions as a microcosm of the activities of 
NSAGs and armed conflict is that it encapsulates the very nature and modus operandi of 
NSAGs in that region as well as globally throughout the Twentieth Century and beyond. The 
Kurdish NSAGs under consideration in this study indicate the range of characteristics of such 
armed groups. The microcosm is also used to illustrate the developmental approach of 
international law towards civil war/internal armed conflicts from treating it as purely internal 
concern of a sovereign state to the codification of international law through instruments such 
as the Charter of the UN in 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 
1948 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 albeit in a minimalistic way through Common 
Article 3 to all the four Geneva Conventions. 
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1.3 Methodology of the thesis 
 
This thesis draws on several scholarly discourses in order to achieve its aim. It is recognized 
by the author that the switching between different fields of international law in the course of 
this study may prove burdensome for the reader. However, attempts have been made to 
lighten the encumbrance by providing sufficient background information for each particular 
field. In order to enhance this process, in relation to the microcosm under consideration, 
sufficient historical and political backgrounds (through literature analysis) have been 
provided. In contrast to domestic legal systems, with respect to international law it is not 
possible to point to institutions endowed with readily identifiable legislation and executive 
function.
38
 In other words, there is no international government and no system of 
international legislation. International law is primarily a system of customary rules which is 
increasingly supplemented by rules and principles enshrined in treaties. These two sources of 
international law are ‘positive international law’ in that the laws they generate are based on 
norms agreed upon by sovereign states. Notwithstanding the fact that there is no doctrine of 
stare decisis in international law, judgment and pronouncements of international and 
domestic courts and tribunals are increasingly relied upon as persuasive norms of 
international law resulting from custom, treaties and the general principles. The absence of a 
formal mechanism for law-making enhances the importance of material sources that are 
‘evidence of the existence of consensus among states concerning particular rules or 
practices.’39 The starting point for a researcher in international law is Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of International Court of Justice (ICJ), generally recognized as an authoritative 
sources of international law, notwithstanding the fact that it does not specifically mention 
‘sources’.40 Article 38 is considered the cornerstone of positivist approaches since it makes a 
distinction between legal obligations from non-legal practice.
41
 It provides:  
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply; 
(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
(b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
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(c) The general principle of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
Mindful of the above Article, this study pays special attention to three exclusive law-creating 
processes namely; international conventions, custom and general principle of law, judicial 
decisions and academic writings. Moreover, newspaper articles, journals and academic legal 
researches regarding the Kurdish issue have also been utilized.  
One needs to mention that some materials in this thesis were collected from the variety of 
sources. The present author benefited immensely from having access to the Oxford 
University Bodleian Law Library and the Library at the Middle East Centre of St Anthony’s 
College, Oxford. It is pertinent to point out that the materials collected from the 
aforementioned institutions have proved extremely important and invaluable to this study. 
Moreover, as a result of direct collaboration with Dicle University in Diyarbakir and Turkish 
National Police Academy in Ankara, the author was granted the opportunity to carry out 
research in those institutions for a period of two months. During this period a series of 
interviews with a number of academics, practitioners, military and police officers were 
carried out which remain confidential, although the information obtained through these 
interviews has certainly enhanced the substance of the present study.     
 
1.4 Classification of armed conflict in Kurdistan 
 
1.4.1 International armed conflict 
 
An international armed conflict is a conflict between two or more states’ armed forces, no 
declaration of war or recognition of the state of war between the two states is required.
42
 It is 
a well-known fact that international armed conflicts are regulated by the four Geneva 
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Conventions of 1949
43
 (hereinafter GC 1949) and Additional Protocol I (hereinafter Protocol 
I) of 1977.
44
 The Geneva Conventions (1949) set out conditions in which they apply:  
To all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between 
two or more of High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by 
one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation 
of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no 
armed resistance.
45
  
According to the Commentary on the Geneva Conventions: ‘any hostile act–no matter how 
minor–by one state against another makes applicable all of international humanitarian law’.46 
If such acts were to take place by one state against another they would be construed as an act 
of war. Schindler also supports this approach by saying that ‘the existence of an armed 
conflict within the meaning of Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions can always be 
assumed when parts of the armed forces of two states clash with each other.’47 
On this point the Commentary on the Geneva Conventions reiterate the point that in the ambit 
of international armed conflict any hostile act no matter how minor by one state against 
another would bring the international humanitarian law (IHL) into operation.
48
 However, it 
does not mean that the whole corpus of IHL must be applied. On this point Sandoz notes that 
inter alia the rules on prisoners of war cannot be applied, particularly, if there are no prisoners 
and the rules on occupation cannot apply if there is no occupied territory.
49
 The case-law of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Tribunals, such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), have also elaborated on 
the concept of international armed conflict in relation to NSAGs. In the Nicaragua case the 
ICJ had to deal with the question of whether financing of the Contra by the United States was 
in breach of the IHL and the ensuing conflict between the contra and Nicaraguan army was 
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tantamount to an international armed conflict.
50
 The ICJ held that the United States had to 
exercise “effective control” and the control should be regarding a particular operation in 
which the breach of IHL has taken place in order to render the armed conflict international. In 
the Tadic case, according to the Appeal Judgment of the ICTY, a NSAG becomes the de 
facto organ of the state; even though it is not designated as by the states’ own municipal law, 
and all or any of its acts become the act of the state.
51
 The ICTY judges in the Tadic case had 
to determine whether the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia was international or non-
international. Disagreeing with the Nicaragua judgement they held: 
In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a state, it must be 
proved that the state wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and 
financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its 
military activity. Only then can the state be held internationally accountable for any 
misconduct of the group. However, it is not necessary that, in addition, the state should 
also issue, either to the head or to numbers of the group, instructions for the 
commission of specific acts contrary to international law.
52
    
On the basis of this rational the Appeal Chamber held that paramilitary activities of the 
Republika Srpska armed forces were under overall control and on behalf of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and hence the armed conflict in that territory was categorized as an 
international armed conflict.
53
 Therefore, if it is proved that a NSAG is under overall control 
of a sovereign state it becomes an organ of that particular state and as result the armed 
conflict which the said NSAG is involved in becoming an international one.  
 
1.4.2 Internal armed conflict 
 
The most challenging task in the contemporary international security situation is ascertaining 
whether there is a non-international armed conflict in progress in order to enforce the 
normative provisions of IHL.
54
 To establish whether an internal armed conflict is taking place 
is even more of a task than an interstate one, since, at least one of the parties (in the shape of 
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a NSAG) to such conflicts lacks legal standing.
55
 This is in light of the fact that the existence 
of an international armed conflict involving two states is much easier to establish. 
Furthermore, states engaged in international armed conflict see it beneficial to respect IHL 
for the protection of their own troops. On the other hand, establishing whether there is an 
internal armed conflict where the very existence of the state may be at stake is a more 
difficult undertaking.  
Internal armed conflict can be described as use of armed forces within the borders of a state 
between the established government and an armed group for the purpose of challenging the 
legitimacy of that government.
56
 The civil war in Sierra Leon between 1991 and 2001 is an 
example of this form of conflict.
57
 It could also be the case that a section of the population 
strives to secede from a sovereign state in order to form a new independent state.
58
 There can 
also be other types of internal armed conflicts, where in search of more freedoms NSAGs to 
establish an autonomous region in order to achieve more democratic rights by internalizing 
human rights and democratic norms.
59
 Because of the state-centric nature of international law 
and reluctance of sovereign states to recognize new states, the latter form of non-international 
armed conflict seems to be a lot more common place now. Moreover, a central government 
would always maintain that there is no armed conflict in progress, hence, ‘seeking to render 
humanitarian law inapplicable and reduce their legal obligations to armed opponent.’60 
It has also been suggested that increasingly internal armed conflicts can take place between 
different NSAGs without the involvement of the central government either because it is more 
prudent to remain neutral or it is too weak to intervene, as the civil war in Lebanon between 
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1970 and 1990 clearly illustrates.
61
 This was confirmed by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ITCY),
62
 that as in the case of the so-called failed states, 
the central governments are so weak to function that they inevitably lose their monopoly on 
coercive use of force the very preserve of the Westphalian notion of statehood.
63
  
As will be discussed below, internal armed conflict under modern international law is 
regulated by Common Article 3 to all Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol 
II of 1977.
64
 In relation to internal armed conflict, there must be a certain level of intensity to 
the conflict to differentiate between fully-fledged armed conflict and internal security 
operations as a result of a mere civil strife or disturbance.
65
 Furthermore, existence of three 
different definitions of non-international armed conflict in international treaties namely, 
Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II and more recently, the Rome Statute of the ICC 
makes this task much more difficult.
66
  
It is stated that Common Article 3 is applicable ‘in the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character,’67 but it does not provide any guidance how to ascertain that. 
Additional Protocol II does not offer any further clarification in terms of the definition of 
such armed conflicts.
68
 Nevertheless, in Article 1(1), Additional Protocol II does list a 
number of criteria which require that the armed conflict should take place between ‘the armed 
forces of a High Contracting Party and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over part of [the state’s] 
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement [the] Protocol.’ Therefore, it is the intensity of the conflict and the organization of 
the parties especially the NSAGs that distinguish an internal armed conflict from mere acts of 
banditry and civil strife.
69
 Article 1(2) makes it absolutely clear that it does not apply to 
situations of ‘internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
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violence and other acts of similar nature.’70 Protocol II ‘develops and supplements Article 3 
without modifying its existing condition of application.’71 Hence, it has been noticed that 
although Additional Protocol II was to develop and supplement Common Article 3, both 
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II can apply to different armed conflict situations 
according to the level of intensity.
72
 Therefore, as mentioned above, in most cases Common 
Article 3 applies to situations of non-international armed conflict because of its lower 
threshold of intensity.
73
  
 
1.4.3 Internationalized armed conflict 
 
The events in Libya in 2011 brought into sharp focus the ambiguity regarding the 
classification of armed conflict regarding NSAGs. In a situation which initially appeared to 
be an internal armed conflict but eventually becomes internationalized by virtue of 
involvement of outside stake holders. According to Stewart: 
The ‘internationalized armed conflict’ describes internal hostilities that are rendered 
international. The factual circumstances that can achieve that internationalization are 
numerous and often complex: the term internationalized armed conflict includes war 
between two internal factions both of which are backed by different states; direct 
hostilities between two foreign states that militarily intervene in an internal armed 
conflict in support of opposing sides; and war involving a foreign intervention in 
support of an insurgent group fighting against an established government. The most 
transparent internationalized internal armed conflicts in recent history include NATO’s 
intervention in the armed conflict between the Federal Republic Yugoslavia (FRY) and 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1999 and the intervention undertaken by 
Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda and others, in support of opposing sides of the 
internal armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo since August 1998.
74
  
Marko Milanovic is of the opinion that the following two conditions render an internal armed 
conflict internationalized: 
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(1) State A intervenes into an internal conflict in state B, in support of the non-state 
actor and against state B. This is the Bosnian scenario, where Serbia and Croatia 
supported the Bosnian Serbs and Croats against the internationally recognized 
government of Bosnia. This is likewise the scenario of the coalition attack on 
Afghanistan post 9/11, when they acted jointly with the Northern Alliance against 
the Taliban who were then the de facto government of Afghanistan, before the new 
government of Afghanistan was set up. 
(2) State A attacks a non-state actor located in state B, without B’s consent. This is the 
scenario of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon.
75
 
However, the authors of ‘the Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict’ 
express doubt regarding the existence of such a category of armed conflict: 
When a foreign state extends its military support to the government of a state in which 
a non-international armed conflict is taking place, the conflict remains non-international 
in character. Conversely, should a foreign state extend military support to an armed 
group acting against the government, the conflict will become international in 
character. Admittedly, it is sometimes difficult to determine in the circumstances of a 
protracted non-international armed conflict whether there exists a government.
76
 
The nature of armed conflict in relation to Kurdish NSAGs and their resultant revolts with a 
variety of intensity have to be classified as internal armed conflicts. This is in spite of the fact 
that they display a transnational nature and almost none of the revolts under consideration 
throughout the twentieth century have been limited to a particular state’s boundaries. As will 
be seen below this was even true of early revolts which the warring forces (both state and 
non-state) did not limit their operation to a particular country. 
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Chapter 2. The Kurds: an historical background 
2.1 The land of the Kurds 
 
2.1.1 The Kurds: a divided people 
 
The Kurds are Sunni Muslim mountain-dwelling Indo-European tribes with their own 
language and culture comprising the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East.
77
 The 
territory commonly known as Kurdistan (the land of the Kurds)
78
 is a strategic area located in 
the heartland of the Middle East.
79
 It is a predominantly mountainous region, bordering Syria 
to the west, Iran to the east, and Turkey to the north, Iraq to the south, lying where fertile 
plains meet the Zagros mountains in the east and Turkey`s eastern mountains.
80
  
According to legends, the Kurds are the children of the populace who fled from the tyranny 
of Zahhak, an ancient ruler who symbolises violence and evil, a well-known figure who also 
appears in Ferdowsi’s classical epic Shahnameh.81 ‘Kordestan’ or ‘Kordistan’ as it was 
known by the successors to the Kurdish dynasties
82
 coincides with the Iranian province that 
was created in the twelfth century by sultan Sanjar, who belonged to the Turkish Seljuk 
dynasty and ruled most of Persia at the time.
83
 The Province of Kordestān in Iran84 is the only 
official recognition of the existence of any Kurdish entities in the area where the Kurds are 
settled.
85
 It has been noted that references were made to the Kurds in Sumerian inscriptions 
dating 2000 BC, found near Lake Van in modern-day Turkey.
86
 This mountainous area is 
characterised by heavy snow and rainfalls that are a water reservoir for the Middle and Near 
East, famous Tigris and Euphrates rivers as well as many other smaller rivers, such as 
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Khabur, Tharthar and Ceyhan, Greater and Lesser Zabs are watered throughout those 
mountains.
87
 McDowall puts the term ‘Kurdistan’ into perspective: 
Although the population is not exclusively Kurdish in much of this area, the dominant 
culture is Kurdish. Since the early 13
th
 century much of this area has been called 
Kurdistan, although it was not until 16
th
 century after the Kurds had moved north and 
west onto Anatolia plateau by a series of tribal migrations that the term Kurdistan came 
into common usage to denote a system of Kurdish fiefs. Since then, although the term 
Kurdistan appears on few maps, it is clearly more than a geographical term since it 
refers also to a human culture which exists in that land. To this extend Kurdistan is a 
social and political concept.
88
   
From the outset it has to be emphasised that the Kurdish way of life is very much influenced 
by its geographical locality.
89
 The Kurds are distinct from Arabs, Persians and Turks of the 
region, but, ethnically and linguistically closest to the Persians. Their origins are traced back 
to the Empire of Medes, an Indo-European people, the nomadic tribes that lived between the 
Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea centuries before the birth of Christ. Most scholars trace the 
beginning of Kurdish civilisation to pre-Christian times. The Greek historian Xenophon in 
Anabasis (Retreat of 10,000) in the fourth century BCE refers to the likely ancestors of Kurds 
as a disobedient tribe of fighters who made a living hell for the Greek army, according to him 
‘they dwelt up among the mountains, were a warlike people, and were not subjects of the 
king’.90 
There are no reliable figures available on the total number of the Kurds in the Middle East. 
Kurdish sources have at times claimed that their population amounts to thirty-five to forty 
million people.
91
 This is perhaps an exaggerated estimate given by different Kurdish political 
leaders and academics in order to accentuate their political demands.
92
 The majority of the 
Kurds, as the largest non-state actor in the Middle East reside in the south-eastern part of 
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Turkey.
93
 McDowall states that ‘Kurds in Turkey are 13 million (23 per cent), in Iraq 4.2 
million (23 per cent), in Iran 5.7 million (10 per cent), and in Syria 1 million (6 per cent).
94
 
Nonetheless, significant surveys such as that carried out in 1990s estimated the Kurdish 
population to be over 30 million,
95
 whilst others record much smaller numbers.
96
 
Furthermore, there has since the 1980s been a tangible Kurdish diaspora which has been very 
active in promoting, funding and shaping the nationalist movements,
97
 an example of which 
Ben Anderson describes as “long-distance” nationalism. Nevertheless mainly due to 
unreliable official statistics all figures quoted in the cited literature lack precise evidence but 
do not deny the fact that the Kurds constitute one of the largest non-state actors in the Middle 
East.
98
 As it is correctly pointed out, Middle Eastern history has all too often been written by 
its hegemons.
99
 
The Kurdish people have during their long existence, been ruled and divided between many 
dominating imperial powers such as Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Mongols 
and Ottomans but significantly have managed to outlive them all. However, they are, even 
now in the twenty first century, still divided between four major Middle Eastern powers of 
Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria as well as the former Soviet Republic of Armenia.
100
 The similar 
but not identical cultural traits of these tribes reveal how diversity infuses the Kurdish 
culture.
101
 As a result of this varied ancestral background the Kurds speak different dialects, 
believe in a variety of religious sects and belong to different social strata. According to their 
place of residence, they are divided into ‘pastoral and nomadic’,102 ‘clans and tribes’.103 The 
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diversity among the Kurds is reflected in the number of dialects spoken by them. The most 
widely spoken dialects among the Kurds are Kurmanji and Surani. Kurmanji is the dialect 
mostly spoken in Turkey and Syria and among some Iranian Kurds. Surani is spoken mainly 
by the Kurds in Iraq south of the Greater Zab as well as by the majority of the Kurdish 
population of the province of Kordistan in Iran.
104
 With regard to religion, the mainstream 
Kurds are Sunni Muslims (of the Shafi’i legal school in contrast to their Arab and Turkish 
Sunni Neighbours) converted into Islam around the 12
th
 and 16
th
 century, but there are Shi’is, 
Yazdanists, the Ahl-e Haqq (people of truth), and Alawis (or the Qizilbash), with beliefs and 
rituals that are clearly influenced by Islam but owe more to other religions notably 
Zoroastrianism.
105
 In addition, 2 per cent of the Kurds (that) are Yezidis (known to outsiders 
as devil worshipers) mostly reside in Syria, there are also a few thousands Christians and 
Zoroastrians and some two hundred Jewish families in the Iranian city of Sanandaj make up 
the religious affiliation of the Kurds.
106
 It is worth noting that in the aftermath of the Arab 
conquest the Kurds played a crucial political role in the Islamic world. They provided 
important leaders in the Islamic world most notably the legendary Salah-ed-din Ayyubi 
(Saladin), who led the Islamic army against Richard the Lion Heart and the Crusaders.
107
 In 
spite of this Saladin never ruled over the territory now known as Kurdistan, nor did he 
emphasise his Kurdish identity since he was foremost an Islamic warrior, not a Kurdish 
nationalist.
108
 
From the fifteenth century onwards however, the designation ‘Kurd’ no longer applied to 
nomadic tribes. Rather it referred to ‘the people of the region of Kurdistan’,109 the region 
extending from ‘the South East of Turkey, North east of Iraq, North West of Iran and North 
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East of Syria.
110
 Consequently, from the information above it can be deduced that the Kurds 
have been inhabitants of a specific land throughout their history.
111
  
It is worth noting that until the mid-twentieth century, religion played a pivotal role in the 
Kurdish nationalist movement. In fact, according to Meho, ‘many of the Kurdish rebellions 
which broke out in the period between 1880 and the mid-1940s were led by Sheikhs … these 
rebellions, however, were intensely affected by the religious diversity of the Kurds.’112 
Moreover, it has been argued by some that the Kurdish practice of ‘settlement into 
independent tribes which act autonomously and have limited contacts with each other in 
conjunction with the lack of unifying supreme authority to keep them together’ has 
contributed greatly to the heterogeneity of the Kurds.
113
 Entessar is of the opinion that the 
heterogeneity of the Kurds is threefold:  
First, the rugged, mountainous terrain of Kurdistan has historically impeded 
communication between Kurdish tribes and clans. Second, the absence of a strong, 
centralized administrative structure to unify the many rival Kurdish groups encouraged 
the development of diverse languages among the Kurds. Finally, the emergence in the 
twentieth century of a sovereign nation-state system in the Middle East further 
fragmented the Kurds and placed them under the jurisdiction of countries which 
themselves displayed linguistic diversity.
114
 
 
2.1.2 Division of Kurdistan 
 
Less is heard of the Kurds during the Mongol and Turkoman periods (1258-1509).
115
 It was 
in the early sixteenth century that the Kurds became an important pawn in the Persian-
Ottoman conflict.
116
 On 23
rd
 of August 1514, with the assistance of the Kurds, Sultan Selim’s 
Ottoman army defeated the forces of Shah Ismail Safavid at Chaldiran, north-west of Lake 
Urmiah which marks the first division of the Kurdish territory between Persia and the 
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Ottoman Empire.
117
 The main reason for the Kurds to support the Ottomans was the fact that 
they both were advocates of Sunnism against the Shi’i Persians which eventually resulted in 
setting the boundaries between the respective kingdoms through the Zuhab Agreement (Peace 
of Qasr-e-Shirin), May 17 1639.
118
 The aforesaid Kurdo-Ottoman Pact formally recognized 
sixteen independent principalities of various sizes, about fifty sanjaks (fiefdoms) and a 
number of Ottoman sanjaks.
119
 In fact, due to the fighting prowess of the Kurds both the 
Ottomans and Persians used the Kurdish populated regions as buffer zones dividing their 
respective empires as well as competing spheres of interest among different Kurdish 
groupings.
120
 Indeed, in order to contain possible Kurdish rebellions this policy of divide and 
rule was very much in evidence in the modes operandi of the Persian monarchs.
121
 
Nonetheless, the establishment of the hegemony of the Ottomans over the Kurds in the 
following centuries had a profound effect upon the social structure of Kurdistan, resulting in 
emergence of semi-autonomous emirates, or principalities as well as major Kurdish 
landowners.
122
 Furthermore, in spite of centralized policy of both Empires a series of semi-
independent Kurdish principalities flourished well into the first half of nineteenth century.
123
 
However, it has been noted that the transformation of the Kurdish organizational structure 
from a traditionally tribal to a feudal system in which only a few privileged families owned 
most of the land, on the one hand exacerbated divisions among the various dominant Kurdish 
families and on the other was a setback for the Kurdish national sentiment.
124
 
 
2.1.3 The roots of Kurdish nationalism 
 
It has been argued that Kurdish nationalism is a new phenomenon and a product of modernity 
which coincided with the emergence of Arab and Turkish nationalism in the Middle East in 
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the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire.
125
 Kurdish nationalism emerged according to some 
scholars as a consequence of the collapsing Ottoman Empire during and after World War I.
126
 
Nonetheless, sense of Kurdish identity did not find written expression until in the poem of the 
seventeenth century poet Ahmad-i Khani entitled, Mem-u-Zin (the Kurdish Romeo and 
Juliet).
127
 Kurdish nationalistic sentiments started emerging in the latter part of nineteenth 
century, in step with other Muslim peoples living under the ailing Ottoman Empire.
128
 In its 
modern form according to Edmonds ‘Kurdish nationalism developed during the second half 
of the nineteenth century along parallel lines with similar movements of the other subject 
races of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, the Arabs and the Armenians.’129 It has also been linked 
with the abandonment of the Muslim concept of Umma (Islamic Nation) through which 
successive Ottoman Sultans kept the Kurdish population on their side since the Kurds were 
also Sunnis and shared a certain affinity with the Caliphate.
130
 In order to reinforce this 
religious bond between the Kurds and the central government and mindful of possible 
designs in the remote and lawless Anatolia provinces, in 1891, Sultan Abdulhamid II 
authorised a tribal militia called Hamidiye,
131
 led by tribal chiefs with the sole purpose of 
ensuring the security of the territory against Armenian nationalism.
132
 According to Finkel, 
‘the Kurdish tribes were jealously independent, and forging them into a formal organisation 
would, he hoped, also serve to restrain their lawlessness and increase their loyalty to the 
distant government in Istanbul.’133 Moreover, ‘The Hamidiye Cavalry in the development of 
Kurdish nationalism ‘was a necessary interlude in emergent Kurdish nationalism … it 
contributed to feelings of solidarity among Sunni Kurds and offered leadership opportunities 
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to many young Kurdish men. The Hamidiye also provided many Kurds with knowledge of 
military technology and equipment and the capabilities to use it.’134 
The best expression of Kurdish nationalism was the emergence of socio-political and literary 
organisations such as the publication of the newspaper, Kurdistan, in 1897.
135
 The Young 
Turks Revolution of July 1908 had profound effects on the destinies of the peoples of the 
Ottoman Empire particularly the Kurds.
136
 The Young Turks Revolution was followed by a 
honeymoon period between the Turks and the Kurds which resulted in for the first time in the 
public establishment of Kurdish nationalist organizations especially in the capital city of 
Istanbul.
137
 The most important one of these organisations was the Kurt Terraki ve Teavun 
Cemiyeti (Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid), also known as Kurdistan Taali ve 
Terraki Cemiyetti (Society for the Rise and Progress of Kurdistan), which were founded by 
some of the most illustrious sons of famous Kurdish families.
138
 Also, during this period a 
number of Kurdish literary and cultural clubs were created under the patronage of prominent 
Kurdish families in Mosul, Diyarbakir and Baghdad.
139
 Nonetheless, the activities of the 
well-educated Kurdish intelligentsia during that period did not seem to make much of an 
impression on the majority of Kurds living in rural areas, as well as being viewed with 
suspicion by the Kurdish Aghas and Khans who considered them ‘with hostility and 
suspicion as carriers of ungodly and revolutionary ideas.’140 It has been noted that, ‘in 
addition to the urban-rural dichotomy that undermined development of unified Kurdish 
nationalist organisations, intense rivalry among prominent feudal families also undermined 
Kurdish unity.’141 Nonetheless, in this period of openness the Kurdish nationalists managed 
to propagate their message among the ordinary populace through the takiyas (gathering 
places for specific religious order). Jwaideh opines that: 
This was a development of great significance in the history of Kurdish nationalism. For a 
number of reasons, the importance of the takiyas as centres for dissemination of nationalist 
ideas can scarcely be exaggerated. The ideas emanating from these focal points found ready 
and wide acceptance among the Kurds, for they bore the stamp of authority of the Sheikhs. 
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Moreover, the religious character and influence of the Sheikhs gave the Takiyas relative 
immunity from interference and harassment by the authorities [the importance of this was 
clearly demonstrated in the Iranian revolution in the 1980s]. The Sheikhs, who as a class 
represented an important segment of the Kurdish elite, were ardent nationalists. Unlike the 
largely Turkified urban elite, they were closely associated with the Kurdish masses, and 
identified themselves with them. Furthermore, both by training and conviction they stood for 
the traditional Islamic state as opposed to the modern secular state envisaged the Young 
Turks.
142
      
The political freedom which Kurdish nationalists enjoyed after the Young Turks Revolution 
did not last long mainly due to a series of conflicts resulting in deterioration of Turkish-
Kurdish relations. The bourgeoning Kurdish nationalism was influenced as a reaction to 
Armenian nationalism and ultimately the ever more aggressive Turkish nationalist agenda 
under Ataturk, Celadet Bedir Khan, one of the main figures at the forefront of Kurdish 
nationalism in 1920s and 1930s, wrote to Ataturk that Turkish nationalism, ‘made as many 
Kurdists for us as it made Turkists for you.’143 Bozarslan is of the opinion that:  
… During the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, both the Kurdish traditional elite 
and the emerging intelligentsia tried to define the boundaries of the Kurdish group as a 
distinct entity. The aim was both to prevent the formation of an Armenian state in the 
Eastern parts of the Empire, and also to avert direct Turkish rule in the region.
144
  
Also, he expresses the fact that ‘Kurdish nationalism was essentially cultural, and even when 
it formulated political aims, as it did in the Bitlis, Suleymaniye and Barzan revolts in 1914, it 
never ceased to be “Ottomanist” at least until the end of the World War I’.145 Nevertheless, 
‘until the twentieth century, the only model of unification for the Kurds remained 
membership of a movement instigated by a charismatic figure, a movement which would 
collapse the moment they disappeared.’146 Indeed, a situation which has persisted throughout 
the twentieth century and beyond. At the heart of the development of Kurdish nationalist 
movement in the nineteenth century as a result of the gap left by the disappearance of the 
independent emirates (the reform of the Tanzimat period)
147
 was the dominance of Sheikhs 
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and religious figures.
148
 It is worth mentioning that with few exceptions almost all of the 
Kurdish nationalist leaders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were all sheikhs. 
However, the Kurdish revolts of the nineteenth century were not based on any political 
organization or clearly defined political program which is unusual in the Islamic world.
149
    
Therefore, ‘because Kurdish religion and tribal leaders had derived their authority from the 
twin institution of the Sultanate and Caliphate, the abolition of these institutions removed the 
temporal and spiritual basis of their legitimacy, which led the Turkish republic to outlaw all 
the manifestations of Kurdish identity.’150 Proclamation of the Turkish republic in 1923 
resulted in the end of what Serif Mardin calls the Ottoman tacit contract between the Sultan 
and the Kurds.
151
 
The Kurds in response to the draconian measures established by the new Turkish Republic 
launched an insurgency in 1925 with the goal of establishing an independent homeland. The 
rebellion was brutally put down and its leaders hanged in public in the middle of the central 
square in Diyarbakir. In spite of this the Kurds embarked upon a series of uprisings 
culminating in another rebellion in 1937 resulting in Turkey adopting the policy of denying 
the very existence of the Kurdish identity, referring to them only as “mountain Turks”. As a 
result Kurdish language, culture and geographical place names were banned. 
The rise of Sheikh Obeydullah to prominence in 1880 has been described as ‘the first stage of 
a greater consciousness of Kurdish nationalism’,152 and is of particular importance to this 
study since he launched transnational armed attacks upon both the Ottoman and Persian 
territories with the aim of establishing an independent Greater Kurdistan.
153
 In July 1880, in a 
letter addressed to the British Vice-Consul in Başkale, he states: 
The Kurdish nation is a people apart. Their religion is different (to that of others), and 
their laws and customs are distinct. They are known among all nations as mischievous 
and corrupt …. The chief and rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian subjects, 
and the inhabitants of Kurdistan (Christians) one and all are united and agreed that 
matters cannot be carried on this way with the two governments, and necessarily 
something must be done so that European governments having understood the matter 
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shall enquire into our state … We want our affairs to be in our hands…. Otherwise the 
whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put 
up with these continued evil deeds, and the oppression which they suffer at the hands of 
the two governments of impure intention.
154
  
It is worth noting that the offensive launched in October 1880, involved 80,000 Kurdish 
fighters which achieved early success by capturing territories within the Persian border.
155
 
But he was no match for the might of the Ottoman and the Persian armies who cooperated to 
quell Sheikh Obeydullah’s uprising resulting in his subsequent arrest and exile to Mecca, 
where he lived until his death.
156
 In respect to Sheikh Obeydullah’s uprising it is noted that it 
heralded the emergence of twentieth century Kurdish uprisings with nationalistic, as opposed 
to feudalistic, tribal, or religious, overtones.
157
 It is also of particular importance to this study 
that Sheikh Obeydullah’s transnational armed operations for the first time since the division 
of Kurdistan in 1514, made the Kurdish nationalist movement for independence an 
international issue.
158
 One of the Kurdish national organizations instrumental in Kurdish 
revolts in the aftermath of the emergence of Kemalist ideology and the abolition of the 
Caliphate in 1924 was Ciwata Azadi Kurd (Kurdish Freedom Society), later renamed Ciwata 
Kweseriya Kurd (Kurdish Independent Society), or Azadi, freedom or independence.
159
 The 
Turks, who had only recently been fighting for their own self-determination, ‘crushed the 
Kurds, who sought theirs. It is strange how a defensive nationalism develops into an 
aggressive one, and a fight for freedom becomes one for dominion over others.’160 
In terms of Kurdish revolts in Turkey after its creation as a modern state in 1923, lack of a 
cohesive national agenda among the divided Kurds played a major part in unsuccessful 
attempts of the Kurdish movements in relation to the armed struggle to internal and external 
factors. One of the most important factors was that the Kemalist ideology provided the state 
an intellectual framework and the capacity for mobilization strengthened by an ancient 
administrative and military tradition. Also, the great powers, France anxious to please 
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Turkey, Britain not wishing to destabilise Iraq, remained deaf to the Kurdish demands. As far 
as the Kurds were concerned, Iran shared the same interest as Turkey which is best illustrated 
in the manner in which the two states collaborated to crush revolts by their Kurdish 
populations. 
 
2.2 The Kurds, international law and the formation of the modern 
Middle East 
 
2.2.1 A struggle for dominance: the Treaty of Sèvres 
 
The World War I heralded the close of a dynamic and optimistic century, in which European 
Empires had ruled the world and European political ideas reigned supreme.
161
 The most 
important outcome of the 1919 Peace Treaty was the creation of the League of Nations.
162
 
The emergence of the Kurdish issue in the international arena came to the fore at the end of 
the World War I, in the aftermath of fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire into the sphere of 
influence by the victorious Allied Powers.
163
 Upon the defeat of the Central Powers in the 
World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire the so-called ‘Sick Man of Europe’, 
resulted in the creation of a number of new nation-states. However, the main casualty of the 
post-First World War as the modern map of the Middle East was being drawn up was the 
realization of an independent Kurdish state.
164
 The secret Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 
was to pave the way for the penetration by the European powers into Ottoman Empire, as 
well as division of its territories into the sphere of influence and intended administrative 
control of the Allies mainly Britain and France.
165
 Indeed, Sykes-Picot would become the 
basis of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres,
166
 which subsequently divided the Ottoman territory under 
the pretext of “Mandates,” with the explicit promise by the Allied Powers that the people of 
those territories will be given their independence when it is deemed that they were ready for 
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it.
167
 This was in spite of the fact that in the Paris Peace Conference ‘Kurdistan’ had been 
considered as a nominally independent state that should fall under the Mandate System 
intended by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
168
 Unfortunately for the 
Kurds, the Treaty of Sèvres was never implemented.
169
 Only Greece ratified the Treaty and 
the provisions of the Treaty never became a reality.
170
 But this was the first time in the 
Kurdish history that the issue of Kurdistan was discussed in an international arena.
171
 It is 
worth noting that at the Paris Conference the Kurds were not completely without 
representation. General Sherif Pasha, a high ranking Kurdish officer of the Ottoman Empire 
and the Turkish Ambassador to Stockholm, was dispatched to inform the Conference of his 
people’s demands, to no avail.172  
The fact that a Kurdish state did not emerge from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire was a 
clear indication that the much heralded notion of ‘self-determination’, championed by the 
American President Woodrow Wilson was no more than a political rhetoric that came a lowly 
second to the interests of the European powers.
173
 From the outset, Wilson was of the opinion 
that the post-war boundaries of the Middle East should be decided upon his fourteen point 
program. Somewhat idealistically he spoke of ‘free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial 
adjustment of all colonial claims’ (point 12 of President Woodrow Wilson’s Program of the 
World Peace) that also encapsulated Kurdistan: ‘the Turkish portion of the Present Ottoman 
Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now 
under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development, […]’.174 In the treaty of Sèvres President Wilson’s 
Fourteen Point Programme for World Peace provided for the drafting of a scheme of local 
autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of Armenia 
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and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia.
175
 Article 64 of the treaty 
states: 
If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish people 
within the areas define … shall address themselves to the Council of the League of 
Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population in these areas 
desire independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these people 
are capable of such independence and recommends that it be granted to them, Turkey 
hereby agree to execute such a recommendation and to renounce all rights and titles 
over such areas. 
If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principles 
Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the 
Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which hitherto been included in the Mosul 
Vilayet.
176
    
However, the Kurds could not make the most of this window of opportunity to forge their 
own state due to the fact that the Treaty of Peace was never ratified by Turkey.
177
 Moreover, 
there was no address to the Council as required, nor were there any substantial preparation for 
the necessary vote.  
 
2.2.2 Treaty of Lausanne (1923): Creation of modern Turkey and Iraq 
 
As the concept of nationalism gathered momentum among the Kurds as well as other peoples 
in the Middle East,
178
 between the Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 
1923, the issue of the Kurds was completely overlooked. The Treaty of Lausanne settled the 
borders of modern Turkey, a notion introduced by the British, resulting in the claim by the 
Kurds of being betrayed, hence, dashing any hopes of an independent Kurdish state.
179
 It 
appears that the emerging Kurdish movement had pinned its hopes too much on the 
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Wilsonian conception of self-determination..
180
 Nonetheless, Allain contributes various 
factors to purging the notion of a Kurdish state from the international discourse:  
… Foremost among which was the retreat of the United States from the international 
system conceived by its president; the British and French infighting over the spoils of 
war, and finally, the rise of the Kemalist Turkey … would converge to dissipate the 
move toward the creation of Kurdistan. Not to be out of the equation was the lack of a 
nationalist movement within Kurdistan that could effectively demonstrate a unity of 
purpose, both in governing the Kurdistan region and in articulating its claims 
internationally to the European Powers.
181
  
According to the Lausanne Treaty most of the Kurdish territory was given to Turkey. But 
crucially, the Treaty made no mention of the Kurds nor were there any mention of their 
national rights. Nevertheless, there were a few provisos regarding the “protection of 
minorities”, which specifically referred to non-Muslim minorities in Turkey such as 
Armenian, Greeks and the Jewish population.
182
 
As a result of this development the majority of the Kurdish population of the Middle East 
found themselves dispersed over the modern states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, the four 
most powerful political entities in Western Asia.
183
 It is worth noting that the unambiguous 
interference of Allied Powers contributed greatly to the internationalisation of the Kurdish 
issue. However, the transition of the Kurdish issue from singularity to plurality perfectly 
demonstrates the complexity of this issue.
184
  
The withdrawal of the United States from the international post-World War I peace process 
was detrimental to the realisation of a Kurdish state, since initially they had shown interest in 
undertaking the Mandate of the ‘Greater Kurdistan’.185 With the US out of the equation Great 
Britain, an early supporter of the independent Kurdistan was left to fill the void but was 
unwilling to take on the financial and military burden of acting as a mandatory power of a 
‘Greater’ Kurdistan. Great Britain opted to slowly dismember it with the aim of retaining the 
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oil rich Vilayet of Mosul.
186
 It goes without saying that discovery of oil in the Vilayat Mosul 
played a huge part in adding the said region to the newly formed state of Iraq.
187
 Britain 
initially espoused the creation of an independent Kurdish state mainly to be used as a buffer 
zone between Mesopotamia (under its Mandate) and the newly formed Turkey as well as the 
Bolshevik Russia. As the importance of the issue of oil became clear it slowly abandoned the 
Kurdish aspirations in the move toward the final settlement of a dismantled Ottoman 
Empire.
188
 In the case of Iraq, in order to appease the restless Kurds, Britain supported the 
enshrinement of cultural rights of the Kurdish population in its constitution which also 
proved fruitless. Having been denied a state in Paris, having been promised autonomy with 
the possibility of statehood at Sèvres, Kurds would, when the smoke cleared at Lausanne, be 
granted limited cultural rights and administrative control in the Northern Vilayet of 
Mosul.”189 These limited gains would soon vanish once the dust had settled and the Real 
politik prevailed at the expense of an independent Kurdish state. The Wilsonian conception of 
self-determination, as a political ambition, was a mere rhetoric where the Kurds were 
concerned and by and large imperial powers did as they saw fit in order to protect their vital 
interests. Nevertheless, the biggest impact was felt by the Kurds in Turkey where 
international pledges incorporated in the Treaty of Lausanne were never invoked,
190
 not to 
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mention subjecting its Kurdish population to full-scale repression as a means of 
implementation of the policy of “Turkification” of what remained of the Ottoman Empire.191  
 
2.2.3 The Permanent Court of International Justice and the Vilayet of Mosul  
 
The Treaty of Lausanne also set out a procedure to finalise the demarcation of the border of 
Turkey and Iraq but it proved rather  contentious during the negotiation, principally because 
of Turkey claiming a title to the largely Kurdish Vilayat of Mosul in Northern Iraq.
192
 It was 
eventually decided to allow the Treaty to be concluded under the proviso that Britain and 
Turkey will continue negotiation and if no agreement was reached nine months after the entry 
into force of the Treaty, they would refer the case to the Council of the League of Nations.
193
 
By the summer of 1924, negotiations had broken down and the case was referred to the 
League Council by the United Kingdom and an Advisory Opinion was sought from the 
Permanent Court.
194
 The Permanent Court held that the decision of the Council under the 
Treaty of Lausanne was to ‘be binding on the parties and [would] constitute a definitive 
demarcation of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq’.195 On 16 July 1925, a Commission of 
Enquiry awarded the territory south of the Brussels Line (so-called because drawn by the 
League Council at Brussels, 29 October 1924) to Iraq, subject to two important conditions: (i) 
the territory must remain under the effective mandate of the League of Nations for a period 
which may be put at twenty-five years; (ii) Regard must be paid to the desires expressed by 
the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their 
country, the dispensation of justice, and teaching in the schools, and the Kurdish should be 
the official language of all these services.
196
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Turkey challenged the decision, insisting on the reinstatement of de facto Turkish 
sovereignty, promising Britain the exclusive oil exploitation rights. Britain was not 
interested.
197
 The Council adopted its final decision on 16 December 1925, favouring a 
solution recommended by the Commission, and demarcated the boundary between Iraq and 
Turkey along ‘Brussels’ line and invited the British Government to come up with a new 
treaty with Iraq to ensure continuance of the Mandate for a further 25 years.
198
 The decision 
of the Council also called upon the United Kingdom to implement the recommendations of 
the Commission of Enquiry ‘to [secure] for the Kurdish populations … the guarantees 
regarding local administration recommended by the Commission in its final conclusions.’199 
Furthermore, by the tripartite Treaty of Ankara in June 1926, Turkey finally renounced its 
sovereignty over the Vilayet of Mosul.
200
 
The end of the First World War also coincided with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 
October 1917 which had a lasting impact on the international relations and perhaps played a 
minor role in the formation of the modern Middle East, in spite of its great impact on the 
national aspirations of the non-Turkish nationalities.
201
 According to Kendal ‘the Allies, who 
for a while had feared that the movement led by Mustafa Kemal might be an offshoot of 
Soviet Revolution, were effectively reassured.’202 This fear was justified since the Soviet 
Revolution had played a part in the eventual Turkish victory through withdrawing its claims 
from the former Ottoman territories because of the on-going civil war in Russia. Also, later 
on the Soviet Union had provided kemalists with greatly needed material and moral support 
since the friendship of a strong nationalist Turkey ensured protection of its southern flank.
203
 
It has been argued that in the Paris Conference as a reaction to the communist menace the 
Allied Powers sought to establish a cordon Sanitaire to separate the Soviet Union from the 
rest of Europe as well as other territories in which they had vital interest such as the oil rich 
states in the Middle East.
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The Allied Powers facilitated the emergence of nationalistic regimes which were to form a 
sort of quarantine belt against the Soviet red virus.
205
 In regards to the Kurds the emergence 
of quasi-military regimes in Turkey under Mustafa Kemal and Reza Khan (later Reza Shah) 
in Iran are of particular importance to this study since at the heart of their agendas was the 
policy to forge national identities at the expense of other ethnic and religious minorities such 
as their Kurdish populations.
206
 This is in light of the fact that both newly established regimes 
in Turkey and Iran due to instability had initially inferred that they may tolerate autonomous 
Kurdish regions within their unitary systems and yet, as soon as they established themselves 
especially militarily they reneged on those ideas.
207
  
 
2.3 The Kurds in Turkey: 1923-1945 
 
2.3.1 Living under the Kemalist regime 
 
It has been argued that injustices experienced by the Kurds in other states are nothing 
compared to the brutality endured by the Kurds in Turkey.
208
 As noted above, the modern 
state of Turkey was established in the aftermath of the World War I, by Mustafa Kemal, 
dubbed Kemal Ataturk, “Father of the Turks,” a westernized military officer from Salonika 
(now Thessaloniki, Greece). The emergence of modern Turkey heralded an era of intense 
Turkish nationalism, at the expense of other minorities in that country especially the 
Kurds.
209
 But Ataturk’s attitude towards the Kurds was rather ambiguous to begin with. Since 
initially he carried on the traditional Ottoman policy to strengthen its rule over the Kurdish 
territory rather than “Turkification” of the Kurdish population.210 It is worth noting that in the 
aftermath of the Ottoman defeat in the World War I, the Kurdish population of Anatolia had 
rallied to the Islamic cause in the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) in order to 
preserve the Islamic state. Ataturk had convinced the Kurdish Chieftains that the only way to 
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escape the dominance of the Arminian hegemony or the British Protectorate was to “fight 
alongside other Muslims for the creation of a Muslim state under the spiritual guidance of a 
Caliph”. He called upon ‘all Muslim Elements’, meaning Turks and Kurds for ‘complete 
unity in struggle to expel the invaders from the Muslim Fatherland’.211 However, Ataturk was 
careful not to reveal his true nationalistic intentions and between 1919 and 1923 he continued 
this tactical alliance with the Kurds. It allowed Turkey to maintain six vilayets populated 
mainly by the Kurds but claimed by Armenians.
212
 The Kurds had taken an active part in the 
forces commanded by Ataturk driving the British, French and Greeks (including ethnic 
Greeks living in south-western Anatolia) from the country by 1923.
213
 Even prior to the 
signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in regards to the Turkey’s Kurdish population, Ataturk had 
said: ‘whichever provinces are predominantly Kurd will administer themselves 
autonomously’.214 However, ominously for the Kurdish aspirations, he later announced: 
‘apart from that, we have to describe the people of Turkey together. If we do not describe 
them thus, we can expect problems particular to themselves … it cannot be correct to try to 
draw another border [between Kurds and Turks]. We must make a new programme.’215 On 
this crucial point Mango notes that ‘any kind of provincial self-government would have been 
an obstacle to his designs, particularly self-government in what he, along with the entire 
Turkish elite, considered to be a backward region.’216 
The true intention of Ataturk was to create a unitary Turkish national identity based on denial 
of any ethnicity other than Turkish. In 1922 the newly established Grand National Assembly 
abolished the Sultanate and established the modern Turkish Republic under Ataturk.
217
 
Furthermore in 1924, Ataturk abolished the concept of Caliphate, and more importantly 
eradicated any Islamic ideological point which had previously been the rallying point around 
which the Turks and the Kurds had united to rid Turkey of Greek and Armenian threats.
218
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Once the Kemalist Republic was formed and consolidated upon signing of the Lausanne 
Treaty in 1923, Ataturk began a Turkification process that included, among other things, the 
banning of all Kurdish schools, associations, publications and other forms of cultural 
expression.
219
 Indeed, Ataturk’s vision was based on denying and destroying any aspect of 
the Kurdish identity in order to create a mono-ethnic secular state.
220
 Consequently, the 
Turkish government coined the term “Mountain Turks” to refer to the country’s Kurdish 
population as well as replacing the Kurdish names of over 20,000 settlements with Turkish 
names.
221
 Ismet İnönü, one of Ataturk’s most loyal supporters and the former Turkish Prime 
Minister has encapsulated the Kemalist policy: ‘only the Turkish nation is entitled to claim 
ethnic and national rights in this country. No other element has any such rights.”222 This point 
was very much reiterated in September 1930 by Mahmut Esat Bozhurt that: ‘we live in a 
country called Turkey, the freest country in the world … I believe that the Turks must be the 
only lord, the only master of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock can have 
only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves.’223 Therefore, it is 
understandable that the status of the Kurds in Turkey has been a lot more precarious 
compared to the Kurds in Iran and Iraq in which their ethnic identity and equality are 
enshrined in law.
224
 This was indeed a radical change in Kemalist thinking by clearly 
embarking on a racial policy which proposed to expunge all non-Turkish expressions.
225
 
 
2.3.2 Legal measures against the Kurds in Turkey   
 
As discussed above, the Treaty of Lausanne attempted to include provisions to protect the 
cultural rights of minorities in modern day Turkey. In the aftermath of this treaty, 75 Kurdish 
Deputies held seats in the National Assembly in Ankara.
226
 But from March 1924, speaking 
or publishing in Kurdish were banned and the Constitution of the same year reiterated the 
Kemalist vision of a strictly Turkish Turkey, upon which the Turkish government has pursued 
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a policy of forced assimilation of the Kurds.
227
 Article 69 of the Turkish Constitution of 1924 
is unequivocal in setting out the policy of assimilation. It says: ‘All Turks are equal before 
the law and are obliged to respect the law. All privileges of whatever description claimed by 
classes, families and individuals are abolished and forbidden.’228 
As part of his nationalistic and secular agenda Ataturk abolished the Caliphate, and 
introduced the secular ‘Law on the Unification of Education’.229 Hence, resulting in the 
closure of the religious schools, the madrasas and kuttabs, he removed the last remaining 
source of education for many Kurds in the rural areas.
230
 Moreover, this action alienated 
many Kurds who had helped his forces through the tumultuous period of the Turkish War of 
Independence (1919-1923).
231
  
On 8 December 1925, the Ministry of Education issued a circular banning the use of such 
decisive terms as Kurds, Circassian and Laz, Kurdistan and Lazistan.
232
 In 1930, Mustafa 
Kemal approved the publication entitled: the Outline of Turkish History (Turk Tarihinin Ana 
Hatlari), formulated the Turkish historical thesis, that claimed many if not most of 
civilizations including the Medes, whom the Kurds consider as their ancestors, as well as the 
Achaemenians and Parthians are related to Turkish origin.
233
 However, there was a particular 
insistence on cultural hegemony which could be traced to views advanced by Ziya Gökalp, 
one of the leading ideologists of Turkish nationalism.
234
 According to Gökalp the term 
‘nation’ means ‘a group of people who have the same education, [and] have received the 
same acquisitions in language, religion, morality and aesthetics, rather than [who share] a 
common ethnicity’.235 In his seminal book ‘the Principles of Turkism’, he did not deny the 
existence of other ethnic groups within the Turkish nation but gave privilege to Turkish 
                                                 
227
 J. Blau, ‘Refinement and Oppression of Kurdish Language’, in ‘the Kurds: Nationalism and Politics’, op. cit., 
p. 109. 
228
 Article 69 of the Turkish Constitution of 1924, http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~genckaya/1924constitution.pdf 
229
 Kemal Kirisci & Gareth Winrow, ‘the Kurdish Question and Turkey: an Example of Trans-State Ethnic 
Conflict’, Routledge, 1997, p. 95 
230
 McDowall, ‘a Modern History of the Kurds’, op. cit., p. 192; Although Islam was declared as the religion of 
the state and creating a Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1924 Constitution, in the 1935 Amendment these 
provisions were left out since at that time it was claimed by the state that the equality of all citizens factually and 
legally was established, see Yilmaz M. Altug, ‘Turkey and some Problems of International Law’, Yenilik 
Basimevi: Istanbul, 1958, p. 146.   
231
 Ibid, According to McDowall, ‘these were the religiously-minded, the Shaykhs and the old Hamidiya Aghas 
who had genuinely believed in the defence of the Caliphate’. 
232
 Sami Ozerdim, Ataturk Devrimi Kronolojisi [Chronology of Ataturk’s Reforms] (Ankara, 1996), p. 93; see 
also M. Kendal, ‘Kurdistan in Turkey’, op. cit., p. 55. 
233
 A title reminiscent of Ataturk’s favourite history book, ‘the Outline of History’ by H.G. Wells. Andrew 
Mango,’ Atatürk and the Kurds’, op. cit., p. 20. 
234
 Mango states that the Turkish nationalism under Ataturk was very much influenced by the French model 
where Bretons, Occitanians, Saviyards, Flemings, etc. had all been assimilated to French culture, ibid, p. 21. 
235
 Omer Taspinar, ‘Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition, 
Routledge, 2005, pp. 28, 50. 
51 
 
culture over other ethnic cultures.
236
 By the mid-1930s it was forbidden to even mention the 
words “Kurds” and “Kurdistan”. Meiselas notes:  
Turkish identity was no longer a matter of choice; the Kurds were taught that they were 
Turks even by racial origin, and they had to be referred to as “Mountain Turks” … their 
language (which is related to Persian) was declared a Turkish dialect with some Persian 
influence-but speaking it was forbidden.
237
  
For the Kurds, the right of association was in practice banned by law no. 765 published in the 
official journal of the Turkish Republic on 3 March 1926, Article 141 and 141 contain the 
key provisions.
238
 Furthermore, the policy of Turkification continued throughout 1920s and 
30s, for instance, the Turkish Penal Code enacted in 1926 prohibited organisations and 
propaganda seeking to destroy or weaken nationalist feelings which was broadly interpreted 
by the judiciary to usurp any expression of Kurdish identity.
239
 However, the most draconian 
manifestation of this policy of forced assimilation was the Law of Resettlement (Law 2510) 
enacted in 1934, that divided Turkey into four different zones meant to assimilate Kurds by 
forced migration to predominantly Turkish speaking areas, while making off-limit settlement 
to other areas of the country, as well as establishing a zone designated as being ‘closed for 
security reasons to any form of civilian settlement’.240 Yet, according to McDowall the main 
purpose of the Settlement Law was to spread the Kurdish population, ‘to areas where it would 
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constitute no more than 5 per cent of the population, thus extinguishing Kurdish identity.’241 
Such draconian measures resulted in a series of rebellions in Turkey that this study will deal 
with below. 
 
2.3.3 The major Kurdish revolts in Turkey 
 
As noticed above, the Kurds had rendered great services to the Ottoman Empire for which 
they had shed their blood for its defence especially in the course of the World War I and its 
aftermath.
242
 In other words, what bound the Turks and Kurds at this stage was the 
preservation of the concept of Caliphate in what remained of the Ottoman Empire. As the 
Kemalist secular notion of a Turkish nation emerged the resultant by-product was the 
abolition of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924, a decree banned all Kurdish Schools, 
associations, publications, and religious fraternities.
243
 Hence, this action not only weakened 
the old Ottoman concept of a Muslim Umma (community) and severed the bond between the 
Kemalism and the Kurds irreparably.
244
 It should not be forgotten that as the Ottoman Empire 
laid prostrate Ataturk had appealed to the Kurdish population to preserve the concept of 
Caliphate in the context of a Muslim Empire. He said in September 1919, ‘as long as there 
are fine people with honour and respect, Turks and Kurds will continue to live together as 
brothers around the institution of Caliphate, and an unshakeable iron tower will be raised 
against internal and external enemies.’245 
From 1925 to 1939, as a reaction to the Kemalist ultra nationalist policy the Kurdish 
population of modern Turkey experienced some of the most brutal and bloodiest armed 
conflicts between the Turkish army and the Kurdish armed groups. The tension that existed 
between the Kurds and the newly established nationalistic government led to a period of 
marked instability.
246
 Disenchanted and angry, Kurdish leaders embarked upon a revolt for 
independence.  
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2.3.3.1 Sheikh Said revolt, 1925 
 
The first major challenge to the Kemalist authoritarian regime was the revolt of Sheikh Said 
of Piran in February 1925 with a Kurdish force numbering an estimated fifteen thousand 
men. Under his leadership a staff of veteran Kurdish officers, munitions depots were 
established and a general revolt of the Kurds was set for 21 March 1925, with the aim of 
driving the Turks out of the Kurdish territory.
247
 A proclamation publicized by the Kurds on 
14 February 1925, declared Darhini as provincial capital of Kurdistan,
248
 and Sheikh Said 
became “the supreme commander of the Kurdish combatants”.249  According to Chaliand ‘the 
strategy adopted was of a direct attack on the principal towns and the aim was to install, 
without delay, an embryonic administration, a de facto state in order to gain international 
recognition.’250 However, the impending revolt was sabotaged due to a successful espionage 
by the Turks.
251
 Hence, rather than attacking on 21 March 1925, the revolt broke out on 7 
March prematurely fourteen days earlier than intended with only two hundred strong men as 
opposed to a larger force. This was mainly due to the fact the Kurdish forces had no means of 
communications (telegraph or wireless stations) to coordinate their operation. 
Sheikh Said, a devout Muslim, was the son of a hereditary chief of the Naqshbandi dervishes 
and his revolt was inspired very much by the activities of a Kurdish nationalist movement 
namely Ciwata Azadi Kurd (Kurdish Freedom Society), which later changed its title to 
Ciwata Kweseriya Kurd (Kurdish Independent Society), or Azadi meaning freedom or 
independence.
252
 Although this organisation was founded in secret in Anatolia between 1921 
and 1924, the Turkish authorities were aware of and concerned about the existence of this 
organisation.
253
 In order to neutralize the influence of this organisation the Turkish authorities 
routinely dismissed and severely punished Kurdish officers suspected of having sympathy 
with or being a member of the abovementioned organisation.
254
 It is worth noting that this 
organization had played a crucial role in planning a Kurdish officers’ revolt at the Beyt Sebab 
garrison in September 1924, which subsequently had been unsuccessful because the leaders 
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of Azadi were unable to synchronize the Kurdish officers’ rebellion with the anticipated 
uprisings of tribal leaders.
255
  
It has been noticed that it would be wrong to construe Sheikh Said’s revolt as a purely 
religious uprising against modernization and secularization. He was a staunch Kurdish 
nationalist and harboured an ambition of creating an independent Kurdish state who was 
‘simultaneously an ardent nationalist and a committed believer … for the average Kurd who 
participated in the rebellion, the religious and nationalist motivations were doubtless 
mixed’.256 This is true in light of the fact that ‘most Kurds did not consider religious 
identification and Kurdish nationalism as antagonistic concepts, nor did they view them as 
being mutually exclusive.’257  
From 7 March 1925, the Kurdish forces had captured a vast area of the country, occupying a 
third of Kurdistan in Turkey, and were besieging Diyabakir. Other Kurdish units were 
liberating the region north of Lake Van as well as advancing towards the Ararat area and 
Bitlis.
258
 These actions prompted Turkey to decree a partial mobilisation and sent the bulk of 
its armed forces of 80,000 men into the warring region.
259
   
Although he was supported by some important tribal leaders the biggest weakness of Sheikh 
Said’s revolt was the fact that his support was mainly drawn from the Zaza tribesmen and 
crucially lacked support from urban populace. McDowall notes that ‘it demonstrated yet 
again the difficulty of uniting the different geographical, linguistic, socio-economic and 
religious elements among the Kurds.’260 Major Kurdish cities such as Diyarbakir did not join 
the revolt due to excessive looting and pillage of Sheikh Said’s forces.261   
In spite of its short duration, Sheikh Said`s revolt marked a watershed in the Turkish-Kurdish 
relations as a result of which the Turkish government adopted draconian measures against 
any manifestations of Kurdish culture and nationalism in the aftermath of this revolt.
262
 One 
of the main consequences of such harsh measures against the Kurds in eastern Turkey was 
that many of them in the Mosul vilayet, (claimed both by Turkey and the British Mandate of 
Iraq) opted to express a definitive desire to become part of Iraq.
263
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The intensity of Sheikh Said`s revolt was such that the Turks had to mobilize three army 
corps against the Kurds. Many defeats were inflicted upon the Turkish forces resulting in the 
capture of the cities of Urfa, Severak and Diyarbakir, the capital of Kurdistan, occupying the 
southern section of that city.
264
 Faced with certain defeat, Turkey’s ‘considerations of 
strategy and logistics pointed to the necessity of finding an access to rebel territory, protected 
as it was by impassable mountain barriers.’265 It managed to persuade France to allow its 
troops the use of the Syrian railways to transport its fresh corps and supplies in order to open 
a new front against the Kurdish fighters.
266
 Permission was granted in accordance with 
Article 10 of the Franco-Turkish agreement of 20 October, 1921.
267
 As a result, by 1926, the 
Kurdish forces had no alternative but to abandon their positions and retire to the strategic new 
positions north of Tigris and as far north as Mount Ararat, which form an impregnable natural 
fortress. In the aftermath of the revolt, special Court-Martials known as Tribunals of 
Independence were set up.
268
 The most notable was the one that summarily tried and 
condemned Sheikh Said along with 52 of his partisans to death. They were executed in 
Diyarbakir on 25 September 1925.
269
 It has been recorded that after the revolt was over, the 
Turkish government through the military authorities and the “Independence Tribunals” dealt 
very severely with the Kurds, executing many of the leaders of the revolt and a large number 
of the Kurds. More than 20,000 in all were deported from south east and forcibly settled in 
the west of the country.
270
   
 
2.3.3.2 Ararat revolt, 1927-1930 
 
The second noteworthy Kurdish revolt in the aftermath of the creation of the Turkish republic 
was instigated by Ihsan Nuri Pasha, a former commander of the Ottoman army. In the 
aftermath of the Sheikh Said revolt ‘the Turkish government was beginning to think that the 
only way to bring Kurdistan to heel was to denude it of population. During the winters of 
1925 to 1928, almost a million people were deported. Tens of thousands died on the way due 
to lack of food and supplies and because of the huge distances they were forced to cross in 
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the middle of the harsh Anatolian winter’.271 This revolt took place shortly after Sheikh 
Said`s ended. By 1920, General Ihsan Nuri Pasha, the commander of the Kurdish force, was 
already in control of the area between Mount Ararat and the north of Van and Bitlis. Faced 
with this problem the Turkish government was slow to mobilise its troops possibly because of 
political and social problems that were troubling Turkey at the time.
272
 By 1928, a miniature 
Kurdish state had been created at Agri Dagh, a small army of several thousand well equipped 
and well trained Kurdish fighters had been gathered, arsenals and supply depots set up, and 
the Kurdish flag hoisted.
273
 The fighting in this revolt was particularly fierce around Mount 
Ararat in the northern region of Turkish Kurdistan. This revolt was also of a particular 
significance since for the first time it was supported by a secular Kurdish organisation called 
the Khoyboun (independence), formed by a group of exiled Kurdish intellectuals based in 
Syria and Lebanon with the ultimate ambition of creating a united front in supporting Ihsan 
Nuri`s revolt.
274
 In October, 1927, Kurdish leaders of diverse political affiliations met outside 
Kurdistan to form a national pact, as well as to take necessary steps to realise their national 
aspirations. Khoyboum organisation was unanimously created as the supreme national organ, 
or Kurdish government, and invested that government with full and exclusive national and 
international powers.
275
 This revolt also marked the involvement of a regional sovereign state 
in which the Kurdish forces secured the tacit support of Reza Shah of Iran who was using the 
Kurds as a bargaining chip to force Turkey to settle some of its territorial disputes with 
Iran.
276
 Unquestionably, this was not to be the last occasion that the Kurds were used to settle 
old scores between regional powers. This gave the Kurdish forces the right of passage 
through the Iranian territory to receive supplies and equipment from sources in Iranian 
Kurdistan and Azerbaijan.
277
 By 1929, Ihsan Nuri`s movement was in control of a large 
territory spreading through Bitlis, Van, Ararat and Botan. Unable to keep Kurdish revolt from 
spreading to other areas of Kurdistan, faced with the resistance of the Kurdish troops, with 
hundreds of Turkish prisoners taken and planes shot down, it compelled the Turkish 
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government to lodge numerous protests with Reza Shah`s government, demanding that Iran 
prevent the Kurds from using its territory as a military launching base against Turkish 
forces.
278
 By early 1932, both Iran and Turkey were eager to settle their territorial disputes 
and establish cordial relations. On 23 January the two countries signed an agreement whereby 
Turkey was given an area around Mount Ararat and Iran gained territorial concessions around 
Van to the west of Uromiyah.
279
  
However, the Turkish-Iranian rapprochement had taken place two years before the signing of 
the 1932 agreement in which the Turkish government finally managed to convince Reza Shah 
to cut off supply of arms and equipment to Ihsan Nuri`s forces as well as allowing Turkish 
forces to enter Iranian territory in pursuit of the Kurdish fighters. In spite of its earlier 
success, Ihsan Nuri`s revolt succumbed to the inevitable defeat faced with much superior 
Turkish army and the fact that it was no longer supported logistically by Iran. Defeated Ihsan 
Nuri and some of his closest allies escaped to Iran but many other members of his inner circle 
were executed publicly or severely punished by the Turkish army.
280
 In the aftermath of the 
defeat of Ihsan Nuri`s revolt what followed was one of the harshest treatment of the Kurds 
meted out by the Turkish army which included the mass deportation of Kurdish villages, the 
exiling of Sheiks and Aghas as well as forced recruitment of young Kurds into the Turkish 
army to name a few.
281
 The Turkish government also condoned acts of vigilantism against the 
Kurds during this period of repression, and in some cases legally sanctioned such behaviour.  
An example of this is best illustrated in Law No. 1,850, which reads: 
Murders and other actions committed individually or collectively, from the 20
th
 of June 
1930 to 10
th
 of December 1930, by the representatives of the state or the province, by 
the military or civil authorities, by the local authorities, by guards or militiamen, or by 
any civilian having helped the above or acted on their behalf, during the pursuit and 
extermination of the revolts which broke out in Ercis, Zilan, Agridag (Ararat), and the 
surrounding areas, including Pulumur in Erzincan province and the area of the First 
Inspectorate, will not be considered as crimes.
282
  
According to Chaliand the repression came down on all the Kurdish regions, not just those 
involved in the revolt which included mass deportation and dispersion of the Kurds. The law 
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of 5 May 1932 instituted four separated categories of inhabited zones three of which were in 
Kurdistan.
283
 For example, in February 1932, a large number of Kurdish people were 
deported to Anatolia, and this policy continued until 1935.
284
  
 
2.3.3.3 The Dersim revolt of 1937 
 
The third major revolt happened in the mountainous region of Dersim highlands in January 
1937. The Dersim revolt was one of the bloodiest that took place after the creation of the 
modern Turkish republic. Some scholars have even questioned whether in the course of 
quelling the Kurdish forces Turkish army committed genocide.
285
 According to Kendal ‘the 
carefully prepared attack on this last pocked of Kurdish resistance was an integral part of the 
Ankara government`s policy of piecemeal pacification of Kurds’.286 The inhabitants of this 
secluded and inaccessible territory, who spoke the Zaza dialect and were followers of 
extreme Shi’a Islam had always retained their autonomy and were notoriously defiant to the 
central rule even throughout the reign of the Ottomans.
287
 An indication of their 
rebelliousness was the fact that its inhabitants had not joined the Hamidiye regiment and had 
refused to participate in the Russo-Turkish wars, of the First World War, or the Turkish war 
of independence as well as had not taken part in any of the previous Kurdish revolts.
288
 
Because of the difference in their religious affiliation they were indifferent to the abolition of 
the caliphate and were certainly not in sympathy with the religious doctrine of Sunni Kurdish 
Sheikhs.
289
 However, the intrusion of Turkish secular laws and arms shattered the linguistic, 
religious and geographic isolation that had hitherto checked the spread of Kurdish 
nationalism among the Dersim Kurds.
290
 
 Dersim was situated in a terrain surrounded almost on all sides by the high snow-capped 
peaks of the Merjan Dagh (about 3,500 meters), Mntsur Dagh and others. Dersim was an 
oasis of green fields, shady valleys, ancient forests and flourishing orchards. It has been 
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noticed that until 1908 the place was hardly known to the Turks, its population led an isolated 
life of agriculture, cattle-farming and vine-growing.
291
 It is worth noting that during 1930s, 
the Kemalist policy towards Dersim had been remarkably vague.
292
 The main cause of 
Dersim revolt has been attributed to the promulgation by the Turkish government of a law 
designed to enforce assimilation, which particularly incensed the Kurdish population of 
Dersim.
293
 Furthermore, according to the 1932 law on accommodation, Dersim had been 
designated to the fourth category which was to be totally evacuated from its Kurdish 
population.
294
 In 1936, the Turkish government attempted to transfer the population from this 
region but in spite of involvement of 60,000 Turkish troops and because of inaccessibility of 
the terrain the Kurds managed to resist such move. Elphinston notes:  
It would appear that the Turkish government policy had, in the first place, antagonised 
the Kurdish patriarchal feudal leader; in the second place, it had led to the opposition of 
the religious leaders, and finally, the Kurdish people themselves had been aroused by 
the fear that they might lose their separate racial identity.
295
  
In step with other Kurdish revolts of this period, this uprising was led by a religious chieftain, 
eighty-two-year-old Sayyid Riza of Dersim. He led the revolt for two years resulting in heavy 
losses of life and material for both the government forces and the Kurds.
296
 Due to the 
isolation of the region and censorship imposed upon military communiqués, little is known 
about the military operations and loss of life on both sides. However, on the basis of the 
information available the suppression of Dersim revolt involved a considerable military 
operation as well as a high intensity armed conflict between the warring parties.
297
 For the 
first time the Kurdish forces resorted to guerrilla warfare, which the conventional Turkish 
army found difficult to deal with. This conflict was unlike anything fought on Kurdish 
territory, in which there was no front, no battles between large military units.
298
 This heralded 
a new tactic used by Kurdish fighters against a sovereign state. By the end of summer of 
1937, in spite of massive use of poison gas, heavy artillery and the use of air bombardment, 
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the Turkish army could not overcome resistance of the Kurds in Dersim.
299
 This prompted the 
Turkish army to concentrate three army divisions and most of its air force in the Dersim 
region. It took until October 1938 to finally break down the resistance of Dersin population. 
Due to running out of food and ammunition they decided to lay down their arms.
300
 The 
leaders of the revolt, including Sayyid Riza and their families surrendered to the Turkish 
army. The leaders were summarily tried and executed.
301
 As a retaliatory measure the 
Kurdish government embarked upon a massive deportation of Kurdish population of Dersim 
region.
302
 It has been alleged by Kurdish sources that the Turks resorted to the most inhuman 
methods to punish the rebels both in the course of and after the revolt.
303
 As noted above, 
there are no official casualty figures available to ascertain the number that were killed during 
the revolt and deported in its aftermath.
304
 Nevertheless, one source estimates the number of 
casualties at forty thousand and another puts the number of Kurdish families deported at three 
thousand.
305
 Some observers are of the opinion that the violence of the repression smashed 
the Kurdish resistant movement which was not to be rebuilt until the 1950s.
306
 Kendal says: 
The whole affair reflected so badly on the “progressive Ankara regime” that “the entire 
area beyond the Euphrates” was declared out of bounds to foreigners until 1965 and 
was kept under permanent stage of siege till 1950. The use of Kurdish language was 
band. The very words “Kurds” and “Kurdistan” were crossed out of the dictionaries and 
history books. The Kurds were never ever referred to except “mountain Turks.307 
 
2.4 The Kurds in Iraq: 1923-1945 
 
2.4.1 Iraq: a British creation 
 
Although Mesopotamia is recognised as the cradle of civilization and the city of Baghdad has 
a long history of contributing to the Islamic culture, the Country of Iraq is a twentieth century 
creation.
308
 In fact, it has been described as a British creation.
309
 Before World War I ended, 
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Britain decided to create the state of Iraq, initially by adjoining the two Ottoman Provinces of 
Basra and Baghdad, making them come under the jurisdiction of the British mandatory power 
under the provisions of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement.
310
 On 1 May 1920, the League of 
Nations gave Britain mandatory power over Iraq.
311
 With the discovery of oil in the Vilayet 
(province) of Mosul, Britain changed plans and decided to include Mosul (populated mainly 
by Kurds) as part of the new country of Iraq.
312
 Vanly notes that:  
… the British imperialists who were in control had already decided that, in order to 
appropriate the oil fields in Southern Kurdistan, they were going to ride roughshod over 
the people’s aspirations. They were quite determined to set up a client state which bring 
together the three ancient vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul.
313
  
So in 1918, Britain occupied Mosul still under the Ottoman jurisdiction in violation of the 
armistice of Mudros between the Allied Powers and the Sultan’s Turkey signed on 30 
October 1918.
314
 In November, 1918, Britain forced Turkish General Ali Ihsan Pasha to sign 
a capitulating agreement followed by the complete withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from 
the province of Mosul.
315
 In fact, this was a partial occupation of the Mosul province by the 
British forces since the city of Sulaymaniya was under the occupation of one of the well-
respected Kurdish nationalist leaders, Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji who raised forces over an 
area extending to Kurdistan in Iran.
316
 As will be seen below Sheikh Mahmud staged two 
rebellions against the British forces as a manifestation of the Kurd’s refusal to be ruled by 
Arabs in Iraq.
317
 What Sir Arnold Wilson, the main British political officer in Bagdad, says is 
indicative:  
The Kurds wish neither to continue under the Turkish government nor to be placed 
under the control of the Iraqi government’, he confirms that ‘in Southern Kurdistan, 
four out of five peoples supported Sheikh Mahmud’s plan to set up an independent 
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Kurdistan … the idea of Kurdistan for the Kurds was already popular … nearly all the 
Kurds were anxious to break their ties with Turkey.
318
  
The British occupation of Mosul also resulted in many skirmishes among the powers 
involved, but the British who were to administer the new Iraq, prevailed and in 1925 Mosul 
was attached to Iraq.
319
  
 
2.4.2 The false promise of self-rule 
 
While the Kurds of Iran and Turkey were affected dramatically by the Westernized policies 
of those states, this was not the case for Iraq’s Kurds.320 In the case of Iraq rather than 
assimilating the Kurdish population in order to amalgamate the province of Mosul, the British 
policy favoured appointment of local Kurdish leaders to administer under the direction of 
their British advisors. Let us not forget that the Treaty of Sèvres had provided the possibility 
of a sovereign Kurdistan including the province of Mosul, under the proviso that the majority 
of its inhabitants voted for independence.
321
 Eventually, at the Cairo Conference of 1921, the 
idea of allowing the emergence of a separate southern Kurdistan function as a ‘buffer zone’ 
in the north Mesopotamia was finally discarded in favour of retaining it as a part of Iraq.
322
 
By the time the state of Iraq was created Britain had long since betrayed its offer of self-
determination to the Kurds.
323
 These broken promises and lost opportunities convinced many 
Kurds that they were ‘expendable tools in the hands of great powers’, a theme persisting 
throughout the twentieth century and beyond.
324
 Unfortunately, for the Kurds of Southern 
Kurdistan in the precarious period following the World War I, they were insufficiently united 
to press on for independence or other collective rights.
325
 McDowall says:  
The Kurds were politically inept in their response to the post war situation. Poor 
communications, diffusion of society and the adversarial nature of inter-tribal relations 
made the presentation of a united political position virtually impossible. On the whole 
most Aghas and Sheikhs were happy to fall in with British plans, since, these included 
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administration through the traditional patronage system; but subordination to Arab rule 
stuck in their craw.
326
   
Britain faced opposition from the Kurdish population of Mosul Province as well as Ataturk 
who was decidedly dissatisfied.
327
 Aziz opines that:  
Between 1918 and 1929 the British policy towards the Kurds was to encourage Kurdish 
nationalism but not independence. From 1918 to 1923 British colonial officers had no 
clear policy or approach towards the Kurds or Mesopotamian region. Many observers 
felt that the British policy in Kurdistan was vague and amorphous. British Policy was 
not only fluid, but it also varied according to the perceptions and interests of decision 
makers.
328
 
 
2.4.3 The establishment of monarchy: the nascent Arab state 
 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that there was a contradiction between London’s stated policy 
and the one put into practice in the Middle East.
329
 On 23 August 1921, following a faked 
referendum organised by the British mostly shunned by the Kurdish population of the 
Province of Mosul, Britain installed Emir Faisal, on the throne as the King of new Hashemite 
monarchy in Iraq.
330
 Faisal was a prince who was not from Iraq. In order to forge a unitary 
system in Iraq, Britain sought to integrate the Kurds into the new state by allocating the 
Kurds some senior positions within the new Arab-led administration.
331
 But as one 
commentator noted, the British authorities in Kurdistan ‘supported Kurdish participation in 
high office while those in Baghdad took a dim view of the Kurds.’332 Moreover, Britain’s 
intention was to establish one or several semiautonomous Kurdish provinces under the 
jurisdiction of the nascent state of Iraq.
333
 In fact, the 1921 Iraqi Constitution declared that 
the state of Iraq was comprised of two ethnic groupings Arab and Kurds, and that Kurdish 
along Arabic was recognised as one of the official languages, Natali notes that because of 
‘seeking Iraq’s admission to the League of Nations, the British tried to ensure minority 
groups’ rights in the new state … even ‘welcomed outside intervention, inviting international 
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commission to Iraq that recognised the quasi-autonomy of the local groups.’334 It is vital to 
note that: ‘by treating Mosul Province as a separate entity from Arab Iraq the British gave 
Kurdistan semi-legitimate political status from the outset of the nation-building project.’335 
Therefore, Iraq was divided into two zones of al-Iraq and al-Arab (or the central and southern 
Arab zone which included Baghdad and Basra provinces, and the northern territory which 
included Mosul of al-Iraq al-Cadjmi (Irak-Perse).
336
 Britain even attempted to institutionalise 
Kurdish identity in the newly formed state of Iraq by issuing an Anglo-Iraqi Joint Declaration 
on 24 December 1922, which solemnly recognised the right of Kurdish population to form an 
autonomous Kurdish government within the frontier of Iraq.
337
 In order to calm the restive 
Kurds, a joint Anglo-Iraqi state of intent was issued in London on 20 December 1922:  
‘His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of Iraq recognize the right of the 
Kurds living within the boundaries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish Government within those 
boundaries and hope that the different Kurdish elements will, as soon as possible arrive at an 
agreement as to the form which they wish that government should take and the boundaries 
within which they wish it to extend and will send responsible delegates to Baghdad to discuss 
their economic and political relations with his Britannic Majesty’s Government and the 
Government of Iraq.’338  
But according to Vanly, the aforementioned Declaration provided, ‘little satisfaction to the 
province of Suleymanieh, which … had no desire to come under the authority of the King of 
Iraq and sought to pursue the struggle for a free and united Kurdistan.’339 This dissatisfaction 
was partly the reason for a series of rebellions which also British forces were deployed 
against Kurdish armed groups. Moreover, rather than neutralising ethnic and religious 
differences in Iraq with a heterogeneous population of comprised Shi’a Arab (51 per cent), 
Sunni Arabs (20 per cent), Shi’a Kurds, Shia Persians, Jews, Turkomen, Christians (11 per 
cent), the British opted to elevate the minority Sunni Arab population to rule over the others. 
Indeed, for many decades to come this imbalance became a bone of contention in regards to 
the relationship between the Sunni Arab administration and the Kurdish and the Shi’a 
population of Iraq.
340
 Reeva Simon explains the ideology of the new Iraqi state:  
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Iraq’s “imagined community” was that of Arabs, rather than Iraqis of Mesopotamians, 
Arabs whose identity and history were fashioned by Arab nationalist ideologues. These 
new elites, or priesthood, teachers who taught from the text books commissioned by the 
Ministry of Education in Baghdad, attempted to amalgamate the Sunni minority elite 
with the ethnic and religious minorities and the Shi’a majority via the glue of Arab 
nationalism in order to forge a Pan-Arab identity for the Iraqis.
341
  
By 1925 the British affirmed that ‘it formed no part of the policy of His Majesty’s 
Government to encourage or accept any responsibility for the formation of any autonomous 
or Kurdish state.’342 Furthermore, in 1926 when the Iraqi and British Governments were 
assured of the control of the Kurdish region they reneged on their promises made earlier to 
the Kurds in 1922:  
… Both His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of Iraq are fully 
absolved from any obligation to allow the setting up of a Kurdish Government by a 
complete failure of the Kurdish elements even to attempt, at the time this proclamation 
was made, to arrive at any agreement among themselves or put forward any definite 
proposals …343  
The only assurance for the Kurdish population that remained was the stipulation made by the 
League of Nations whose Commission had advised that: ‘the desire of the Kurds, the 
administrators, magistrates and teachers in their country be drawn from their own ranks, and 
adopt Kurdish as the official language in all their activities, will be taken into account.’344 As 
will be pointed out below, Kurdish revolts in Iraq followed the British announcement to end 
their mandate in 1930, as well as Iraq’s accession to independence in 1932. Notwithstanding 
the fact that Britain reported to the League of Nations in 1928 that although Kurdish 
population in Iraq ‘dream of an ultimate union of all the now scattered Kurdish tribes and 
peoples’ they ‘on the whole for the present are satisfied by the special administrative 
treatment and privileges which they enjoy.’345 But the period of lull was short lived and 
publication of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which ended the British Mandate and 
established the independence of the state of Iraq in 1932 failed to live up to the Kurdish 
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safeguards the basis of the inclusion of the Vilayet of Mosul into the Mandate for Iraq. 
Consequently, there was dissatisfaction among the Kurdish population of Iraq which led to 
the second revolt by Sheikh Mahmud. Yet again with the aid of the British forces his revolt 
was defeated again in 1931, but this time the revolt did manage to put Kurdish issues on the 
international agenda.
346
 This left the new Iraqi government with no alternative but to pass a 
local language law in February 1932, which provided that Kurdish speakers rather than ethnic 
Kurds would fill administrative and teaching positions in the Vilayet.
347
 In this way:  
The guarantees required by the league had been rid of their content: the nominal 
protection of cultural and language rights of the majority Kurdish population in the 
Vilayet vanished. For its part, the League of Nations did not stand in the way of Iraqi 
independence. The Council of the League accepting the Mandates Commission’s view 
that it was unnecessary to require from an independent Iraq the guarantees it had sought 
from Great Britain as Mandatory, deeming the measure of the Local League Law 
adequate for the termination of the Mandate.
348
  
Britain according to McDowall:  
Thus found itself a compromised accomplice in Iraq’s determination to integrate 
Kurdistan bereft of any special status. It was a shabby end to the high-flown promises 
with which British political officers had entered Kurdistan in 1918, and a betrayal of 
the assurances given by Arab Iraqi ministers during the formation of the Iraqi state.
349
 
  
2.4.3.1 Kurdish revolts in Iraq 
 
Although the repression of the Kurds in the newly created state of Iraq in the inter-war period 
was not as punitive as in Turkey, the amalgamation of the vilayet of Mosul into Iraq 
necessitated military subjugation of Kurdish nationalism.
350
 As stated above, Iraq was created 
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its Kurdish population found themselves under 
the rule of King Feisal, an Arab, imposed by the British. Due to the vast reserves of oil and 
gas the British annexed southern Kurdistan which included Vilayet Mosul, with its Kurdish 
majority population, and set upon extending their sphere of interest among the Kurdish tribes 
based there. Although, this was only a partial occupation of southern Kurdistan since Kurdish 
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nationalist movement led by Sheikh Mahmud of the Barzinji tribe had Sulaymaniya region 
under its control. At first, the British seemed to have aimed merely at maintaining friendly 
relations with these tribes and used them as a buffer zone against the Turkish aggression 
toward the newly formed Iraqi state. Initially, British policy favoured the appointment of 
local tribal leaders to administer the territory, under the supervision of British advisors.
351
 
The aforementioned Sheikh Mahmud was one of the most prominent of such local tribal 
leaders and although not universally supported by all the tribes as their leader, he was 
accepted by the Kurdish notables in Sulaymaniya as their leader.
352
 In the autumn of 1918, 
the Ottoman Commissioner and the Military base in Sulaymaniya surrendered to Sheikh 
Mahmud, hence officially ending Ottoman administration in that region.
353
 Consequently, 
Sheikh Mahmud was left in sole control of Sulaymaniya. On 1 December 1918, Arnold 
Wilson the acting civil administrator for Mesopotamia had endorsed Sheikh Mahmud as 
governor of Sulaymaniya, and assigned other Kurdish officials to administer various sub-
divisions under the guidance of British political officers.
354
 As governor of the autonomous 
Kurdish entity, Wilson had the authority to run local affairs and to appoint Kurdish officials 
in different areas under his control.
355
  
 
2.4.3.2 Sheikh Mahmud’s revolts 
 
Once Faisal was in power he imposed his authority in the Kurdish region which until then 
had been under British control. However, the coming to power of the Kemalist regime in 
Turkey had reignited its desire to re-impose its control over Vilayet Mosul through instigating 
a campaign of unrest in June 1921. This resulted in uprising under the guidance of Turkish 
officers driving the British out of Sulaymaniya in September of that year. In order to counter 
the Turkish advances the British turned to Sheikh Mahmud, the only leader who had 
sufficient influence among the Kurdish tribes in order to prevent the recapture of the rest of 
southern Kurdistan by the Turks. Upon his return to Sulaymaniya in October 1922, Sheikh 
Mahmud proclaimed himself as the ”king of Kurdistan” and set about forming an 
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administration in order to run the territory under the auspices of the British advisers. In 
reality, the British had used Sheikh Mahmud as a tool against the aggression of the Turks but 
eventually the cooperation between the British administrators and Sheikh Mahmud broke 
down. Two reasons have been cited for this break down of relations. First, Sheikh Mahmud 
wished to include Kirkuk to his administration against the wishes of the British, who wanted 
it administered from Baghdad. Secondly, Sheikh Mahmud decided, to play one power against 
another in order to strengthen his own position rather than taking on the Turks as the British 
had intended. Nevertheless, the biggest contributory factor to the breakdown of relations 
between the British and Sheikh Mahmud was the failure of the first Lausanne Treaty in 
February 1923, which resulted in the British change of policy towards Sheikh Mahmud and 
the self-proclaimed Kingdom of Kurdistan. Therefore, Britain withdrew all financial and 
logistical support for Sheikh Mahmud’s administration and decided to impose direct rule on 
southern Kurdistan from Baghdad, which left the Sheikh and the nationalist circle around him 
with no option but to revolt against the British and to declare independence in May 1919.
356
 
In preparation of the revolt he raised three hundred armed followers on the Iranian side of the 
border.
357
 The revolt started on 22 May 1919, with the arrest of all British military and 
political officials in Sulaymaniya and ejected the British garrison of levies.
358
 Sheikh 
Mahmud declared himself the ruler of all Kurdistan, seized the treasury, appointed his own 
administration officials and raised his own flag.
359
 The British decided to take 
countermeasures by sending a small expeditionary force from Kirkuk to Sulaymaniya to 
challenge Sheikh Mahmud, nonetheless the force proved inadequate and had to withdraw to 
Kirkuk.
360
 In the eyes of the Kurdish population this military success had an immediate and 
electrifying effect throughout southern Kurdistan tribes on both sides of the border (Iraq and 
Iran) they proclaimed themselves for Sheikh Mahmud.
361
 
The role of Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1921 in suppression of Sheikh Mahmud’s 
revolt was critical. Lacking sufficient troops to quell the Kurdish uprising in Iraq, Britain 
used the Royal Air force (RAF) to bomb the Kurds, setting an enduring precedent for the 
region and the whole world.
362
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2.4.3.3 The emergence of Mullah Mustafa Barzani 
 
With the subjugation of Sheikh Mahmud’s nationalist enterprise at the hands of the British a 
family would emerge whose name would become synonymous with Kurdish nationalism and 
its aspiration for self-determination.
363
 The Barzani family has played a pivotal role in the 
Kurdish nationalist movement since 1930s.
364
 The history of their mutiny against central rule 
goes back to 1907 when Sheikh Abdel Salam Barzani revolted against the Ottoman rule for 
the rights of the Kurds to be respected, which led to his arrest and execution. His brother 
Sheikh Ahmed Barzani became the next torchbearer for Kurdish autonomy by challenging 
the authority of the British Mandate holder of Mesopotamia which brought about a revolt 
between 1931 until 1934. The revolt started when Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, a determined and 
skilful leader in mountain warfare, send several hundred armed men across the border to 
support the Kurdish revolt of Mount Ararat to no avail.
365
 According to Entessar:  
He was never able to acquire the needed assistance of other Kurdish tribes in 
confronting Iraqi and British troops. Another and perhaps more serious cause of the 
failure of Sheikh Ahmed’s revolt was his opposition to the spring 1932 British plan to 
settle the Assyrian Christians who had left or been expelled from Turkey on or near 
Barzani tribal lands.
366
  
The revolt was finally put down by a combined operation of the Iraqi land forces aided by the 
Royal Air Force bombardment which destroyed many villages under Barzani’s control.367 
Nonetheless, a group of his supporters continued armed struggle which was to keep the entire 
region in a state of insecurity until 1934.
368
 In 1932, Sheikh Ahmed Barzani’s men inflicted 
heavy losses on Iraqi forces before surrendering to Turkish troops in June of that year. Sheikh 
Ahmed, his younger brother Mullah Mustafa and their followers were eventually exiled to 
Sulaymaniya and whereas,  
… Sheikh Ahmed Barzani’s star began to fade, his brother Mullah Mustafa, would rise 
for another twenty years. Mullah Mustafa Barzani would head a revolt that appear to 
have more to do with personal animosity toward the Iraqi leadership, and was actually 
related to the 1943 Kurdish famine, then to a nationalist rebellion. When his forces 
clashed with police in Barzan in 1943, he became the focal point of the Kurdish 
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discontent with the Baghdad government. The Iraqi military again took heavy 
casualties in attempting to suppress a Barzani, and again, this time Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani would flee over a border to safety.
369
 
With the hope of setting up their own independent state dashed, the Kurds continued to 
embark on minor revolts which were aimed at the Iraqi government. However, their 
nationalistic aspirations were to be realized albeit for a short period across the border in 
Iran.
370
 Indeed, Mullah Mustafa Barzani would make his name a household one as the 
military commander in the nascent Kurdish Mahabad Republic in Iran.
371
 
 
2.5 The Kurds in Iran  
 
 2.5.1 The end of the Qajar Dynasty  
 
In step with other Kurdish nationalist movements, the modern Kurdish movement for 
autonomy in Iran is a new historical phenomenon which started emerging in the late 
nineteenth century.
372
 So far this study has concentrated only on Kurdish regions which were 
the spoils of World War I,
373
 yet the Greater Kurdistan also includes the Province of 
Kordestan in Iran.
374
 Kurdistan in Iran has always been a problematic territory for the Persian 
(Iranian) government.
375
 As stated above, the first division of Kurdistan between the former 
Persian Empire (modern-day Iran) and the former Ottoman Empire took place in 1514, this 
partition was formalised when Shah Abbas Safavid signed a treaty with the Ottoman Sultan 
Murad in 1639. The frontier through this part of Kurdistan has hardly changed ever since.
376
 
Indeed, the Kurds of Iran had been involved in armed struggle against the hegemony of the 
central government in Isfahan (the old Iranian capital) and later Tehran.
377
 Since then, both 
the Ottoman and the Safavids embarked upon establishment of powerful centralised 
governments, ‘a policy that ran counter to the relative freedom of Kurdish principalities and 
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led to Kurdish revolts.’378 One strategy which served successive Persian kings well was the 
policy of divide and rule, to use tribal hostilities among the Kurds to their advantage.
379
 By 
the mid-nineteenth century most of the semi-sovereign Kurdish principalities had come under 
the direct control of the central government in Iran.
380
 However, as noticed elsewhere the 
most significant event of the late nineteenth century which concerned both parts of Kurdistan 
was Sheikh Obeydullah’s uprising in 1880, with the aspiration of uniting the two Ottoman 
and Persian Kurdish entities. This has been cited as the first modern Kurdish movement with 
the aim of creating an independent Greater Kurdistan.
381
  
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the Kurds living in Iran were also affected by the 
hopes and aspirations of their kinsmen and the events taking place across the artificial border 
between them and their Kurdish brethren.
382
 Undeniably there was affinity between the 
Persian Kurds and their more numerous kinsmen living within the Ottoman Empire.
383
 
According to Noel, many Kurds from Sulaymaniya left for Iran shortly after the termination 
of hostilities in World War I to preach the idea of a united Kurdistan.
384
 There were also 
some Kurdish tribal leaders in Persia who advocated the creation of the Greater Kurdistan 
and sought the help of Britain to realise it.
385
 In fact, the two important Kurdish leaders in 
Persian Kurdistan, Ismail Agha Simko
386
 of the Shikak and Sheikh Sayyid Taha of Nehri, 
were known to be working closely together on a plan for the inclusion of the Persian Kurds in 
an independent Kurdish state with the help of the British.
387
 The disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire coincided with the weakness of the Qajar central government which opened 
the way for the emergence of Kurdish nationalist feelings in Iran.
388
 In the early twentieth 
century, Persia went through its first constitutional revolution in 1906 giving it a constitution 
and parliament.
389
 It is worth noting that Iran as a nation is a tapestry of different racial and 
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ethnic groupings.
390
 Due to power struggle within the government the country was in turmoil 
and perpetually challenged by regional warlords and tribal leaders especially in the Kurdish 
inhabited region. 
  
2.5.2 Reza Shah and Iranian nationalism 
 
By the end of World War I, Persia was in administrative and financial chaos, McDowall 
notes that:  
Tribal fighting, anarchy and famine plagued many areas; Gilan was in revolt, both 
Soviet and British forces were still on Iranian soil; in Tehran the government had fallen 
as a result of its universally unpopular acquiescence to the 1919 Agreement with 
Britain which implied protectorate status. By the end of the year Iran’s dismal 
circumstances included the imminent threat that rebel groups in the Caspian region 
would march on Tehran, backed by the Red Army. Iran seemed weaker than any time 
in the nineteen century.
391
  
In fact, by the virtue of signing of the 1919 Anglo-Iranian Agreement Iran became a semi-
colony of Britain, even though it escaped the Mandate System.
392
 This created a power 
vacuum in the region, enabling the Kurdish tribes to once again challenge the Ottoman and 
Iranian authority in Kurdistan.
393
 With the downfall of the Qajar imperial system and the rise 
of constitutional monarchy the new elite in Iran, as in the case of Kemalist Turkey and Iraq, 
pursued an ultra-nationalist policy based upon centralising and secularising the 
government.
394
 By 1921, the Kurds in Iran had to deal with the Iranian forces under the 
command of Reza Khan (later became Reza Shah in 1925) who had come to power in 
February of that year in a military coup d’état. It has been noted that ‘to stabilize the country 
and consolidate power, Reza Khan, like the British and Turkish officials, reached out to the 
traditional stratum tied to imperial structures. Although he repressed tribal revolts with force, 
Reza Khan permitted the chiefs to retain relative autonomy in their localities.’395  
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But, he adopted a different approach to the Kurdish issue. As Natali says: ‘instead of 
promising Kurdish-Persian fraternity in a future Iranian state or creating committees for the 
development of southwest Iran, he addressed the Kurds strictly as a tribal community and 
later criticised foreign governments for stirring rivalry among the Kurdish tribes in Iran.’396 
Upon accession to power, one of the central issues on Reza Shah’s agenda was the disarming 
of all tribal regions across Iran including the Kurdish areas.
397
 By doing so, he intended to 
stamp his authority on the country especially in relation to rebellious tribes.
398
 Consequently, 
he turned his attention to reorganizing the Iranian army to meet this challenge.
399
 In spite of 
this, even his authoritarian regime was not immune from Kurdish revolts which directly 
challenged his central authority. 
 
2.5.3 Simko’s revolts 
 
The revolt of Ismail Agha Simko’s was the first major challenge to the authority of Iranian 
government by a Kurdish leader since the end of World War I.
400
 Simko the chief of Shikak 
tribe who exercised control over the region west of Lake Urmiah was one of the first Kurdish 
tribal leaders to call for an independent Kurdistan under his leadership.
401
 He has been 
described as one of the most remarkable personalities to emerge in Kurdistan during the 
World War I.
402
 He came to prominence during the period of constitutional revolution and the 
ensuing internal turmoil in Iran.
403
 He succeeded his brother Ja’far Agha, who had been 
treacherously murdered by the Persian Crown-Prince in 1907.
404
 However Natali opines that: 
‘Simko may have occasionally considered himself a nationalist, but his overriding demand 
was to protect his property rights and local power networks in the shifting early-twentieth-
century political context.’405 Although Simko was no ordinary leader but he lacked a clear 
political programme and never managed to administer the territory under his control 
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effectively in order to create an independent state.
406
 In 1918, Simko had refused to link up 
with Armenians in resisting the Turks and murdered the Assyrian Patriarch Mar Shimun for 
which he gained notoriety.
407
 In the same year he managed to capture the region between 
Lake Urmiah and the Turkish border. The acts of violence committed against the Assyrian 
community earned Simko a fierce reputation as a bandit which prompted the Western powers 
to deny him support. In the last days of the Qajar Dynasty the central government had tried to 
eliminate him by dispatching the brigade of Persian Cossacks, led by Russian colonel Filipov, 
which Simko managed to defeat. As a result of this event and due to the weakness of the 
central administration in Tehran, he managed to exercise a tenuous control over the territory 
until 1921. The biggest problem facing Simko was that the territory under his control was not 
only resided by the Kurds but also Azeri-speaking Shi’a and Assyrian Christians, both of 
whom had been involved in long running conflicts against the Kurds.
408
 The cities of 
Uromiyeh, Salmas and Khoi which are claimed by the Kurds are predominantly Azeri in 
composition and had no intention of being part of Simko’s Kurdistan.409 In October 1921, he 
moved his headquarters to the old Mukri capital of Sawj Bulaq (Mahabad), where he was 
reported to publish a newspaper, Roja Kurd (Independent Kurdistan), intended to serve as a 
mouthpiece for Kurdish aspiration.
410
 
In the meantime, there was a truce maintained between Simko and the central government 
mainly to give Reza Khan much needed time to set up a powerful central administration and 
reorganise and modernize the Iranian army as well as addressing his preoccupation with the 
task of pacifying the disaffected elements in various part of the country.
411
 The Iranian 
government: 
… Even tried to come to terms with him by holding out the prospect of granting a 
measure of autonomy to the Persian Kurds … Simko, however, appears to have become 
impatient. Taking advantage of the still unsettled condition of the country, the Kurdish 
leader decided to strike a decisive blow for the realisation of his dream.
412
 
The Iranian government signed the now famous treaty of February 1921 with the Soviet 
Union and then reached an accord with Turkey on 25 October 1922, which completed 
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Simko’s isolation.413 In summer of 1922, Simko had declared himself in open revolt against 
the central government and marched on Maragha in which time he reached the widest extent 
of his power.
414
 The Iranian army led by Reza Khan took part in a decisive battle on 25 July 
1922, and delivered Simko a crushing defeat in which out of his ten thousand men Simko was 
left with only a thousand all from his tribe.
415
 He fled across the frontier into Kurdish zone of 
Iraq, and then Turkey, ‘in the operations against Simko, Turkey rendered valuable support to 
the Persian army by sending powerful units to the Turco-Persian frontier. This action on the 
part of Turkey marked the end of Simko’s cooperation with the Turks.’416 His struggle finally 
came to an end in 1930, when he was pardoned by Reza Shah who made him governor of 
Uchnovieh and subsequently his forces assassinated him a few days later.
417
 Simko’s revolt 
compared to other Kurdish leaders’ was very limited in its territorial scope nevertheless:  
… It was the first major attempt by the Kurds to establish an independent Kurdistan in 
Iran. Despite some initial military success, Simko’s ultimate failure to establish a 
genuine Kurdish nation state has become attributed to his inability to overcome his 
parochialism and his inability to create a state in the modern sense of the word, with an 
administrative organisation. He was chiefly interested in plunder and as he could not 
loot his own tribe or the associated tribes, he raided and tried to dominate non-Kurdish 
region, like Salmas, Uromiyah, and eventually Khoi reducing the population of this 
districts to utter ruin and despair.
418
  
Reza Shah’s decisive victory over Simko and other tribal leaders heralded a new repressive 
era for the Kurdish population of Iran in that he created a centrally controlled administration 
based on national unity of all Iranian peoples, an artificially imposed Persian consciousness 
that was fronted by the so-called Society for Public Guidance.
419
 
 
2.6 The Kurdish Mahabad Republic of 1946 
 
The most serious Kurdish challenge to authority of the three sovereign states under 
consideration was the creation of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad under the Soviet Union’s 
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auspices.
420
 The Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in September 1941 resulted in the collapse of 
the pro-German Reza Shah’s administration throughout tribal areas including Iranian 
Kurdistan, which was divided into three zones.
421
 The northern zone was under Soviet 
occupation, the southern zone under British control and crucially the middle one was left 
under Kurdish control as a buffer zone between the two occupying forces.
422
 In their attempt 
to annex the northern part of Iran (at the time under their occupation) to the Soviet Union, 
nationalist ferment was actively promoted by the Soviets in both the Azerbaijani and Kurdish 
areas of Iran.
423
 One of the consequences of this collapse was the Kurds seizure of vast 
quantities of arms and ammunition left behind by the retreating Iranian forces before the 
advancing Soviet Army.
424
 The invasion of Iran by the Allies put a stop to continuation of 
Reza Shah’s draconian tribal policies. Reza Shah was merciless and unrelenting in his 
suppression of native institutions; not even native dresses were immune from this practice.
425
 
The Persian Kurds who resented Reza Shah’s tribal policy were now in a position to reverse 
such draconian measures. Since, for almost two decades, the Kurds had been forced to submit 
to the Shah’s despotic rule and his officials’ corrupt practices with no hope of remedy for the 
injustices suffered by the Kurds.
426
 Because of this void the Kurds showed the willingness to 
break away from the Iranian unitary system.
427
 The zone held by the Kurds was to become a 
centre of Kurdish political activities. Free from outside control they embarked upon all things 
they had been denied and boldly sought to gain their autonomy.
428
 However, it was in the 
town of Mahabad, within the territory inhabited by Iranian Azeris that the most significant 
Kurdish political developments were to take place.
429
 On 16 August 1943, a group of young 
Kurdish merchants, intellectuals and petty officials of the town of Mahabad established 
Komala-i-Zhian-i-Kurd, or “Committee of Kurdish Youth” which eventually transformed 
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itself into KDP-I (Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran).
430
 In fact, ‘the Komala spread rapidly, 
not only in Iran but in other countries as well, where Kurds saw in the new group a more 
vigorous force than in the traditional Kurdish nationalist parties.’431 This development 
heralded a change of policy in Kurdish nationalist movements in that urban intellectuals 
played a pivotal role above and beyond tribal objectives. Nevertheless, ‘Iranians quite 
naturally feared autonomy as the first step in a move toward separation and then 
amalgamation with Kurds from other lands under Soviet sponsorship.’432 In the meantime, 
the KDP-I managed to secure the tacit support of the Soviet authorities for the creation of an 
autonomous Kurdish republic.
433
 However, the eventual leader of Mahabad Republic Qazi 
Mohammad did not join the aforementioned political party until October 1944, but he very 
quickly became its dominant personality.
434
 Subsequently, a cabinet was convened by Qazi 
Mohammad consisting of mainly tribal chiefs, merchants and urban intellectuals.
435
 The 
cabinet carefully maintained relations with both, the central government and the Soviets in 
Azerbaijan and de facto performed many of the functions of a local government.
436
 It should 
not be forgotten that, the Soviets provided military training to the traditional Kurdish forces, 
although their financial support was rather meagre.
437
 This led to the issuing of a Kurdish 
manifesto that sought, above all, the following, ‘the Kurdish people in Iran should have 
freedom and self-government in the administration of their local affairs, and obtain autonomy 
within the limits of the Iranian state.’438 The military muscle for this tiny republic was 
provided by the Iraqi Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani and his men fresh from their 
defeat against Iraqi government as well as the assistance of the Soviet Red Army that blocked 
any Iranian reinforcement from arriving in the region.
439
 This relative stability enabled Qazi 
Mohammad to proclaim independence on 22 January 1946, and Kurdish replaced Persian as 
the official language.
440
 As McDowall says: ‘the idea that the Republic of Mahabad was the 
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critical moment at which the Kurds realised their freedom is arguably a rosy version  of 
reality … it never had a hope without serious Soviet support and the republic’s leaders knew 
in their hearts that such support was not dependable’.441 By April 1946, the Soviet Union 
declared to the newly established United Nations Security council that it was negotiation with 
Iran for the evacuation of “its troops as rapidly as possible” from northern Iran.442 Hence, this 
sealed the death knell of the only republic in the history of Kurdish people.  With the 
withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the Iranian Army soon recaptured the Kurdish republic. As 
expected the leaders of the demised republic were summarily tried and Qazi Mohammad and 
some of his close allies were hanged at the same square he had declared the republic. Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani, perhaps one of the most charismatic leaders of Kurdish nationalist 
movement, fought his way back to Iraq and eventually had to take refuge in the Soviet Union 
where he spent eleven years in exile.
443
 However, Chaliand notes that ‘Mahabad Republic has 
remained an important moment in the political history of Kurdistan, in particular with the 
formation of the KDP-I, and via Barzani, KDP-Iraq the parties that had been at the heart of 
the nationalist struggle in their two countries up until the present day.’444 Hence, the fate of 
Iranian Kurdish nationalism, as in Turkey and Iraq, was not to find expression in autonomy 
or independence but in repression.    
 
2.7 A United front against the Kurds: Treaty of Saadabad of 1937 
 
These armed revolts were sufficiently serious for the sovereign states of Turkey, Iraq and Iran 
to persuade them to conclude the Treaty of Saadabad on 8 July 1937,
445
 the purpose of which 
although not specifically stated, was to ensure co-operation in tackling the menace of Kurdish 
armed revolts. According to Article 7 of the said Treaty:  
Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to prevent, within his respective 
frontiers, the formation and activities of armed bands, associations or organisations to 
subvert the established institutions, or disturb the order or security of any part, whether 
situated on the frontier or elsewhere, of the territory of another Party, or to change the 
constitutional system of such other Party.  
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In other words, the Treaty of Saadabad was specifically aimed at Kurdish political 
movements and their armed groups.’446 Further, it proves beyond shadow of a doubt that how 
perturbed the three sovereign states were in the armed challenges posed by their Kurdish 
populations. In the second half of the twentieth century Kurdish NSAGs became mere pawns 
in the Cold War chess game where the Soviet Union and the United States used the Kurds to 
maintain their hegemony and vital national interests in the region.
447
  
 
2.8  Kurdistan 1946-1991 
 
2.8.1 After the Mahabad Republic and emergence of Kurdish political parties 
 
The period that followed the demise of the Mahabad Republic, central governments in Iran 
and Iraq were much weaker militarily compared to the Kemalist regime in Turkey. After the 
downfall of the Mahabad Republic in 1946 a period of general political repression ensued. 
Consequently, Kurdish nationalism in Iran and Iraq was taken to pieces but it remained 
dormant.
448
 Likewise, in Turkey, due to repressive measures and complete news blackout 
adopted by the Turkish government in eastern Anatolia the Kurdish population remained in 
check.
449
 In an environment that pan-Turkish nationalism and denial of the Kurdish culture 
and identity was order of the day.
450
 The Kemalist regime reacted forcefully to any dissent by 
its Kurdish population. The policy of deportation of the Kurds from their homeland to other 
parts of the republic was still in progress.
451
  
Nevertheless, there is no denying that the experience of the Mahabad Republic and self-rule 
despite its ephemeral span provided the Kurdish populations of these states with the belief 
that they had to organise themselves as political entities alongside armed resistance.
452
 The 
Mahabad Republic was also significant since it gave birth to the Kurdish Democratic Party in 
1945 formed collectively by Iranian and Iraqi Kurds as a united front against their host 
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states.
453
 This harmony did not last long. Eventually, mainly due to the external factors a 
schism emerged leading to the formation of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP-) and 
the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I).
454
 Both parties adopted left-wing oriented 
programs with the intention of attracting support from the Soviet Union.
455
 It is significant to 
point out that for the first time in the history of the Kurds they adopted a two-pronged 
strategy of having a political wing as well as a military one. This was in spite of their initial 
reluctance to engage in armed struggle against the central governments in Iran and Iraq after 
the collapse of the Mahabad Republic. Although both parties attempted to create a united 
front against their rulers, they eventually became hostages to the Cold War game.
456
 It is 
worth noting that at the time neither of the Kurdish groups in Iran and Iraq harboured any 
ambitions of secession with the view of setting up their own states, both parties advocated 
autonomy within the unitary systems of Iraq and Iran.
457
  
 
2.8.2 The Kurds in Iran: the post 1946 era 
 
Following the demise of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad on the territory of Iran, a period 
of general political repression began in the Kurdish populated territory of Iran.
458
 
Mohammad-Reza Shah’s reign was in its early stages and was striving to establish its grip on 
the instruments of power.
459
 With the defeat of the Kurds in Mahabad the young Shah’s 
government accelerated the disarming policy of non-Persian ethnic groups including the 
Kurds in order to establish a centralized power structure based on Persian nationalism.
460
 The 
nascent Iranian government continued suppression of its Kurdish population including any 
military challenge to its central rule. It was only in the early 1950s with accession of 
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democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh that there was a great revival 
of political parties in Iran, including the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I).
461
 By 
now KDP-I had evolved into a left wing political party that supported and sympathized with 
Mossadegh’s policy of nationalization of the oil industry in Iran.462 In the Iranian 
Parliamentary Elections of 1952, six years after the fall of the Republic of Mahabad the 
candidate from the KDP-I achieved a landslide majority of more than 85 per cent in the town 
of Mahabad and its suburbs.
463
 The period of relative political freedom ended following the 
downfall of Mossadeq on 19 August 1953 through a British-US sponsored coup d’etat.464 
Consequently, ‘the Kurds, who had hoped to attain their minority rights under Mossadegh’s 
leadership, found themselves once again at the mercy of the Shah’s authoritarian regime, and 
the remnants of Kurdish resistance to the Shah’s forces were easily overcome.’465 The 
government also declared the election of KDP-I candidate in Mahabad invalid and instead 
appointed a religious leader as the parliamentary deputy of Mahabad.
466
 Once back in 
absolute power the Shah eradicated all traces of democracy and democratic movements.
467
 
The Kurdish population of Iran in general, KDP-I and their leaders in particular, experienced 
a new period of virulent repression. This left the KDP-I with no alternative but to continue its 
activities as an underground movement.
468
 It is worth noting that until then, KDP-I had 
remained in close association with its sister party the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq 
(KDP). Between 1955 and 1958, KDP-I went through a process of re-organization and 
Abdul-Rahman Ghassemlou became its leader.
469
 Because of widespread political repression 
in Iran, KDP-I had to stage their second joint congress with KDP in Baghdad in March 
1964.
470
 At the same time, the Iraqi Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani had emerged as 
the undisputed leader of the KDP and also a prominent figure of the Kurdish movement as a 
whole. On his return to Iraqi Kurdistan after eleven years from exile in the Soviet Union, 
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Barzani had proposed unification of the DKP and KDP-I in order to create a united front 
under the stewardship of one secretary general namely himself.
471
 In order to stamp his 
authority on this united venture, in the second joint KDP and KDP-I Congress in Baghdad, he 
managed to exclude certain Iranian Kurdish delegates such as Ghassemlou from taking part 
in the debate. The disagreement was chiefly due to the rising collaboration between the 
Barzani-led KDP and the Shah’s regime in Iran. Thus, KDP and KDP-I split and established 
separate revolutionary committees to continue their activities as two separate entities. In its 
first congress as an independent party, KDP-I proclaimed a manifesto which rejected 
independence and demanded, ‘the autonomy of Kurdistan within a democratic Iran.’472 
Inspired by Marxism, the KDP-I remained resolutely secular and advocated the creation of a 
socialist society in Iran, close to the Soviet model.
473
 The relations between the two Kurdish 
political movements quickly worsened. By the mid-1960s, KDP was actively supported by 
the Shah’s regime in Iran under the auspices of the US.474 The best example of the apparent 
division between the two Kurdish parties was in 1968, when KDP fighters killed six KDP-I 
committee members who had sought refuge in Iraq after being attacked by the Iranian 
army.
475
 Indeed, Iran’s ‘policy of divide-and-rule had worked, and the Kurds, once again, 
became the victims of their own misguided and opportunistic leadership.’476  
 
2.8.3 Armed revolts against the Shah’s regime  
 
After 1946, examples of Kurdish armed struggle against the central government in Iran were 
very few and far between. However, there were rare incidents in which the Kurds still 
challenged the authority of the central government. An example of this challenge to the 
Iranian government’s authority took place in 1952, by Kurdish peasants of Bokan, who with 
the help of KDP-I, rose against the central government under the pretext of revolting against 
Kurdish feudal landlords and their monopoly on land ownership.
477
 Their uprising quickly 
gained support and strength.
478
 The Shah’s army, with the support of some of the tribal 
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sheikhs ruthlessly put down the revolt, costing much loss of lives and destruction of Kurdish 
villages in the process.
479
  
However, the biggest Kurdish revolt against the Shah’s regime took place after the fall of the 
Premier Mossadeq in 1953. The revolt was instigated by one of the main Kurdish tribes, the 
formidable but small Jawanrudi tribe based to the north of Kermanshah near the Iraqi border, 
which until then had maintained a certain degree of local autonomy.
480
 Due to the 
inaccessibility of their territory the Iranian army had not been able to capture that region 
previously.
481
 The Iranian army launched an all-out attack on their stronghold on 4 February 
1956. Kurdish villages were attacked by thousands of soldiers aided by tanks and crucially 
fighter planes.
482
 Initially they resisted the onslaught but were unable to fight the far more 
sophisticated weaponry of the Iranian army and in the process the Jawanrudi fortress, the 
very symbol of their freedom and resistance was bombed to the ground.
483
 In relation to the 
Jawanrudi revolt, it has been observed that: 
… Like many other Kurdish outbursts, it serves to underline Kurdish grievances and 
thus inevitably assumed a political complexion. Besides focusing international attention 
on the Kurds, it provided fresh grist for the mills of nationalist and communist 
propaganda … official Iranian sources maintained that the uprising took place when the 
Jawanrudis, who had been ordered to disarm but refused to do so, proceeded to attack 
Iranian army garrisons. This action according to Iranian sources, forced the Iranian 
government to undertake punitive measures.
484
     
From this date on until the fall of the Shah in 1979, a state of general unease existed between 
the Kurds and the Iranian central government. This unease in occasions manifested itself in 
low-intensity armed skirmishes between the KDP-I fighters and the much superior Iranian 
army. The apparent collaboration of their once ally KDP led by Barzani with the Iranian 
government made it even more difficult for the Iranian Kurds to roam with ease across the 
border to seek refuge in the Iraqi territory. During the armed campaign against the Jawanrudi 
tribe, as a sign of cooperation between the Iranian and Iraqi governments, the Iraqi army 
sealed off the border to prevent any excursion into Iraq by the Kurdish fighters. This resulted 
in complete elimination of all Kurdish fighters involved in the conflict. Furthermore, due to 
massive military expenditure allied to the economic boom that Iran experienced throughout 
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the 1960s and 1970s the armed challenge by the Kurds in Iran was reduced to low-intensity 
guerrilla warfare mainly limited to mountainous regions of the Iranian Kurdistan. The KDP-I 
armed wing had to limit its operations to hit and run raids against the Iranian army and 
Gendarmerie. Further, the ruthlessly effective Iranian secret police (SAVAK), through its 
extensive network in the Iranian Kurdistan suppressed any sign of dissent or manifestation of 
Kurdish nationalism.
485
 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s SAVAK rounded up many 
hundreds of Kurds on the basis of expressing Kurdish nationalistic aspirations. Of course, 
such expression of diversity by the Kurds was the very anathema to the Iranian government’s 
propaganda that all citizens of Iran were part of an Aryan nation.
486
 Ghassemlou has noted 
that: 
National oppression weighed heavily throughout Iranian Kurdistan. The Shah’s regime 
absolutely refused to recognize the existence of a non-Persian Kurdish people whose 
nation extended beyond the Iranian frontiers. Even the most minimal demand for 
national rights was very severely repressed. The assimilation policy launched by Reza 
Shah sought to crush all Kurdish opposition in Iran.
487
 
 
2.8.4 The establishment of the Islamic Republic: a false dawn 
 
After the fall of the Shah on 11 February 1979, and the coming to power of an autocratic 
regime in Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian Kurds faced 
an entirely different challenge.
488
 This historical event directly affected the Kurds in Iran 
profoundly.
489
 The Kurdish political groups led by the KDP-I initially welcomed the Islamic 
revolution enthusiastically and took part in many demonstrations organized by the KDP-I that 
contributed to the collapse of the Shah’s regime. The Kurdish hatred for the Shah’s regime 
had been accentuated by the betrayal of the Iraqi Kurds through the Algiers Agreement of 
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1975.
490
 In the post-revolutionary period, the political vacuum created by the overthrow of 
the Shah was quickly exploited by the Kurds.
491
 After years of suppression by the Shah’s 
regime, the KDP-I began to establish revolutionary councils to manage local affairs. 
Furthermore, armed Kurdish militias were set up and equipped from the captured arsenal 
from the Iranian army. It made them an effective military force on the ground by the end of 
1980.’492 Cultural life also began to flourish, Kurdish language publications, which had been 
banned for three decades, began to appear again.’493 What the KDP-I demanded from the new 
revolutionary government was legalization of itself, recognition of the de facto autonomy and 
self-determination within Iran’s borders that it had proclaimed on 3 March 1979.494 This was 
important because the Kurds in Iran are mainly Sunni Muslims and wanted to ensure that the 
nascent Shiite state would not subject them to any discrimination and denial of their ethnic 
and religious rights.
495
 In their eyes, this provided them with ‘an unrivalled opportunity for 
Kurdish demands for autonomy far greater than that offered to the men of Mahabad [the 
Republic of Mahabad], since Soviet or other Great Power interest or physical presence was 
not involved.’496 This was in light of the fact that the incoming Khomeini regime had 
promised the KDP-I, autonomy for Iranian Kurdistan within the framework of a democratic, 
secular and federal Iran.
497
 As previously in the case of Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah in 
Iran, promise of autonomy by Khomeini was proved to be a false dawn for the Kurdish 
population of Iran. In fact, by promising the Kurdish leaders of complete autonomy 
Khomeini had tried to buy time in order to consolidate his power base.
498
 As Entessar puts it:  
Initial Kurdish euphoria over the demise of the Pahlavi monarchy gave way to the bitter 
realization that Kurdish autonomy demands would go unheeded by the new Islamic 
Republic … It became evident that Ayatollah Khomeini’s objective of establishing a 
strong centralized Islamic Republic would clash with the goals of the autonomy-
seeking Kurds.
499
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The early promises made by the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan to the Kurds and 
other ethnic groupings in Iran that the new constitution would enshrine their cultural and 
groups’ rights according to Iran’s obligations to international law proved to be false.500 In 
reality, as far as Khomeini was concerned, demands of autonomy by an ethnic nationality 
namely the Kurds within the Islamic Republic was basically redundant.
501
 In spite of 
Khomeini’s rejection of this idea, the first Constitution of the Islamic Republic by virtue of 
Article 15 recognized the existence of linguistic diversity within Iran. However, according to 
the said constitution the only minorities recognized were religious minorities in Iran namely, 
Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrians and not any other minorities such as the Kurds.
502
 
Accordingly, apart from political considerations, religion played a key role in intensifying 
tension between the Sunni Kurds and the Shi’a leadership in Tehran.503 Hence, calls for 
autonomy of Kurdistan in the unitary system of Iran by Kurdish Sunni religious leaders such 
as Sheikh Ezzedin Husseini fell on deaf ears.
504
 It was looked upon as challenging the 
legitimacy and authority of the new Islamic regime and perceived as a revolt against its 
authority.
505
 In the meantime, Khomeini consolidated his power base and declared himself 
the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Moreover, clashes between conservative 
Kurdish landowners and Peasants who had seized land from the owners because of the power 
vacuum created by the fall of the Shah’s regime, ‘reflected deep divisions within Kurdish 
Society.’506 
Three weeks after the return of Khomeini from exile, a major armed clash took place near the 
small town of Bana, between the armed fighters of the KDP-I and militias loyal to the new 
revolutionary regime in which over a hundred people were killed.
507
 For the next twelve 
months, there were sporadic clashes between the Kurds and the newly formed volunteer 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), a government militia which asserted the Islamic 
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values of the new regime in Tehran.
508
 It is worth noting that the Islamic Revolution had 
decimated the Iranian army because of its loyalty to the Shah.
509
 The IRGC was created 
according to Article 150 of the new Constitution, was meant to fill in the void left by the 
army.
510
 At the time of its creation the IRGC generally operated outside of the sphere and 
jurisdiction of the regular army and the police controlled by the short-lived provisional 
government of Mehdi Bazargan.
511
 Because of the lack of cohesion and organization between 
the new Islamic government and the Iranian armed forces, by and large, most of the Kurdish 
territory in Iran remained under the control of the armed wing of the KDP-I until 1982.
512
 As 
a result, the Kurdish cities of Mahabad and Sanandaj became the battleground between the 
KDP-Iran’s Peshmerga and the IRGC forces. Evidently, the fighting was not limited to these 
cities and soon other parts of Iranian Kurdistan became the daily scenes of battles between 
Peshmerga aided by some of the left-wing guerrilla forces such as Fadaiyan and the 
Mujahidin, and the government forces of the IRGC.
513
  
It is worth noting that in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution in Iran, apart from the other 
left-wing guerrilla armed groups, there was a much smaller Kurdish political movement 
which called itself Komala
514
 (not to be mistaken by 1945-6 Komala political movement), a 
left-wing Marxist-Leninist organization, whose armed fighters for a short period assisted the 
KDP-I’s Peshmerga in its armed campaign against the Islamic regime in Iran.515 The 
cooperation between the two Kurdish groups did not continue for long. Until it unilaterally 
abandoned armed struggle in the early 1990s, due to ideological differences, Komala 
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regularly engaged in armed skirmishes with the armed wing of KDP-I.
516
 Yet another 
example of the in-fighting between Kurdish NSAGs based in Iran that debilitated their 
effectiveness in their struggle against the theocratic regime. Eventually, the government 
dispatched the IRGC to the Kurdish region again in order to put down yet another revolt by 
the Kurds in Iran. Human rights abuses instigated by the IRGC added much bitterness to the 
conflict. It is estimated that 10,000 Kurds lost their lives and in many cases the IRGC 
summarily executed many of the captured Kurdish fighters without trial.
517
 
In the meantime, on 22 September 1980, Iraq launched a major attack upon Iran resulting in 
the invasion of a part of the Province of Khuzestan in south-eastern Iran.
518
 Faced with the 
menace of the Islamic government the KDP-I committed the cardinal sin of asking for 
military and logistical support from the invading Iraqi army.
519
 Consequently, the KDP-I was 
branded by the Islamic regime as traitors and yet causing more soured relations between the 
Kurds and the central government in Iran.
520
 The war between Iran and Iraq continued for 
almost eight years in which the Kurdish political parties and their armed wings became mere 
proxies yet again to in the Iran-Iraq power-game.
521
 In fact, throughout this war and beyond 
the Islamic regime in Tehran actively supported the Kurdish groups over the border in Iraq 
and likewise the Ba’athist regime in Baghdad harboured and assisted KDP-I.522 This, in the 
case of KDP-I, resulted in loss of credibility among the Kurdish population of Iran. However, 
it did not stop the KDP-I to continue its armed struggle against the central government in 
Tehran. In 1982, KDP-I as a principal partner, joined the National Council of Resistance 
(NCR) formed in Paris by the second president of Iran in the post-Islamic era, Abulhassan 
Bani-Sadr and the leader of the People’s Mujahidin Organization of Iran (PMOI),523 Masud 
Rajavi.
524
 The PMOI was an urban guerrilla organization that in spite of its initial support for 
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the Islamic regime was engaged in armed struggle against it.
525
 But just prior to the PMOI 
setting up base in Iraq under the auspices of Saddam’s Government in Iraq at the height of 
Iran-Iraq War, in 1987, DKP-I left the NCR citing political differences with the organization. 
This left the KDP-I very marginalized since this left it bereft of no regional or global allies. 
Consequently, it had to concentrate on self-preservation and survival. Its leaders on the other 
hand had to go into exile in Western Europe. In due course, they would meet a tragic end to 
their lives in what has been described as an act of state terrorism perpetrated by the Islamic 
regime in Iran.
526
  
 
2.8.5 State terrorism: assassinations of Kurdish leaders in Europe 
 
In the late 1990s, KDP-I suffered a series of assassinations against its leaders allegedly 
perpetrated by the leadership of the Islamic Republic in Iran.
527
 At least in one case Iranian 
leaders have been directly implicated in organizing and carrying out the assassination. KDP-I 
suffered a major blow when its incumbent leader Ghassemlou was assassinated on 13 April 
1989, in a Vienna apartment while negotiating with the representatives of the Islamic 
Republic regime.
528
 Along with Ghassemlou two of his Kurdish party colleagues were also 
assassinated and an Iranian diplomat Mohammad Jafar Shahroudi who was wounded. It has 
been reported that one of the members of the Islamic Republics delegation (accidentally 
injured in the attack) was a high-ranking member of the IRGC.
529
 Significantly, the Iranian 
authorities refused to allow the Austrian Police to interview those who were alleged to have 
been involved in the assassination.
530
 Ghassemlou was succeeded by Sadeq Sharafkandi as 
the new Secretary General of the KDP-I. Three years later, on 17 September 1992, in a 
disconcertingly similar manner to that of the previous Kurdish leader’s assassination 
Sharafkandi, along with the KDP-I’s European and German representatives and four other 
Iranian dissident leaders were assassinated in the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin.
531
 The 
significance of the verdict handed down in a German court is that for the first time a foreign 
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court directly implicated the highest echelons of the Islamic Republic’s Government for this 
crime.
532
 The German court implicated the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the then President 
Rafsanjani, and the then Minister of Intelligence Ali Fallahian as directly involved in the 
crime.
533
 In the above case, it was said that the Mykonos restaurant assassination was 
masterminded and authorized by the Islamic Republic’s powerful Special Affairs Committee, 
at the time headed by Supreme Leader Khamenei and included Ali-Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, Minister of Intelligence Ali Fallahian and Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati. 
The said Committee was set up after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 to make 
decisions on important matters of state.
534
 Such acts have become an inseparable part of the 
regime’s modus operandi in eliminating its enemies abroad.535 It is believed that between 
1979 and 1994, more than sixty of the opponents of the Islamic regime have been 
assassinated in Western countries.
536
 Most of these assassinations were carried out by its 
agents in Western Europe and the members of Hezbollah, the southern Lebanese NSAG 
sponsored by the Islamic regime.
537
    
10 April 1997 witnessed the conclusion of the Mykonos case in the Berlin Appeal Court. An 
Iranian, Kazem Darabi, was sentenced to life imprisonment and his four Lebanese 
accomplices were also found guilty of being accessory to the murder of the Kurdish leaders 
and sentenced to lengthy imprisonments.
538
 The presiding judge Frithjof Kubsch in his 
decision held that the trial had proved beyond reasonable doubt that ‘Iran’s political leaders 
had ordered the crime’.539 The judge noted:  
The previous statements make it clear, that the assassination of the leaders of KDP-Iran 
under Dr Sharafkandi, was neither the act of an individual, nor caused by conflicts 
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within the opposition groups themselves. Rather, the assassination is the result of the 
work of the rulers of Iran … the evidence makes it clear that the Iranian rulers, not only 
approve of assassinations abroad and that they honour and reward the assassins, but 
they themselves plan these kinds of assassinations against people who, for purely 
political reasons, become undesirable. For the sake of preserving their power, they are 
willing to liquidate their political opponents.
540
  
It has been noticed that for the first time in the German legal history a higher court has 
attributed responsibility in a murder crime to another state.
541
 Ever since the assassination of 
the KDP-I leaders there has been accusation of involvement of some of the top Iranian 
political leaders such as the incumbent Iranian President Ahmadinejad.
542
 It is submitted that 
by performing such acts of terror through its agents and proxies in Western Europe, the 
implication is that the Islamic regime in Tehran had ‘effective control’ over the deprivation of 
life, even when the killing of the Kurdish leaders occurred away from the territory of Iran in 
contravention of its ICCPR obligations.   
 
2.9 The Kurds in Iraq: the Post-1946 Era 
 
2.9.1 The End of monarchy and the war of 1961 
 
The late-1950s witnessed a period of political uncertainty in Iraq that was to have lasting 
effect on its Kurdish population. In 1958 a group of military officers (the so-called Free 
Officers) under the leadership of Abdul Karim Qasim staged a bloody military coup d’etat 
toppling the monarchy of King Faisal and established a republic.
543
 Initially the Kurds 
welcomed this change and came to his side and assisted Qasim to strengthen his position.
544
 
In return, Qasim pledged to grant the Kurds autonomy, by setting up a three-man 
“sovereignty council” led by a Kurd Khalid Naqshabandi.545 The new regime also promised 
to transform the life of the Kurds by acknowledging them as a distinct ethnic group with 
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national rights.
546
 In October 1959, Qasim welcomed Mullah Mustafa Barzani back to Iraq 
after eleven years of exile from the Soviet Union and legalised KDP in January 1960.
547
 
Return of Barzani coincided with him assuming the leadership of KDP and setting about 
reinvigorating the Iraqi Kurds political and military fortunes. Mullah Mustafa’s alliance with 
the Iraqi government allowed him to settle old scores especially with the Kurdish tribes that 
had helped the monarchy against him in the 1930s and 1940s.
548
 As Van Bruinessen notes:  
Traditionally the dividing line among the Kurdish tribes in Iraq was whether they were 
on the government’s side or fighting against it. Additionally, urban Kurdish politicians 
have in occasions ‘turned against the mainstream of the Kurdish movement and reached 
agreements with the central governments under the pretexts that were unintelligible and 
unacceptable to the tribesmen. Both groups suspect the other of inherent tendencies to 
betrayal – and both have a few convincing instances to cite.549  
As Qasim consolidated his position, he considered the mobilization of the Kurds by Barzani 
as a threat to his central authority and reneged on the promise of autonomy for the Kurds and 
to counterbalance Barzani’s power, provided his rivals with arms and financial support.550 
Further, he showed his true hostile intentions towards the Kurds by issuing a series of decrees 
that threatened Kurdish tribal leaders economically and politically.
551
 This hostile political 
posturing by the Iraqi central government was to embitter relations between the Sunni Arab 
leaders of Iraq and its Kurdish population and resulted in a series of revolts led by Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani for the next two decades.
552
 
 
2.9.2 First Barzani revolt 1961-70 
 
In September 1961 the Kurds under the leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani launched a 
surprised attack against the Iraqi army with a force of between 5000-15000 men and in two 
weeks managed to occupy the whole of Iraqi Kurdistan.
553
 The second division of the Iraqi 
army counter attacked across Kurdistan pushing out along the major roads and they 
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consistently kept to the lowlands.
554
 The Kurds were unprepared for serious combat and 
retreated quickly to the mountains for the winter.
555
 On March 1962, Barzani’s winter 
offensive began as a surprise that inflicted heavy casualties on the Iraqi army.
556
 By 1963, 
Mullah Mustafa`s peshmargas succeeded in keeping the Iraqi Army and their primary 
Kurdish adversaries, the pro-Baghdad tribes at bay.
557
 Mullah Mustafa`s guerrilla tactics in 
the mountainous terrain of Kurdistan had apparently frustrated and fatigued Iraqi forces.
558
 
Consequently, in January 1963, the two sides agreed to sign a cease fire.
559
 
On 8 February 1963, a bloody Military coup was staged by the Baathists and Arab nationalist 
officers led by Abdul-Salam Arif (a non-Baathist), removed and executed Abdul-Karim 
Qasim and his close allies. It is worth noting that Arif a military officer was very much a 
figure head in the incoming administration and the Baathists were the primary moving force 
in this affair.
560
 The new Ba’athists regime established a rule of terror to eliminate their 
opponents such as the Iraq Communist Party members and their sympathizers who were 
totally exterminated. This coup took place as a reaction to the heavy casualties that the Iraqi 
army had sustained in the previous winter against the Kurds.
561
 As a reaction to the coup 
Barzani offered a truce which the Baathists accepted willingly in order to buy them some 
time to strengthen their position of power.
562
 
On February 15 1963, Colonel Aref promoted himself to the rank of field marshal and asked 
the Kurds to support his regime. In the new cabinet, the Ba`athists held twelve of the twenty 
seats, and the Kurds held two.
563
 This situation prompted some Kurds to expect that the 
Ba`athists would grant instant and extensive recognition to the Kurds as a sign of their 
obligation to the Kurdish cause.
564
 The Kurds demanded the establishment of an ‘autonomous 
Kurdish government, the evacuation of Kurdish territory by Iraqi troops and an equitable 
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division of state revenue, especially oil royalties, between the Kurds and Arabs.’565 On 10 
March 1963, the Baathist government announced that an agreement had been reached to grant 
the Kurds autonomy within the structure of the Iraqi state.
566
 In the meantime, in 1963, there 
was a split between the nationalist officers led by Arif and the Baathist Party within the Iraqi 
government that resulted in the removal of Baathist Prime Minister Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. 
567
 One of the main repercussions of this split in the Iraqi government was the breakdown of 
autonomy talks in October 1964.
568
 This also resulted in resumption of hostilities between the 
Kurds and the Iraqi forces which attempted to cut off the main Kurdish supply rout of 
Hamilton road to Iran. The Kurdish forces ultimately managed to repel the Iraqi forces and 
maintain their hold on the Kurdish populated territory.
569
  
The tumultuous political events continued at pace in Iraq with the death of Abdul-Salam Arif 
in a helicopter accident who was succeeded by his brother Abdul-Rahman Arif, who 
concluded a cease fire agreement with a guarantee of autonomy for the Kurds on 29 June 
1966, nearly fulfilling all the Kurd’s demands.570 The new Iraqi president was perfectly 
aware of the Iraqi army’s weakness in quelling the Kurdish threat mainly due to the shock of 
the Six Day War humiliation against Israel in 1967 and the inability of the Iraqi army to seal 
off the border with Iran the main source of supply to the Kurd. It should be pointed out that 
after the demise of Qasim’s government the Shah’s regime in Iran had begun supplying the 
Kurds with modern weaponry.
571
 
In July 1968, Arab nationalists and Baathist army officers organized yet another coup, which 
send Abdul-Rahman Arif into exile and established Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as the new 
president.
572
 The new Baath government reiterated the promise of granting autonomy to the 
Kurds yet again to strengthen its position.
573
 The Baath administration attempted to weaken 
Barzani’s position within the Kurdish community by supporting his opposing tribes headed 
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by Jalal Talebani and Ibrahim Ahmad.
574
 However, on 11 March 1970, a 15-point peace 
Accord between the Baathist government and Barzani was reached.
575
 Some scholars have 
attributed the making of this concession by the government to the Kurds due to weak 
Ba’athist administration in Baghdad, tension with Iran, and more importantly the pressure put 
on the Iraqi government by the Soviet Union to reach an agreement with the Kurds.
576
 This 
agreement provided at least in theory the legal framework for broader Kurdish autonomy 
within the Iraqi unitary system and to give them representation in the executive and 
legislative bodies of the central government.
577
 The Accord in point 10 recognized Kurdish as 
an official language and amended the Constitution to state that “the Iraqi people is made up 
of two nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality.”578 This Accord also 
authorized the Kurdish forces to keep their heavy weapons for four years, until the accord 
was to be fully implemented.
579
 According to Harris, ‘this agreement marked a high-water of 
Kurdish gains … Not only was Baghdad forced to acknowledge its inability to crush 
Barzani’s movement, Mullah Mustafa’s opponent in the Democratic Party of Kurdistan were 
obliged to recognize his paramountcy as well.’580 Nonetheless, behind the scenes in order to 
off-set the demography of the Kurdish region, the Iraqi government embarked on a program 
of Arabization of the oil rich regions of Kirkuk and Khanaqin during the same period.
581
 Of 
particular interest to this study is the use of chemical weapon by the Iraqi army against the 
Kurdish civilians during the few months of armed conflict in the Iraqi Kurdistan in 1969. 
According to Chaliand: 
During those few months of war, the Iraqi army conducted a number of operations 
against civilians. For instance, on 19 March 1969, the inhabitants of the village of 
Dokan in the Shaykhan district were asphyxiated when Iraqi soldiers lit fires at the 
entrance to the grotto in which they were hiding. Sixty-seven women, children old 
people were killed. In September 1969, the village of Serija in Zakho district was 
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surrounded and then destroyed by a column of tanks. Among the Chaldaean population 
not a single person survived.
582
    
 
2.9.3 The Second Barzani revolt of 1974-75 
 
After four years of broken promises, the Kurds resumed their armed conflict against the Iraqi 
armed forces now firmly under the control of Saddam Hussein who by now had supplanted 
the figure-head ruler Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr.
583
 Furthermore, in 1974 the Iraqi government 
had unilaterally announced a new Autonomy Law that granted the Kurds fewer national 
rights than the 1970 agreement had stipulated.
584
 The inclusion of a Treaty of Friendship 
between the Iraqi government and the Soviet Union in April 1972 left Barzani with no choice 
but to seek the help of the United States through its proxy the Shah’s regime in Iran.585 The 
Ba’ath regime mindful of the foreign support for the Kurdish forces went ahead with the 
implementation of the autonomy law and opted to negotiate with 600 independent and anti-
Barzani Kurds including Ahmed-Talabani faction.
586
 After the break down of negotiation 
between the Ba’athist government and the Kurds, open hostilities between the Iraqi army and 
the Kurdish forces resumed in earnest. The main reason for the breakdown of talks was that 
Barzani demanded a larger territorial area and a share of oil revenue proportionate to the 
Kurdish population.
587
 Barzani had overestimated the support of Iran and the United States, 
as McDowall notes on its part: 
Iran had hoped the Kurdish war might even lead to the overthrow of the Ba’ath party, 
as it had done in 1963, but instead it found itself having to back the Kurdish forces 
overtly. Not only did it send Iranian Kurds to assist the peshmerga, but also deployed 
regular forces, dressed in Kurdish garb.
588
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By April 1974, Barzani according to Zaid had diligently recruited and trained around 100,000 
thousand peshmergas and another 50,000 irregulars.
589
 In the meantime, since the last armed 
conflict with the Kurds, the Iraqi army had also modernised and gradually built up their 
forces with the help of Soviet military advisors in anticipation of the impending conflict.
590
 
By 1974, the Iraqi army had amassed 90,000 troops, 1200 tanks (including armoured 
personnel carriers) and crucially 200 fighter aircrafts in and around Iraqi Kurdistan.
591
 In 
terms of intensity and casualty the armed conflict that ensued was very much reminiscent of a 
fully-fledged civil war and even at some stage more akin to an interstate armed conflict. The 
Kurdish forces based on military and material support from Iran and possibly Israel, inflicted 
heavy casualties upon the Iraqi army. They were completely at home in the mountains and 
had overwhelming support from their own rank and file. Indeed, this was a unique moment in 
the history of Kurdish people, in that the conflict attracted ‘the support of the vast majority of 
the Kurdish movement.’592 The Iraqi armed forces, enjoying superior fire power, were also 
able to launch devastating air raids against civilian targets. Spurred on by their success 
against the Iraqi army in 1966 and 1969, Barzani organised his forces in a conventional army 
comprising of three divisions, and seventeen brigades of varying size.
593
 
In the autumn of 1974, the well trained and disciplined Iraqi army began fighting and 
advanced deep into Kurdistan. The Iraqi government had built 700 miles of new roads in 
Kurdistan, mostly under proviso of goodwill to the Kurds but in reality this enabled Iraqi 
army to have access to previously inaccessible territories of the Kurdish territory.
594
 By the 
spring of 1975, the Iraqi army threatened to capture the whole of the Shuman valley, the main 
supply route running to the Iranian border. Although Iran had supplied the Kurds with light 
and medium guns, US anti-aircraft Hawk missiles and with heavy gun fire from inside of the 
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Iranian border, by early 1975, it was clear that the Kurds had lost any hope of resisting the 
Iraqi offensive.
595
  
 
2.9.4 The Algiers agreement of 1975  
 
By February 1975, Iraq had indicated to some Arab states that it was ready to settle its 
dispute with Iran peacefully and was willing to settle its boundary dispute with Iran over the 
Shat al-Arab (Arvand rood) waterway.
596
 The Iraqi government offered Iran the recognition 
of the waterway between the two countries as an international waterway. The negotiation 
between the two states had secretly been taking place behind the scenes for many months 
unbeknown to the Kurds. On their part the Iranians had demanded recognition of the 
waterway as an international water as a price for their withdrawal of support for the Kurds. In 
reality, Iraq had made substantial territorial concessions to secure the withdrawal of Iran’s 
support.
597
 In March 1975, the Iranian assistance to the Kurdish forces was suspended. On 6 
March 1975, Iran and Iraq concluded the Treaty Concerning the State Frontier and 
Neighbourly Relations between Iran and Iraq (the Algiers Agreement);
598
 according to which 
Iran gave undertaking of not supporting the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq.
599
 Article 3 of the 
Algiers Agreement provides that: 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to exercise strict and effective permanent 
control over the frontier in order to put an end to any infiltration of a subversive nature 
from any source, on the basis of and in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol 
concerning frontier security, and the annex thereto, attached to this treaty. 
As a result of the withdrawal of Iranian assistance, the major armed conflict between the Iraqi 
army and the Kurdish Peshmerga in 1974 to 1975 ended in defeat for the Kurdish forces. 
Indeed, ‘the Algiers Agreement was a bitter blow to the Kurdish dream of autonomy and 
destroyed Mullah Mustafa’s ability to pursue the war.’600 The Ba’athist government gave 
Barzani and his peshmerga two weeks to put down their arms and even as a final insult to the 
Kurds Iran even threatened to assist in the military suppression of the resistance if it did 
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continue.
601
 Thus, the Kurdish struggle completely collapsed and on 23 March 1975, Barzani 
announced the end of the hostilities and went into exile in Iran with more that 100,000 of his 
peshmerga and their families joined another 100,000 Kurds already in Iran as refugees.
602
 
The Iraqi army embarked on a vicious campaign of reprisals not only against the peshmerga 
but also Kurdish civilians causing many thousands of deaths and destruction of an estimated 
1,500 Kurdish villages.
603
 By 1978, in order to put an end to any notion of Kurdish revolt the 
Iraqi army created a cordon sanitaire thirty kilometres wide along the Kurdish and Iranian 
borders uprooting more than a thousand villages and forcibly deported more than half a 
million Kurds to Imara and Nasriye cities and suburbs in southern Iraq.
604
 This was yet 
another calamitous episode in the struggle of the Kurds for recognition and even limited self-
determination. Suffering from cancer after arriving in Iran, to seek medical attention Barzani 
left for the United State. Barzani died in Washington in 1979 and was buried in the city of 
Oshnaviyeh in Iran.
605
 It was only after the collapse of the Kurdish movement in 1975 that 
Jalal Talebani formed a new party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). PUK would 
assume a much more pivotal role in Kurdish political discourse not only in Iraq but in other 
Kurdish territories. Hence, the leadership of the Iraqi Kurds was divided between the two 
dominant Kurdish political parties KDP-Iraq led by Massoud Barzani and PUK led by 
Talebani. In the aftermath of the Kurdish defeat two distinct policies were implemented by 
the Ba’athist regime, ‘the first was the ill-fated and prejudiced policy of Arabization of 
Kurdistan and the second was the policy of Ba’athization entire Iraqi society, including the 
Kurdish territory.
606
 
 
2.9.5 The emergence of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
 
In the aftermath of the defeat of the KDP-Iraq in 1975, a more serious schism within the 
Kurdish movement in Iraq occurred. A group of radical KDP-Iraq members led by Jalal 
Talabani was to become the other major Kurdish group in the Iraqi Kurdistan. PUK was one 
the factions of the old KDP under Mullah Mustafa Barzani. It was established by the Kurds 
who had managed to escape to Damascus in June 1975.
607
 PUK mainly represented the 
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Kurdish urban intellectuals and adopted the same pragmatic slogan as the old KDP, namely, 
“autonomy for Kurdistan, democracy for Iraq” espoused Marxism as its political doctrine.608 
In June 1976, Talabani formally announced the creation of the PUK from his refuge in 
Damascus.
609
 Chastened by the experience of Iran and the US, the PUK leadership described 
Barzani as “reactionary” and disagreed with the decision of the KDP, that continuing armed 
resistance against the Ba’athist regime would be futile.610 Talabani accused Barzani of 
betraying the Kurdish nationalist aspirations by striking a bargain with the US, Israel and the 
Shah of Iran that eventually had caused its collapse.
611
 Ever since its existence, the PUK has 
forged a series of unlikely alliances with different powers and stakeholders in the region. 
Although from its inception it was supported financially and logistically by Syria but it has 
made alliances with KDP-I as a makeshift to the KDP supported by the Islamic regime in Iran 
since 1979. This resulted in many major armed conflicts between PUK and DKP ultimately 
weakening the Kurdish unity in Iraq. Even in 1983, at the height of Iran-Iraq War,
612
 it took 
on the Iranian forces under the pretext of “fighting the outside invaders” as a means of 
improving its relations with the Ba’athist regime in Baghdad.613 In fact, by 1984, Talabani 
was openly negotiation with Saddam Hussein with the view of establishing an autonomous 
authority in northern Iraq under the control of PUK.
614
 By 1985, the negotiations broke down 
owing to the refusal of the Iraqi government to make any concessions in relation to the 
financial autonomy of the oil-fields of Kirkuk and the local security forces.
615
 Hence, the 
government of Iraq embarked on the resumption of its policy of Arabization and deportation 
of the Kurds in clear violation of international law and the ‘UN Guiding Principles’.616 
Owing to this development, the rapprochement between the KDP and PUK was inevitable 
and eventually in November 1986, they announced their intention to set aside their 
differences and signed an agreement in Tehran to cooperate against their common enemy the 
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Ba’athist regime in Iraq.617 This was indeed a big victory for the Islamic regime in Tehran to 
secure the support of the two major Kurdish groups in Iraq.
618
 Buoyed by the explicit Iranian 
support the Kurdish groups established a de facto division of the Kurdish region according to 
their party lines. Yet again, this was another example of the Kurds being reduced to mere 
pawns in the power politics of the region.
619
  
 
2.9.6 The Anfal campaign: the genocide of the Kurds 
 
In order to reassert its authority in the region the Iraqi Government mindful of the alliance 
between the Iraqi Kurds (the PUK and KDP) and their collaboration with Iran at the height of 
the Iran-Iraq War embarked on a military operation code-named al-Anfal.
620
 This phrase was 
used to refer to the series of eight military offensives conducted from February to august 
1988 against the Kurds. What was to follow constitutes one of the most shameful chapters of 
not only the Kurdish history but human affairs.
621
 On 29 March 1987, Saddam Hussein issued 
Decree No. 160 of the Revolutionary Command Council according to which he appointed his 
cousin Ali-Hassan al-Majid, later widely referred to as “Chemical Ali,” as the head of the 
Iraqi State Services and the chief of the Ba’ath Party’s Bureau for Northern Affairs. This 
military operation was distinct from others mounted by the Iraqi army against the Kurds. The 
cause of this military operation’s international notoriety was the systematic use of chemical 
weapons against the military and civilian targets.
622
 By virtue of this campaign Iraq became 
the first sovereign state to attack its own population with chemical weapons. It is worth 
noting that prior to the deployment of chemical weapons against its Kurdish population Iraq 
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had used it extensively against the Iranian forces in the course of Iran-Iraq War.
623
 The 
targeted region was home to thousands of farming communities, and was where the Kurdish 
resistance to Saddam’s dictatorship was most active.624 The Anfal Campaign resulted in 
destruction of 3,000 villages, death of an estimated 180,000 and displacement of 1.5 million 
Kurdish population of Iraq.
625
 Anfal is cited as one of the most brutal acts of genocide with 
profound demographic, economic, psychological impact upon the Iraqi Kurds.
626
 Initially, the 
campaign was limited to destruction of mainly rebel villages, capture and execution of a large 
number of the Kurdish fighters and intermittent use of chemical weapons.
627
 In June 1987, al-
Majid issued successive sets of standing orders to govern the conduct of the security forces 
through the Anfal campaign and beyond.
628
 The crux of these orders was based on the simple 
maxim that in the “prohibited” rural areas, all resident Kurds were to be considered as 
collaborators of the Kurdish fighters and should be dealt with accordingly through a policy of 
“shoot-to-kill”.629 In Clause 4 of one of the Directives numbered SF/4008, dated 20 June 
1987, he modifies and expands on these orders by a bald incitement to mass murder by 
ordering army commanders ‘to carry out random bombardments, using artillery, helicopters 
and aircrafts, at all times of the day or night, in in order to kill the largest number of persons 
present in these prohibited zones.’630 In Clause 5 of the same Directive, he demands that, ‘all 
persons captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services 
and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful information has 
been obtained from them, of which we should be duly notified.’631 By the end of February 
1988, the PUK leader Jalal Talabani accused the Iraqi forces of committing genocide against 
the Kurdish population, with 1.5 million already deported, and 12 cities and 3000 villages 
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laid waste in the Kurdish territory.
632
 Human Rights Watch estimates that between 70,000 to 
150,000 ‘disappeared’ during the campaign.633  
Throughout the Anfal Campaign the Iraqi army deployed a variety of chemical weapons,
634
 
including mustard gas, a blistering agent and Sarin, a nerve agent known as GB.
635
 On 16 
March 1988, the Iraqi forces bombardment of the town of Halabja is the largest known use of 
chemical weapon against civilians. It is estimated that at least 5,000 died immediately, mainly 
women and children and more than 12,000 were injured.
636
 Halabja was the worst single 
violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Use of Chemical Weapons since the invasion of 
Abyssinia by Italy under Mussolini’s rule in 1933.637 The full details of atrocities committed 
in the Anfal Campaign took some time to reach the rest of the world.
638
 The US Secretary of 
State George Shultz was scathing in his condemnation of the Iraqi Government and described 
Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish population “unjustified and abhorrent” 
and unacceptable to the civilized world.
639
 One should note that in 1988, Iraq enjoyed near-
impunity on the international stage because of its war with the universally despised Islamic 
regime in Iran, not to mention the importance strategic and economic interests of the Western 
and Eastern Bloc in Iraq.
640
 
2.9.7 The Gulf War 1990-91: the establishment of a safe haven 
 
In August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, and was subsequently driven out by the international 
community authorized by the Security Council in 1991.
641
 The Kurdish leaders in Iraq 
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sensing an apparent weakness within the Iraqi government seized the opportunity to take up 
arms against the central government. The revolt culminated in the capture of the city of 
Kirkuk on 19 March 1991 and most of the towns in the Kurdish populated northern Iraq.
642
 In 
the aftermath of Iraq accepting the terms of the cease-fire under the Security Council 
Resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991), the Iraqi government once again turned its forces 
towards the Kurdish revolt with devastating consequences. It launched a massive counter-
attack against the Kurdish forces of KDP and PUK to reassert its authority on the Kurdish 
region. By the end of March 1991, the Iraqi forces had managed to recapture a big part of the 
territory previously under the Kurdish control and inflicting heavy casualties on the Kurdish 
NSAGs. This also led to a massive movement of Kurdish refugees towards the Iranian and 
Turkish borders in search of a safe haven from the Iraqi troops.
643
 In its communication to the 
UN, the Iraqi government highlighted Iran as the instigator for infiltrating the armed bands 
and subversion of the Kurds; it proclaimed: ‘treacherous foreign enemy forces behind the 
rebelling Kurds using “slogans of national schism”’.644 Nevertheless, once the Iraqi 
government had re-established its authority over the Kurdish region, the ruling Revolutionary 
Council adopted a reconciliatory approach towards the Kurds by referring to ‘Kurdish and 
Arab citizens’ and ‘Kurdish Iraqi citizens’, and granting amnesty to anyone who had taken 
part in the Kurdish revolt.
645
 Such protestation by the Iraqi government did not hide the fact 
that at the time there was a humanitarian catastrophe taking place in northern Iraq.
646
 This 
prompted France and Turkey to call for a meeting of the UN Security Council citing the 
plight of the Kurds in Iraq as a threat to international peace and security.
647
 France in 
particular was unequivocal in the need for a meeting ‘to discuss the serious situation resulting 
from abuses being committed against the Iraqi population in several parts of Iraq and more 
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particularly in Kurdish inhabited areas; by virtue of its repressions in the region this situation 
continues a threat to international peace and security.’648 It is worth noting that in its 
communication to the UN, Turkey did not specifically mention the Kurds and opted to refer 
to the plight of 220,000 Iraqi citizens mostly women, elderly and children that had amassed 
along its southern border mainly because of operations carried out by the Iraqi Armed 
forces.
649
 In its communication of 4 April 1991, to the UN, Turkey stated: 
It is apparent that the Iraqi government forces were deliberately pressing these people 
towards the Turkish border in order to drive them out of their own country. These 
actions violate all norms of behaviour towards civilian populations and constitute an 
excessive use of force and a threat to the region’s peace and security. In the course of 
the Iraqi operations, which were being carried out with the support of helicopters and 
artillery, many mortar shells actually landed on Turkish Territory.
650
  
In reality, Iran allowed over a million Kurdish refugees into its territory but Turkey refused to 
honour its asylum obligations under international law leaving some 400,000 refugees 
stranded on its border with no possessions or supplies.
651
 Due to the desperate predicament of 
the Kurds, the international community was left with no alternative but to intervene in the 
situation by adopting Security Council Resolution 688 on 5 April 1991.
652
 The Resolution 
called upon Iraq to end repression of its civilian population and to allow immediate access by 
international organizations to all those in need of assistance.
653
 Contrary to the popular belief 
the aforementioned Resolution was not based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
specifically refers to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which prohibits interference in matters 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state.
654
 Iraq on its part was very 
indignant on adoption of Resolution 688 and stated that this was yet ‘another tendentious and 
biased Resolution against Iraq.’655 It stated that:  
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It is extremely paradoxical that the Council should show in letters from Iran and Turkey 
concerning the situation of the Kurds despite the fact that the world knows full well that 
these states do not by any means recognize any of the rights of the Kurds (such as 
distinct nationality) in their countries, where the majority of the Kurds are to be 
found.
656
  
In the same letter to the UN Secretary General, Iraq expressed the view that it was highly 
paradoxical that states such as Iran, Syria and the United States had incited agents and 
subversives against the authority in Iraq and provided the Kurdish forces with weapons and 
materiel to undermine the restoration of security in the country.
657
      
Although Resolution 688 did not authorize the use of force, the US and UK undertook 
military operations in northern Iraq in order to protect the Kurdish refugees and more 
importantly forced the Iraqi army out of the region to allow international humanitarian 
organizations to operate there.
658
 The flight of the Kurds from northern Iraq was not the worst 
humanitarian crisis of its kind but perhaps the most dramatic.
659
 The crisis unravelled in a 
matter of days perhaps for the first time in the history of humanitarian intervention, the whole 
story was being captured by television cameras across the globe in all its squalor.
660
 This was 
followed by the US, UK and France declaring a no-fly zone above the 36
th
 parallel in 
northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish population of Iraq from any further attacks from the Iraqi 
armed forces.
661
 The Security Council was never called upon to consider the legality of the 
no-fly zone over northern Iraq.
662
 It is worth adding that Turkey allowed the use of the 
Incirlik airbase for the US and UK aircrafts policing the no-fly zone in northern Iraq first in 
Operation Provide Comfort,
663
 later in Operation Poised Hammer, starting from July 1991, 
and subsequently from December 1996 in Operation Northern Watch until the invasion of 
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Iraq by the US-led Allied forces in 2003.
664
 The US for its part claimed that there is 
authorization under Resolutions 678 and 688 put together, and northern Iraq is ‘under the 
supervision of the United Nations’ or ‘under the protection of the United Nations.’665 The US 
and UK have repeatedly stated that they do respect the territorial integrity of Iraq and do not 
support the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.
666
 Since the 
establishment of the no-fly zone in northern Iraq the US and UK had repeatedly been 
involved in clashes over the issue with the Ba’athist regime in Baghdad. In the aftermath of 
Operation Desert Fox in 1998 these clashes escalated substantially by the Allies mainly 
targeting Iraqi air defence systems.
667
  
From humanitarian point of view Operation Provide Comfort was a resounding success, by 
the Summer of 1992 most of the Kurdish refugees had returned home, where they began to 
put their lives back together under the protection of the no-fly-zone.
668
 The declaration of the 
no-fly zone over northern Iraq by the Western powers described by some scholars as illegal 
has meant that a de facto Kurdish entity has been able to mature under the auspices of the 
Western powers with considerable political and legal implications.
669
 It has been noted that 
‘the intervention thus provided not merely emergency humanitarian aid, but long-term 
military assistance that shifted the balance of power within Iraq, effectively rewarding the 
Kurds with political autonomy that also promoted their human rights.’670 Consequently, the 
Kurds in northern Iraq have been able to exercise considerable authority over that territory 
leading to the formation of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
671
 In spite of the 
protection provided by the Western Allies, Iraqi Kurds remained divided along geographical 
and political divisions.
672
 This de facto division of the liberated province has been cited as a 
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major obstacle to any Kurdish claim to autonomy or independence.
673
 This division 
manifested itself in the elections held in May 1992 (the first of its kind in northern Iraq) in 
which the KDP supported by the US and UK having overwhelming support in Dohuk in the 
north and the PUK mainly supported by Syria and Iran dominated provinces of Kirkuk and 
Sulaymaniya in the south.
674
 By the mid-nineties the KDP and PUK had also evolved into 
fully-fledged political parties.
675
 Throughout the nineties there were many armed clashes 
between the two major Kurdish armed groups in northern Iraq.
676
 The intensity of some of 
these internal clashes at times was very fierce and in one occasion in Summer of 1996, when 
the Iranian armed forces with the cooperation of PUK entered KDP controlled territory in 
search of armed members of an opposition group the People’s Mujahedeen Organization of 
Iran (PMOI),
677
 KDP asked for assistance from the Ba’athist regime.678 This was the first 
combat operation carried out by the Iraqi armed forces since the establishment of the no-fly-
zone resulting in the capture of the important city of Erbil, the administrative centre of the 
KRG.
679
 This left the US with no alternative but to intervene to eject the Iraqi forces from the 
north by targeting Iraqi forces in the north and the Iraqi air defence system in the south of the 
country.
680
 
Continuation of the conflict between PUK and KDP eventually led to the intervention by the 
US, UK and Turkey to sponsor talks between the two Kurdish groups (the Ankara Process), 
leading to a cease-fire and the Ankara Accord of October 1996.
681
 However, the clashes 
between the two Kurdish groups continued unabated resulting in many hundreds of deaths in 
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the process.
682
 The division between the two major Kurdish groups was eventually settled in 
September 1998 through the Washington Accord (affirmed in 1999) under pressure from the 
US.
683
 Turkey mindful of problems with its own Kurdish population maintained a rather 
sceptical attitude towards this process.
684
 This scepticism became a major concern when it 
was announced that as part of the agreement there was going to be a Kurdish Regional 
Parliament.
685
 The major by-product of the establishment of the no-fly zone in northern Iraq 
has been the creation of a safe haven for other Kurdish NSAGs namely PKK operating in 
Turkey and the Party for a Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) operating in Iran in recent years.
686
 
Ever since the establishment of the KRG, due to the apparent inability of the authorities there, 
Turkey has carried out incursions and air strikes on PKK bases mainly in the Qandil 
Mountain area in northern Iraq to stop PKK attacks.
687
 
 
2.10 The Kurds in Turkey: the Post-1946 Era    
 
2.10.1 Repression of the Kurdish population in 1950s & 1960s   
 
In the intervening years between the World Wars, international law was in its embryonic 
stage of development and could not provide the Kurds with any protection as a distinct 
cultural group particularly in Turkey, where they received the harshest treatment by the 
Kemalist autocratic regime.
688
 It is important to point out that after the bloody revolts in the 
aftermath of the creation of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, a policy of systematic state 
repression was imposed on the Kurdish populated provinces within Turkey. In fact, ‘after the 
fall of Dersim, there were no more major armed uprisings in Kurdistan … the massacres, the 
massive deportations, the militarization and systematic surveillance of the Kurdish territories 
had all had an undeniably intimidating effect on the population. Revolt ceased to be a 
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credible avenue towards liberation.’689 A report published by the CIA stated that from 1937 
onwards Turkey pursued: 
‘A program of assimilation – likely to be continued’ and that ‘the Turkish Government 
has kept a strict watch over the Kurdish areas and, while doing so, has worked 
assiduously to assimilate the Kurds … Turkish policy is based on the concept that 
“there is no Kurdish problem, and there are no Kurds.”690  
It was during this period that the dominant concept of state superiority over its citizens, upon 
which the Kemalist state was built, further buried the distinctive ethnicity of the Kurds 
through the policy of “Turkification”.691 Consequently, the Kurdish community in Turkey 
became the primary victims of state repression, its restrictive legislations and state 
violence.
692
 Further, since the major revolts of 1920s and 1930s, the state imposed Martial 
Law throughout the Kurdish region and deployed more than 52,000 military personal there.
693
 
The region of south-eastern Turkey remained a militarized zone until 1966.
694
 In the 
aftermath of the aforementioned rebellions the state presided over destruction of many 
Kurdish villages and mass deportation of thousands of Kurds to the west of the country.
695
 
This has resulted in tangible Kurdish populations in some of the major cities in the western 
part of Turkey such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.
696
  
Following the implementation of multi-party democracy in 1945, the incumbent Kemalist 
government was subsequently replaced by the Democratic Party in 1950.
697
 However, it was 
only in the early 1960s that there was a resurgence of Kurdish identity. This was in spite of 
the fact that the Kurdish population of Turkey by this time had been more or less integrated 
into the Turkish society.
698
 This manifested itself through the emergence of democratic and 
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leftist movements that assisted the burgeoning of Kurdish nationalism.
699
 The Kurds voted in 
large numbers for the Democratic Party as a reaction to the oppressive measured imposed on 
the Kurds by the Kemalist regime and even a number of Kurds were elected to the Turkish 
National Assembly (TNA) and even some were appointed as ministers.
700
 The new political 
environment was short lived and in 27 May 1960 the first military coup d’état removed 
Adnan Menderes, the democratically elected Prime Minister who was subsequently executed 
leading to a period of chaos and repression especially directed at the Kurds.
701
 The use of 
Kurdish language was made illegal and it was also declared ‘illegal and forbidden to 
introduce to, or distribute, in the country, materials in the Kurdish language of foreign origin 
in any form published, recorded, taped, or material in similar forms.’702 The new military 
junta set up a Committee of National Front (CNF) which governed the country for a year and 
a half and then handed over to a civilian government following the elections of 1961.
703
  
Since the inception of modern Turkey, the army has consistently played a key role as the 
protectorate of the Kemalist secularism in the running of the country.
704
 The army has staged 
three coup d’états in 1960, 1971 and finally in 1980 culminating in suppression and 
curtailment of any democratic manifestations. The aforementioned coups took place as a 
reaction to the popularity achieved by the left-wing organizations in the 1970s, where 
Kurdish groups were very active and played a prominent role.
705
 The power of military 
Kemalism was revived with more pronouncement after these three coup d’états.706 During the 
course of the 1971 coup the Workers Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) was accused by 
the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic of carrying out communist propaganda and 
helping the Kurdish separatists by “creating a minority” in contravention of the Turkish 
Constitution.
707
 The constitutional reform implemented by the military regime following the 
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1971 coup repealed any fragments of liberal measures of 1961 Constitution and allowed the 
government to withdraw fundamental democratic rights.
708
 All political institutions such as 
the leftist youth organizations were outlawed, strikes pronounced illegal and all left-wing 
publications were banned.
709
 Martial law (to be renewed every two months) was declared in 
eleven provinces together with main Kurdish urban regions and districts.
710
 Hundreds of 
intellectuals, and Worker’s Party campaigners were detained and tortured; any manifestations 
of dissent were promptly and harshly dealt with by special courts.
711
 These courts put more 
than 3000 people on trial before their abolition in 1976. These courts were restored by the 
1982 Constitution, enacted after the military takeover of the civilian government in 1980.
712
  
This period of Turkish history was plagued by political violence between the right and the 
left, particularly in the second half of the 1970s.
713
 One of the most extreme examples of this 
trend was the massacre of more than 100 people in 1978, in the south eastern town of 
Kahramanmaraş by the notorious right wing organization Grey Wolves, an illegal militant 
paramilitary wing of the National Movement Party (NHP).
714
 This harsh treatment of ethnic 
Kurds was to be one of the main reasons for the Kurdish revolt of 1984 led by the PKK.  
 
2.10.2 The 1980 military Coup d’état in Turkey  
 
As mentioned above, left wing organizations including Kurdish ones became popular and 
powerful in the late 1970s that prompted the army to stage yet another coup under the 
leadership of the Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren on 12 September 1980.
715
 The military 
seized all executive and legislative powers under the pretext of restoring law and order as 
well as democracy to the country by imposing martial law throughout Turkey.
716
 In fact:  
The coup marked the third time that the Turkish military had intervened in politics 
since the late 1940s. Unlike the previous two interventions, however, the military did 
not give up control of the legislative and executive branches of the government easily ... 
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it was not until the elections of late 1983 that a civilian cabinet and parliament were 
established.
717
  
It is worth noting that the role of the military in Turkish politics is strengthened by the means 
of constitutional-legal mechanisms, such as the so-called “National Security Council” (NSC), 
the army is granted a constitutionally secured position as the very custodians of secularism 
and Kemalist values.
718
 The military government created a new constitution which elevated 
the role of the president, dissolved the two-chamber parliament, and granted new decision-
making powers to the NSC, dominated by the military.
719
 The NSC was established after the 
first military intervention of 27 May 1960 in order to provide the army a legally fortified 
position in the running of the state without clearly defined limits.
720
 In the aftermath of the 
1980 coup the crackdown on the Kurdish population was particularly harsh due to their 
portrayal as a threat to the national security of Turkey, for instance, the use of the term 
`Kurdish` was totally banned in 1983, as well as Kurdish language and any other 
manifestations of Kurdish culture and identity.
721
  
 
2.10.3 The emergence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
 
In the past, a number of Kurdish political parties were formed and subsequently disbanded by 
the Turkish Constitutional Court on the basis of imperilling the unity of the state.
722
 The PKK 
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was the most prominent of left wing Kurdish organizations to emerge in the 1970s.
723
 The 
history of the PKK has been dominated by its leader Abdullah Öcalan.
724
 Undeniably, as a 
result of its armed campaign against the Turkish government, the PKK has become a 
significant non-state actor in the Middle East and the Kurdish issue is now featured 
prominently in the international arena.
725
 Its origins can be traced back to Kurdish university 
students in Ankara that organized the Ankara Democratic Patriotic Association of Higher 
Education.
726
 It has been noted that the PKK, `emerged not in the guerrilla camps on the 
rugged terrain of south-east Turkey, and not in any other neighbouring country in the Middle 
East, but in Turkey`s capital city in 1974`.
727
 The founders of the PKK were very much 
inspired by Lenin’s principle of “self-determination of nations” and Stalin’s book, the 
National Question.
728
 They concentrated their activities on obtaining recognition for the 
Kurdish language and culture.
729
 However, the PKK in its present guise was founded on 27 
November 1978, when, in the village of Fis in Diyarbakir, the nucleus of the PKK was 
established and the first draft of party program was announced.
730
 In the beginning of its 
campaign, the PKK enjoyed considerable following within the Kurdish population in eastern 
Turkey, some of the major cities of Turkey (with sizeable Kurdish populations) and crucially 
in some Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe.
731
 The latter, is of great importance to the 
organization, particularly in terms of their financial support and generating publicity 
abroad.
732
 In contrast, some have argued that it is not representative of the whole of the 
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Kurdish population of Turkey and beyond.
733
 It is important to remember that the PKK as a 
NSAG accepts violence as a political means, not only against the central government but also 
used against its Kurdish political adversaries.
734
 The PKK has sought to free the Kurds both 
from the Turkish yoke and the Kurdish aghas (feudal landlords) who it claims exploit the 
Kurdish peasantry.
735
  
Prior to the coup of 1980, some of the key PKK leaders had managed to flee to Syria and the 
Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.
736
 Öcalan eventually set up base in Syria with the alleged approval 
of the government there.
737
 Although the Syrian government has never accepted providing 
support for Öcalan, it is quite obvious that no NSAG of the scale of the PKK could survive 
without the full support of a state such as Syria on whose territory the PKK was based in.
738
 
From the beginning of its violent campaign, the PKK demanded that the Kurds choose 
between loyalty to Turkey or support for the PKK, any dissent would be met with brutal and 
swift punishment.
739
 Öcalan demanded that, ‘anybody who opposed the PKK, were 
collaborators with the Turkish government and betrayers of Kurdish freedom, whatever their 
ethnic origins or political aspirations for the Kurdish groups were.’740 
Inability of Turkey to come to terms ‘with its Kurdish citizens’ demand for cultural 
recognition not only prevented a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish problem but also impeded 
improvement in the country’s legal and political standards.’741 This has been demanded of 
Turkey by the European Union (EU) as part of its accession procedure to improve its human 
rights record particularly in relation to its Kurdish citizens’ minority rights.742 It is worth 
remembering that, according to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, only the rights of religious 
minorities such as the Jews and Armenians were recognized in the Turkish Constitution of 
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1924.
743
 This has been described as one of the symptoms of the failure of Turkish democracy 
that does not recognize the ethno-cultural minority groups such as the Kurds.
744
  
  
2.10.3.1 Political and military structure of the PKK 
 
In contrast to other Kurdish NSAGs in the past, the PKK has a significant structure and 
considerable organizational ability to shape its rank and file within the communities it 
operates.
745
 The PKK considers itself foremost as a political party that has taken up arms to 
achieve its political goals.
746
 Although the political philosophy of the PKK was based on 
Marxism-Leninism, it had to integrate religious elements in the last decade in order to 
broaden its appeal within the largely Muslim Kurdish society.
747
 The PKK adopted the same 
political philosophy as the Komala in Iran that blended Marxism-Leninism with a strong dose 
of Kurdish nationalism.
748
 What distinguished the PKK from other Kurdish organizations is 
that it initially advocated the establishment of a separate Kurdish Marxist republic in south-
eastern Turkey with ultimate aim of uniting all the Kurdish territories under the umbrella of a 
united Kurdistan.
749
 Nevertheless, in the early 1990s after the military defeat, the PKK 
changed direction and no longer refers to the establishment of a separate Kurdish state.
750
 It 
has ever since concentrated its political efforts on creating a federal system within Turkey.
751
  
The PKK from the beginning of its campaign against the Turkish Government adopted a 
dual-policy of political and military strategy similar to those of other Kurdish organizations 
in Iraq and Iran in the second half of the twentieth century.
752
 Although the PKK started as a 
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group with twenty militants in 1978, however, by 1994 it is estimated that its operatives were 
at around 15000.
753
 Gürbey opines that ‘in contrast to the Kurdish uprisings in Turkey thus 
far, the PKK is characterized by a broad organizational structure and a force capable of 
extraordinary mobilization. It possesses a network not only in the Kurdish parts of Turkey 
and other countries in the region but also in western Europe.’754 It is based on three separate 
administrative branches, namely; the politburo or the central committee (the only existing 
body dating back to the creation of the PKK) was at the top of the organization under the 
command of Öcalan until his eventual arrest in 1999; the ERNK, the Liberation Front of 
Kurdistan (Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan) the political wing, was created in 1985, and 
the ARGK (Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan) the armed propaganda wing was created in 
1986.
755
 The ERNK has played a pivotal role in coordinating the activities of the PKK within 
Turkey and Europe.
756
 All of these bodies have altered in size throughout its armed campaign 
according to operating objectives and operating context.
757
 It has been noted that the PKK ‘… 
recruits guerrillas in both the Kurdish regions of crisis and among the Kurds living in 
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Western Europe.’758 It is significant to note that the PKK has many women fighters among its 
ranks especially since the 1990s and the number increased to 30 per cent of its fighting force 
at the height of the conflict.
759
 The PKK as a NSAG is highly disciplined and has a structure 
based on small guerrilla units led by a hierarchy of commanders.
760
 During its first campaign 
which lasted from 1984 to 1999, the PKK tried unsuccessfully to control large swaths of 
territory especially at night as well as launching large-scale attacks on military outposts.
761
 In 
the beginning of its campaign the PKK, due to its guerrilla tactics was very successful in 
hurting regular Turkish troops, who were inexperienced and ill-equipped to deal with 
guerrilla warfare.
762
 Indeed, it continued to maintain military superiority over the Turkish 
military throughout the 1980s.
763
 These early losses convinced the Turkish army and the 
police force to adopt a different approach and train special units specifically for combatting 
guerrilla warfare.
764
 By 1995, this change of tactics to a counter-insurgency strategy and the 
use of Cobra Helicopters in hot pursuit operations also extended to incursions into northern 
Iraq, proved to be very successful tactics for the Turkish army and security services.  The 
latter incursions into northern Iraq in hot pursuit of the PKK by Turkey raises very important 
legal issues in relation to the use of force (jus ad bellum) by a sovereign state against a 
NSAG, a topic which will be discussed more extensively below.  
 
2.10.3.2 PKK’s revolt of 1984 
 
As we have already observed, since 1918 the three Kurdish entities under consideration have 
been beset by the spectre of armed conflict in the shape of revolts against the sovereign states 
who host these Kurdish communities. None of these revolts has attracted so much 
international attention as the conflict in south-eastern Turkey since 1984 waged by the PKK 
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against the Turkish army.
765
 The armed campaign waged by the PKK is the longest against a 
sovereign state by a Kurdish NSAG since the end of the World War I.
766
 In total the conflict 
in south-eastern Turkey has cost 37000 lives, including civilians, a large proportion of whom 
were Kurdish and a huge burden on the Turkish economy.
767
 According to Ihsan Bal the 
factors that contributed to the PKK revolt were issues such as, unsolved economic 
underdevelopment in the Kurdish region, the military coup of 1980, some errors of judgment 
made by the state such as banning of the Kurdish language and other manifestations of the 
Kurdish identity, and finally the creation of the de facto Kurdish Regional Government 
(KRG) in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf war in 1991.
768
 Human 
Rights Watch Reports estimate that at the peak of the conflict in 1995, approximately around 
400,000 troops were present in south-east Turkey with additional 240,000 troops sent to the 
region in 2006.
769
 Indeed, this would indicate that the conflict at the time was at the least an 
insurgency due to its intensity and the size of the military operation involved, in spite of, 
being initially confined to south-eastern Turkey. 
The PKK began its armed campaign against the Ankara government in 1984, by launching its 
first major large scale armed attack on the gendarmerie station building in Eruh district of 
Siirtt and as a result, one gendarme was killed, six soldiers and three civilians were 
wounded.
770
 This was in spite of the fact that by 1983 it was widely believed that armed 
opposition in Turkey had been defeated.
771
 This assumption was based on the belief that after 
the military coup of 1980, due to draconian measures imposed nation-wide on all political 
parties in Turkey which included the arrest of over 500,000 people, no political opposition 
had survived.
772
 The emergence of and the danger posed by the PKK was not foreseen by 
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many Turkish officials.
773
 In fact, this complacency was not limited to the political class and 
it also existed among the military ranks.
774
  
Some observers have opined that ‘the PKK differs from other Kurdish organizations on the 
issue of violence … the armed fight that the PKK has led since August 1984 is based on 
“revolutionary violence” as a means of achieving mobilization and liberation.’775 From the 
beginning, the PKK directed its violent campaign not only against the Turkish Government, 
right and left-wing political parties, the Kurdish landlord class and the village guards.
776
 The 
“village guards” is a state mandated but largely unregulated paramilitary force of 65,000 
organized by the Turkish Government consisting of those Kurdish tribes and villagers who 
resisted the PKK.
777
 This paramilitary organization has played an important role in thwarting 
the PKK and to regain the control of the countryside by the Turkish government.
778
 The 
inadequate supervision of the village guards has exacerbated lawless violence in the rural 
areas in south-eastern Turkey.
779
 They have been accused of some of the most serious human 
rights violations in south-eastern Turkey.
780
 In the early days of its armed campaign, its main 
objective was to attack high-profile targets to generate as much publicity and to show the 
Kurdish population that it was a force to be reckoned with. The modus operandi of the PKK 
also involved attacks on Turkish diplomatic offices throughout Europe in the 1990s, attacks 
on tourist centres in Turkey in an attempt to disrupt the tourist industry which is a vital source 
of income for Turkey.
781
  
In its third Congress (25-30 October 1986) the PKK established the Peoples’ Liberation 
Army of Kurdistan (ARGK) which was to expand military operations to cities and to 
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intensify political activity in urban areas.
782
 Indeed, targeting urban conurbations heralded a 
new tactic unique to any of the Kurdish NSAGs involved in revolts and led to accusation and 
ultimately classification of the PKK as a terrorist organization.
783
 According to Laciner and 
Bal, ‘in war of national independence, guerrilla warfare is commonly used as a primary 
method and is based on the consent and support of a large portion of the people. The PKK 
however, lacked that support and relied on a small minority, some of whom were forced to 
support the organization.’784 The former Turkish General Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş, stated 
publicly in July 1993 that approximately one-tenth of the Kurdish population in the Kurdish 
regions, or roughly four hundred thousand people, must be considered as active supporters of 
the PKK.
785
  
From the beginning of the conflict in 1984, the Turkish Government adopted the position that 
the PKK is a terrorist organization.
786
 Therefore, in response it has adopted very draconian 
military measures and political repression which include severe violations of human rights.
787
 
On 19 July 1987, as a reaction to the deteriorating security situation in southeast of the 
country, the Turkish Parliament proclaimed a civil state of emergency to establish an 
emergency civil administration according to State of Emergency Legislation (OHAL) and 
appointed a regional governor in whom all powers of the state of emergency administration 
were vested.
788
 However, there was no provision for an independent judicial review of its 
actions which contributed substantially to the breakdown of the rule of law.
789
 As some 
observers have noted:  
An atmosphere of intimidation and violence prevailed. State security forces targeted the 
PKK, although Kurdish rural communities were caught in the crossfire. Security 
operations in Kurdish villages were accompanied by arbitrary arrests, looting of 
moveable property, beatings, torture and disappearance. Few Kurds escaped the trauma 
of the actions of the security forces.
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The ensuing violence resulted in destruction of many villages and internal displacement of as 
many as 4 million Kurdish villagers.
791
 Further, in 2008, it was only as a result of the high 
profile court case of Ergenekon, involving top members of the military and civilian officials 
of the Turkish state that revealed the discovery of mass graves in eastern Turkey an 
indication of extrajudicial murders throughout that period.
792
 The abovementioned case is in 
relation to the existence of the so-called “deep state” in Turkey involving the army, heads of 
police departments, businessmen and journalists of the secular press.
793
 Since 22 January 
1990, Turkey accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to hear 
individual claims, followed by a number of cases in which Turkey has been found to have 
violated the right to life, liberty and effective remedy.
794
     
The closest the PKK and the Turkish Government have come to a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict was during the presidency of Turgut Özal in early 1990s when he proposed a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict.
795
 For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic 
he admitted publicly that ‘Turkey must deal with the Kurdish problem.’796 Indeed, under his 
leadership there was a relaxation of domestic restrictions on the use of Kurdish language and 
it was during this period that some tenuous attempts were made to engage the more moderate 
Kurdish elements to push the PKK towards a political solution.
797
 In 1993, the PKK 
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announced a unilateral ceasefire as a gesture of good will towards the Turkish government 
that had for the first time addressed the Kurdish issue directly. Özal even floated the idea of a 
general amnesty for PKK fighters.
798
 He believed that ultimately there had to be a political 
solution in relation to the troubles in south-eastern Turkey.
799
 Thus, during early 1990s Özal 
decided to develop an integrated approach to the Kurdish problem without necessarily giving 
up on combating the insurgency. In order to achieve this, he even called upon the good 
offices of the Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq in search of a viable solution.
800
 However, the 
Turkish Government’s intransigence continued and that same year in a paradoxical change of 
policy, President Özal announced a program of forced migration of the Kurds from south-
eastern Turkey to the west of the country presumably under pressure from the army 
destroying any political space left to negotiate between the government and the PKK.
801
 
Nonetheless, with Özal’s premature death in 1992, the reforms he had envisioned for Turkey 
could not be implemented.
802
 
 
2.10.3.3 The capture of Abdullah Ocalan 
 
The most pivotal moment in the conflict between the Turkish Army and the PKK transpired 
when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK since its inception, was captured by the 
Turkish Special Forces in Nairobi, Kenya on 15 February 1999.
803
 Since early 1980s Öcalan 
had been based in Syria with the alleged support of the Syrian Government.
804
 However, in 
spite of the fact that the PKK operated out of Syria in the 1980s and 90s, the government of 
Syria never admitted to provide support for the PKK.
805
 With Turkey growing restless due to 
activities of the PKK in the late 1990’s it threatened Syria with military action unless Syria 
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deported him.
806
 Prior to his arrest after months of negotiations and bargaining Turkey and 
Syria reached a security agreement upon which Syria would expel Öcalan, recognize the 
PKK as a terrorist organization, cut off the supply of weapons, logistic material, financial 
support and prevent any dissemination of PKK propaganda activity from its territory.
807
 
Hence, by reaching this agreement between the two major Middle East powers, the PKK 
found itself rather isolated.
808
 After deportation from Syria he travelled to Russia and then to 
Italy where his application for political asylum was rejected.
809
 He eventually found his way 
to Nairobi, Kenya where he was arrested in a secret operation by members of Turkish 
intelligence agents and taken back to Turkey.
810
 There were reports that the US, Israel and 
Greece had collaborated in his capture.
811
 Upon his return to Turkey Öcalan was convicted 
for treason and sentenced to death according to Article 125 of the Turkish Republic Criminal 
Code which later was commuted to a life sentence.
812
 Until now Öcalan remains the sole 
inmate in a specially organized prison on Imrali Island. In the course of his trial Öcalan urged 
the PKK to abandon armed struggle and engage in political dialogue with the Turkish 
Government with the view to achieve autonomy within the unitary system of Turkey.
813
 
Although the PKK abandoned armed struggle, Öcalan reserved the right to self-defence in the 
event of an armed attack.
814
 This unilateral ceasefire by the PKK subsequently led to a great 
reduction in hostilities and virtually ended the targeting of civilians.
815
 There remained 
sporadic skirmishes between the PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces, as noted by the 
Council of Europe. Throughout the period September 1999 to June 2004 the situation had 
improved appreciably.
816
 Significantly, in 2000 the PKK dropped the word “Kurdistan” in 
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recognition of abandoning the aspiration of an independent Kurdish state.
817
 At the time it 
claimed to advocate for advancement of cultural rights, wider democratic and legal standards 
by which ethnic, linguistic and political differences may be respected and protected.
818
   
The resulting lull did not last long. In September 2003 the PKK announced that due to lack of 
political progress with the Turkish government, it was ending the unilateral ceasefire and 
resuming its combat operations.
819
 The PKK cited the concentration of 60,000 Turkish troops 
and heavy artillery deployed near the border of Iraq in March 2003 as a belligerent statement 
of intent.
820
 On its part, Turkey had somewhat erroneously assumed that with the capture and 
conviction of Öcalan, the PKK as an organization and the conflict would be over. However, 
the reality has been far from that, notwithstanding the successes of the counter-insurgency 
tactics of the Turkish Army in the 1990s. A low-intensity armed conflict has continued in 
earnest even in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the on-going 
conflict is not of the same ferocity and intensity of the 1980s and early 1990s. In recent years, 
due to depletion of its military capability, the PKK has limited its operations to hit and run 
attacks targeting members of the army and security services as to generate as much publicity 
as possible. Like many other revolts or insurgencies this conflict could not have matured 
without an international dimension.
821
 For obvious reasons in the early days of the conflict 
because of its capacity to call upon up to 15,000 fighters, the PKK was intent on increasing 
the intensity of the military action in order to turn the conflict into a fully-fledged internal 
armed conflict. As a consequence the conflict would have been regulated by instruments of 
IHL related to internal armed conflict namely, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II 
of the Geneva Conventions rather than the Turkish domestic criminal law. The PKK was 
unable to achieve this simply because the conflict was by and large confined to south-eastern 
part of Turkey and although most of its operations were transnational and carried out of the 
safety of northern Iraq, the conflict never reached the level of a fully-fledged armed conflict. 
In recent years, Turkey has taken considerable strides in democratization of its political 
system mainly due to harbouring aspirations of joining the European Union. On 30 May 
2001, a package of 34 amendments to the 1982 Constitution was adopted, which introduced 
new provisions on issues such as freedom of thought and expression, the prevention of 
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torture, the strengthening of civilian authority, freedom of association, and gender equality.
822
 
Thus, by virtue of this reform the law prohibiting the use of Kurdish language in publications 
was repealed.
823
 Furthermore, as part of the process of democratization, Turkey also signed 
up to a number of major treaties principally due to pressure from the EU.
824
 In July 1999, it 
withdrew its reservations to the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW),
825
 and in August 2000 it signed up to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
Apart from the armed struggle carried out by the PKK Kurdish political activism in Turkey 
has continued unabated.
826
 As noted above, there have been many political parties which 
supported the demands of the Kurdish population but they were routinely deemed 
unconstitutional and subsequently closed down.
827
  
 
2.10.3.4 The Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK)828 
 
In February 2002, following the trial of Öcalan, the PKK announced its dissolution and 
reform as a political party namely; Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) in 
order to escape its terrorist designation.
829
 It stressed the wish to engage in political dialogue 
with the Turkish government in order to find a political solution to the conflict.
830
 This 
development coincided with the coming to power of the pro-Islamic the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) led by Receb Tayyip Erdogan.
831
 The PKK hierarchy considered 
this as a fresh opportunity to engage in the Turkish political process through peaceful 
means.
832
 In hope of political recognition by the new administration it even decided for yet 
another make-over by changing its name to the Kurdish People’s Congress (KONGRA-GEL) 
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without any structural, ideological or political reform from KADEK (PKK).
833
 This initiative 
was rebuffed by the Turkish government. The Turkish government has consistently 
maintained throughout the conflict that the PKK is a terrorism organization and it does not 
engage in dialogue with such organizations whose real agenda is seceding from Turkey and 
the establishment of a separate Kurdish state.
834
 It is worth noting that in 2003 KADEK was 
designated as a terrorist organization by the US Department of State.
835
 
The most significant development in relation to the PKK since its formation is the 
establishment of the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) in March 2005 through 
Öcalan’s Declaration of Democratic Confederalism in Kurdistan.836 KCK has been described 
as the umbrella organization bringing together the PKK and Kurdistan Free Life Party 
(PJAK) of Iran, the much smaller PKK allies Democratic Union Party (PYD) of Syria led by 
Fuat Omer and Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party led by Faiq Gulpi in Iraq.
837
 As of 2012, 
Murat Karayilan, the acting PKK leader serves as the chairman of the 12-person Executive 
Council of the KCK. Karayilan claims to have up to 8,000 fighters under his control, half of 
are based in Qandil mountains in northern Iraq and the other half are distributed throughout 
various provinces in Turkey.
838
 Turkish authorities claim KCK an urban arm of the PKK.
839
 
Since 2009, some 1,800 individuals have been prosecuted for alleged membership of the 
KCK by the Turkish judiciary. As of March 2012, the detainees included six MPs of the Main 
Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).
840
 According to the report on ‘Turkey-UK 
Relations and Turkey’s Regional Role’, by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK 
Parliament in 2012, there has been: 
… An intensified and sweeping wave of arrests of activists, journalists and lawyers, 
officials and elected politicians of the main Kurdish political party, the BDP, for 
terrorism-related offences, on the basis of alleged links to the KCK. By early 2012, 
                                                 
833
 ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2004’, United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, April 2005 <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf>. 
834
 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey’ 
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk_kongra-gel.en.mfa>. 
835
 US State Department, Iraq: Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 25 February 2004 
<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27928.htm>. 
836
 Öcalan, ‘the Declaration of Democratic Confederalism in Kurdistan’, op. cit.  
837
 M.M. Gunter, ‘Historical Dictionary of the Kurds’, scarecrow Press, 2011, p. 164-5. 
838
 Eccarius-Kelly, ‘the Militant Kurds: a Dual Strategy for Freedom’, op. cit., P. 212. 
839
 A. Christie-Miller, ‘the PKK and the Closure of Turkey’s Kurdish Opening’, MERIP, 4 August 2010 
<http://www.merip.org/mero/mero080410>. 
840
 ‘Turkey: Arrests Expose Flawed Justice System’, Human Rights Watch, 01 November 2011 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/01/turkey-arrests-expose-flawed-justice-system>. 
128 
 
thousands of people were reckoned to be on trial for such offences, with hundreds 
subject to pre-trial detention; the BDP’s had been severely disrupted.841  
 As discussed above, one of the main purposes of the establishment of KCK was to 
coordinate military and political activities of non-state Kurdish groups in states with Kurdish 
population and manifestation of this collaboration between various Kurdish groups has been 
felt over the border in Iran.  
 
2.11 Party for a Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK)
842
 
 
As touched upon before, since 1979, Iran has been ruled by a theocratic regime that is 
increasingly being challenged by collective display of peaceful political activism and by a 
number of armed groups claiming to stand for the advancement of the interest of sectarian 
and ethnic minorities who see themselves as primary victims of the state-directed 
oppression.
843
 PJAK is a new Iranian Kurdish militant nationalist group (NSAG) which held 
its first Congress on 25 March 2004 and has a close association with the PKK.
844
 The group 
has been engaged in low-intensity armed conflict with the Iranian security forces in Iran-Iraq 
border region since 2006.
845
 PJAK claims to be fighting for the autonomy of the Kurds within 
a federal and democratic Iran.
846
 It is driven by an ideology which combines Kurdish 
nationalism with secular and socialist principles.
847
 Many Iranian Kurds who are actively 
involved in peaceful political campaigns are frequently victims of human rights abuses by the 
Iranian regime under the pretext of collaboration with terrorist organizations.
848
 PJAK claims 
that having exhausted all avenues through peaceful means to resolve its differences with the 
central government, it was left with no choice but to take up arms.
849
 The precise origin of 
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PJAK is somewhat in doubt but it could be traced to 1997 to a peaceful student-based human 
rights organization inspired by the success of the Iraqi Kurds and the PKK in Turkey.
850
 In 
1999 due to harsh crackdowns carried out by the Iranian government on various political 
organizations especially in the Iranian Kurdistan, the leaders of the group sought refuge in the 
Qandil mountain region of northern Iraq.
851
  
The organization is led by Abdul-Rahman Haji-Ahmadi who has previously been a member 
of the PKK and is now in exile in Germany.
852
 Iran considers PJAK a terrorist organization 
and in recent years tried to extradite its leader for the alleged crimes committed by PJAK 
against the security services and civilians in Iran.
853
 Iran alleges that PJAK is the latest ploy 
by the US and Israel to destabilize it and the region as a whole.
854
 A number of commentators 
have claimed that through PJAK the US and Israel were waging a proxy war against Iran and 
that it was receiving clandestine assistance from the US and Israel in order to curtail the 
ambitions of the Iranian regime in the region and the wider Middle East.
855
 However, these 
allegations have been vehemently denied by US officials.
856
 It is interesting to note that in 
July 2007 the PJAK leader visited the US and met with US officials to gather support for his 
organization’s struggle against the theocratic regime in Iran.857 Although the US has not 
officially commented on the meeting, it has been claimed by some PJAK military leaders that 
their leader’s meeting in Washington was with “high level” officials and that they discussed 
“the future of Iran.”858 However, on 4 February 2009 in an apparent change of policy and a 
gesture of goodwill towards Iran, the US Government designated PJAK as a terrorist 
organization by virtue of supporting the PKK rather than on the basis of its own activities.
859
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The Iranian government has made repeated attempts to ask to extradite the PJAK leader from 
Germany.
860
 
Ever since its relocation to northern Iraq, Qandil Mountains has served as a “safe haven” to 
the organization’s 3,000 fighters and also as a hub for launching attacks against Iran.861 There 
they adopted the same operational tactics of the PKK and in effect came under the latter’s 
control. Women form 40 per cent of PJAK’s rank and file, as in the case of the PKK play a 
major part in every level of the organization.
862
 PJAK’s operations are not comparable to the 
PKK mainly because of its limited number of fighters. PJAK has claimed responsibility for a 
number of armed operations against security forces in Iran.
863
 As a reaction to these 
operations carried out by PJAK, since 2007, Iranian security forces have been shelling 
PJAK’s positions within northern Iraq from inside Iran.864 
It is worth mentioning that PJAK is alleged to be part of the Union of Communities in 
Kurdistan (Koma Civakên Kurdistan, KCK) headed by the PKK’s acting leader Murat 
Karayilan.
865
 According to the US Department of State PJAK is controlled by the PKK and 
has Turkish Kurds in its ranks.
866
 Because of the alleged association between PJAK and PKK 
in recent years Iran and Turkey in spite of their complex and at times acrimonious relations 
have carried out coordinated military operations against PJAK and PKK in Qandil 
Mountains.
867
 The determination of Iran and Turkey to combat the joint threat of the PKK 
and PJAK has recently been reiterated.
868
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Chapter 3 Modern International Law, the Kurds and self-determination 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In 1945, in the aftermath of the World War II, the United Nations was established, coinciding 
with the rise and fall of the Mahabad Republic.
869
 However, the Kurds as a people were not 
to benefit from the new international system especially the right to self-determination 
enshrined in the UN Charter as a principle but not a legal right. The right of self-
determination of people has been described as perhaps the most controversial and contested 
term in the vocabulary of international law. Self-determination in its modern form can be 
related to the experiences of the American, French and Bolshevik revolutions, with their 
emphasis on popular sovereignty. This concept was widely used by politicians and 
nationalists. However, in international law it had remained in embryonic form until the 
breaking out of the First World War at which point V.I. Lenin, the Soviet leader, and the US 
President Woodrow Wilson became the leading exponents of this ideal.
870
 The Charter 
neither defines “self” or “people” nor specifies the concept of “self-determination”871 and 
who are entitled to exercise that right.
872
 The legal basis of claims to self-determination in 
international law can be found in Articles of 1(2) and 55 and 73(b) of the United Nations 
Charter which make brief reference to the ‘principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
people’ as one of the bases for the development of friendly relations between states.873 These 
provisions have subsequently been elevated by the international community through a series 
of resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations to the point 
that self-determination has been described as ‘the imperative right of people’.874 In terms of 
application of the doctrine of self-determination Franck opines that due to its inconsistent 
application by the international community this right of self-determination has been 
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undermined under international law.
875
 In spite of its ill-defined content, the doctrine of self-
determination in international law has been used in the context of decolonization.
876
 This 
culminated in the General Assembly’s striking Resolution 1514 (XV) of December of 
1960
877, ‘the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ by 
some referred to as the most important of the General Assembly Resolutions
878
, which says 
‘all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. It also 
affirms that in the decolonization process, ‘any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’879 
However, the object of the Declaration was not to provide a general commentary on the 
emerging right of self-determination, in fact, it was being used specifically in the context of 
freeing Afro-Asian colonies from the yoke of European colonial powers.
880
 The decade after 
the adoption of Resolution 1514 (XV) was marked by two other major developments. The 
first was the two International Covenants on Human Rights
881
 and the second, the Declaration 
of Friendly Relations in 1970.
882
 It is worth noting that the 1970 declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Amongst States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625
883
, referred specifically to 
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the colonial situation.
884
 The 1970 Declaration went one step further in stating that states 
have a duty not to deprive people, who are subject to ‘colonialism’ and ‘alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation’, of their right to self-determination.’885 But under pressure from 
newly independent states the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations has a “claw-back” 
clause which limits the expression of the right to self-determination: 
Nothing in the forgoing paragraphs [related to the exercising of the right of self-
determination] shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity 
of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus 
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction as to race, creed or colour. 
The UN had based its strategy on the proposition that ‘the territory of a colony or other non-
self-governing territory has under the Charter a status separate and distinct from the territory 
of the state administering it’ and such a situation will exist until the people of that territory 
had exercised their right to self-determination.
886
   
At this stage special attention has to be paid to the importance of the principle of territorial 
integrity, which protects the territorial framework of newly independent states and is part of 
the overall sovereignty of those states.
887
 This is the concept of freezing territorial boundaries 
at the moment of independence; case-law has long maintained this principle.
888
 Also, it has 
been argued that the principle of territorial integrity of states is well established through the 
UN Charter. For instance, Article 2(4) forbids the threat of use of force against the territorial 
integrity and political independence of states.
889
 It is worth noting that the said principle has 
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particularly been emphasised by developing nations.
890
 In regard to the international 
community’s approach Cassese in his seminal evaluation of self-determination notes that it 
remained:  
Silent in response to claims asserting the right of self-determination … on behalf of 
ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, Armenians, and Basques, indigenous populations, 
such as the native peoples of Latin America, North America, Australia, and New 
Zealand; linguistic minorities, such as the Québécoise; and religious groups such as the 
Catholics in Northern Ireland.
891
   
As noted above, not only has the principle of self-determination been enshrined in the most 
important international documents and conventions but it has also been adopted by regional 
organizations.
892
 This principle has also received favorable judicial approval in the 
Namibia
893
, Western Sahara
894
 and East Timor
895
 cases. As the above-mentioned cases 
illustrate the right to ‘external’ self-determination was to be conceived only in the process of 
decolonization where a people assert their right only in the three following situations, against: 
colonial regimes, racist quo apartheid regimes, or military occupying forces.
896
 Clearly, the 
external right to self-determination developed by the UN since 1945 was to rid the statist 
system of foreign influence from the so-called third world countries but ensuring 
maintenance of established frontiers.
897
 Therefore, in the strict positivist sense, the doctrine of 
self-determination in its external guise is not applicable to the Kurdish populations of Turkey, 
Iraq, and Iran since they are not under neither colonial or racist regimes nor under occupying 
forces.
898
 As Chaliand says:  
‘During international assemblies, the invocation of “the right of self-determination” is 
made as often as it is vague; this right is legally guaranteed, but its content is however, 
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non-existent and it is known that it depends more often than not to relations of powers 
as it is measured by force of arms.’899 
It is worth noting that beyond the process of decolonization the said doctrine has evolved into 
‘internal’ self-determination.900 In the light of this development, the focus of self-
determination was diverted from purely decolonization process into an internal human rights 
issue concerning existing independent states.
901
 In other words the principle of self-
determination attained a new application in terms of collective human rights.
902
 Therefore, 
self-determination applies beyond the process of decolonization albeit under a different 
context, it provides the overall framework for the consideration of the principles relating to 
democratic governance.
903
 In the post-1945 era, the Cold War had a profound effect on the 
exercise of the right to self-determination, as many former colonies in Africa and Asia were 
achieving their independence instead the Kurds were ‘doomed, in large part, to remain within 
a system bent on maintaining territorial integrity of states.’904 As a result, yet again due to 
international intervention in favor of Turkey and Iran (by the US & the West) and Iraq 
(supported by the USSR) usurped the aspirations of the Kurds in the Middle East.
905
 So it 
comes as no surprise that the Cold War era marked more continuous repression and forced 
assimilation of the Kurds into the unitary systems of Turkey, Iraq and Iran, ultimately 
resulting in the Kurds taking up arms against the sovereign states in question.
906
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3.2 The rise of non-state actors in the post-1945 era 
 
One of the most distinguishing aspects of contemporary international law since the end of the 
World War II has been the emergence of wide variety of participants which include sovereign 
states as well as international organizations, regional organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, public companies, private companies and individuals.
907
 Moreover, the 
twentieth and twenty-first Centuries heralded the rise of non-state actors whose activities are 
transnational or have transnational affect.
908
 Consequently, this has resulted in non-state 
actors becoming more prominent in international relations.
909
 On this point Green notes: 
Non-state actors play a crucial role in today’s globally interdependent world. The 
actions of international organizations, multinational corporations, terrorists groups, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), minority peoples and individual persons now 
permeate all areas of international life – from economics and trade to peace and 
security, and from human rights to the regulation of the natural environment.
910
   
This view is very much supported by some of the most prominent scholars of international 
law that point to the changing nature of global power structure, international law and 
specifically the decline of the sovereign state and the rise of non-state actors.
911
 Many 
observers such as Martin Van Creveld acknowledge the decline of the state as one of the most 
important institutions since the middle of the seventeenth century as one of the main reasons 
for this trend.
912
 In the first decade of the twenty-first century we find ourselves in a global 
environment where a significant number of the nominal states of the world are incapable of 
exercising anything approaching plenary power within their borders. They are commonly 
described as failed states.
913
 Reisman contributes the very formation and existence of such 
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states to the fact that they are treated as nation-states because of the tacit or expressed 
agreement or the coincidental disinterest of the effective global elite.
914
  
Moreover, globalization has had the greatest impact on the structure of international relations 
and international law and as a result many experts are convinced that this body of law is 
going through a rapid period of transformation.
915
 Undoubtedly, globalization has also 
precipitated the decline of the nation-state in the twentieth century and the rise of non-state 
actors as subjects of international law.
916
 The fact that entities other than states can be 
subjects of international law is not a universally accepted idea and remains a very 
controversial issue.
917
 Therefore, it could be concluded that although there are more non-state 
actors prominent on the global plain but still it will be sovereign states sitting at the 
negotiating table presiding over crucial decision-making process in international relations. 
Howard notes: 
It is not clear what alternative creators and guarantors of peaceful order could or would 
take place of the state in a wholly globalized world. The state still remains the effective 
mechanism through which people can govern themselves … The erosion of state 
authority is thus likely not to strengthen world order but to weaken it, since states 
become incapable of fulfilling the international obligations on which that order 
depends.
918
  
In spite of the emergence of non-state actors, there is no question that the most important 
decisions regarding any aspects of international relations and international law will ultimately 
be made by the community of sovereign states.
919
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3.3 The rise of NSAGs globally, guerrilla warfare and international law  
 
The second half of the twentieth century has been described as the era of guerrilla warfare.
920
 
It is fair to say that the concept of armed conflict evolved from predominantly inter-state in 
nature in the first half of the twentieth century to being increasingly pre-occupied with an 
intrastate character in the second half of the twentieth Century.
921
 In these internal conflicts 
NSAGs in the shape of rebels, insurgents and militias which operate outside the control of 
any states not only seriously threaten the security of populations within states but also imperil 
the security of millions beyond their borders.
922
  
Since the end of the Second World War, ideology, revolution and counter-revolution together 
have been the most potent causes of conflict in the shape of internal armed conflicts in the 
world.
923
 Various studies that track armed conflicts confirm that in the post-1945 period the 
majority of those conflicts were of internal rather than between sovereign nations.
924
 The 
incidences of inter-state wars have declined dramatically over the past half a century.
925
 In 
this regard Derriennic opines that ‘if civil wars seem to be the most deadly form of political 
violence, it is certainly not because of the new intensity of the phenomenon but more 
probably because of the relative decline in another form of organized violence, inter-state 
war’.926 After the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, many governments and jurists 
abandoned the use of the term “war”.927 It has been argued that another contributory factor to 
the demise of inter-state war was the outlawry of war as a national instrument through Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.
928
 War as an instrument of national policy was abolished.
929
 This 
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even prompted many international jurists such as Quincy Wright to rush to claim the 
abolition of war as an institution of international law in the nineteenth century positivist 
sense. He states that ‘war in the legal sense has been in large measure “outlawed”; that is, the 
international law conventionally accepted by most states no longer recognizes that large-scale 
hostilities may constitute a “state of war” in which belligerents are legally equal’.930  
In this regard, Dinstein opines that by omitting the term ‘war’ the drafters of the said Article 
2(4) abolished the use or threat of force in international relations.
931
 But significantly intra-
state clashes were therefore beyond the reach of the Charters provisions. This reflected the 
humanitarian revolution which marked a fundamental shift in the very nature and purpose of 
the rules governing the prosecution of armed conflict.
932
 The UN regime however spelt out 
two exceptional circumstances in which resort to use of force by states would be allowed. 
One was in case of self-defence a sovereign state was permitted to use proportionate force in 
order to protect its population and sovereignty against outside aggression under Article 51 of 
the UN Charter
933
 and the other through collective law-enforcement action by the UN 
Security Council through the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
934
 These two exceptions 
however were only strictly related to states and not in relation to other entities such as 
NSAGs.
935
  
Not only war as an institution in international relations was not abolished but simply the 
nature of armed conflict went through a dramatic shift of paradigm from predominantly inter-
state armed conflicts between sovereign states in Europe to intra-state conflicts limited 
mainly to regions outside Western Europe.
936
 It is significant to note that since the Korean 
War in 1954, there has been no conventional war between major powers, and the incidence of 
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inter-state wars have declined dramatically over the past half a century.
937
 Indeed, this trend 
left the international community in no doubt that the issue of internal armed conflict had to be 
addressed, albeit, through a somewhat minimalist manner by the adaption of Article 3 to the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The said Conventions and its two Additional Protocols of 
1977 which specifically deal with internal armed conflict will be discussed in greater detail 
below.  
3.4 NSAGs, the Cold War & proxy wars  
 
As noted above, as the specter of civil war enters the picture of post-1945 armed conflict, any 
optimism for eradication of war as a phenomenon was dashed. Such idealism was short lived 
and was shattered by the outbreak of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet 
Union and its resultant ideological confrontations. To put it simply, the ideological contest 
between communism and free market capitalism. This clash of ideologies continued until the 
collapse of the Soviet empire in 1990.
938
 Hence, the Cold War’s ideological conflicts 
subsequently played a major part in proliferation of many NSAGs engaged in proxy-wars on 
behalf of the super-powers challenging the legitimacy of the government of states (mostly of 
newly independent states) who were hosting them.
939
 Indeed, the armed conflicts in which 
Kurdish NSAGs were involved in were also a result of this ideological dichotomy in the 
shape of proxy wars.
940
 According to Neff, ‘there was an increasing view, strongly 
undergirded by Cold-War consideration, that modern civil wars, much more than those in the 
past, often had repercussions that extended well beyond the boundaries of the state in 
question.’941 
Inevitably, there was an upward trend in internal armed conflicts during the Cold War era.
942
 
With the advent of the Cold War and the proliferation of nuclear weaponry put an end to 
inter-state conflicts and direct form of aggression involving major powers, resulted in, many 
less transparent internationalized armed conflict which were on the surface of internal nature 
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but in reality were ‘proxy wars’.943 These conflicts were taking place in the territory of a 
single state with the covert intervention of a foreign state, mainly the two superpowers.
944
 In 
other words, the existence of nuclear weapons acted as a deterrent and prevented the super 
powers to engage in direct confrontation in those conflicts.
945
 The repercussions of this 
ideological contrast in regards to armed conflicts were very far reaching.
946
 As a 
consequence, the concept of “proxy war” became a common feature of the second half of the 
twentieth century in international  and non-international warfare.
947
  
 
3.5 The classical approach to NSAGs & armed conflict in international 
law 
 
3.5.1 The legal development 
 
In order to follow this important element of international law especially in relation to NSAGs 
and internal armed conflict, the following historical analysis will act as a catalyst to promote 
appreciation of the development and values of the laws of war or in its modern guise 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). All of the revolts in the first half of the twentieth 
century involving traditional Kurdish NSAGs were considered purely as civil wars in 
international law. This was so in the light of the fact that at the time the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state were of no concern of international law. 
The laws of war were the first part of international law to be codified which had its basis in 
human history.
948
 Until the mid-nineteenth century the laws of war remained customary in 
nature, ‘recognised because they had existed since time immemorial and because they 
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corresponded to the demands of civilization.’949 What existed at the time was more in custom, 
in broad principles, in military manuals and the national laws and religious teachings.
950
 
Although the laws regulating the conduct of hostilities were recognized in many early 
cultures, the theories of the laws of armed conflict are essentially “Eurocentric” in nature.951 
‘In his seminal work ‘De jure belli ac pacis’, published in 1625, Hugo Grotius, the father of 
modern international law, signaled the existing bounds to the conduct of war.
952
 In it he 
considered what principles governed or should govern the behavior of nations towards each 
other. However, the text was concerned as much with the causes as to the conduct of war; 
spelt out in a convenient technical language of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Not only was 
Grotius concerned with the question of how men should behave in the heat of the battle, but 
he also dealt seriously with the question whether they should be fighting at all in the first 
place. In other words for Grotius, the rights and wrongs of engaging in war at all was as much 
a concern as how the war should be conducted.
953
 
It was only during the age of the enlightenment in the seventeenth century that something 
recognizable like the modern international law took shape, in that it found its way into the 
common discourse of the ruling elites of the whole European state-system.
954
 As a result of 
the creation of a modern European state system in the seventeenth century, the laws of war 
were the first branch of international law to be developed in any depth. 
955
 Indeed it has been 
noted that ‘more humane rules were able to flourish in the period of limited wars from 1648 
to 1792’.956 But it was during the middle of nineteenth century to the first decade of the 
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twentieth century that the laws of war were partially codified.
957
 Multiplicity of factors led to 
their restatement and development in the second half of 19
th
 century.
958
  
The development of the laws of war in the second half of the nineteenth century was brought 
about mainly because of an era of great belief in human progress in general.
959
 This also 
heralded the birth of an era of multilateral treaties, setting out principles in this area of 
international law for states to follow.
960
 Yet, ironically the greatest contribution to the laws of 
armed conflict was made by a Prussian expatriate, Francis Lieber, who was given the task of 
regulating the conduct of hostilities by the Confederate army in the American Civil War.
961
 
The Lieber Code and the original Geneva Conventions in 1864 heralded the era of “civilized” 
warfare between “civilized” sovereign states.962 The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 
played an instrumental role in the development of the laws of war. The Declaration of St 
Petersburg provided an impetus for the international community to embark upon the adoption 
of further declarations of a similar nature at the two Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907.
963
 
Nevertheless, this universal aspiration came to an abrupt end by the concept of total war and 
the advent of more destructive weaponry with the outbreak of the First World War in1914.
964
 
In the aftermath of the Great War, the international community turned its attention more to 
jus ad bellum restrictions rather than the development of the laws of war through instruments 
such as the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), 
which condemned recourse to war as a solution for international disputes.
965
 In the 
intervening years between the two World Wars and as a reaction to the First World War, the 
1929 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies 
in the Field was adopted.
966
 Hitherto the international community had only been specifically 
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concerned with inter-state wars between sovereign states. The abovementioned instruments 
were almost entirely concerned with international armed conflicts, much of which was 
subsequently revised and refined through the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its additional 
Protocol of 1977. Therefore, the law of war was paradigmatically inter-state law and not 
applicable to internal armed conflicts in the nineteenth as well as the early twentieth 
centuries. Some states may have observed them through the doctrine of recognition of 
belligerency but were mostly done out of self-interest and practical purposes, rather than 
adhering to international law.
967
 However in the aftermath of the Second World War, civil 
wars achieved a more prominent place on the international agenda and it is here that the laws 
of war have been described at their weakest.
968
 But the modern approach to ‘internal armed 
conflict’ is contained in common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention 1949 supplemented by 
the Additional Protocol II of 1977.
969
 This has been described as one of the most significant 
expansions of the laws of war in the realm of civil war in the second part of the twentieth 
century.
970
 The law of war which evolved into International Humanitarian Law is the best 
example of the humanizing wave that swept through Public International Law after the 
establishment of the United Nations in 1945. The apparent paradox besetting the Law of 
War/IHL throughout its history could be explained albeit in simplified terms between those 
who call for it and those who formulate and have to implement it. Lauterpacht, the foremost 
international jurist of his time notes: 
We shall utterly fail to understand the true character of the law of war unless we are to 
realize that its purpose is almost entirely humanitarian in the literal sense of the word, 
namely to prevent or mitigate suffering and, in some cases, to rescue life from the 
savagery of battle and passion. This, and not the regulation and direction of hostilities, 
is its essential purpose.
971
 
In contrast to rules related to international armed conflict, the legal rules concerning internal 
armed conflict are of relatively new in origin. Traditionally, state-centric international law, 
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largely ignored NSAGs and internal armed conflicts and such issues were treated as prima 
facie as domestic affairs of sovereign states.
972
 The laws of war were not automatically 
applicable to internal armed conflict even as way back as the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries internal conflicts and uprisings were believed to be purely internal matters of 
sovereign states.
973
 Some have even suggested that before a civil conflict could be considered 
as true war, a crucial conceptual step was necessary to be taken to somehow place insurgents 
on a legal par with the government that they were rebelling against, at least in matters relating 
to the conflict itself.
974
 In order to understand how the international community has fashioned 
its approach towards internal armed conflict, a brief historical background is provided here. 
As stated above, international law has long acknowledged a distinction between international 
and internal armed conflict. This dichotomy is based upon the core legal principle of state 
sovereignty which has been the cornerstone of international order since the Peace Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648.
975
 In western thoughts, there has been a long tradition of regarding civil 
conflicts as fundamentally distinct from true war in the sixteenth to the eighteenth century in 
which rebels were without any rights.
976
 The concept of state sovereignty as it emerged in the 
sixteenth century, determined that political power rested only with the sovereign states.
977
 
However, if the intensity of the conflict were to reach a high level of severity, the question of 
regulation by international law arises, in which case the relevant threshold being 
characterized and identified by the concept of recognition of belligerency.
978
 In other words, 
the only condition that members of NSAGs were to be recognized as lawful combatants was 
to be recognized either by the central governments they were fighting at or other states, 
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especially regional and world powers. During the nineteenth century civil war was given a 
different legal perspective into something resembling the mainstream of legal analysis, 
mainly because of the crumbling of older conceptions of legitimacy and realization by many 
peoples in that period for their right to self-determination.
979
 
Furthermore, in the nineteenth century a body of law on the recognition of belligerency was 
devised by the international community to deal with a new phenomenon called 
‘insurgency’.980 This attitude emerged in European law and practice manifesting itself 
through the recognition that insurgent forces could be regarded as de facto entities as long as 
they met certain conditions namely; control of a part of the territory of the host state as well 
as discharging of the governmental functions; carrying out their military operation according 
to the laws of war; and circumstances that make it necessary for third states to recognition the 
belligerency.
981
  
Thus under one condition the laws of war were applicable to internal armed conflicts in the 
case of recognition of belligerency. It depended very much on the government facing a 
rebellion on its territory and if that government was prepared to unequivocally declare its 
intention to observe the laws of war to the rebels.
982
 But as long as the onus of recognition of 
belligerency was firmly upon the central government, it had very little chance of being 
granted.
983
 Nevertheless in traditional international law, an armed and violent challenge 
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which pitted NSAGs (insurgents) against the established government within a state was 
divided into three different stages according to the scale and intensity of the conflict, bearing 
different legal consequences flowing from each namely; rebellion, insurgency and 
belligerency.
984
   
 
3.5.2 The three tier hierarchy 
 
3.5.2.1 Non-application of the laws of war to situations of rebellion 
 
Violence within a state is labeled a rebellion ‘so long as there is sufficient evidence that the 
police forces of the parent state will reduce the seditious party to respect the municipal legal 
order.’985 International law does not purport to grant protections to participants in 
rebellions.
986
 Rebellions often revolved around single issue concerns, modern examples may 
include Soviet food riots or Indian language riots, to name a few.
987
 In such situations a local 
rebellion ‘warranted no acknowledgement of its existence on an extra-national level.’988 At 
least one eminent international lawyer does not even consider rebellion as a category of 
internal armed conflict.
989
 Thus the attitude of international law towards rebellion was the 
most straightforward compared to the other two categories, especially if the uprising by a 
section of the population in the shape of rebellion was to be put down swiftly and effectively 
through the operation of internal security forces. In this case the conflict remained as a purely 
internal matter. As a result, the rebels were not granted any rights or protection under 
international law.
990
 Furthermore, the established government would brand them as criminals 
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undeserving any legal protection. This kind of attitude is still prevalent among many states 
and legal scholars even till the early part of the twenty-first century.
991
  
It is worth noting that it was within the remit of traditional international law whether the third 
states were to maintain normal relations with the aforementioned government and were also 
permitted to lend it support in the suppression of the rebellion.
992
  On the other hand assisting 
rebels by a third state was not permitted according to international law on the basis of 
prohibition of intervention in the domestic affair of a state. On this crucial point Wilson states 
that ‘because rebels have no legal rights, and may not legitimately be assisted by outside 
powers, traditional international law clearly favors the established government in the case of 
rebellion, regardless of the cause for which the rebels are fighting.’993 The criteria of rebellion 
are rather vague and could cover a variety of situations from instances of minor disturbances 
including single-issue protests to a rapidly suppressed uprising.  
 
 
3.5.2.2 The concept of insurgency 
 
Insurgency on the other hand involves a more significant attack against the legitimate order 
of a state, where the insurgents are sufficiently organized and capable of mounting a serious 
challenge to the central government.
994
 As with rebellion, traditional international law 
provided no exact definition of insurgency. On this point Lauterpacht notes: 
‘Any attempt to play down conditions of recognition of belligerency leads itself to 
misunderstanding. Recognition of insurgency creates a factual relation in that legal 
rights and duties as between insurgents and outside states exists insofar as they are 
expressly conceded and agreed upon for reasons of convenience, of humanity or of 
economic interest.’995      
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Thus it is generally agreed upon that recognition of insurgency is recognition of ‘factual 
relation’ or in effect acknowledgement of the fact that of existence of an internal armed 
conflict taking place.
996
 Beyond that, according to Wilson there is little description of the 
characteristics of the ‘fact’, she opines: 
‘There are no requirements for the degree of intensity of the violence, the extent of 
control over the territory, the establishment of a quasi-governmental authority, or the 
conduct of operations in accordance with any humanitarian principles which would 
indicate recognition of insurgency is appropriate.  Indeed, the only criterion of 
recognition, if one could call it that is necessity.’997 
The upshot of this was that other states were left substantially free to determine the 
consequence of this acknowledgement.
998
 An analysis of traditional international law leads us 
to deduce that in order for rebels to be elevated to the status of insurgency, they had to 
occupy a considerable portion of the state in which the internal conflict is taking place. 
Recognition of insurgency also constitutes a belief by a foreign power that the insurgents 
should not be executed upon capture.
999
  Some scholars of international law such as Higgins 
and Greenspan have suggested that by conferring the status of ‘insurgents’ upon any rebel 
group, they are taken out of the domestic legal system and firmly onto the international law 
forum. In their opinion, recognition of insurgency means that the rebels are no longer law-
breakers but contestants-at-law.
1000
 Others such as Castren maintain that the status of 
insurgency does not confer any rights or duties on the group and they should still be subjected 
to the domestic criminal law of the state concerned.
1001
 However, Falk is of the opinion that 
by granting a rebellious group the status of insurgency they would be provided with quasi-
international law status. He notes that ‘… a catch all designation provided by international 
law to allow states to determine the quantum of legal relations to be established with the 
insurgents. It is an international acknowledgement of an internal war but it leaves each state 
substantially free to control the consequences of this acknowledgement.’1002        
It is worth noting that recognition of insurgency does not extend beyond the territorial 
borders of the state in question nor does it provide the rebels with any protection under 
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international law.
1003
 In effect, such recognition according to Castren means that 
‘acknowledgement of the existence of an armed revolt of grave character and the lawful 
government’s capacity, at least temporarily, to maintain public order and exercise authority 
over all the parts of the national territory.’1004 Nevertheless, the nineteenth century heralded a 
sea-change in attitude of the international community towards civil wars culminating in the 
development of a “recognition of belligerency” doctrine.   
 
3.5.2.3 The recognition of belligerency 
 
The third category of civil conflict is recognition of belligerency that is much more 
comprehensively dealt with in international law than those of insurgency and rebellion. This 
is perhaps the only way in classical international law in which rebels could have been 
considered as international legal persons, depending very much upon the attitude of other 
subjects of international law, the sovereign states.
1005
 The distinction in international law 
between insurgency and recognition of belligerency has been dealt with by the ITCY in the 
Tadic Jurisdiction Decision.
1006
 It noted that the ‘dichotomy was clearly sovereignty oriented 
and reflected the traditional configuration of the international community, based on the 
coexistence of sovereign states more inclined to look after their own interest than community 
concerns or humanitarian demands.’1007 
By the end of the nineteenth century, it gradually became commonplace to apply these rules 
to internal armed conflicts of considerable proportions. Therefore, for the insurgents to be 
recognized the conflict had to assume the attributes of inter-state wars.
1008
 As a result, upon 
recognition by the host state the insurgents were challenging militarily, not only as insurgents 
but expressly as belligerents. In reality, they as an entity became assimilated as a state actor 
with all the rights and obligations that flow from laws of international armed conflict.
1009
 In 
the nineteenth century in the case of the Santissima Trinidad and the St. Sander, the 
American Supreme Court referred to recognition of belligerency by its government of a 
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condition of civil war between Spain and its colonies in Latin America.
1010
 In the case of 
Williams v Bruffy, the Supreme Court set out the conditions of recognition of belligerency, 
‘when a rebellion becomes recognized, and attains such proportions as to be able to put 
formidable military force in the field, it is usual for the established government to concede to 
it some belligerent rights.’1011  
According to Lauterpacht it is permissible and possibly obligatory to recognize a condition of 
belligerency providing certain conditions of facts existed. They include: the existence of a 
civil war beyond a mere civil disturbance accompanied by a state of general hostilities; the 
seditious party enjoying partial military success to be capable of maintaining military 
operation for considerable length of time; holding and forming an alternative administration 
of a substantial part of the state’s territory as well as involving a large number of the 
population within the society; observance of the laws of war by the rebel forces and acting 
under responsible command.
1012
 Lauterpacht also emphasizes upon the crucial point that 
without the latter requirements recognition of belligerency might be open to abuse for the 
purpose of gratuitous manifestation of sympathy with the cause of the insurgents.
1013
  
By the beginning of the twentieth century a view seemed to emerge that recognition of 
belligerency by a foreign state must be explicit and formal, manifesting itself either through a 
declaration of neutrality or a specific pronouncement to the de facto status of the belligerents 
amounting to the recognition of belligerency. In 1937, Robert Wilson stated:  
The sound view seems to be that, given the de facto existence and possession by the 
insurgents community of the physical and organizational attributes which would show 
capacity to be responsible person, recognition of belligerency still implies in the words 
of John Bassett Moore, ‘existence of an emergency, actual or imminent, such as makes 
it incumbent upon neutral powers to define their relations to the conflict.
1014
  
However, as far as NSAGs in the early twentieth century were concerned their legal status 
had to be evaluated according to the degree of control they had over the territory and 
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recognition by governments.
1015
 As indicated earlier, international law traditionally did not 
recognize rebels as legal entities unless they graduated to insurgency since insurgents enjoyed 
international rights and obligations in relation to those states that recognized them as having 
such a status.
1016
 Antonio Cassese opines that insurgents only needed to satisfy minimal 
conditions to achieve such a status in which the rebels should prove that they are in effective 
control of a certain part of the territory and that the civil commotion has reached a certain 
degree of intensity and duration, beyond the mere riots and sporadic acts of violence.
1017
  
 
3.5.2.4 State practice and recognition of belligerency 
 
In practice, the occasions in which insurgents were granted belligerent rights were very few 
and far between.
1018
 In occasional cases that some states may have observed the doctrine of 
recognition of belligerency mostly done out of self-interest and practical purposes than 
adhering to international law.
1019
 Consequently, attempts made by international lawyers to 
make observance of recognition of belligerency compulsory for governments came to no 
avail.
1020
 Even the theory of recognition of insurgency that developed later with the same 
purpose, imposing certain responsibilities upon states to apply certain rules of the laws of war 
to internal armed conflict, did not have much success.
1021
  
Nonetheless, from the political point of view it could be argued that the abovementioned 
rules were devised mainly to protect the commercial interests of third states; namely the great 
European powers such as France and Great Britain. Existence of a civil war more often 
affects the commercial interest of the third state and may also affect the personal and property 
rights of the third state citizens who happened to be in the afflicted area.
1022
 Falk notes that 
‘in a state system, governments have a mutual interest in their security of tenure. Hence, the 
                                                 
1015
 H.A. Wilson, ‘International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements’, op. cit., p. 24.  
See also R. Jennings, and A. Watts, (ed.) ‘Oppenheim’s International Law (Peace)’, 9th ed., Vol. I, part 1, 
Longman, London, 1996, pp. 161-83. 
1016
 R. Mushkat, ‘Who May Wage War? An Examination of an Old/New Question’, 2 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 
97 (1987), p. 109. 
1017
 Cassese, ‘International Law’, op. cit., 2005, p.125. 
1018
 Castren, ‘Civil War’, op. cit., p. 39.  
1019
 See for example the recognition of US of Spanish colonies in their war of independence (1815); or in the 
Greek War of Independence by Great Britain. Moir, ‘The Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, op. cit., p. 17 
1020
 Cullen, ‘the Concept of Non-International Armed’, op. cit., p. 22. 
1021
 Y.M. Lootsteen, ‘the Concept of Belligerency in International Law’, (2000) Military Law Review, p. 114. 
1022
 J.G. Stark, ‘An Introduction to international Law’, Butterworth, 5th ed., 1963, p. 145. 
153 
 
bias of the system against revolutionary challenges is a logical expression of the basic idea of 
sovereign states exercising exclusive control over territory.’1023 
However, Castren cites other ulterior motives on the part of the sovereign states for the 
development of the said doctrine. He notes that ‘in order to prevent outside parties from 
intervening in insurrections and civil wars, states often concluded treaties according to which 
no assistance should be given to the insurgents should internal disturbances occur in the 
territory of either party.’1024 On this crucial development Rosemary Abi-Saab opines that ‘if 
such a recognition emanated from the established government it entailed the application of 
the jus in bello in its entirety to its relation with the rebels; if it emanated from third parties it 
enabled them to require to be treated as neutrals by both belligerent parties.’1025 
But she maintains that this was a purely discretionary act.
1026
 Recognition of belligerency was 
only granted once there had been substantial successes in the conflict on the part of the 
rebels, such as occupying a considerable part of the territory of the host state. Therefore, the 
parties would assert belligerent rights on par with an international conflict.
1027
 This approach 
was confirmed by the Institute of International Law in 1900 through the adoption of a 
resolution on rights and duties of foreign states in case of insurrection. The resolution stated 
that recognition of belligerency should only be granted by third parties once the rebel forces 
were in possession of certain part of the national territory.
1028
 However, such instances were 
very few and far between. This was very much reflected by the state practice at the time, as 
Neff notes: 
In this area, the inheritance of nineteenth century remained very much in evidence, 
most notably in the retention of the traditional bias in favour of established 
governments and against insurgents. Recognition of belligerency and of insurgency 
were little in evidence, at least on the surface; but it was likely that they were merely 
sleeping and not dead.
1029
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It is worth noting that recognition of belligerency by third parties did not bind the 
government of the state concerned. In regard to such situations Moir is of the opinion that it 
imposed no duty on the established government to recognize the belligerents and that 
widespread recognition by foreign states undoubtedly influenced the host state to follow suit 
too.
1030
  
In relation to this, Gasser claims that the last case of recognition of belligerency granted by a 
parent state to insurgents, operating within its borders, was in the Boer War in 1902.
1031
  
Although this trend was largely welcomed by states, it resulted in a legal vacuum of any 
international regulation for internal armed conflict.
1032
 Nowadays, it is claimed that these 
recognition of regimes that formed the essential pillars of the application of the laws of war to 
internal armed conflict are no longer applicable in modern international law and have been 
replaced by compulsory rules of IHL that apply once the intensity of the conflict has reached 
a certain level.
1033
 It is argued that this approach adopted by modern international law is very 
much the reflection of the obsolete nature of such recognition regimes.
1034
 
Detter is of the opinion that the rules of recognition of belligerency in regard to the laws of 
armed conflict have now been ‘abandoned’, mainly due to the political reality that no 
government of a sovereign state would recognize the belligerency of a rebel movement on its 
territory since it would be in direct challenge to its political legitimacy and territorial 
integrity.
1035
 
To summarize, according to classical international law rebels, insurgents and belligerents 
were the main categories of NSAGs which were positioned according to degrees of control 
over certain territory and recognition of belligerency by states. Rebels were considered to 
have rights under international law only once they had upgraded to insurgency, which in turn 
they would have obligations with regard to those states that recognized them as having such a 
status. But even in regard to insurgents, there was no unanimity amongst international 
lawyers on this legal status as there was no accurate legal definition in international law. But 
only when insurgents were recognized expressly by the host state as belligerents, did they 
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become de facto state actors with all the rights and obligations. But in reality such recognition 
almost never occurred. Recognition of belligerency and insurgency inherited from the 
nineteenth century were not completely dead but very much pushed to the background. 
However, they would find a new utility and some relevance in the twenty-first century. 
Another contributory factor to the contemporary disuse of the recognition of belligerency 
doctrine was the outlawry of war and the use of the phrase “armed conflict” in the drafting of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
1036
 
 
3.6 Humanization of the law of war: a modern approach 
 
Until the second half of the twentieth century, the violence within states and acts of sovereign 
leaders remained outside the scope of international law, not even customary international law 
was applicable.
1037
 This was in spite of the fact that in the twentieth century major internal 
conflicts such as the Spanish civil war of 1936-1939,
1038
 the Greek Civil war of 1946-49,
1039
 
and the Chinese civil war of 1945-49,
1040
 took place with more regularity. As a result, causing 
so much suffering worldwide and in such conflicts humanitarianism was least regarded.
1041
 
The beginning of the twentieth century also witnessed efforts by the International Committee 
of Red Cross (ICRC) to devise some international regulation applicable to internal armed 
conflicts.
1042
 In the intervening years between the two Hague Conventions (1899 &1907) and 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1929 Geneva Conventions were the only codification 
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attempt that due to lack of consensus between major powers did not receive universal 
approval.
1043
 The shortcomings of the Geneva Conventions of 1929 exposed by the Second 
World War prompted the international community to adopt four new Conventions for the 
protection of the victims of war in 1949.
1044
  
It is worth noting that a few months prior to the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
another important step had been taken by the international community by the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 by the U.N. General Assembly.
1045
 Hence a 
clear indication by the international community that international legal regulations were no 
longer only concerned with inter-state relations; this was a clear signal that it was now also 
concerned with the internal order of states too.
1046
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War and the formation of the United Nations, the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremburg and the Nuremberg principles, did the act of 
state doctrine eventually lost its verve.
1047
 Hence, the international community deemed it 
necessary to deal with this mode of armed conflict,
1048
 and this deficiency was eventually 
remedied by the adoption of the Geneva Conventions on 12 August 1949.
1049
 Most important 
of all to this study Common Article 3 to all the Geneva Conventions in which the respect for 
basic standards of humanity in non-international armed conflict and especially protection of 
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civilians in such situations was enshrined.
1050
 Significantly, according to the said 
conventions, IHL provisions were compulsory irrespective of which party decided to resort to 
force, the Convention also confirmed the autonomy and distinction of jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello.
1051
  
International human rights law (IHRL) has played an important role since its introduction 
into international discourses in the aftermath of the World War II. It is basically concerned 
with the relationship between states, their own nationals and alien nationals under their 
jurisdiction.
1052
 It has to be emphasised that IHRL is now an integral part of the fabric of 
international law and relations for the common welfare of humanity and represents common 
values that no state can deny its citizens even in time of armed conflict.
1053
 The origins of the 
modern human rights law can be traced to the visionaries of the enlightenment who sought a 
more just relationship between the state and its citizens.
1054
 Prior to this human rights had 
been granted to individuals through bill of rights, constitutional law or in very rare cases 
international treaty instruments for protection of minorities following the First World War, a 
subject of national law until the end of the Second World war.
1055
 In order to supervise and 
control states, IHRL has also been developed in the shape of different levels of regional and 
universal schemes of the world.
1056
 The first international instrument to deal specifically with 
the issue of human rights standards applicable globally was the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.
1057
 The declaration 
has been supplemented in 1966 by two specific treaties: the International Covenant on 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
1058
 and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).
1059
 Subsequently, these instruments have been supplemented 
by four regional treaties.
1060
 
In the aftermath of the creation of the UN the interrelation between IHL and IHRL was rather 
non-existent. This was in the light of the fact that the UN in particular was reluctant to 
include matters concerning the laws of war (IHL) in its agenda, as it has been noticed it could 
have undermined the force of jus contra bellum as well as compromising the impartiality of 
the UN as a truly world body to maintain peace.
1061
 In contrast, Schindler is of the opinion 
that in spite of the UN exerting a considerable amount of pressure upon the outcome of the 
diplomatic conference the influence of UDHR left an imprint on the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. In his opinion the inclusion of Common Article 3 by the diplomatic conference 
constitutes a human rights provision since it aims to regulate the relationship between the 
state and its nationals in times of non-international armed conflict.
1062
 Some scholars state 
that, ‘the greatest departure made by the Geneva Law of 1949, may be regarded as a 
manifesto of human rights for civilians during armed conflict, is the Fourth Convention 
related to the protection of civilians.’1063 Doswald-Beck also notes that the willingness to 
regulate internal armed conflicts by treaty-law arose when IHRL came into being and became 
central to the UN’s approach.1064 
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3.7 Article 3 Common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
 
3.7.1 The drafting history of Common Article 3 
 
In reality, Common Article 3 often referred to as a Geneva Convention in miniature,
1065
 was 
the outcome of extensive negotiations and compromise at the adoption of the Geneva 
Conventions in regard to non-international conflicts which features in each of the four 
conventions.
1066
 The final draft of Common Article 3 is far less ambitious than the rules 
adopted by the Stockholm Red Cross Conference of 1948.
1067
 It is a well-known fact that 
initially the ICRC had intended to adopt a common definition for armed conflict but could 
not reach a formula acceptable to the majority of states.
1068
 In the Draft conventions for the 
Protection of War Victims, the ICRC submitted the following paragraph to the Seventeenth 
Red Cross Conference which would have featured as the fourth paragraph of Common 
Article 2. It says: 
‘In all cases of armed conflict which are not of international character, especially 
cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, which may occur in the 
territory of one or more of High Contracting Parties, the implementing of the 
principles of the present Convention shall be obligatory on each of the 
adversaries. The application of Convention in these circumstances shall in no way 
depend on the legal status of the parties to the conflict and shall have no effect on 
that status.”1069 
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Indeed, by adopting this extra paragraph the entirety of the Geneva Conventions would have 
been applicable to all internal armed conflict.
1070
 Within the Joint Committee charged with 
evaluating the common article, two schools of thought existed. On the one hand, there was a 
group of states that rejected the draft in this form fearing that it gave belligerent status to any 
insurgents who may be no more than a small group of rebels and it failed to adequately 
protect the rights of states at the expense of individual rights.
1071
 On the other, there was 
another group of states that believed, the draft article would ensure its humanitarian purpose 
and would not prevent a legitimate government from taking measures under its own penal 
law to curb acts considered illegal, dangerous to the order and security of the state.
1072
 Many 
states including mostly newly independent states argued that such an approach, ‘would 
amount to [a] mandatory and automatic recognition of belligerency.’1073 The majority of 
sovereign states were reluctant to abandon the legal distinction between international and 
non-international conflicts, the very corner stone of IHL. The diplomatic conference rejected 
the paragraph on the basis that it would undermine the sovereign prerogative of states.
1074
 
Nonetheless, it serves as a reminder of what the drafters of the convention intended to 
achieve, but as Cullen notes the support for such an approach could never be successful 
because of its impact on state sovereignty.
1075
  
 
3.7.2 The substitution of ‘armed conflict’ for ‘war’ 
 
The adoption of Common Article 3 altered the way internal armed conflict was viewed and 
dealt with by state practice in traditional international law.
1076
 By adoption of this provision 
recognition of armed conflict by the established government or a third state became 
obsolete.
1077
 The recognition procedures were replaced by compulsory rules of IHL that 
started applying as soon as the hostilities reached a certain threshold and the conditions for 
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applicability of IHL had been fulfilled.
1078
 Furthermore, the term ‘armed conflict’ was used 
instead of ‘war’ in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in order to broaden the basis for the 
application of the IHL and in doing so to avoid any confusion over the legal definition of 
war.
1079
 During the time of drafting of the Geneva Conventions there was confusion 
surrounding the legal meaning of ‘armed conflict’, although the term had been used before in 
the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, but not in the framework of a substantive provision 
relating to the field of application regarding either instrument.
1080
 It has been suggested that 
the term ‘armed conflict’ was employed by drafters of the Geneva Conventions to avoid 
complications of recognition not only in relation to civil war, but also in relation to 
international armed conflict.
1081
   
The ICRC Commentary on the first Geneva Convention also focused on the ambiguous 
meaning of armed conflict: 
‘It remains to ascertain what is meant by ‘armed conflict’. The substitution of this 
much more general expression for the word ‘war’ was deliberate. One may argue 
almost endlessly about the legal definition of ‘war’. A state can always pretend, 
when it commits a hostile act against another state, that it is not making war, but 
merely engaging in a police action, or acting in legitimate self-defence. The 
expression ‘armed conflict’ makes this less easy.’1082  
 
3.7.3 The intended scope of Common Article 3 
 
The scope of application of Article 3 is defined negatively as ‘it applies in conflicts not of an 
international character.’ In spite of lack of unanimity amongst delegates they eventually 
settled on a watered down version of the Article which established minimum humanitarian 
protections applicable in “armed conflicts not of international character occurring within the 
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territory of one of the High Contracting Parties’.1083 The insurgents and the government 
forces alike were required to respect “as a minimum” certain basic standards of international 
humanitarian law contained in the aforementioned Article.
1084
 In addition, it prohibits certain 
acts including murder, torture, and inhuman treatment directed against “persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities”.1085 Common Article 3 is considered a major step forward by 
providing minimum humanitarian standards towards protection of persons taking no active 
part in the hostilities but does not provide any provisions for conduct of hostilities or means 
and methods of warfare.
1086
  Article 3, Common to all Geneva Conventions, 1949 provides: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, at a minimum, the following provisions: 
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages;  
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised people. 
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross may offer services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict 
                                                 
1083
 C. Smith, ‘Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as a Minimum Standard in International 
Humanitarian Law’ 13 Israel Law Review 168 2005, p. 169.   
1084
 See D.A. Elder, ‘The Historical Background of Common Article 3of the Geneva Convention of 1949’, 11 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 37 1979; G.I.A.D. Draper, ‘Humanitarian Law and Internal 
Armed Conflicts’, 13 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 253 1983, pp. 268-272 
1085
 For example see, Tom Farer, ‘Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Towards a Definition of 
International Armed conflict’, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 37 (1971).  
1086
 Generally see V.S. Shasthri, ‘International Humanitarian Law Relating to Non-international Armed 
Conflict’, in ‘International Humanitarian Law: An Anthology’, Lexis-Nexis Publication, 2009, pp. 207-238. 
163 
 
shall further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreement, all or 
part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the 
proceeding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. 
It is generally accepted that low-intensity disturbances and tensions are excluded from the 
ambit of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
1087
 Bond notes, if all Article 3 does is 
to impose ‘a few essential rules which [a government] in fact respects daily, under its own 
laws, even when dealing with common criminals, then one might wonder why so many 
scholars have praised the Article and so many states are opposed to its application’.1088 
The Article also stipulates that in the absence of a specific body to administer and supervise 
the states’ compliance with Common Article 3, the ICRC may offer its services as an honest 
broker to the parties of the conflict, but states are under no obligation to accept the offer of 
the service.
1089
 In practice, state parties tend to be very specific about the service and 
assistance of ICRC.
1090
 Nonetheless, in the vast majority of cases states parties rejected 
ICRC’s assistance maintaining that the said conflict was a mere civil disturbance and falls 
under the domestic jurisdiction of the state.
1091
  
 
3.7.4 The binding nature of Common Article 3 upon states & NSAGs 
 
Common Article 3 sets out clearly who is bound by its provisions – it is to be observed by 
‘each party to the conflict’.1092  In Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
high contracting parties agree to respect and ensure respect for instruments established by the 
conventions in all circumstances. Some observers have stated that by adoption of this 
provision the high contracting parties are stripped of the possibility of using arguments based 
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on legality of use of force to be released from their obligations under the GC.
1093
 Moreover, 
Common Article 2 states that the conventions apply to all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more high contracting parties, even if a 
state of war is not recognized by one of them. Therefore, it prohibits states from using the 
excuse of being victim of aggression to justify their refusal from applying IHL to conflicts 
which NSAGs are engaged. Nevertheless, the most significant characteristic contained in 
Common Article 2 is the notion of power which directly deals with NSAGs.  It states: 
… Although one of the powers in conflict may not be a party to the present 
Conventions, the powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their 
mutual relations.  They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the 
said power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof… 
Therefore, the Conventions would apply the moment any NSAG attains the status of having 
the label of “power” attached to it within the conception of the framers of the 
Conventions.
1094
 The attempt to bind NSAGs involved in the conflict in light of the fact that 
they are not party to the Conventions poses a major obstacle. In the 1974-1977 Diplomatic 
Conference, the representative of Belgium stated that Common Article 3 was binding upon 
‘both states and rebels’, since Additional Protocol II was meant to develop and supplement 
the said Article.
1095
 Also Cassese is of the opinion that the binding nature of Common Article 
3 upon insurgents is ‘undisputed’.1096 Kalshoven notes that the article presents a peculiar 
problem in that armed opposition groups (NSAGs) who are not signatory to the Conventions 
may use that fact as an argument to deny any obligation to apply the article. He argues that by 
encouraging armed opposition groups to adhere to Article 3 provisions it is likely to entail 
improvement of their ‘image’, not only in the country of conflict but in the eyes of the world 
at large.
1097
 The most commonly advanced legal justification is the doctrine of legislative 
justification.
1098
 According to which the insurgents are bound by provisions of Article 3 on 
the basis that the parent state has ratified the Geneva Conventions. There are ‘strong 
indications that state practice assumes that these provisions … are binding also for the rebels 
…’ and as a result one can point to ‘state practice and opinio juris’ to the extent that the 
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‘ratification of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions … has the effect that also rebels are 
bound’.1099 This approach has attracted broad acceptance among scholars,1100 although some 
remain sceptical such as Moir who describes this argument as politically untenable. 
1101
  
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that not only do the insurgents have to comply with the 
requirement of Article 3 through certain amount of organization, but also a certain degree of 
possession of national territory. Control of territory also featured quite prominently in the 
criteria suggested at the Diplomatic Conference, almost thirty years before. Additional 
Protocol II which went one step further to list territorial control in Article 1 of the said 
instrument as a precondition for its application.
1102
  It has to be emphasized that territorial 
control would strengthen the case for claiming that an Article 3 conflict was in progress. 
However, this is not to say that Common Article 3 would not apply if the insurgents do not 
have effective control of part of the territory of the state. As Bond concludes, the lack of 
territorial control, however, needs not necessarily to preclude Article 3’s application.1103  
Another important factor in regard to Article 3 is whether the central government resorts to 
using the regular army in order to control the situation. On the face of it, Moir deduces that it 
seems perfectly sensible – the very term ‘armed conflict’ could easily be construed as 
implying that the military are involved in active operation. He goes on to say that ‘the 
organization and territorial control aspects are strongly reminiscent of the traditional doctrine 
of recognition of belligerency, in that where situations existed meeting those requirements, 
states would previously have considered a grant of belligerency to the insurgent party.’1104   
The next question that arises is how would the recognition of belligerency impact on the 
application of Article 3? It should also be remembered that upon the recognition of 
belligerency by a state, the entire jus in bello comes into operation.
1105
 Therefore, the conflict 
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becomes subject to all four Geneva Conventions in the entire corpus of the IHL, and not 
simply common Article 3.
1106
  
 
3.7.5 State practice related to Common Article 3 
 
In spite of the number of non-international armed conflicts taking place globally, the record 
of state practice in regards to the application of the Geneva Conventions has been rather 
limited.
1107
 One challenge to the IHL in the current context is the tendency of states to label 
as ‘terrorist’ all acts of warfare committed by NSAGs in the course of non-international 
armed conflicts.
1108
  On this point ‘one of the most assured things that might be said about the 
words “armed conflict not of an international nature” is that no one can say with assurance 
precisely what meaning they were intended to convey.’1109 It is generally accepted that in an 
international armed conflict belligerent forces can lawfully target military objectives.
1110
 
However, in contrast, states are very reluctant to recognize the same principles in non-
international armed conflict fearful of the fact that by recognizing the belligerency they may 
jeopardize their territorial integrity.
1111
 Hence, states are also very reluctant to accept the 
applicability of Article 3 within their territory.
1112
 In an attempt to remedy this objection 
Article 3(4) goes some way to stipulate that application of its provision ‘shall not affect the 
legal status of the parties to the conflict’.1113 In addition, the UK Ministry of Defence Manual 
states: ‘Although Common Article 3 specifically provides that its application does not affect 
the legal status of the parties to a conflict, states have been, always will be, reluctant to admit 
that a state of armed conflict exists’.1114 In reality, governments of many states have been 
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disinclined to accept these limitations on their sovereignty or the freedom to shape policies to 
maintain law and order within their territory no where was this tension better manifested than 
in the adaption of Common Article 3.
1115
 On this point, Bothe notes that the tension between 
unrestrained state discretion and legal limitations of internal violence has been the leitmotif 
of the development of human rights and humanitarian law.
1116
 On the other hand, Cullen 
notes:  
The application of Common Article 3 in particular does not in any way prevent the 
criminalisation of acts committed by those who take up arms against the state. The use 
of emergency powers by the state to deal with a situation of insurgency is in no way 
precluded by the provision provided such measures do not conflict with standards 
contained therein. A plain reading of the final clause of Common Article 3 makes it 
clear that the application of this provision has no effect on the legal status of non-state 
actors and as such does not in any way prevent a de jure government from treating 
them as criminals for their participation in a non-international armed conflict.
1117
  
In spite of the above, the biggest difficulty which remains is whether a certain situation is 
an armed conflict of non-international nature of merely a civil strife. In this regard 
Clapham notes: 
The designation of a situation as “armed conflict not of an international character” so as 
to trigger the application of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is 
obviously an act of considerable political importance for all sides to the conflict. The 
insurgents will often welcome the designation of their attacks as constituting armed 
conflict as this confers a curious sort of international recognition on them; the 
applicability of Common Article 3 reinforces the special role of the international 
committee of Red Cross (ICRC). On the other hand the government may be less willing 
to acknowledge the situation as one of armed conflict, preferring instead to portray it a 
fight against criminals and terrorists.
1118
   
Nevertheless, the ambiguity regarding the scope of Article 3 provides states with the 
opportunity to shirk their responsibility to observe its provisions. No wonder that there is so 
much reluctance on the part of states to formally recognise existence of ‘armed conflict’ 
which some equate to the following reasons:  
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First, it highlights the failure of the state in preventing such a situation; second, it is 
possible for it to contribute to the perceived recognition of insurgents as legitimate 
combatants; and, third, acknowledging the existence of an armed conflict automatically 
brings into force the most basic provisions of International humanitarian law, limiting 
the state’s use of repressive measures. These reasons serve as examples to explain 
states’ reluctance to acknowledge the existence of an armed conflict.’1119  
The failure of the drafters to define the term “armed conflict not of an international character” 
allows reluctant states to accept any international humanitarian obligations simply to deny the 
existence of an armed conflict, and thus applicability of the IHL regulations.
1120
 Yet another 
feature that makes the application of Article 3 challenging, according to the ICRC 
Commentary on Additional Protocol II, is the phraseology used in some of the provisions, 
‘lays down the principles without developing them, which has sometimes given rise to 
restrictive interpretations.’1121 
Review of state practice reveals that the application of Article 3 is far from automatic.
1122
 For 
example the United Kingdom never admitted that Article 3 was applicable in Kenya, Cyprus 
and Northern Ireland.
1123
 By the same token Portugal never admitted any obligation to apply 
Article 3 to rebel forces in Mozambique and Angola.
1124
 Turkey, Iraq, Iran have never 
admitted application of Article 3 to the Kurdish revolts on their respective territories. 
Similarly, Russia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka never recognised any obligation under Article 3.  
On the positive note, there have been a few states which accepted the applicability of Article 
3 to the hostilities taking place on their territory between their armed forces and rebels.
1125
 
Nonetheless, such cases of compliance by states are very few and far between.
1126
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3.8 1977 Additional Protocols I & II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
 
The two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, were adopted on 8 June 1977 in 
Geneva by a specially convened Diplomatic Conference.
1127
 This Conference was supposed 
to herald a new chapter in the development of the IHL but in reality it did not achieve what it 
set out to accomplish.
1128
 The outcome of a series of Diplomatic Conferences on 
Humanitarian Law held in Geneva from 1974 to 1977 was the two Additional Protocols to 
the Geneva Conventions which were the product of a long diplomatic struggle.
1129
 Further, 
due to the increase in the frequency and intensity of internal armed conflicts, the quest for 
more elaborate rules governing internal armed conflict gained special impetus.
1130
 In contrast, 
international armed conflict occurred relatively infrequently.
1131
 Many international 
organizations concerned with humanitarian and human rights operations around the world 
argued that if humanitarian and human rights norms were to be universally respected, they 
should apply to all the parties engaged in conflict.
1132
 Hence, it did not matter whether the 
atrocities were committed by a state or a NSAG, since ultimately the civilian population bore 
the brunt of suffering.
1133
 It is worth noting that apart from common Article 3 that specifically 
dealt with internal armed conflicts, there were over 20 treaties, declarations and conventions 
containing over 700 articles were devoted to international armed conflict. This change of 
paradigm and the numerous lacunae in Common Article 3, prompted the international 
community to adopt a more comprehensive instrument regulating internal armed conflicts in 
the shape of Additional Protocol II of 1977 which was to apply to “all parties” involved in a 
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conflict of non-international nature.
1134
 For the purpose of this study we concentrate on 
Additional Protocol I and its significance in relation to NSAGs, in particular, Article 1(4) and 
its characterization of internal wars of national liberation as international armed conflict.
1135
 
Some scholars are in no doubt that at the time there was a desperate need for a new 
instrument applicable to non-international armed conflict.
1136
 Also, Protocol II, at least in 
theory attempted to widen the scope of the rules regulating internal armed conflict by way of 
a statement of black-letter law.
1137
  
 
3.8.1 Additional Protocol I of 1977 
 
3.8.1.1 The emergence of national liberation movements 
 
One of the most distinguishing features of the post-1945 era in international relations was the 
emergence of national liberation movements (NLM).
1138
 The term “national liberation 
movements”1139 evokes a whole set of movements which sought to integrate territorially 
oriented nationalism with socially reformist themes.
1140
 Emergence of national liberation 
movements has been described as one of the most distinguishing features in international 
politics in the twentieth century.
1141
 George Abi-Saab in his seminal article regarding the 
legal status of wars of national liberation says that based on experiences of 18
th
 and 19
th
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century wars of national liberation, they have never been purely internal affairs.
1142
 He cites a 
series of events in the aforementioned period in which different peoples in search of their 
statehood embarked upon engaging in such conflicts.
1143
 The introduction of this category 
into international law has been described as one of the legal novelties on the aftermath of 
World War II. On this very point Cassese notes that these struggles were remarkable because 
firstly, they proliferated so rapidly with great magnitude and intensity, secondly, “national 
liberation” was no longer merely a political concept but was now given a legal turn by the 
international community.
1144
  
Notwithstanding the fact that initially the international community had retained its traditional 
bias in favour of established governments and against belligerents.
1145
 By acquiring the status 
of a party to an international armed conflict a NLM could claim that its members engaged in 
armed conflict are no longer considered as rebels and they should be recognized as lawful 
belligerents and consequently granted prisoner of war status.
1146
 The war of independence in 
Algeria (1954-62), more than any other war of national liberation, contributed to the 
elevation of such wars to international level.
1147
 From the early days of the conflict, the 
Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) had intended to reach an agreement with the 
French colonial forces regarding the applicability of Common Article 3 to the said 
conflict.
1148
 However, the French forces refused to recognize the conflict as international in 
nature and maintained that Algeria was an inseparable part of France in which domestic law 
and order were applicable.
1149
 This also prompted the ICRC in 1958, as entitled by Common 
Article 3 to present a draft by which both parties would pledge to observe the provisions of 
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the said Article 3 which was duly refused by France in the beginning but eventually the 
French strongly implied that the Article was applied as of June 1956.
1150
 
 
3.8.1.2 Customary status of wars of national liberation 
 
Therefore, armed forces which are engaged in wars of national liberation against racist 
regimes, colonial domination, and alien occupation in the exercise of their right for self-
determination; by virtue of Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol II turn what had traditionally 
been an important mode of internal armed conflict into an international one.
1151
 There can be 
little doubt that in the context of international law the suggestion that a national liberation 
movement could use force on behalf of their peoples to realise their self-determination 
challenges the very principle that only sovereign state can legitimately use force.
1152
 As noted 
above, the development of the right to self-determination also had a significant impact on the 
rules governing the conduct of NSAGs, especially, in regards to internal armed conflict.
1153
 In 
fact, many scholars consider the development of the right to self-determination and its 
subsequent application through the process of decolonization in Asia and Africa as a great 
contributory factor to the re-evaluation of the rules governing internal armed conflict where 
the so-called national liberation armies challenged the authority of the state.
1154
 According to 
Higgins, ‘wars of national liberation’ are said to occur when ‘peoples entitled to self-
determination take up arms against the governments ruling the territory that they seek to 
exercise that right’.1155 Indeed the term “national liberation movement” encapsulates a whole 
range of movements that sought to integrate territorially oriented nationalism with social 
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reformist themes.
1156
 Hence, the phrase peoples featured prominently in 1977 Geneva 
Additional Protocol I in which the entire provisions of the Geneva Convention 1949 were 
extended to such movements through Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I.
1157
 In practice 
according to Wilson it was the national liberation movements that claimed to have the right to 
use force on behalf of their ‘people’.1158 However the term “peoples” which had started its 
life as a vague concept in the aspirational provisions of the U.N. Charter to a term 
guaranteeing legal protection in the use of force of the kind that traditional international law 
had reserved only for sovereign states.
1159
 
However, the biggest problem facing the international community that still persists is what 
constitutes a genuine national liberation movement from a separatist movement undermining 
the legitimacy and political power of an independent sovereign state using a legalistically 
determinist argument of self-determination.
1160
 In the intervening years between the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and its two Additional Protocols of 1977, the General Assembly of the 
UN had tried to address the issue of national liberation movements through Resolution 3103 
(XXVIII) of December 1973, a more general nearly legislative resolution on the legal status 
of combatants engaged in struggles of national liberation against colonial and alien 
domination and racist regimes.
1161
 The most telling part of this resolution was paragraph 3, 
which in affect removed such armed conflicts from the purview of Common Article 3 of 
Geneva Convention 1949 creating a new category of conflicts assimilated to interstate armed 
conflicts.
1162
 With the doctrine of self-determination placed at the center of international 
political agenda, NSAGs engaged in wars of national liberation would also come very closely 
to being perceived as a “power”, providing they represented the aspirations of their peoples’ 
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right to self-determination.
1163
 Such developments eventually led to internationalization of 
wars of national liberations and brought the whole jus in bello to apply.
1164
 
Nonetheless, the very issue was dealt with more comprehensively under Article 1(4) of 1977 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which promoted wars of national 
liberation to international level.
1165
 Therefore, by virtue of the said Article, an armed conflict 
involving peoples in pursuit of their self-determination
1166
 enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of international Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations is considered an international armed conflict.
1167
 Nonetheless, some observers note 
that to codify wars of national liberation was not on the basis of their status under 
international law but rather the impetus behind it was fundamentally political.
1168
     
 
3.8.1.3 Drafting history of Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I  
 
As noted above, the most conspicuous aspect of this was promotion of one particular group of 
insurgents from humble rebels operating in countries under colonial domination to fully-
fledged belligerents; representing what became commonly known as ‘national liberation 
struggle’.1169 Initially, this development did not receive universal approval from international 
lawyers, some of whom were of the opinion that a dangerous precedent had been set against 
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the very realm of what the foundations of international law was based upon, interstate 
relations.
1170
 Others heralded this as a welcome extension to the ‘just war’ principles.1171 
In fact, the Diplomatic Conference responsible for drafting of the Additional Protocols 
extensively debated the issue of extending the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to 
wars of national liberations.
1172
 The inclusion of such conflicts to international level has also 
been criticised by many scholars for mixing up ius ad bellum and ius in bello.
1173
 In fact, the 
American administration at the time was very vociferously critical of the abovementioned 
Article 1(4) since it deemed it as harmful because by internationalizing wars of national 
liberation on the basis of perceived ‘just’ nature. It argued, that this would provide immunity 
from prosecution for belligerent acts committed by groups such as Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) that often resort to terrorism, consequently enhance their status ‘to the 
detriment of the civilized world community’.1174 This approach adopted by the US 
government was a reflection of tension between it and some of the third world countries 
supported by the USSR which had managed to accord observer status for some of the 
national liberation organizations to attend the conference.
1175
 One of the best illustrations of 
this approach in support of militias and guerrilla fighters in wars of national liberation was 
the statement delivered by the representative of the People’s Republic of China: 
People’s militia and guerrilla fighters in wars of national liberation should be protected, 
since they were basically civilians who had been forced to take up arms in self-defence 
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against imperialist repression in order to win independence and safeguard their right to 
survival. When not participating directly in military operations, members of people’s 
militia or guerrilla movements should have civilian status and benefit from the 
protection granted to civilians.
1176
 
On this point Moir opines that classifying armed conflict according to the objective of parties 
was at the time highly controversial but maintains that now such conflict should be regulated 
under the whole body of international humanitarian law since Article 1 of the Additional 
Protocol II accepts that the abovementioned conflicts are beyond its scope of application.
1177
 
But an alternative opinion has been suggested since then such conflict should have been 
contained under Additional Protocol II rather than Protocol I.
1178
 It is also important to note 
that Additional Protocol I, does not apply to all wars of national liberation due to its limited 
scope.
1179
     
 
3.8.1.4 Scope of application of Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I 
 
Article 1(4) considers as “international armed conflict” situations which include: 
Armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, 
as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
1180
  
The term “armed conflict” in regard to wars of national liberation has not been clarified 
anywhere in Protocol I and it is not clear whether any threshold condition is attached to it.
1181
 
In this regard Greenwood states, ‘although that term is nowhere defined, it implies a certain 
level of intensity going beyond isolated acts of violence. Thus the Red Brigade, Action 
Directe, the Baader-Meinhof Gang and groups of that kind fall wholly outside the scope of 
                                                 
1176
 Chinese Statement, Official Records, Meeting of Committee III, CDDH/III/SR.7, 135-136, [54] (1974). 
1177
 Moir, ‘The Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, op. cit., p.90 
1178
 G.I.D.A., Draper, ‘Wars of National Liberation and War Criminality’ in Michael Howard (ed.), in 
‘Restraints on War’, Oxford U.P., 1979, p.135 
1179
 N. Higgins, ‘Regulating the Use of Force in Wars of National Liberation: the Need for a New Regime’, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010, p. 112.  
1180Schindler & Toman, ‘The Laws of Armed Conflicts’, op. cit., p.621 ; See Article 96(3) of Additional 
Protocol I in regards to its application and that of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to such conflicts. 
1181
 Higgins, ‘Regulating the Use of Force in Wars of National Liberation’, op. cit., p. 112. 
177 
 
the provision on this ground alone.’1182 Article 1(4) only applies if the national liberation 
movement has a level of organisation which represents the ‘peoples’ engaged in the armed 
conflict as well as to declare an undertaking to apply the Geneva Conventions as well as 
Additional Protocol I.
1183
   
In regards to application of Protocol I to wars of national liberation one of the categories 
listed in Article 1(4) has to be satisfied namely; ‘colonial domination’, ‘alien occupation’, 
and ‘racist regimes’. But the meaning of the said terms are not defined by the provisions of 
the drafters, although, the scope of each classification is of particular importance in 
determining the issue of applicability.
1184
 As noted by Green, ‘neither the Protocol nor 
Declaration on Friendly Relations makes any provisions for determining what movement is 
seeking self-determination and thus qualified as a national liberation movement. Neither does 
either instrument offer any assistance in determining whether a country is self-governing or 
part constitutes a people.’1185 Since in the absence of any definition that would set out the 
scope of application of Article 1(4), the Commentary on the two Additional Protocols 
interprets the three categories of armed conflict as: ‘the expression ‘colonial domination’ 
certainly covers the most frequently occurring case in recent years, where a people has had to 
take up arms to free itself from the domination of another people; it is not necessary to 
explain this in greater detail here. The expression ‘alien occupation’ in the sense of this 
paragraph – as distinct from belligerent occupation in the traditional sense of all or part of the 
territory of one state being occupied by another state – covers cases of partial or total 
occupation of a territory which has not been fully formed as a state. Finally, the expression 
‘racist regimes’ covers cases of regimes founded on racist criteria. The first two situations 
imply the existence of distinct peoples. The third implies, if not the existence of two 
completely distinct peoples, at least a rift within a population which ensures hegemony of one 
section in accordance with racist ideas. It should be added that a specific situation may 
correspond simultaneously to two of the situations listed, or even with all three.’1186 This 
interpretation by the ICRC Commentary is an attempt to limit the meaning of the said terms. 
According to Aldrich:  
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Paragraph 4 of Article 1 was designed by its sponsors with certain conflicts in mind, 
especially those in Palestine and South Africa, and was drafted in terms fashioned to 
exclude its application to civil wars within existing states. That is why it uses 
emotionally loaded terms like “colonial domination”, “alien occupation” and “racist 
regimes”; indeed, the use of these terms goes far to ensure that the provision will never 
be applied.
1187
  
There are other scholars that interpret this Article in a more expansive way that, ‘as long as 
an internal conflict is directed towards self-government, the Protocol provides for its 
recognition as an international conflict governed by the Conventions and the Protocol, as well 
as the ordinary law regarding international armed conflict.’1188 One of the main consequence 
of inclusion of such armed conflicts to Protocol I is the application of international 
humanitarian norms that ultimately benefit the victim of such conflicts.
1189
 In contrast to 
Protocol II in which control of a part of the territory is a precondition, the control of territory 
proviso is not included in Article 1 of Additional Protocol I, which means that forces 
involved in national liberation movements could operate outside the territory for which they 
are striving to achieve their self-determination. The African National Congress (ANC) 
fighting the apartheid regime in South Africa was a case in point.
1190
   
 
3.8.1.5 Provisions for application: Article 96 (3) 
 
The role played by Article 96 of the Additional Protocol I is to clarify any uncertainties and 
limitations which may result from the application of Article 1(4) to wars of national liberation 
as well as allowing them to apply and be bound by the Conventions and the said Protocol.
1191
 
It states: 
1. When the Parties to the Conventions are also parties to this Protocol, the 
Convention shall apply as supplemented by this Protocol. 
2. When one of the Parties to the conflict is not bound by this Protocol, the Parties 
to the Protocol shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall 
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furthermore be bound by this Protocol in relation to each of the parties which are 
not bound by it, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 
3. The authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting Party in 
an armed conflict of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may undertake 
to apply the Conventions and this protocol in relation to that conflict by means of 
unilateral declaration addressed to the depository. Such declarations shall, upon 
receipt by the depository, have in relation to that conflict the following effects: 
a) The Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the said authority as 
a party to the conflict with immediate effect; 
b) The said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have 
been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this Protocol; 
and 
c) The Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all parties to the 
conflict. 
As pointed out by the ICRC, this provision places groups’ fighting for national liberation in a 
“fundamentally different legal position from insurgents in a non-international armed 
conflict.”1192 In other words, this elevates the status of various liberation movements to state 
or quasi-state.
1193
 Article 96, somewhat surprisingly gives states (through ratification) and 
also national liberation movements “the right to choose whether or not to submit to 
international humanitarian law”, at least “insofar as it goes beyond customary law”.1194 On 
this point Abi-Saab opines: 
… The fact that the locus standi of liberation movements was codified in Article 96, 
paragraph 3, vindicates the earlier interpretation of the term “power” in the 
Conventions to include such movements, at least for the purposes of common Article 2, 
paragraph 3, of the conventions, whose formula was more or less borrowed by Article 
96 of the Protocol.
1195
  
However, eligibility of the authority claiming to represent the people must meet other 
conditions set out in Article 96(3) and other provisions of Additional Protocol I. First, the 
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NSAGs must represent the people and the fact that there has been a continuance armed 
conflict for a prolonged period of time.
1196
 Secondly, the NSAG claiming to be a national 
liberation force must be an organized armed force as described in Article 43 of Protocol I, as 
well as being under responsible command and to have an internal disciplinary system which 
enables it to comply with humanitarian law.
1197
  
It is clear that paragraph 3 of the above Article enables the authority representing the peoples 
struggle against the colonial, alien, or racist party to make a unilateral declaration to the 
depository (the Swiss Federal Council) to undertake to apply the Conventions and the 
Protocol.
1198
 This can only take place under the proviso that the conditions stipulated in 
Article 1(4) are met, i.e. (a) there must be an armed conflict where a people are fighting for 
self-determination against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist regimes, and (b) 
the armed conflict must be between such a people and a party to the Protocol. As stated 
above, this authority must then make a declaration to the depository which will in turn notify 
the other parties to the Conventions.
1199
 However, Greenwood has noted that no successful 
declaration has ever been deposited mainly because states most likely to be affected by 
Article 1(4) are not parties to the said Protocol.
1200
 Throughout the 1980s and 90s states such 
as South Africa and Israel strenuously resisted any application of Additional protocol I in 
relation to the African National Congress (ANC) and Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO).
1201
 
However, efforts for codification and regulation of wars of national liberation in 1977, and in 
order to elevate such conflicts to international armed conflicts level was met with tangible 
opposition from sovereign states and major powers, in particular the US.
1202
 In fact, there was 
little agreement in relation to the appropriate scope of self-determination which in turn made 
the right to self-determination and the right to use force to achieve it unworkable 
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concepts.
1203
 As it has been noticed elsewhere it is debatable whether wars of national 
liberation could still take place with the apparent end of the process of decolonization, 
although in spite of the near-completion of decolonization, the issue is not obsolete.
1204
 It has 
been noticed that once the last remains of European colonialism has disappeared then the 
provisions on wars of national liberation will probably not be relevant anymore.
1205
 On the 
other hand, until there is a universal ratification of Protocol I, or Article 1(4) enters into 
customary law, or key states such as the United States and Israel ratify it, there is little hope 
of dissipating the force of those objections.
1206
 Given the erga omnes character of the right of 
self-determination as a fundamental international concern any forcible denial of such a right 
by states would be construed as oppression in international law.
1207
 Nevertheless, states are 
very reluctant to accept a form of international legislation which might eventually undermine 
their own legitimacy or power structure.
1208
  
On the unlikely event that a national liberation movement’s struggle is being recognized by a 
state party to the Protocol, members of such armed organization unlike insurgents are not at 
the mercy of that state’s criminal law regime, since according to Articles 43 and 44 of 
Protocol I they will be granted combatant and prisoner of war status.
1209
 Indeed, at the sharp 
end of this issue is the perennial dichotomy of one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter, a general discourse very much born out of the Cold War period. In spite of the near-
completion of decolonization, the issue of self-determination is not obsolete, since there still 
remain territories such as Palestine, the Western Sahara, and Tibet as well as other territories 
around the world where numerous claims to self-determination on the basis of ethnic and 
other group identity still persists.
1210
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3.8.1.6 State practice related to Article 1(4) 
 
It is now universally accepted that wars of national liberation would be regulated by IHL in 
its entirety. However, application of Article 1(4) of the Additional Protocol I is fraught with 
complications. Some scholars are of the opinion that due to: ‘Considerable body of 
opposition in state practice to treating such conflict, for the purposes of jus in bello, as though 
they were conflicts between states suggests that Article 1(4) went well beyond customary law 
as it stood in 1974 and has not met the criteria for being absorbed into customary 
international law since its inclusion in Protocol I.’1211 
Indeed, in recent decades this has become more complicated with the growth of ‘post-modern 
tribalism’ which the said legitimacy has increasingly been challenged.1212 Werner notes that 
although the process of decolonization has almost come to an end, by relying on recent state 
practice, international conventions and jurisprudence, self-determination has been reiterated 
as a right of all peoples.
1213
 In the last few decades the international Committee of Red Cross 
has attempted to reform the IHL to encompass the conduct of armed opposition and national 
liberation forces. However due to lack of a credible compliance framework it has failed to 
ensure that such NSAGs have any incentive to comply with the laws of armed conflict. There 
is also a great deal of reluctance by sovereign states to admit the applicability of the Geneva 
Convention or specifically Additional Protocol I in relation to national liberation movements 
fearful of recognizing NSAGs operating on their territory which they consider as “terrorists”. 
The states concerned are mindful of the fact that by recognizing these groups they would 
ultimately encourage them to claim that they are engaged in internationally recognized armed 
struggle and no longer come under the ambit of the national criminal law mechanism. The 
states’ concern is reflected in the list of non-parties to Protocol one which include: India, Sri 
Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Iran Iraq, Turkey, Israel, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Morocco, and the last but not least the United States.
1214
 It is worth 
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noting that most of the abovementioned states are either currently embroiled in or potentially 
could be involved in an internal armed conflict.
1215
 
More often than not, a national liberation movement would argue that, usually, their armed 
organisations would act against a repressive government that has denied them the right to 
self-determination, a norm of jus cogens in international law.
1216
  The government of the state 
in question on the other hand would argue that they are entitled to safeguarding their 
territorial integrity and can theoretically use any force short of genocide to protect its territory 
from fragmentation.
1217
 The above arguments also perfectly highlight the two competing 
principles of territorial integrity and self-determination in the sphere of contemporary 
international law.
1218
 
 
3.8.2 Additional Protocol II of 19771219 
 
 3.8.2.1 The drafting history of Additional Protocol II 
 
There is no doubt that at the time there was a desperate need for a new instrument applicable 
to non-international armed conflict since, ‘experience demonstrated the inadequacy of the 
common article. While its provisions do extend certain fundamental humanitarian protection 
to non-combatants, they do not provide any definitive codification of the laws of war for non-
international armed conflicts. Moreover, the provisions are so general and incomplete that 
they cannot be regarded as an adequate guide for the conduct of belligerents in such 
conflicts’.1220  
At the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict which took place in 1974 to 1977, the 
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ICRC representative Daniele Louise Bujard observed that there was a need for further 
development of the law governing of internal armed conflict: 
When put to the test … the rules of protection in [common] Article 3 had been shown 
to require elaboration and completion. Government and Red Cross experts consulted by 
the ICRC since 1971 had confirmed the urgent need to strengthen the protection of 
victims of non-international armed conflicts by developing international humanitarian 
law applicable in such situations.
1221
  
The intention of the drafters of Additional Protocol was to expand on the protection already 
contained in Common Article 3 which “needed to be confirmed and clarified”.1222 It is quite 
clear that the drafters had two different types of non-international armed conflict in mind. On 
the one hand, major civil wars such as in Spain in the 1930s and on the other, more 
“contained” civil wars of Nigeria and the Congo in the 1960s.1223 Baxter notes:  
Through this definition two levels of internal armed conflicts were created, even as to 
both parties to both Conventions of 1949 and Protocol II – the lower level, governed by 
Article 3, and the higher level, governed by Protocol II. Such nice legal distinctions do 
not make the correct application of the law any easier.
1224
 
The evolutionary process of Additional Protocol II very much mirrored the events of 
1949.
1225
 In fact, the original proposal was a lot more comprehensive than the text that was 
eventually agreed upon in the Diplomatic Conference.
1226
 Some Scandinavian delegates in 
the Diplomatic Conferences prior to the adoption of the two Additional Protocol favoured 
implementation of a single protocol applicable to all types of armed conflicts hence removing 
the traditional dichotomy between international and non-international armed conflicts as well 
as bypassing the difficulty surrounding classification of situations.
1227
 This view also 
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attracted some support from third world states.
1228
 As stated above, the notion of having a 
uniform body of international humanitarian law had been discussed briefly in the Diplomatic 
Conference which drafted the Geneva Conventions of 1949. As in the case of the Diplomatic 
Conference which drafted the Geneva Conventions of 1949, ‘support for realisation of this 
approach was lacking due to concern about its impact on state sovereignty.’1229 
For one thing, it counts for only 28 articles (in contrast to the 102 articles of Additional 
Protocol I, and for another most of its provisions are copies of provisions in Additional 
Protocol I. Furthermore, without breaking new grounds Protocol II makes the law more 
specific.
1230
 Additional Protocol II according to Greenwood: ‘goes a long way to putting flesh 
on the bare bones of Common Article 3 of 1949 GC. In particular, Additional Protocol II 
contains the first attempt to regulate by treaty the methods and means of warfare in internal 
conflicts’.1231 A view shared by George Abi-Saab, he notes, ‘a much greater, and greatly 
needed, elaboration of the elliptic declarations of principles of Common Article 3, and 
through introducing new fundamental rules concerning the protection of civilians against the 
effects of hostilities, as well as the protection of medical personnel and transport.’1232   
 
3.8.2.2 The intended scope of Additional Protocol II 
 
In step with Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II has no provisions regarding methods 
and means of the warfare other than Article 4(1), which states that, ‘it is prohibited to order 
that there shall be no survivor’.1233 A distinct feature of the Protocol II is that it has an almost 
exclusively content.
1234
 Protocol II, adopted an entirely new approach to internal armed 
conflict, in contrast to Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II deploys the terms ‘civilian’ 
and ‘civilian population’ in its text but does not define the term.1235 It also abolished the 
                                                 
1228
 The Syrian delegate stated that ‘it was unfortunate that there were two draft Protocols, providing for two 
kinds of treatment. But surely humanitarian law was concerned with man; why then should there be two sets of 
rules? There was no excuse for this kind of differentiation.’ Official Records, vol. 5-6, CDDH/SR. 18, p. 193.  
1229
 Cullen, ‘the Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict’, op. cit., p. 89.  
1230
 Robert & Guelff, ‘Documents on the Laws of War’, op. cit., pp. 481. 
1231
 C. Greenwood, ‘A Critique of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949’, In H. Durham, 
& L.H. McCormack (ed.), ‘The Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of International Humanitarian Law’, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999, pp. 3-22, p. 14.  
1232
 ‘ICRC Commission of Experts for the Study of the Question of Aids to the Victims of Internal Conflict’, as 
cited in G. Abi-Saab, ‘Non-International Armed conflicts’, in ‘International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law’, 
Institute Henry Dunant, UNESCO, 1988, p. 225. 
1233
 To an extend Articles 13-18, which sets out the protection of the civilian population, including the 
obligation not to launch attacks against the civilian population or against civilian objects. 
1234
 Cassese, ‘The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol’, op. cit., pp. 418-19. 
1235
 Additional protocol II, Article 5(1)(b) and (e) and Part IV (Articles 13-18). 
186 
 
distinction between regular and irregular armed forces and provided that ‘the armed forces, 
groups and units that are under a command responsible for its subordinates’.1236  
Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II also reiterates that “situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar 
nature” do not amount to an armed conflict.1237 In this regard the Commentary of Additional 
Protocol II states that the term “armed conflict” should only be used where “the existence of 
open hostilities between armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser degree.”1238 
Moreover, Additional Protocol II lacks an international mechanism to ensure respect, by both 
sides, for their obligations.
1239
 Nevertheless, the right of the ICRC ‘to offer its services to the 
parties to an internal armed conflict’, as codified by the Convention’s Common Article 3, was 
reaffirmed albeit limited to a single Article without mentioning the ICRC by the Diplomatic 
Conference as a manifestation of an expression of unanimous political will.
1240
 According to 
Moir, ‘the reluctance to accept such a role for outside organizations again underlines the fear 
of the developing nations that such provisions would encourage interference in their domestic 
affairs.’1241 The biggest difficulty with Additional Protocol II (in fact, this applies to both 
Protocols) is two-fold; firstly, it is a newly created convention and there has not been enough 
time for it to harden into customary law, as a result, it only creates treaty law for those states 
which have ratified or agreed to it, secondly, it has not been received with universal 
approval.
1242
 The main reason for the second part stemmed from the fact that there was a 
general reluctance on the part of major powers to commit themselves to this instrument since 
they were not affected by internal armed conflicts. As for the smaller nations beset by tribal 
and ethnic conflicts, they were very much wary of handing out a carte blanche to would be 
separatists in their territory, consequently compromising their territorial integrity.
1243
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3.8.2.3 The threshold for the application of Additional Protocol II 
 
In regards to Additional Protocol II, the concept of internal armed conflict sets a much higher 
threshold of application compared to Common Article 3 that applies to all situations of non-
international armed conflict.
1244
 This approach is very much reflected in the definition of non-
international conflicts in Article 1 of Additional Protocol II which define it as: 
All armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of Protocol I and which take 
place in the territory of a high contracting party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organised armed groups which under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations and to implement this protocol. The protocol shall not 
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots and sporadic acts 
of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.    
It has been noted that by adopting such a high threshold, it is very unlikely that the Additional 
Protocol II would operate in a civil war until the rebels were well established and were 
controlling part of the territory through a de facto government as in the case of the nationalist 
revolution in Spain.
1245
  
 
3.8.2.4 The binding nature of Additional Protocol II 
 
As in the case of Article 3 the same justification of the principle of legislative jurisdiction 
have been used regarding the binding nature of Protocol II.
1246
 Protocol II, ‘at least taken on 
face value, does not confer rights or impose obligations on rebels, in that it does not permit 
them formally to become party to it. It would therefore seem that states are the only 
international entities to which the Protocol applies.’1247 Moir opines that for the Protocol ‘to 
have any legal effect for insurgents, two criteria must accordingly be met: (a) the High 
Contracting Parties must have intended the Protocol to bind insurgents, and (b) the insurgents 
must, in turn, accept the rights and obligation thereby conferred upon them.’1248 
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If a dissident NSAG were to be covered by the Additional Protocol II, it should be under 
responsible command; be able to maintain discipline and ensure compliance with the 
Protocol.
1249
 The other vital prerequisite of the Additional Protocol II is the proviso of 
territorial control of a certain part of the national territory imposing a threshold reminiscent to 
that stipulated by the recognition of belligerency in traditional international law.
1250
 Rene 
Provost opines that ‘Protocol II can be considered a regression, given that it requires basically 
the same conditions as did the recognition of belligerency, but without triggering the full 
application of all humanitarian rules for international armed conflict.’1251 Some scholars even 
go as far as claiming that Protocol II has in effect reiterated the general rule of international 
law relating to the status of belligerency.
1252
 The NSAGs in question should also be able to 
mount and sustained military operations. Green encapsulates this by applying it to a modern 
case: ‘The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, certainly before it secured control of any part 
of the formerly Israeli-administered territories, was outside the scope of the Protocol’s 
operation, even if Israel had become a party thereto. The same is also true of both Hamas and 
Hezbollah movements.’1253 
Apart from controlling part of the territory as a necessity, for a group to be covered by the 
Protocol, the conflict in which it is involved in should meet a certain threshold similar to the 
one which prevailed in the Spanish Civil war allotted to the nationalist forces, in that they 
acquired recognition as a de facto administration with legal immunities and responsibilities of 
the legitimate government.
1254
 It is worth mentioning that Protocol II would not cover 
NSAGs which are constantly on the move; since many of these groups because of their fluid 
nature and irregular activities can not satisfy the preconditions stated in Protocol II.
1255
 
Likewise NSAGs engaged in guerrilla or partisan activities against the central government of 
a territory will not be covered by Additional protocol II but will be protected under the 
Common Article 3. There are many organisations around the world that call themselves 
‘national liberation movements’ involved in urban guerrilla warfare, civil disturbance, riots 
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and resort to terrorism that would not be covered by the Protocol, even if the central 
government’s forces are involved in the maintenance of law and order operations.1256 
Furthermore, as the Commentary observes, Additional Protocol II, does not apply to 
situations where there is no functioning government as in the case of “failed states”.1257 
Moreover, the readiness of any NSAG to abide by Protocol II must be determined on the 
basis of each individual conflict, which could be made in the shape of a unilateral declaration 
to an impartial body such as ICRC to guarantee respect for the provisions of the Protocol 
II.
1258
   
 
3.8.2.5 State practice related to Additional Protocol II 
 
As noted above, many states are reluctant to recognise any insurgency even according to 
lower threshold of Common Article 3, i.e. that there is an ‘armed conflict not of international 
character occurring within the territory of one of the high contracting parties’.1259 In the light 
of the denial of insurgency the question that arises is whether such a denial really matters? 
Greenwood has emphasised the acceptance by a government of existence of an armed 
conflict is not a legal prerequisite; the obligations in Common Article 3 and Protocol II will 
be applicable provided that certain objective criteria are met.
1260
 As stated above, in regards 
to international law, wars of national liberation are the only context in which NSAGs’ legal 
combatancy is recognized in search of exercising their right to self-determination and whose 
struggle was elevated to the level of international armed conflict.
1261
 This came about as the 
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opinion developed in the 1960s that wars of national liberation were international conflict 
within the ambit of Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
1262
 Right after the Geneva 
Conferences concluded the formulation of Additional Protocols a member of the US 
Delegation wrote: ‘the two new Protocols will now have to be submitted to the Senate for its 
advice and consent prior to ratification. This procedure will probably move quickly, and 
before long the two new Protocols will be in force for the United States.’1263 Even after 
thirty-five years the United States has not ratified the two Protocols. In 1997, Ambassador 
Aldrich, head of the US delegation, stated:  
Looking back … I deeply regret … I did not press, within the executive branch of my 
government, for prompt submission of Protocols to the Senate …. I failed to realize 
that, with the passage of time, those in both [the US State and Defence] Departments 
who had negotiated and supported the Protocols would be replaced by sceptics and 
individuals with different political agendas.
1264
  
Indeed, the attitude of the United States Government is very much reflected by those states 
which are reluctant to ratify both Protocols mainly because of being beset by internal dissent 
as in the case of the three states under consideration, namely, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. 
 
3.9 NSAGs: armed conflict reclassified? 
 
Given the primacy of internal armed conflicts in the contemporary international relations and 
the fact that some of the most heinous crimes are generally committed against civilians, it is 
rather surprising that the attention of scholars and the international community lie 
elsewhere.
1265
 As discussed above, the IHL has traditionally divided armed conflicts into 
bifurcated legal distinction between inter-state and intra-state conflicts. According to Sassoli: 
For a situation to classified as an international armed conflict between states, the 
necessary level of violence is lower and the number of treaty rules applicable in such a 
conflict is much longer than for non-international armed conflicts. For violence with a 
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non-state actor to amount to an armed conflict (not of an international character), its 
intensity must be much greater.
1266
  
 
3.9.1 The bifurcated legal distinction  
 
At the outset, it has to be determined whether the armed conflict is of international or internal 
(non-international) nature in order to engage the respective applicable humanitarian treaty 
law framework.
1267
 This traditional dichotomy has been reiterated by the International Court 
of Justice decision in the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequence of the Construction of 
the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
1268
 In that case Israel’s justification of 
building a security fence was rejected since Israel ‘does not claim that the attacks against it 
are imputable to a foreign state’.1269   
In 2008, the ICRC released a paper entitled: “How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in 
International Humanitarian Law?” in which it adheres to the classical dichotomy of 
international and non-international armed conflict and proposes to define them as follows: 
(1) International armed conflicts exist whenever there is resort to armed forces 
between two or more states. 
(2) Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring 
between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or 
between such groups arising on the territory of a state [party to the Geneva 
Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and 
parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation.
1270
 
As discussed previously, the IHL does not provide a settled legal definition for ‘armed 
conflict’. This unguided case-by-case analysis has often produced unsatisfactory results and 
has always been shrouded in controversy.
1271
 In order for the instruments of international 
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humanitarian law (IHL) to apply, there must be an armed conflict or occupation.
1272
 This is 
regardless of whether the initial decision was taken in conformity with the rules and 
principles of jus ad bellum or not.
1273
 Normally, states are reluctant to admit the existence of 
an armed conflict as well as the level of intensity between the government forces and a 
NSAG that automatically trigger IHL obligations.
1274
 Reluctance of states not to recognize a 
NSAG operating on their territory is not to provide them legal status and legitimacy.
1275
 The 
twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century have witnessed a 
proliferation of NSAGs’ involvement in armed conflicts mostly within borders of a sovereign 
state involving the central government’s armed forces and a NSAG or between multiplicity of 
such groups in some cases in the so-called ‘failed states’ engaged in violence.1276 
Consequently, the characteristic of contemporary armed conflict presents fresh challenges to 
protection of civilians in particular and application of IHL in general.
1277
  
 
3.9.2 Internal disturbance and iensions 
 
Treaty law provides some indication of situations that do not amount to an armed conflict, 
Article 2(1) of Additional Protocol II, deals with ‘non-international armed conflict’, and 
specifically mentions the violent situations that the Protocol excludes from its scope as ‘not 
being armed conflicts’, including ‘internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated 
and sporadic acts of violence, as opposed to military operations carried out by armed forces 
or armed groups; other acts of a similar nature, including, in particular, large scale arrests of 
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people for their activities or opinions”, as not being armed conflict’.1278 The ICRC provided 
the following explanation of civil disturbances in the Diplomatic Conference of Government 
Experts in 1971 prior to the adoption of the two Protocols: 
This involves situations in which there is no non-international armed conflict as such, 
but there exists a confrontation within the country, which is characterized by a certain 
seriousness or duration and which involves acts of violence. The latter can assume 
various forms, all the way from spontaneous generation of acts of revolt to the struggle 
between more or less organized groups and the authorities in power. In these situations, 
which do not necessarily degenerate into open struggle, the authorities in power call 
upon extensive police forces, or even armed force, to restore internal order. The high 
number of victims has made it necessary the application of a minimum of humanitarian 
rules.
1279
 
As regards to situations of “internal tension”, those could be said to include in particular of 
situations of a serious tension (political, religious, racial, social, economic, etc.), but also 
internal disturbances. Such situations have one or more of the following characteristics, if not 
all at the same time: 
- large scale arrests; 
- a large number of “political” prisoners; 
- the probable existence of ill-treatment or inhumane conditions of detention; 
- the suspension of fundamental judicial guarantees, either as part of the promulgation 
of a state of emergency or simply as a matter of fact; 
- allegations of disappearances. 
In short, there are internal disturbances, without being an armed conflict, when a state uses 
armed forces to maintain order; there are internal tensions, without being internal 
disturbances, when force is used as a preventive measure to maintain law and order. While 
designed for practical use, they may serve to shed some light on these terms, which appear in 
an international instrument for the first time.
1280
 
Moreover, ICTY has stated that the ICRC Commentary provides criteria which are useful 
indicators of what constitutes an armed conflict according to Common Article 3: 
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(1) The party in revolt against the de jure government possess an organized military 
force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within determinate territory and 
having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention. 
(2) That the legal government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces 
against insurgents organized as military and in possession of the part of the national 
territory. 
(3) (a) That the de jure government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or 
(b) that it has claimed for itself the rights of belligerents; or 
(c) that it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes  
only of the present Convention; or 
(d) that the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the 
General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace and 
security, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. 
       (4) (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of 
a state. 
             (b) That the insurgent’s civil authority exercise de facto authority over the population 
within a determinate portion of the national territory. 
              (c) That the armed forces act under the direction of an organized authority and are 
prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war. 
              (d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the 
Convention.
1281
 
International law does not consider the use of force by criminal gangs, street rioting even 
activities instigated by well organised terrorist groups as amounting to armed conflict.
1282
 It is 
worth noting that the Inter-American Commission in Abella case recognized that fairly low-
level internal violence triggers IHL since it ‘does not require the existence of large scale and 
generalized hostilities or a situation comparable to a civil war in which dissident armed 
exercise control over parts of national territory.’1283 In Abella case, the commission applied 
IHL to an organized attack by 42 armed civilians on La Tablada military installations in 
Argentina in which 1500 military personnel were deployed to repel the attack.
1284
 The attack 
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lasted 30 hours and resulted in the death of 29 attackers and a number of military personnel. 
However, this is a rather unique and isolated case and in the opinion of the present author sets 
a dangerous precedent by recognizing such civil disturbances as armed conflicts. It is 
significant to point out that no other international court or tribunal has followed this appraoch 
by applying IHL to what could only be described as a low intensity internal violence. 
 
3.9.3 NSAGs and defining armed conflict 
 
In relation to a state, there is always reluctance on the part of the government to admit that 
there is an armed conflict taking place on its territory, as in the case of Russia that ignored to 
recognize existance of an armed conflict in spite of the pronouncement by the Russian 
Supreme Court in 1995 that Additional Protocol II was applicable to the conflict in 
Chechnya.
1285
 However, upon the resumption of the conflict in 1999 the Russian government 
opted to classify the conflict as an anti-terrorist operation, hence, denying the fact that an 
internal armed conflict was taking place on its territory.
1286
 By the same token, since the start 
of the armed campaign by the PKK in 1984, Turkey has never accepted that there is an armed 
conflict taking place on its territory.
1287
 
It is submitted that the modern conflicts that NSAGs are engaged in do not fall within the 
existing framework of the IHL.
1288
 In fact, attempting to compartmentalize contemporary 
armed conflicts in the above manner has been open to criticism for some time.
1289
 Although 
many of NSAGs predominantly operate within borders of a certain territory but ultimately 
they extend their sphere of influence and military operations beyond those boundaries. The 
Middle East and in particular the three Kurdish entities under consideration in Turkey, Iraq 
and Iran could be cited as a good example of this phenomenon where the international 
instruments are incapable of dealing with NSAGs since their activities are no longer limited 
to the borders of the states they operate in.
1290
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The ICTY in the case of Tadic has also provided a definition of both international and 
non-international armed conflict that:  
Exists whenever there is resort to armed force between states or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within state … These hostilities [fighting among groups within the Former 
Yugoslavia] exceed the intensity requirements applicable to both international and 
internal armed conflicts. There has been protracted, large scale violence between the 
armed forces of different states and between governmental forces and organized 
insurgent groups.
1291
  
Moir opines that the Tadic definition is much closer to the definition provided in Common 
Article 3 rather than the higher intensity level of Additional Protocol II, nor does the above 
definition require any control of territory, compliance with humanitarian law by the NSAGs 
involved and significantly there is no requirement of the government troops actually taking 
part in the hostilities.
1292
 The subsequent judgements of the ICTY and ICTR have approved 
the latter approach, although some writers have noticed exercise of caution on the part of 
ICTR. The Appeal Chamber’s provided definition in Tadic is still ‘termed in the abstract and 
whether or not a situation can be described as an “armed conflict”, meeting the criteria of 
Common Article 3, is to be decided on a case-by-case basis.’1293 It is worth noting that the 
Statute of ICTR also contains norms of international humanitarian law expressly relating to 
armed conflicts of non-international character.
1294
 The Tadic Trial Chamber concentrated on 
two crucial aspects of a conflict which may involve NSAGs: the intensity of the conflict and 
the organization of the parties to the conflict. The Chamber stated: ‘[I]n an armed conflict of 
an internal or mixed character, these closely related criteria are used solely for the purpose, as 
a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived 
insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian 
law’.1295 
More recently, Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
1296
 
provides a definition of internal armed conflict. Hence, according to Article 8(2)(f) of the 
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ICC Statute, ‘the Court will have jurisdiction over serious violations of the laws and customs 
of war committed in armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a state when there is 
protracted armed conflict between governmental authority and organised armed groups or 
between such armed groups.’1297 It has been argued that the aforementioned definition was 
very much influenced by the case-law of ICTY and is more in tune with the definition 
provided in Common Article 3 than that of Additional Protocol II. 
1298
 It is the only provision 
which unequivocally refers to armed conflict and clearly distinguishes between international 
and non-international armed conflict as well as internal disturbances and tensions. On the 
importance of inclusion of a definition of internal armed conflict Moir notes: 
The existence or otherwise of a non-international armed conflict is not, however, only 
relevant to the applicability of Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II or customary 
law. It is also a vital question for the purposes of international criminal law, in that war 
crimes can only be committed in the context of, and associated with, armed conflict.
1299
      
In regards to non-international armed conflict the list of war crimes in the form of ‘serious 
violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions’1300 could be found in Article 
8(2)(c), which ‘applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not 
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature’. Other serious violations of the laws 
costumes of non-international armed conflict are listed in Article 8(2)(e). What constitute the 
concept of internal armed conflict is elucidated in subparagraph (c) and (e), thus clarifying 
the scope of application.
1301
 This definition maintains the concept of national sovereignty of 
states and repeats and reinforces the classical applicability of IHL between international and 
non-international armed conflict.
1302
 It is also worth noting that Article 8(3) of the Rome 
Statute based upon Article 3(1) of Additional Protocol II, reiterates the responsibility of a 
state to maintain and re-establish law and order as well as protecting its territorial integrity, 
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by all legitimate means.
1303
 It is significant to note that the Rome Statute does not limit itself 
to conflicts between governments and armed groups, it also excludes the pre-requisite 
attached to Additional Protocol II that dissident armed forces or other organized groups 
should be ‘under responsible command or exercise such control over part of the territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations’.1304    
 
3.10 The importance of customary law 
 
In recent years the importance of customary international law in relation to armed conflict has 
achieved special importance mainly ‘due to the perceived need that certain obligations are 
customary so that they can form the basis for the prosecution of an individual for an 
international crime before an international criminal tribunal.
1305
 Unlike International treaties 
or domestic law, custom does not result from a standardized process of rule-making, and as 
evidence of a general practice, international custom is defined in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Customary international law is formed of widespread 
and consistent state practice and opinio juris as well as a belief that a certain practice is 
binding upon states as a matter of law.
1306
 This general practice has ‘to be both extensive and 
virtually uniform’,1307 as well as a psychological or subjective belief by states that such a 
behaviour is required by law.
1308
 Customary international law has also been considered and 
taken into account by domestic courts.
1309
 The task of determining different elements of 
international law relating to NSAGs and internal armed conflict is not an easy one and 
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ultimately may be insufficient.
1310
 Furthermore, identification of customary international 
norms is of paramount importance for reaching NSAGs, who are not party to IHL 
instruments or the United Nations.
1311
 Consequently, it is important to make reference to 
customary law as well as general principle of international law applicable to armed conflict 
situation such as the Martens clause, a tangible legal tool which has acquired customary 
character in international law.
1312
 The Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II perfectly 
encapsulates the concept of Martens clause which states: ‘Until a more complete code of the 
laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not 
included in the regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the 
protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirement of the 
public conscience.’1313 According to Detter, ‘the Martens clause is of the greatest importance 
in modern international law, especially to rebut any suggestions that states are free to behave 
as they wish within their own territory …’1314 
The Martens clause constitutes the most important of humanitarian principles in the corpus of 
the IHL which has significantly been reaffirmed in all subsequent major codifications such as 
all four 1949 Geneva Conventions which relying upon Martens clause in the case of a party’s 
denunciation of the said Conventions.
1315
 It says, ‘parties to the conflict [including the 
denouncing power] shall remain bound to fulfil [their obligations] by the virtue of principles 
of the law of nations, as they result from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience.’1316 It has also been noticed elsewhere by Meron that the Martens clause provides 
an essential tool for protection of persons affected by an armed conflict because, ‘the 
adoption of a treaty regulating particular aspects of the laws of war does not deprive the 
affected persons of the protection of these norms of customary international law that were not 
included in the codification.’1317 
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As mentioned above, the treaty instruments regarding NSAGs and internal armed conflict are 
mainly contained in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.
1318
 Additionally, the 
international community has developed a tendency to encompass both international and non-
international armed conflicts in relation to the regulation of certain types of weapons such as 
the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993.
1319
 Article 1 of the 1997 Ottawa Convention
1320
 
related to anti-personnel mines prohibits the use of anti-personnel mines in both international 
and non-international conflict.
1321
 Article 19 of the ‘Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict’ could also be cited as the proof of this trend, 
according to which the parties to an internal armed conflict must apply at least those 
provisions relating to respect for cultural property.
1322
 Article 22 of the Protocol II to the 
Convention, adopted in 1999, also applies explicitly to both international and non-
international armed conflict.
1323
 Therefore, it is an undeniable reality that the international 
community has developed a tendency to include both international and non-international 
armed conflicts in recent instruments relating to methods and means of warfare is reflective 
of developments in customary international law.
1324
  
The ICJ in the Nicaragua case identified that a considerable number of customary law 
principles are always applicable regardless of the label of the armed conflict.
1325
 In other 
words, it could be argued that a more comprehensive body of rules which reflects customary 
international law applies to armed conflict regardless of their nature.
1326
 This is in the light of 
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the fact that IHL’s continuous development through the process of state practice and political 
interaction is unstoppable.
1327
  
In relation to customary international rules applying to non-international armed conflict, the 
decision in 1995 by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadic,
1328
 is of 
considerable importance.
1329
 This has been described as the first authoritative statement that 
not only customary international rules also apply to non-international armed conflict, but 
more importantly they largely stemmed from the rules applicable to international armed 
conflict.
1330
 The Appeals Chamber held that those rules protecting civilians in international 
armed conflicts equally applied to non-international armed conflict, in step with many of the 
rules relating to methods and means of warfare.
1331
 In spite of this, the Chamber denied that 
non-international armed conflicts were regulated by the customary rules of humanitarian law 
in their entirety.
1332
 This prompted some scholars such as Greenwood and Warbrick to 
disagree with the approach adopted by the Chamber’s position which has subsequently been 
vindicated by the development of IHL accordingly.
1333
  
The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) following more than eight years of 
research published a study of Customary International Humanitarian Law applicable during 
armed conflict.
1334
 According to the ICRC, ‘the purpose of this study is to enhance respect for 
international humanitarian law and thus to offer greater protection to victims of war’.1335 The 
most relevant and striking aspect of this study relates to the attempt to bridge the gap between 
non-international armed conflict, for which treaty law is not as developed as in the case of 
highly densely regulated treaty regimes regarding international armed conflict.
1336
 The rules 
on the conduct of hostilities, namely, ‘the principle of distinction, the definition of military 
objectives, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, the principle of proportionality and the 
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duty to take precaution in attack are all part of customary international law’ and as a result 
bind on all parties to the conflict including NSAGs.
1337
 In this regard, the President of ICRC 
Jakob Kellenberger encapsulates the importance of this development by stating: 
… Yet civil wars often result in the worst suffering. The study clearly shows that 
customary international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflict goes beyond the rules of treaty law. For example, while treaty law covering 
internal armed conflict does not expressly prohibit attacks on civilian objects; 
customary international humanitarian law closes the gap. Importantly, all conflict 
parties – not just States but also rebel groups, for example – are bound by customary 
international humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflict.
1338
  
The study supports the finding of ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), for instance, which held that conduct of hostilities rules apply equally in 
non-international and international armed conflict.
1339
 According to one of the authors of the 
study: 
The regulation of the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of persons in internal 
armed conflicts is thus more detailed and complete than that which exists under treaty 
law. It remains to be explored to what extent, from a humanitarian and military 
perspective, this more detailed and complete regulation is sufficient or whether further 
development in the law are required.
1340
   
The UN Commission on Darfur stated: 
… That a body of customary rules regulating internal armed conflicts has thus evolved 
in international community … some states in their military manuals for their armed 
forces clearly have stated that the bulk of international humanitarian law also applied to 
internal armed conflicts. Other states have taken similar attitude with regard to many 
rules of international humanitarian law.
1341
  
In this regard, the Commission is referring to the military manuals of the UK and Germany as 
well as a number of comments made in the recent decades by the USA regarding what it 
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considers as general rules regulating conduct in internal armed conflicts.
1342
 The Commission 
in Darfur also states that by including internal violations of IHL in the International Criminal 
Court Statute ‘proves that the general legal view evolved in the overwhelming majority of the 
international community ... to the effect that (i) internal armed conflicts are governed by an 
extensive set of general rules of international humanitarian law; and (ii) serious violations of 
those rules may involve individual criminal liability.’1343 Therefore there is no doubt that 
‘over the past thirty years there has been a general extension of the rules of international 
armed conflict to situations of non-international armed conflict.’1344 
There is no doubt that customary principles play a major role in international armed conflict 
perfectly highlighted in the International Military Tribunal in Nuremburg in which it was 
held that by 1939, the Hague Conventions had achieved customary status and were 
‘recognised by all civilized nations’ and were considered ‘declaratory of the laws and 
customs of war’, consequently, ‘binding on all parties and non-parties alike’.1345 However, 
customary rules
1346
 relating to application of these norms to internal armed conflict and 
NSAGs until recently have been rather vague.
1347
 Furthermore, in regards to internal armed 
conflict non-participation of some of the major (regional and world) powers in major treaties 
concerning IHL makes the importance of customary rules even more imperative to 
consider.
1348
 Further discussion on the validity of different theories is beyond the scope of 
this study. However, it has to be acknowledged that there is no settled legal reasoning on the 
issue it is now accepted as uncontroversial and commonplace that NSAGs are bound by 
customary law.
1349
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3.11 Common Article 3 as a basis for compliance 
 
In order to regulate internal armed conflict, much has been relied upon customary law with 
little analysis of state practice and opinion juris.
1350
 This is particularly important since 
compliance with treaty law is sometimes scarce.
1351
 Allied to this, it is claimed that 
‘calamitous events and atrocities have repeatedly driven the development of international 
humanitarian law.’1352 All doubts with regard to the issue of threshold must be overcome for 
the sake of better humanitarian protection in line with the very ethos of IHL namely 
protection of civilians.
1353
 Consequently, Common Article 3 should then be applied as widely 
as possible.
1354
 It is worth noting that in recent times Common Article 3 has almost 
systematically been preferred as a basis to bring criminal charges at ad hoc Tribunals.
1355
 
Undoubtedly, the minimum protection under Common Article 3 to all four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 was the first globally accepted piece of legislation to regulate treatment 
of citizens by their governments according to community standards.
1356
 When considering its 
legacy, in spite of its deficiencies Common Article 3 has been put into practice in many 
internal conflicts since its inception. For instance, during the French-Algerian conflict, the 
Algerian National Liberation Front and the French government by and large accepted the 
applicability of Common Article 3 to that situation; the French strongly implied that the 
Article was applied as of June 1956.
1357
 Moreover, Common Article 3, the most firmly 
established source of international law on internal armed conflict has also been called a 
statement of “affectionate generalities” than of precise guidelines.1358 Nevertheless, it should 
be pointed out that the application of Common Article 3 does not affect the legal status of 
parties to a conflict.
1359
 Similarly, Protocol II does not affect ‘the sovereignty of the state or 
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the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain and re-establish law 
and order in the state or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity’.1360 In certain 
cases the situation could be clarified through UN resolutions stating that the in a particular 
conflict humanitarian rules contained in Article 3 are to be respected by both sides.
1361
  
Nevertheless, Article 3 provides civilians the same protection equivalent to those granted to 
civilians in international armed conflicts. But as it has been stated that NSAGs do not benefit 
in any shape or form from POW status under the third Geneva Convention available to 
combatants in international conflicts. Common Article 3 makes a distinction between those 
engaged in hostilities and those who do not. However, Additional Protocol II, specifically 
mentions “civilian population”, but does not define it.1362 In spite of this lack of a definition, 
civilians upon their participation in hostilities lose their protection.
1363
 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the Martens clause reinforces the importance of customary 
international humanitarian law as well as obliging the parties to any armed conflict to act 
according to ‘principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience’.1364  
This was confirmed by the decision of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, in which the ICJ 
described Common Article 3 has been described as codification of customary international 
law, it says: 
Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
defines certain rules to be applied in armed conflicts of non-international law 
character. There is no doubt that in the event of international armed conflicts, 
these rule also constitute a minimum yardstick in addition to the more elaborate 
rules which are also to apply to international conflicts; and they are rules which, 
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[22]; and more recently in the Nuclear Weapon Advisory Opinion (Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat 
of Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Rep 1, [78-87]. 
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in the Court’s opinion, reflect what the Court in 1949 called ‘elementary 
consideration of humanity …1365  
It also emphasised that the rules contained in Common Article 3 reflected ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’, a term initially used in the Corfu Channel1366 case which was 
decided in the same year as the Geneva Conventions were signed.
1367
 Moreover, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the case of Tadic 
accepted that Common Article 3 because of its universal compliance, is now part of 
customary international law and as a matter of law applies to both international and non-
international armed conflict.
1368
 Moir notes that the UK Military Manual, having been relied 
upon in its 1958 edition by the ICTY in Tadic as evidence of the customary status of war 
crimes and criminal responsibility in the course of an internal armed conflict, has in turn in its 
2004 edition relied upon the Tadic decision as authority for customary law.
1369
 An ICTY 
Trial Chamber had to rule on a defence motion on jurisdiction which held that the elements of 
the ICJ’s decision in Nicaragua v USA amounted to a finding that the obligations and 
prohibitions contained in Common Article 3 reflected customary international law.
1370
 
Similar statements have been made by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), in its Akayesu judgment upheld the same view:  
‘it is today clear that the norms of Common Article 3 have acquired the status of 
customary law in that most states, by their domestic penal codes, have 
criminalized acts which if committed during internal armed conflict, would 
constitute violations of common Article 3.’1371  
Moreover, some national courts have acknowledged the customary nature of obligations 
contained in Common Article 3, such as Karadizc case in the USA, in which the district court 
held, ‘most fundamental norms of the laws of war, which binds parties to internal conflicts 
regardless of whether they are recognized nations or roving hordes of insurgents’. 
                                                 
1365
 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States), Merits, [1986] ICJ Rep 14. 
1366
 Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania) Merits, [1949] ICJ Rep 4, at 22.  
1367
 C. Smith, ‘Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as a Minimum Standard in International 
Humanitarian Law’, Irish Student Law Review 168 2005, p. 170.  
1368
 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 
1369
 Moir, ‘Non-International Armed Conflict and Guerrilla Warfare’, op. cit., p. 331-332; see also ‘The Manual 
of the Law of Armed Conflict’, UK Ministry of Defence, op. cit., pp. 397-398.   
1370
 Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v Tadic (IT-94-1), Trial Chamber, 10 August 
1995, at para 67.  
1371
 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4 (2 Sept. 1998) para 608; see also the Special Court 
of Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and Brima Bazzy Kamara SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on 
Challenge to Jurisdiction , Lome Accord Amnesty (13 Mar 2004) para 47.   
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The main problem with implementation of Common article 3 is in the recognition of internal 
armed conflict as such by the state authorities, according to Moir: 
 ‘The failure of the drafters to define the term “armed conflict not of an 
international character” allowed states reluctant to hinder their ability to deal with 
insurrection by accepting any international humanitarian obligations simply to 
deny the existence of armed conflict, and thus the applicability of international 
regulation’.1372  
There is a tendency among governments to find it less expedient to formally recognize 
existence of an armed conflict on their territory as long as possible they will portray the 
conflict as a mere internal strife.
1373
 Moreover, recognition of an armed conflict is 
disadvantageous to the central governments for a variety of reasons. According to the UK 
Ministry of Defence, ‘states have been, and always will be reluctant to admit that a state of 
armed conflict exists’.1374 This is in the light of the fact that, it will highlight the 
incompetence of the state to prevent such a conflict.
1375
 Additionally, it will provide the 
rebels with much needed recognition as legal combatants, and by acknowledging the 
existence of conflict on their territory brings into force the most basic provisions of IHL 
which ultimately restrict states use of repressive measures.
1376
 It is also worth mentioning that 
applicability of rules of IHL does not depend upon the de facto recognition of state of armed 
conflict, as highlighted by the ICRC: 
 “The ascertainment whether there is a non-international armed conflict does not 
depend on the subjective judgment of the parties to the conflict; it must be 
determined on the basis of objective criteria.”1377  
Therefore, since there is no set of conditions contained in the Common Article 3 as when it 
would apply, Moir is of the opinion that the onus of recognizing the existence of an armed 
conflict is still upon the discretion of the state hosting the conflict.
1378
  
Like Additional Protocol I, Additional Protocol II cannot be said to be customary law but 
certain provisions of Additional Protocol II unequivocally apply to non-international 
conflicts.
1379
 The Appeals Chamber of ICTY has stated that only ‘the core’ of Additional 
                                                 
1372
 Moir, ‘the Law of Internal armed Conflict’, op. cit., p. 88. 
1373
 J. Yoo, ‘Transferring Terrorists’, 79 Notre Dame Law Review 1183, (2004), p. 1197. 
1374
 UK Ministry of Defence Manual, op. cit., p. 384. 
1375
 Solis, ‘The Law of Armed Conflict’, op. cit., p. 102.   
1376
 Cullen, ‘The Parameters of Internal Armed Conflict in international Humanitarian law’, op. cit., p. 197.  
1377
 ICRC Working Paper, http://www.igc.org/icc/html/icrc8_2e199990629.html (June 29, 1999).  
1378
 Moir, ‘the Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, op. cit., p. 45.   
1379
 See R. Myren, ‘Applying International Law of War to Non-International Armed Conflicts: Past Attempts 
and Future Strategies’ (1990) 37 NILR 367.  
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Protocol II could be considered part of customary international law,
1380
 a view reiterated by 
the ICTR.
1381
Although it is beyond the remit of this study to consider exactly which 
provisions of Additional Protocol II are part of customary international law, there is 
agreement by and large that not all provisions of Additional Protocol II reflect customary 
international law.
1382
 Another factor which makes Additional Protocol II not declarative of 
customary international law is due to lack of ratification by some major states such as the 
USA and others which are currently embroiled in internal armed conflicts such as India, Iran, 
Iraq, Israel and Turkey to name a few. This particular factor ‘makes transformation of the 
Protocol’s provisions into customary law more difficult.1383 This is in spite of the fact that in 
1990s a significant number of states involved in internal armed conflicts ratified Additional 
Protocol II, but this does not hide the poor record of compliance by the parties involved in 
internal armed conflicts. This prompted the UN Secretary General to specifically mention this 
issue in his report pursuant to the creation of the ICTR:  
‘The Security Council has included within the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
Rwanda Tribunal international instruments regardless whether they were 
considered part of customary international law … Article 4 of the Statute, 
accordingly includes violations of Additional Protocol II which as a whole, has 
not as yet been universally recognized as part of customary international law.’1384 
For the purpose of this study since none of the sovereign states under consideration are yet to 
ratify Additional Protocol II, Common Article 3 will be the basis of accountability of NSAGs 
under international law if they reach the threshold of intensity.  
 
                                                 
1380
 Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction (2 Oct. 1995), para. 117. 
1381
 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, para. 608. 
1382
 For a recent pronouncement on the topic, see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, ‘Customary International 
Humanitarian Law’. 
1383
 At present, 168 states are party to Additional Protocol I and 164 states to Additional Protocol II, Two state 
France and the Philippines have ratified Protocol II but not Protocol I. International Humanitarian Law: Treaties 
& Documents: 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView. 
1384
 Report of the United Nations Secretary General pursuant to para. 5 of Security Council Resolution 955, 
S/1995/134 (13 February 1995) para. 12. 
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Chapter 4 International law applicable to NSAGs 
 
4.1 The legal status of NSAGs  
 
Unlike the IHL rules on interstate armed conflict, there is no mention of a legal status of 
combatants, i.e. individuals who may take part and be targeted in intrastate armed conflict in 
treaty rules.
1385
 An entity with legal personality defined under international legal regimes 
possesses rights and responsibilities and is able to enter into agreements with other subjects 
of international law, namely sovereign states.
1386
 The central issue to this is whether there is 
any efficacy in assessing international legal personality of non-state actors, in particular, 
NSAGs.
1387
 A range of factors need to be considered before it can be determined whether an 
entity has international legal personality and if so what rights and obligations apply in that 
particular case. While the development of certain status of non-state actors in the general 
international discourse such as in international environmental law
1388
 their participation has 
largely been welcomed, the case of NSAGs embroiled in armed conflict is more of a 
concern.
1389
  
There is no pre-set of rights or duties that an entity would have to satisfy to be granted 
international legal personality. According to Heintze, generally, the legal status of non-state 
actors is determined by the domestic legal system of the state they are operating in.
1390
 He 
contends that on the basis of the ICJ’s judgement in the Barcelona Traction1391 case in which 
it was held that corporations have the ‘nationality’ of the state they are based in and the same 
can be said of NSAGs involved in internal armed conflicts.
1392
 It has been argued that 
                                                 
1385
 N. Lubell, ‘Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict’, IRRC, vol. 87, no. 860, 
December 2005, p. 748.  
1386
 Cassese, ‘International Law’, op. cit., p. 71. 
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the popular press. See P. J. Simpson, ‘Learning to Live with NGOs’, Foreign Policy, Vol. 112 (1998), 82; 
Jessica Mathews, ‘Power Shift: An Essay on Realism, Reality and the Future of International Relations’, 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 76 (1997), 50; Paul Lewis, ‘Not just Governments Make war and Peace’, New York 
Times, 28 November 1998.  
1388
 P. Sands, ‘Principles of International Environmental Law’, Cambridge U.P., 2nd ed., 2003, pp. 112-113; T. 
Jewell & J. Steele (ed.), ‘Law in Environmental Decision Making: National, European, and International 
Perspectives’, Oxford U.P., 1998, p. 236. 
1389
 J. Kellenberger, ‘International Humanitarian Law at the Beginning of the 21st Century, Addressed to 26th 
Roundtable on Current problems of International Humanitarian Law’, San Remo, 5 September 2002; for text: 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5e2c8v  
1390
 Heintze, ‘Do Non-State Actors challenge International Humanitarian Law’, op. cit., p. 163.  
1391
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) ICJ Reports, the Hague 1970, 
pp. 42.  
1392
 Heintze, ‘Do Non-State Actors challenge International Humanitarian Law’, op. cit., p. 163.   
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because of pluralism and diversity of legal subjects and the ever-changing nature of needs of 
the world community, a legal ‘personality is a relative phenomenon varying with the 
circumstances’.1393  
The non-exclusivity of legal subjects of international law was recognized as early as 1949 by 
the ICJ in the Reparation case opinion in which it dealt with the legal personality of 
international organizations. The Court held: 
The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in 
the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community. 
Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the 
requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in the collective 
activities of states has already given rise to instances of action upon the international 
plane by certain entities which are not states.
1394
  
However, as Menon observes: 
… A subject of international law need not be a state and its rights and duties need not 
be the same as those of the state. The fact that international organizations and 
individuals lack a certain capacity possessed by states does not necessarily mean that 
they are not subjects of international law.
1395
   
It goes without saying that under traditional international law NSAGs would not have 
enjoyed any legal personality, simply because only the sovereign states were the primary 
subjects of international law.
1396
 On this point, Cassese opines that states and insurgents have 
long been ‘traditional’ subjects of international community and from its inception they have 
been the dramatis personae (the character of the play) on the international scene but only 
states enjoy lucos standi and are the bearer of international legal personality.
1397
 But at the 
heart of the issue of NSAGs attaining international legal personality is the delicate question 
of ‘sovereignty of states’ in question as well as monopoly of coercive use of force.1398 For a 
NSAG to be granted an international legal personality would inevitably result in 
                                                 
1393
 Shaw, ‘International Law’, op. cit., p. 196.  
1394
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 P.K. Menon, ‘Subjects of Modern International Law’, in Hague Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 3, 
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compromising of the host state’s sovereignty (the state on whose territory the armed conflict 
is taking place). This is in the light of the fact that as discussed above the only condition that 
a NSAG could legitimately attain international legal personality in the past has been the 
exercise of the right to self-determination by NSAGs representing a distinct ethnic minority 
population in order to achieve statehood albeit through the process of decolonization which in 
today’s global set up is very rare and increasing difficult to achieve.1399 It is submitted that 
attaining a legal personality is based on ‘participation plus some form of community 
acceptance’,1400 manifesting itself in recognition by the majority of sovereign states and 
assert belligerent rights on par with an international conflict.
1401
 
In sum, in relation to NSAGs it is very unlikely that such armed groups would ever be 
granted international legal personality.
1402
 Unless, there has been substantial military success 
on the part of the insurgents (NSAG) in the conflict,
1403
 which subsequently results in 
recognition of their belligerency by the host state, whose acts have been beyond the level of 
mere banditry that ‘possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its 
acts’ and has captured and administered a considerable part of the host state’s territory could 
have international legal personality, however, not on par with a sovereign state.
1404
 As 
emphasized by Dinstein: 
If the rebels have failed to gain effective control over a significant part of their territory, 
if they are not led by a responsible quasi-governmental authority, and if hostilities are 
limited to episodic hit-and-run incidents, there is simply no point in pretending that the 
laws of interstate warfare can be implemented by them.
1405
  
This is in the light of the fact that ‘structure is necessary for the activation and 
implementation of international norms.’1406 However, if the NSAG does not meet the above 
conditions, even if it has used force proportionally, carry arms openly, wear identifiable 
uniform and limited its operation to military targets it will be at the mercy of host state’s 
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criminal justice system.
1407
 The best contemporary examples of this could be found in 
conflicts in Turkey, where the central government does not recognise an armed conflict in 
Kurdistan,
1408
 and Russia has never recognised that an internal armed conflict has ever taken 
place in Chechnya in spite of a ruling by the Russian Constitutional Court in 1995 that 
Additional Protocol II was applicable.
1409
 Nonetheless, since the resumption of hostilities in 
1999, the Russian government has consistently maintained that the ‘operation’ in the 
Chechnya is conducted in accordance with the 1998 Law ‘On Fighting Terrorism’.1410 
Furthermore, the international responsibility of NSAGs has already been addressed by the 
UN Security Council taking sanctions against such groups.
1411
 
 
4.2 International legal obligations of NSAGs under inter-state treaty law 
 
In step with the state-centric nature of international law, NSAGs cannot be party to inter-state 
IHL treaties.
1412
 This is in the light of the fact that only states can ratify or accede to such 
treaty law and NSAGs cannot be bound by Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II on 
the basis of their own legal personality.
1413
 Article 1 Common to the Geneva Conventions 
clearly stipulates that only states can be party to these conventions, a principle also upheld by 
Additional Protocol II of 1977.
1414
 The legal justification most commonly advanced in 
relation to binding NSAGs to inter-state treaty law is the doctrine of legislative jurisdiction 
which was put forward by the Greek delegate during the 1949 Geneva conference.
1415
 In this 
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regard, it has been stated that applicability of Common Article 3 and Additional protocol II 
depends very much on whether the host state to the conflict has ratified the said conventions 
and not the expressed declaration of NSAGs adhering to the IHL. On this point Zegveld 
notes: 
Like armed opposition groups, individuals cannot accede to international treaties, they 
derive their international rights and obligations through the state under which 
jurisdiction they live. However, the international rules applicable to individuals are 
limited to prohibitions on committing a limited number of international crimes … 
Common article 3 and Protocol II do not merely require armed opposition groups not to 
commit the most serious crimes.
1416
  
Providing the state in question has ratified additional Protocol II then the NSAGs concerned 
will be automatically bound by the relevant norms laid down therein.
1417
 Article 4 of the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict of 25 May 2000
1418
 is indicative of such a binding force.
1419
 It has 
been suggested that this article clearly sets out the responsibility of a state for all entities 
under its jurisdiction.
1420
 
There are two particular situations which may apply to NSAGs involved in non-international 
armed conflict. At the heart of this approach is the dichotomy between NSAGs which act 
sporadically and do not hold any part of the territory and organised armed opposition groups 
which exercise administrative authority in a certain part of the territory that cannot be ignored 
by the central government as well as the international community at large. As stated above, 
Protocol II only applies to those armed groups which hold part of the territory of a state and 
in affect act as the de facto administrative authority of that part of the territory and would be 
bound by the said Protocol.
1421
 In the case of NSAGs do not control part of a territory of a 
state, they cannot be bound by Protocol II, however, they will be bound by Common article 3. 
According to Baxter the latter groups are only bound by international humanitarian law by 
the virtue of being inhabitants of the state that has ratified the relevant conventions.
1422
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Otherwise, members of NSAGs (which are loosely organized) will be subjected to the host 
state’s criminal system.1423  
Even by reviewing state practice or decisions of quasi-judicial organs we are unable to fill the 
gap left by conventional law of non-international armed conflict on how to differentiate those 
who are to be protected from those who are to be the legitimate target of attack.
1424
 However, 
the following passage by Bassiouini provides a realist view of legal norms applicable to 
NSAGs: 
… The legal norms applicable to non-state actors are context specific. Therefore, there 
are differentiations between norms intended to protect the same social and human 
interests that depend upon the context, the participation, and who determines certain 
relevant legal facts in a given armed conflict.”1425 He goes on to note: “The power of 
factual appreciation and legal characterization left to the states by IHL gives them 
power to determine legal outcomes pertaining to non-state actors, and that imbalance 
between state and non-state actors ultimately leads to non-compliance by both.
1426
 
Later in the study it will be discussed whether this normative gap in internal armed conflict 
can be supplemented and/or filled by the IHRL to complement instruments of IHL.    
The Palestinian war of 1948 was the first time the Security Council had to grapple with a 
non-state entity involved in armed conflict which took place between the Arab and Jewish 
militia forces
1427
 as a result of termination of the British mandate of the Palestinian 
territory.
1428
 At the time the conflict was between two non-states and no involvement of third 
state, although, some of the Arab states were indirectly involved, it was made absolutely clear 
that international peace and security were very much imperilled.
1429
 As a result, without 
much deliberation, the Security Council called upon the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the 
Arab Higher Committee (both non-state entity) to bring about cessation of hostilities.
1430
 
However, the hostilities continued which prompted the Security Council to call upon ‘all 
persons and organizations in Palestine, and especially called upon the Arab Higher 
                                                 
1423
 Cassese, ‘International Law’, op. cit., p. 125.   
1424
 Kleffner, ‘From ‘Belligerents’ to ‘Fighters’ and Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities’, op. cit., p. 
324.  
1425
 Bassiouni, ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State 
Actors’, op. cit., p. 743.  
1426
 Bassiouni, ibid.   
1427
 See J.B. Whisker, ‘The Militia’, Edwin Mellen Press, 1st ed., 1992.  
1428
 P.H. Kooijmans, ‘The Security Council and Non-State Entities as Parties to Conflicts’, op. cit., p. 334; for 
legal assessment of the said conflict see also W.R. Louis, ‘The British Empire in the Middle East, 1941-1951’, 
quoted in Shabtai Rosenne, ‘International Law Miscellany’, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p. 714; J. Allain, 
‘International Law in Middle East: Closer to Power than Justice’, Ashgate, illustrated edition, 2004, p. 98.   
1429
 Ibid.  
1430
 Security Council Res. 43 (1948) of 1 April 1948.  
215 
 
Committee and the Jewish Agency to take certain measures.’1431 Kooijmans notes that ‘since 
the Jewish Agency was the forerunner of the future provisional Israeli government, it can 
hardly be compared to a normal non-state party in an internal conflict’.1432 This is in the light 
of the fact that subsequently Israel proclaimed independence and the conflict evolved from an 
internal into an inter-state one. 
 
4.3 International criminal law
1433
 
 
There is no doubt that individual criminal responsibility for serious abuse of the IHL, or war 
crime is clearly established as part of international law.
1434
 According to Lachs, a war crime 
is committed ‘during and in connection with an armed conflict under especially favourable 
conditions, created by the war and facilitating its commission.’1435 Hence, in the context of 
non-international armed conflicts it is even more crucial to establish the connection between 
the conduct in question and the continuing armed conflict in order to determine whether an 
individual is to be tried under domestic or international law.
1436
 Until recently, according to 
the state of international law and the unanimous opinion of legal literature war crimes only 
took place in international armed conflict and not in the case of internal armed conflict.
1437
 
Indicative of this approach is what Plattner claimed that, ‘international humanitarian law 
applicable to non-international armed conflict does not provide for individual penal 
responsibility.’1438  
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Consequently, IHL provisions on prosecution of war crimes in internal armed conflict were 
largely ignored until 1990s.
1439
 Moreover, IHL applicable in non-international armed conflict 
has long been hindered by the lack of an universal supervisory body to suppress serious 
violations of its provisions.
1440
 Some attribute this to strong historical sovereignty-oriented 
interests of states, their reluctance to compromise their sovereignty and exclusive 
competences as well as criminalising such acts under international law.
1441
 As Meron 
observes ‘the sovereignty of states and their insistence on maintaining maximum discretion 
with those who threaten their ‘sovereign authority’ have combined to limit the reach of 
international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict.’1442  
Furthermore, in a world where most of armed conflicts take place within the borders of a 
single state (at least to start with), there is a growing humanitarian concern for the protection 
of victims in such armed conflicts.
1443
 Therefore, ‘it was precisely in internal armed conflicts 
that national criminal justice systems were in all likelihood unable to adequately respond to 
violations of such norms.’1444 As a consequence, in recent decades there has been a rapid 
development in regulation of internal armed conflict manifesting itself in the enunciation and 
recognition of an expanding body of norms regarding internal armed conflict but also 
international law has clearly moved towards much greater criminalization of those norms.
1445
 
It had finally become ‘untenable to argue that the perpetrators of atrocities committed in non-
international armed conflict should be shielded from international justice.’1446  
 
4.3.1 The nexus between war crime and armed conflict 
 
In recent years the concept of internal armed conflict in contemporary international 
humanitarian law has been fashioned greatly by the jurisprudence of Quasi-Judicial bodies 
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
                                                 
1439
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1440
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1446
 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Establishing an International Criminal Court: Major Unresolved 
Issues in the Draft Statute (1998), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/LCHRUnresolvedIssues.pdf, 
Section IV. 
217 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) set up as a result of the atrocities 
committed during bloody conflicts in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
1447
 and 
Rwanda.
1448
 The UN Security Council established these tribunals respectively.
1449
 The 
significance of these tribunals according to Shaw is that they came about as a result of the use 
of authority of the UN Security Council to adopt decisions binding upon all member states 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, quite a contrast to the subsequent creation of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) which was created as result of an international 
conference.
1450
 Individual criminal responsibility for violations of norms related to 
international armed conflict was firmly established in international law in Tokyo and 
Nuremberg judgements and was further expanded upon through the grave breaches 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of Additional Protocol of 1977.
1451
 In the 
meantime, scholars such as Meron advocated that there was no moral justification or 
persuasive legal argument to treat perpetrators of atrocities related to internal armed conflict 
more leniently than those of international armed conflicts.
1452
 Nonetheless, in step with the 
traditional approach, the draft Statute of the ICTY defined crimes limited to “rules of 
international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law”1453 in line 
with crimes which had their basis in norms related to international armed conflict.
1454
 The 
same approach was adopted during the course of establishing the ICTR and the United 
Nations Commission of Experts similarly reiterated that war crimes were limited to 
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international armed conflicts.
1455
 The inadequacy of this definition however was exposed 
during the debate in the Security Council which prompted the three permanent members of 
the Council namely France, United Kingdom and the United States to propose a much wider 
interpretation to the relevant provisions that would also cover norms relating to internal 
armed conflict.
1456
 However in a departure from this approach, article 4 of the ICTR’s 1994 
statute was said by the UN Secretary General to constitute a provision which, ‘for the first 
time criminalizes [violations of] Common Article 3’.1457 It is not surprising that in the 
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić the very first case to be heard by the ICTY the defence submitted 
that international law did not provide for individual criminal responsibility for violations of 
IHL in non-international armed conflicts.
1458
 To its lasting credit, and as a reaction to 
widespread international consensus the Tribunal yielded to the reality and adopted a more 
contemporary approach by holding that, ‘… customary international law imposes criminal 
liability for serious violations of Common Article 3, as supplemented by other general 
principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict, and for breaching 
certain fundamental principles and rules regarding means and methods of combat in civil 
strife.’1459 This approach has since been affirmed in the Čelebići case in which the Trial 
Chamber stated, ‘the fact that the Geneva Conventions themselves do not expressly mention 
that there shall be criminal liability for violations of Common Article 3 clearly does not in 
itself preclude such liability.’1460 In fact, even more recently the Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian law carried out by the ICRC has also maintained that serious 
violations of IHL constitute war crimes regardless of whether committed in international or 
non-international armed conflict, and that both classifications of war crimes result in 
individual criminal responsibility.
1461
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As a consequence, the ICTY in the abovementioned case dealing with the armed conflict in 
the Former Yugoslavia had to pay particular attention to this relationship between the 
conduct of the culprit and the on-going armed conflict.
1462
 The Trial Chamber held that ‘there 
must be an obvious link between the criminal act and the armed conflict … it is sufficient that 
the alleged crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the 
territories controlled by the parties to the conflict.’1463 The same Trial Chamber affirmed the 
fact that a war crime could be committed even if ‘substantial clashes were not occurring in 
the region at the time and place’ where the crimes were allegedly committed,1464 an approach 
endorsed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.
1465
   
The Appeals Chamber also held that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute encapsulated all violations 
of humanitarian law not coming under Article 2, 4 or 5, more precisely, violations of the 
Hague Law on international conflicts, violations of provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
other than those classified as “grave breaches” by those Conventions, infringement of 
Common Article 3 and other customary rules regarding internal armed conflicts, as well as 
violation of agreements binding on the parties of the conflict quo treaty law.
1466
 
The creation of the Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR) has also made a telling contribution to this trend 
by the virtue of Article 4 of the Statute which recognizes criminal responsibility for serious 
violations of Common Article 3 and certain elements of Additional Protocol II.
1467
 Therefore, 
according to Moir, due to the above developments and significant expansion of relevant 
customary international law, with regard to criminal responsibility, also now renders it 
beyond dispute that violations of the laws and customs regulating non-international armed 
conflict can represent war crimes.
1468
  
                                                 
1462
 The decision of the tribunal in the case of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic has set out the parameters of internal 
armed conflict; Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995). 
1463
 Tadic Trial, Case No. IT-94-1 – ICTY, para. 573; According to Moir in relation to NSAGs: “The most 
innovative development regarding the laws of internal armed conflict was brought about by the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeals Jurisdiction), and particularly in the part of the judgement 
dealing with Article 3 of the Tribunal’s Statute, which is concerned with ‘violations of the laws or customs of 
war’; Moir, ‘The Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, op. cit., p. 134-135; See M.P. Scharf, ‘Balkan Justice: The 
Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial since Nuremberg’, Carolina U.P., 1997; J.E. Alvarez, 
‘Nuremberg Revisited: the Tadic Case’ (1996) 7 EJIL 245-264; Aldrich, G.H., ‘Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1996) 90 AJIL 64.   
1464
 Tadic (IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 
1995, para. 70. 
1465
 Kunarac, Appeal Chamber ICTY, (IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1 – A), para. 57. 
1466
 In this case it was concluded that the ICTY was the first truly unique international tribunal to be established 
by the UN which has determined an individual’s guilt or innocence in connection with serious violations of 
international humanitarian law the first international war crime tribunal since Nuremberg; Prosecutor v Tadic 
(Jurisdiction) (1996) 35 ILM 35, para 89.  
1467
 Robinson & Von Hebel, ‘War Crimes in International Conflicts: Article 8 of the ICC Statute’, op. cit., p. 18. 
1468
 Moir, ‘Non-International Armed Conflict and Guerrilla Warfare’, op. cit., p. 323. 
220 
 
4.3.2 The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
 
As noted above, due to horrific atrocities committed in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
resulted in creation of two ad hoc criminal tribunals under the auspices of the UN Security 
Council which had the competence of prosecuting all individuals including non-state actors 
who had committed crimes falling within their jurisdiction eventually resulted in the creation 
of the Statute of the International Criminal Court in (ICC) 1998, under which serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts would be under the 
jurisdiction of the Court.
1469
  
Nevertheless, prior to these Tribunals, there were other developments which had a tangible 
influence on the eventual creation of the Statute of the ICC. Namely, the decision by the ICJ 
in the much cited Nicaragua case in which the ICJ held that it considered Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Convention of 1949 as an expression of ‘elementary considerations of 
humanity’, applicable as a yardstick to all kind of conflict.1470 A similar approach was 
adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in the First Draft of the Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 1991 which was revised in 1996, including 
‘exceptionally serious war crimes’ which applied to all kinds of conflicts.1471 It must be noted 
that the first draft of the said report only referred to war crimes related to international armed 
conflict; assimilated to them were conflict in terms of Article 1(4) of additional Protocol I of 
1977 and wars of national liberation.
1472
 Nevertheless, the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC),
1473
 adopted in July 1998, has been heralded as a vital development in 
the laws of internal armed conflict relating to NSAGs due to its universal acceptance and 
clear manifestation of state practice reflected by the number of national delegates.
1474
 
The ICC was the outcome of a long and protracted battle against impunity for particular 
heinous crimes committed in grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (the so-called ‘war 
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crimes’)1475 and other international humanitarian law treaties committed in both international 
and non-international armed conflict.
1476
 Article 8(2)(c) of the ICC Statute is of particular 
significance to this study, which establishes the Court jurisdiction over serious violations of 
Common Article 3 and specifies these offences as war crimes: 
In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of 
Article 3 Common to the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of 
the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause: 
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilations, cruel 
treatment and torture;  
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(iii) Taking of hostages; 
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees 
which are generally recognized as indispensable.
1477
  
At the same time as Article 8(2)(e) grants jurisdiction over other serious violations of the 
laws and customs applicable to non-international armed conflicts which includes provisions 
of Additional Protocol II considered to represent customary international law.
1478
 The Statute 
of the ICC Court also includes acts committed as part of widespread and systematic attacks 
against civilian populations as crimes against humanity outside armed conflict/war 
situation.
1479
 The Statute of ICC purports to reflect custom by restricting its jurisdiction in 
Article 5 to ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole.’1480 It is worth noting that the said Article not only includes violations of Common 
Article 3 and several violations of Additional Protocol II, but also from a tangible number of 
provisions drawn from the rules of international armed conflict.
1481
 Hence, Von Hebel notes 
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that the approach adopted by the ICC is consistent with ‘the general blurring of the 
fundamental differences between international and internal armed conflict.’1482      
Nowadays, those who violate international humanitarian law in armed conflict regardless of 
whether fighting for states or NSAGs, must now be expected to face prosecution not only 
before domestic but also international courts.
1483
 However, Sassoli issues a sobering note of 
caution: 
Once the ICC Statute has been universally accepted and the ICC functions effectively 
without too much interference by the UN Security Council and its permanent members, 
this geographical limitation will be overcome. The very credibility of international 
justice depends on this: justice which is not the same for everyone is not justice … 
International Humanitarian Law cannot be fully credible, in the eyes of international 
public opinion and in particular in the eyes of those who sympathize with the 
perpetrators in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda or with victims in Palestine, 
Lebanon or Chechnya, as long as a war criminal from Israel, Lebanon or Russia are not 
equally brought to trial … another material limitation is a result of the understandable 
policy of the ICC Prosecutor to concentrate upon the most large-scale and the most 
representative crimes.
1484
 
However, the question of criminal sanctions remains at the centre of IHL, and perpetrators 
must expect sanctions whenever serious violations are taking place regardless of the legal 
characterization of the armed conflict and the legal status of the NSAGs involved.
1485
 
 
4.3.3 NSAGs, War crimes and international law 
 
Throughout the negotiating process of the Rome Statute there was a general unanimity 
amongst the participating states that serious violations of the laws and customs of war had to 
be included.
1486
 As noticed above, it is in internal armed conflicts that humanitarian 
considerations are most often cruelly ignored and domestic criminal systems are more likely 
                                                 
1482
 Von Hebel & Robinson, ‘Crimes in the Jurisdiction of the Court’, op. cit., p. 125.  
1483
 O. Triffterer, ‘The Preventive and the Repressive Function of the International Criminal Court’, in ‘The 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity’, op. cit., p. 137. 
1484
 Sassoli, ‘the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and Inherent Challenges’, op.cit., 
pp. 53-54. 
1485
 A.M. La Rosa & C. Wuerzner, ‘Armed Groups, Sanctions and the Implementation of International 
Humanitarian Law’, IRRC, Vol. 90, No. 870, June 2008, pp. 327-341, p. 341.  
1486
 Moir, ‘The Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, op. cit., p. 163; see also Report of the Preparatory Committee 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume 1, UN Doc. A/51/22 (13 September 1996), at 
para. 74.    
223 
 
to be found wanting to respond to violations.
1487
 According to Momtaz regarding protection 
of the civilians: 
Two principles of international humanitarian law, identified by the General Assembly 
as applying to non-international armed conflicts, seems to exist: the principle 
prohibiting attacks on the civilian population as such and the obligation to distinguish 
between combatants and non-combatants and to spare the latter as much as possible. 
Recent practice of the Security Council is the best proof of the existence of an opinio 
juris relative to criminalization of the violation of these rules during these conflicts.
1488
 
When we discuss the concept of crimes we are basically concerned with crimes committed in 
the course of armed conflict that are punishable under international law.
1489
 Although some of 
the acts constituting war crimes are only applicable to international conflicts,
1490
 but many of 
the acts prohibited as war crimes also happen in internal armed conflict.
1491
 
There is no doubt that criminalization of serious war crimes in non-international armed 
conflict is an indication of the growing convergence of the IHL and HRL, where the 
international community is prepared to go beyond the mere monitoring and reporting on 
human rights violations and punish those who commit gross human rights violations. The 
growing convergence of IHL and HRL in the context of war crimes is best illustrated in 
situations where there is uncertainty regarding establishing whether the strife is a fully-
fledged armed conflict or not.
1492
 
Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber of ICTY in Tadić had to decide whether based on 
customary IHL it was within its competences to incriminate any crimes committed in the 
course of an internal armed conflict.
1493
 It found that ‘general principles governing the 
conduct of hostilities (the so-called “Hague Law”)’ apply to non-international armed 
conflicts.
1494
 This approach paved the way for the Appeals Chamber to criminalize violations 
of a rule of IHL committed in the course of non-international armed conflict.
1495
 The Appeal 
Chamber held that with a view to establish the existence of such responsibility, one has to be 
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able to deduce from state practice that the intention to criminalize such behavior exists.
1496
 
The Appeals Chamber also did query whether a practice in favor of all “grave breaches” 
recognized by the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I committed in non-
international armed conflict existed.
1497
 It held that although there was a movement towards 
criminalization of such acts in non-international armed conflict, but rejected the idea that 
“grave breaches” could qualify as serious violations of IHL committed during non-
international armed conflicts.
1498
 However, this view was rejected by Judge Abi-Saab, who 
was of the opinion that practice and opinio juris of states indicate the extension of the regime 
of grave breaches to crimes committed during non-international armed conflicts.
1499
 
According to La Haye, ‘the adoption of the ICC Statute giving the court jurisdiction over war 
crimes committed in internal armed conflicts has created a new impetus for states to include 
such crimes within their own domestic legislation.’1500 Although the ICC Statute does not 
provide any obligation for the states to do so but certainly in the Preamble it does encourages 
them in that direction affirming that, ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be 
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international 
cooperation.’1501 One of the best indications of this extension is the Belgian Law of 16 June 
1993 which was abrogated and the laws of 23 April 2003 and 5 August 2003 amending the 
criminal code,
1502
 which grants universal jurisdiction in relation to grave breaches of IHL 
regardless of whether committed in an international or non-international armed conflict.
1503
 
Moreover, recently adopted military manuals can also be a good indication of this trend 
within the international community.
1504
 The 2004 UK Manual of the law of armed conflict for 
instance is a good indication of the evolving military practice in this area of law which states, 
‘although the treaties governing internal armed conflicts contain no grave breach provisions, 
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customary law recognizes the serious violations of these treaties can amount to punishable 
war crimes. It is now recognized that there is growing area of conduct that is criminal in both 
international and internal armed conflict.’1505    
 
4.4 NSAGs, battlefield status and regulation of force 
 
4.4.1 Combatants in international law 
To ascertain whether an individual is a combatant is vital to two separate stages of the 
conflict – on the one hand whether she/he could be targeted lawfully in the course of fighting 
and on the other, if she/he would be entitled to prisoner of war status upon capture. In 
international law the phrase “combatant” refers to those who can partake in an international 
armed conflict. The distinction between combatant and civilian status has been characterised 
not only as one of the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law but also one 
of its greatest achievements.
1506
 The distinction between combatants and civilians has played 
a major role historically and culturally in creation of a body of law based on a humanist view 
regulating military conduct in war.
1507
 IHL is based on a fundamental principle of distinction 
between combatants and civilians,
1508
 and to ensure that in every feasible manner the armed 
conflicts are waged among combatants of the belligerent parties subject to certain 
limitations.
1509
 In recent years, the International Court of Justice has described the principle 
of distinction as a cornerstone of IHL from its early codification efforts resulting in the 1907 
Hague Regulations.
1510
 The Commentary to Protocol I states that the rule of protection and 
distinction is: 
The foundation on which the codification and the laws and customs of war rests: the 
civilian population and civilian objects must be respected and protected in armed 
conflict, and for this purpose they must be distinguished from combatants and military 
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objectives. The entire system established in The Hague in 1899 and 1907 (1) and in 
Geneva from 1864 to 1977 (2) is founded on this rule of customary law.
1511
 
The first International Law of War document to deal with the combatant status was Article 
155 of the Lieber Code of 1869 which simply states ‘all enemies in regular war are divided 
into two general classes – that is to say, into combatants and non-combatants, or unarmed 
citizens of the hostile government …’1512 
The Declaration of the Brussels Conference of 1874, for the first time dealt with the 
definition of combatant in an international arena.
1513
 Difference of opinion arose on this issue 
between the patriotic school which believed the status should also include irregular forces as 
well as  the so-called francs-tireurs
1514
 and the military school, believing in limiting the 
combatant status solely to regular armed forces with severe penalty for non-combatants who 
take part in the conflict.
1515
 The Hague Regulations of 1907
1516
 were the first notable 
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Clearly the abovementioned article is intended to extend the laws of war not only to regular army but also other 
irregular forces as long as they meet the four conditions mentioned above. 
1514
 Article 10 of the Brussels Declaration deals with the specific situation in which the civilian population can 
take up arms against the invading force, it says: 
“The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously 
take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize themselves in accordance with 
Article 9, shall be regarded as belligerents if they respect the laws and customs of war”. 
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information about the concept of the Militia system see: Whisker, J. B., ‘The Militia’, Edwin Mellen Press, 1st 
ed., July 1992 
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instruments to come up with an internationally accepted definition of combatant.
1517
 Article 1 
specifies that ‘[t]he laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia 
and volunteer corps’ fulfilling the four conditions of being commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates; having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a 
distance; carrying arms openly; and conducting their operation in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war.
1518
 Article 2, extends the belligerent status to the levee en masse
1519
, that 
is to say in situations where the citizens of a country which is being invaded by a foreign 
power spontaneously take up arms to stem the tide of the invading army, without having had 
the time to recognize themselves according to Article 1, providing they carry their arms 
openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
1520
 The phrase “combatant” only features in 
Article 3, which states that: ‘The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of 
combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be 
treated as prisoners of war.’1521 
It is worth noting that Article 1 and 2 of the Regulations very much reflected the state of 
customary international law, from which basis the contemporary international regulations of 
combatant status subsequently developed.
1522
 The above protection is not extended to the 
civilian population of occupied territories who subsequent to occupation of their territory take 
up arms against the occupying force.
1523
 Further, according to the opinion of the majority of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Conferences and a Century of Total War: the 1899 Hague Conference and What came Next’, 75 International 
Affairs (1999) No. , pp. 619-634. 
1517
 Both 1907 and 1899 Hague Conventions reflected the attitude of the international community towards war 
which at the time was considered an instrument of national policy and the exclusive province of, and a state of 
affairs between states. Indeed, this approach was firmly engrained in the notion that war was a political reality 
and routine means of achieving state policy which could not be eradicated but needed to be regulated.
1517
 Hence, 
the coercive use of force was the preserve of sovereign states which held an exclusive monopoly over its 
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scholars and military practitioners of the said period only conflicts between states brought jus 
in bello into operation.
1524
 Thus the issue of internal armed conflict regardless of their 
intensity remained the concern of sovereign states and rebels were spared no protection and 
subjected to the domestic legal system of that state, except as noted above by the virtue of 
recognition of belligerency.
1525
 As will be discussed below, not all individuals captured in the 
course of an armed conflict are entitled to combatant status and its resultant legal protection. 
According to the IHL, members of the regular armed forces are provided with combatant 
status and enjoy immunity from prosecution for acts of war, such as attacks against military 
objectives.
1526
 Further, some members of irregular armed forces are also granted combatant 
status as long as they meet certain requirements.
1527
 As will be seen below the question of 
combatant status in non-international armed conflict is a lot more controversial. 
In an armed conflict regardless of its distinction, no one is without some status and 
accompanying level of protection.
1528
 The ICRC Study argues that regardless of 
characterization of the conflict there is striking uniformity in the application of IHL 
witnessed by state practice but in relation to combatant and prisoner-of-war (POW) the status 
remains solely preserved to international armed conflicts. In particular: 
1. All members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are combatants except 
medical and religious personnel. 
2. The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, 
groups, and units which are under a command responsible to the party for the conduct 
of its subordinates.
1529
 
It is quite obvious that members of NSAGs that fail to distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population fall outside the universal rules since they are not permitted as lawful 
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combatants in a non-international armed conflict and denied POW.
1530
 In regards to NSAGs, 
the issue of legal status of combatants is one of the key elements to classification of conflicts 
into international and non-international armed conflicts since it decides which rules apply to 
the said conflict.
1531
   
 
4.4.2 Combatants in non-international law 
 
The definitions of combatant only appear in IHL rules and there are no provisions concerning 
combatant status in Common Article 3 Additional Protocol II. Kleffner makes the point that 
‘combatant status and its aforementioned consequences is one of the areas, in which 
customary international humanitarian law has not evolved beyond the dichotomy of 
international and non-international armed conflict.’1532 Naturally, states are reluctant to 
allocate members of NSAGs fighting on their territory combatant status and as a result give 
them POW status.
1533
 It has been suggested that the reluctance of states is born out of the fear 
that ultimately the right to prosecute such individuals would be taken away from them.
1534
 It 
is an on-going debate over the question of how members of NSAGs should be categorized as 
perhaps something analogous to combatant (without immunity from prosecution) or 
alternatively as civilians who lose protection as a result of taking up arms against the state.
1535
 
It is worth noting at this stage that in an international armed conflict the only condition in 
which members of NSAGs could have combatant status is under Article 1(4) of Protocol I 
exercising their right to self-determination.
1536
 As noted above, the four conditions in Article 
4A(2) only relate to other militias and volunteer corps, in that they need to have a command 
structure, have a fixed distinctive sign, carry their arms openly, and carry out their operations 
according to the laws of war.
1537
 Another situation (admittedly very rare) is for the members 
of a NSAG to take up arms spontaneously and form a levee en masse against an invading 
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enemy. In recent times the only NSAGs that could remotely be considered to have achieved 
combatant status are the Al-Qaeda members fighting alongside the forces of Taliban the de 
facto government of Afghanistan and members of Hezbollah, the Southern Lebanese militia 
embroiled in an armed conflict against Israel in 2006. In regards to Hezbollah the most 
pivotal question was whether the said conflict was an international or non-international armed 
conflict.
1538
 In fact captured Hezbollah fighters argued unsuccessfully before the Israeli 
Supreme Court that the conflict was an international one and they should be granted POW 
status by virtue of Article 4(1) of Geneva Convention III.
1539
 The Israeli Supreme Court held 
that due to the fact that Hezbollah is an independent terrorist organization it was not under the 
authority of the Lebanese government, hence, rejecting their claim to POW status.
1540
 
Moreover, Hezbollah fighters did not satisfy the conditions of Article 4A (2) Geneva 
Convention III, since they mostly mingled among the civilian population, did not carry their 
arms openly and did not conduct their operation according to laws of war.
1541
  
The case of Al-Qaeda members in the war in Afghanistan in 2001 is a lot more challenging 
and complicated. In October 2001, the United States assisted by other states as part of its 
policy of “Global War on Terrorism” launched a military operation against its de facto 
Taliban government and its Al-Qaeda allies made up mostly of foreign fighters in 
Afghanistan. Initially, the United States administration did not grant POW status to Taliban 
fighters.
1542
 However, based upon the fact that Taliban forces controlled most of Afghanistan 
(apart from a relatively small territory under Northern Alliance control) the Bush 
administration decided to grant them POW status.
1543
 For the purpose of this study it is useful 
to consider their legal status as a NSAG embroiled in that conflict. Although it could be 
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argued that Al-Qaeda were part of other militias and voluntary corps attached to the Taliban 
government,
1544
 their resort to terrorist tactic allied to lack of a fixed distinctive sign, 
probably meant that they could not be considered as lawful combatants.
1545
 According to a 
report by the International Bar Association’s Task Force on International Terrorism:  
It must be acknowledged that determining the status of combatants is not necessarily an 
easy or clear-cut exercise. However, as reference should be made to the facts in each 
individual case, a blank refusal to grant POW status can never be accepted conduct. 
Failure to apply the Geneva Conventions by one state party could undermine the 
principle of reciprocity and even the humanitarian regime itself.’1546 Therefore, it 
appears from the above examples that it is very unlikely that members of a NSAG 
would be granted combatant status as defined under IHL rules, since this status would 
be granted to them if it is established that they operate within a state structure which 
under the circumstances they cannot fulfil.
1547
 
In the last decade the discussion regarding the legal situation of unlawful/unprivileged 
combatant has preoccupied the international community. The term “combatant” and its 
derivatives such as “unlawful combatant”, “enemy combatant” and “unprivileged 
belligerents” are only used in reference to international armed conflict, “combatant status” 
and derived privileges does not exist in internal armed conflict and its usage in that context is 
rather colloquial.
1548
 Furthermore, there is no reference to the term “unlawful combatant” in 
                                                 
1544
 In a press release on 8 February 2002, the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) acknowledged that 
there were ‘divergent views between the United States and the ICRC on procedures which apply to how to 
determine that the persons detained are not entitled to prisoner of war status.’ ICRC Press release, 9 February 
2002 available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/26D99836026EA80DC1256B6600610C90. See also the 
statement issued by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement in which she reminded 
the detaining powers of their obligation to treat prisoners humanely and expressed the view that where the status 
of the detainees is disputed a competent tribunal should make the determination. Available at: 
http://www.unog.ch/news/documents/newsen/hr02004e.htm. The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights also ordered the United States to ‘take urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees 
in Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent tribunal.’ See Annual Report 2002, Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, ‘Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Decision on Precautionary Measures’, 12 March 
2002.   
1545
 Bianchi argues that, ‘this initial assessment would be hard to accept, given that the evidence would seem to 
show that Al-Qaeda operated quite separately and certainly not in a subordinate way to the Taliban. Rather, it 
would appear that the Taliban were supportive of Al-Qaeda, while remaining distinct from it as the de facto 
governing entity in Afghanistan in 2001.’ A. Bianchi & Y. Naqvi, ‘International Humanitarian Law and 
Terrorism’, Oxford & Portland, 2011, p. 286.   
1546
 R. Goldstone et al., ‘International Terrorism: Legal Challenges and Responses’, a Report by the 
International Bar Association’s Task Force on International Terrorism, Transnational Publishers, 2003, p. 97.  
1547
 N. Lubell, ‘Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors’, Oxford U.P., 2011, p. 139. 
1548
 See K.W. Watkin, ‘Warriors without Right? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle over 
Legitimacy’, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict research, Harvard University, Occasional Paper 
series, Winter 2005, http://www.hpcr.org/pdf/occasionalpaper2.pdf; J. Pejic, “’Unlawful/Enemy Combatants’: 
232 
 
any instruments of the IHL, customary or conventional.
1549
 It has also been suggested in 
recent years that such individuals have no protection under IHL, because they are neither 
combatants nor civilians. Additionally, it is true that conditions of modern warfare may blur 
in practice; the dichotomy of combatant vis-à-vis non-combatant. However, it has been 
argued that in the modern warfare this is not as clear cut as in the past.
1550
 While some 
scholars such as Green have suggested that the use of the term ‘unlawful combatants’ is 
incorrect, such individuals are non-combatants unlawfully taking part in combat.
1551
 This is 
mainly due to the fact that the customary international humanitarian law has not developed 
beyond the traditional dichotomy of international and non-international armed conflict, 
notwithstanding the imprecise use of the term “combatant” in some literature covering both 
types of armed conflict.
1552
 
 
4.4.3 Civilians 
 
Civilians are the main victims of non-international armed conflicts involving NSAGs. The 
status of civilians, is negatively defined in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I, in other words 
anything that does not meet the definition of military is civilian. Article 50 of Additional 
Protocol I, provides that a civilian is any person who does not belong to any category of 
persons referred to in Article 4A(1), (2), (3), and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention and in 
Article 43 of the Protocol I. The civilian population comprises all persons who are 
civilians.
1553
 The presence within civilian population of individuals who do not come within 
the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.
1554
 
However, due to lack of definition of combatant in non-international armed conflict the issue 
becomes considerably more complicated.
1555
 Lubell opines that ‘being in the legal category 
of civilians does not by any means leave a non-state actor who takes part in the fighting 
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immune from attack.’1556 The biggest challenge facing international community is protection 
of civilians in especially situations where there is a blurring of the distinctions between armed 
conflict, organized crime and large scale violations of human rights, and ultimately between 
war and peace.
1557
 The ICRC recommendation on the issue of direct participation in 
hostilities refers to civilians in non-international armed conflict as: ‘… all persons who are 
not members of state armed forces or organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are 
civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities.’1558 
 
4.4.3 Direct participation in hostilities 
 
Direct participation in hostilities is a concept that applies only to civilians. The hostilities 
may be either international or non-international.
1559
 The precise scope of the notion of ‘direct 
participation’ is in controversy.1560 The most comprehensive judicial examination on a 
national level has been provided by the Israeli Supreme Court in 2006 in the Target Killing 
case, concerning the assassination of members of Palestinian NSAGs in Gaza Strip and West 
Bank.
1561
 As far as instruments of IHL are concerned, the notion of direct participation 
denotes carrying out an attack or action in the course of an armed conflict. In regard to direct 
participation, the Commentary to Protocol I, provides some clarification: ‘acts of war which 
by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of 
the enemy armed forces.’1562 In its view, direct participation ‘implies a direct causal 
relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and 
the place the activity takes place.’1563 It is interesting to note that the focus of the 
Commentary is ‘acts of war’ directed against ‘enemy forces’ and not civilians per se.1564 
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Some academics have supported this approach. For example, Dinstein notes that ‘in essence, 
taking an active part in hostilities (which negates the status of civilians) implies participation 
in military operations.’1565 Equally, Kalshoven stated that ‘to “take a direct part in hostilities” 
must be interpreted to mean that the person in question performs hostile acts, which, by their 
nature or purpose, are designed to strike enemy combatants or matériel; acts in other words, 
such as firing at enemy soldiers, throwing a Molotov-cocktail at an enemy tank, blowing up a 
bridge carrying war matériel, and so on.’1566 This analysis may give the impression that 
attacking civilian targets may not constitute direct participation in hostilities. However, there 
are those who argue that due to the asymmetrical nature of armed conflict and NSAGs faced 
with much superior state armies may conclude that the civilian population is a ‘center of 
gravity, … [and] deliberately attack it.’1567 According to Rogers such acts would tantamount 
to direct participation in hostilities.
1568
 The Israel Supreme Court in the Target Killing case, 
agreed with the view that ‘hostilities’ are acts which by nature are intended to inflict damage 
primarily to military personnel and targets but considering the contemporary nature of armed 
conflict targeting civilians should also be added to the definition.
1569
 As a reflection of this 
approach Melzer points out that being a member of an ‘irregularly constituted armed group 
who assumes a continuous fighting function on behalf of a party to the conflict, that is to say, 
a function which involves direct participation in hostilities on a regular basis’ do not qualify 
as civilians.
1570
 This view has recently been expressed by a group of experts that ‘there 
seemed to be general agreement among the experts that direct participation in hostilities did 
not necessarily require the use of armed force and did not necessarily have to cause death, 
injury and destruction.’1571 The issue of “direct part in hostilities” has been subject of expert 
analysis by the ICRC and the TMC Asser Institute in The Hague, with the intention of 
clarifying the notion as well as providing practical analysis.
1572
 This process culminated in 
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the ICRC recently releasing its interpretation of the constitutive elements of direct 
participation in hostilities as follows: 
In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet the following 
cumulative criteria:  
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity 
of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction 
on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm); and  
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either 
from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an 
integral part (direct causation); and  
3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm 
in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent 
nexus).
1573
  
In the same vein, the ‘Interpretive Guidance’ Report of the ICRC adopts the same approach 
stating that ‘in non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed 
forces of a non-state party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous 
function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (“continuous combat function”).’1574 The 
concept of “continuous combat function” is not a term found in treaty law.1575 Further, 
because of the military advantage in states’ favor most members of NSAGs constantly switch 
from being a civilian working among the civilian population during the day with complete 
immunity to actively taking part in hostile act under the cloak of darkness in the evening.
1576
 
According to the rule the immunity is revoked as long as and for such time as the individual 
is taking a direct part.
1577
    
It has been noted that ‘… interpretation of the notion of “direct part in hostilities” may be 
subject to varying viewpoints, which have a dramatic effect upon the conclusion with regard 
to the legality of a particular target.’1578 For example, the US Navy manual adopts a cautious 
approach by stating: ‘Direct participation in hostilities must be judged on a case-by-case 
basis. Combatants in the field must make a honest determination as to whether a particular 
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civilian is or is not subject to deliberate attack based on the person’s behavior, location and 
attire, and other information available at the time.’1579  
Nowadays, it is a factual reality that because of the asymmetrical nature of the conflicts 
NSAGs’ operations may include collaborators who provide support but do not carry out 
attacks.
1580
 In such a climate, where it is difficult to distinguish between civilians and 
combatants, some scholars advocate a more liberal interpretation of this distinction which in 
their opinion would go some way to guarantee a more comprehensive civilian protection.
1581
 
In this regard Schmitt proposes a test based on:  
The criticality of the act to the direct application of the enemy … an individual 
performing an indispensable function in making possible the application of force 
against the enemy is directly participating. In other words, the appropriate test is 
whether that individual is an integral facet of the uninterrupted process of defeating the 
enemy.
1582
  
In fact, according to Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I, which is considered as customary 
law,
1583
 civilians are entitled to protection ‘unless and for such time as they take direct part in 
hostilities.’ The same rule also exists in non-international armed conflict,1584 which makes it 
very pertinent in contemporary warfare where sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between 
civilians and combatants.
1585
 However, there is no agreed definition with regard to the scope 
of the phrase ‘for such time’ in the above-mentioned article.1586 It is worth noting that the link 
between direct participation and duration of hostilities in regards to members of NSAGs is of 
particular importance. Determining whether or not a civilian is taking a direct part in 
hostilities does not solve the issue, since the most crucial issue is the need to define the time 
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during which those who take direct part in hostilities lose their civilian protection.
1587
 The 
Israel High Court of Justice dealt with the issue as follows: 
… It is helpful to examine the extreme cases. On the one hand, a civilian taking direct 
part in hostilities one single time, sporadically, who later detaches himself from that 
activity, is a civilian who, starting from the time detaches himself from the activity, is 
entitled to protection from attack. He is not to be attacked for the hostilities which he 
committed in the past. On the other hand, a civilian who has joined a terrorist 
organization which has become his “home”, and in the framework of his role in the 
organization he commits a chain of hostilities, with short periods of rest between them, 
loses his immunity from attack ‘for such time’ as he is committing the chain of 
acts.’1588 
It is noticeable that the Israel High Court of Justice is of the opinion that each case must be 
decided on its own merit and did not offer a one-size-fits-all approach.
1589
 In spite of the fact 
that there is no consensus on this issue this view is very much reflected by scholarly writings 
as well as in state practice that once a civilian participates in hostilities she/he should lose 
her/his immunity not only in the course of the attack but for such time as the hostilities 
continue.
1590
 As McDonald says, ‘a sleeping committed terrorist or rebel who is committed to 
armed struggle against an opponent poses just as potentially lethal a military threat as the 
sleeping combatant.’1591 It has also been noted by that ‘once an individual has opted into the 
hostilities, he or she remains a valid military objective until unambiguously opting out. This 
may occur through extended non-participation or an affirmative act of withdrawal.’1592 
The ICRC Interpretive Guidance has adopted a more rational approach that the loss of 
immunity of a civilian is only limited to the duration of the time they are partaking in 
hostilities and they would regain immunity upon termination of direct participation. 
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Additionally, it does distinguish between civilians and members of NSAGs who would lose 
protection on the basis of ‘continuous combat function’.1593          
 
4.5 Detention under international law 
4.5.1 Prisoners of war status in international law 
 
Both the Geneva Convention III and Protocol I establish clear obligations with regard to the 
treatment of detainees held by the opposing army. As stated above, the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 are the most prominent example of treaties that bind states to a particular manner of 
conduct with respect to the detainees. The Geneva Conventions like all instruments of IHL 
are designed to protect those not-or no longer involved in the hostilities.
1594
 Nonetheless, in 
an international armed conflict upon capture a lawful combatant is entitled to prisoner of war 
(POW) status, subject to the condicio sine qua non.
1595
 Entitlement to POW status is set out 
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to the treatment of detainees, the Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter GC III), and the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts. Article 4(A) of GC III specifies categories of persons entitled to POW 
status as well as outlining the protections that High Contracting Parties to the Conventions 
must provide for those who meet the criteria, as a result, only those persons will be granted 
protection under this convention. The text of GC III provides that POWs are persons 
belonging to one of the following categories, who fall into the power of the enemy: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias 
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
(2) Members of the other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those 
of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating 
in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such 
militia or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the 
following conditions: 
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
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(c) That of carrying arms openly; 
(d) That of conducting their operation in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war.  
According to Article 5 of GC III, if there is any uncertainty regarding the status of captured 
belligerents, as long as such individuals upon their capture by the enemy come within any of 
the categories specified in Article 4, they are to be treated prima facie entitled to POW status 
until such time as their status is formally determined by a competent tribunal (be it civilian or 
military) and not by an administrative authority. The tribunal usually consists of a panel of 
military officers from the detaining power which would determine whether the captured 
combatants are entitled to POW status or not.
1596
 Even if the said tribunal was to acquit the 
POW in question the Detaining Power may intern him until the end of hostilities.
1597
 
Nevertheless, a more noteworthy shift took place with the adoption of Articles 43 and 44 of 
Additional Protocol I (1977).
1598
 Article 43(2) describes combatants as all the members of the 
armed forces of a party to an armed conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains 
covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention). Nevertheless, Article 51(3) of Protocol I, 
1977, a non-combatant, that is to say, civilian, who takes a direct part in hostilities loses 
his/her status as protected civilian under both the Protocol I and the 1949 Civilian 
Convention, only so long as he/she acts in that manner, and he/she then becomes a legitimate 
object of attack. As a result an individual cannot be a civilian during the day and a combatant 
in the evening, simply because he/she is neither a civilian nor a combatant, according to 
Dinstein, she/he is an “unlawful combatant” and can lawfully be targeted by the enemy but is 
not entitled to POW status as a combatant.
1599
 Baxter defines unprivileged belligerents as 
“persons who are not entitled to treatment either as peaceful civilians or as prisoners of war 
by reason that they have engaged in hostile conduct without meeting the qualifications 
established by article 4 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Conventions.”1600     
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4.5.2 Prisoners of war status in non-international armed conflict  
 
In conventional armed conflicts, members of any armed forces wear uniforms in order to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population.
1601
 But, because of the asymmetrical 
nature of contemporary conflicts in some cases even members of states’ armed forces do not 
wear uniforms fearful of being recognized by opposing force as in recent years American and 
British Special Forces have carried out operations out of uniform in Afghanistan and Iraq.
1602
  
The situation regarding combatant status of NSAGs that do not come under the ambit of 
national liberation movements is a lot more different.
1603
 In 1970, Bond observed that, ‘the 
rebel presently fights in a twilight zone between lawful combatancy and common criminality’ 
still rings true.
1604
 The prominence of NSAGs allied to their ability to carry out operations 
trans-nationally sometimes matching the might of some of the state armed forces has been 
one of the most outstanding features of armed conflict in the first decade of the Twenty-First 
Century.
1605
 This also poses a direct challenge to sovereignty of states in whose territories 
they operate in. On this point Crawford opines:  
‘From statist perspective, the denial of combatant status to non-state participants in 
internal armed conflicts is straight forward. The accepted wisdom is that no state would 
willingly grant any degree of recognition to a movement that seeks either to overthrow 
the established authority, attempting to gain control of the government where the 
leadership of the state is in dispute, or to secede and form a new, breakaway state. 
States would prefer to treat such rebels as criminals, and not allow them any of the 
rights and privileges normally attached to combatant status in international law.
1606
  
Hence, the issue of combatant status in relation to NSAGs has preoccupied international 
lawyers, politicians and military practitioners.
1607
 If combatant status is not given to a 
participant in an armed conflict he no longer is protected by IHL regarding treatment of 
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POWs.
1608
 Accordingly, the individuals in question become subject to the domestic criminal 
law of the state in which they are arrested.
1609
 The punishments meted out to them may 
include the death penalty, if their participation has resulted in death to others in the course of 
the conflict.
1610
 By definition the law applicable in non-international armed conflict does not 
anticipate a combatant’s status for a person who is partaking in such a conflict and she/he 
would be considered an “unlawful/unprivileged combatant”.1611 Nevertheless, such non-state 
participants must be treated humanely if arrested in the course of the armed conflict.
1612
 
Crawford is of the opinion that non-international armed conflicts provide an additional 
complication, ‘while in international armed conflicts there is some scope for unlawful 
combatants to be protected under either Convention III or Convention IV, no such scope 
exists for unlawful combatants in internal armed conflicts. The Geneva Conventions, save for 
Common Article 3, deal with international armed conflict only. Therefore a non-state 
participant could never hope to receive protection equivalent to Convention III or Convention 
IV, even if they followed the rules of IHL stringently. Combatant status and the attendant 
POW rights are categorically denied to non-state participants in non-international armed 
conflicts. This goes to the heart of the IHL system, the idea of who may be ‘permitted to 
participate in an armed conflict.’1613 In particular, the civilians that participate actively in the 
fighting are no longer considered as civilians and may be subjected to military targeting only 
‘for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’1614 Yet, as long as they retain the status 
of civilian they would be granted ‘general protection against dangers arising from military 
operations’.1615 Under IHL combatants in international armed conflicts are entitled to engage 
in acts such as killing of a member of another state’s army or destruction of a military 
                                                 
1608
 E. Crawford, ‘The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed Conflict’, Oxford U.P., 
2010, 68. 
1609
 A. Rosas, ‘The Legal Status of Prisoners’ of War: a Study in International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflict’, (the Finish Academy of Science and Letters, Helsinki), 1976, p. 305; it is worth noting that 
according to Art. 85 of GCIII & Art. 44 of API, captives do not lose their POW status due to their pre-capture 
acts, even if such acts amount to war crimes. See generally Meyer, ‘Liability of POWs for Offences Committed 
Prior to Capture: Astiz Affairs’, 32 ICLQ 948 (1993).  
1610
 Ipsen, ‘Combatants and Non-Combatants’, in Fleck (ed.), ‘The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed 
Conflict’, op. cit., p. 68-9. 
1611
 K. Dörmann, ‘the Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants”’, IRRC March, 2003, vol. 85, 
No. 849, p. 47.  
1612
 Under Common Art. 3, and Art. 4-7 of Protocol II.  
1613
 Crawford, ‘the Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents’, op. cit., p. 68-9.  
1614
 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, Article 51(3).  
1615
 Additional Protocol II according to Henckaerts et al., does not explicitly require precautions against the 
effects, however, it is noted that Article 13(1) requires that “civilian population and individual civilians shall 
enjoy general protection against the danger arising from military operations”; Henckaerts, et al., ‘Customary 
international Humanitarian Law: Rules’, op. cit., p. 69. 
242 
 
objective.
1616
 On the other hand, IHL in the context of non-international armed conflict has 
no specific provisions to deal with “combatant” or POW status.1617 Therefore, those who 
have partaken in an internal armed conflict will not be granted “combatant” status and may 
be treated as criminals, punished under the purview of domestic criminal law for participating 
in the hostilities and will not be granted prisoner of war status.
1618
 The main reason for the 
absence of combatant status in non-international armed conflict is the reluctance of sovereign 
states to encourage internal uprising by granting their citizens or others the legal right to take 
on its military forces on behalf of a NSAG, an act which would clearly compromise their 
sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as their monopoly on the coercive use of force.
1619
 
Furthermore, upon violation of international humanitarian norms they could be prosecuted by 
international criminal tribunals based on their individual liability.
1620
  
It is also worth noting that in the past a few organizations such as the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), the African National Congress (ANC) and the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), have expressed their willingness to comply with IHL, in exchange for the recognition 
of lawful and combatant and POW status, which were subsequently rejected by the 
governments of states concerned.
1621
 In this regard Kleffner opines: 
All that the laws of armed conflict do is to encourage (not oblige)’the authorities in 
power’ to grant the widest possible amnesty to persons who participate in the armed 
conflict, provided such persons have not committed war crimes or other international 
crimes, which states are obliged to investigate and prosecute.
1622
 
Nonetheless, when it comes to the question of amnesty, Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II 
sets out judicial guarantees stipulated in the Common Article 3 which provides the following 
provision; ‘at the end of the hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those 
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or 
detained.’ 
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4.6 International human rights law (IHRL) in armed conflict 
 
4.6.1 Relevance of IHRL 
 
Having considered IHL at length in relation to armed conflict and NSAGs, at this stage we 
should also pay particular attention to International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and its 
influence upon law of war (IHL) in order to supplement protection for individuals in 
particular in times of internal armed conflict.
1623
 As mentioned above, under the unequivocal 
wording of Common Article 3, it is undisputed that IHL binds state armed forces as well as 
NSAGs involved in non-international armed conflict.
1624
 On the other hand human rights 
obligations are binding upon governments only, and unlike IHL there is no reciprocity 
between the two parties involved.
1625
 In spite of the fact that both IHL and IHRL are 
primarily addressed to states but the enforcement methods under IHRL are different to those 
of IHL.
1626
 Under IHRL, whilst the human rights safeguards and protections are available to 
persons essentially against state, under IHL, the obligation to observe Common Article 3 is 
binding upon all parties to the conflict.
1627
 
States embroiled in internal armed conflict are also under obligation (both treaty and 
customary law) to comply with basic international human rights norms.
1628
 It is worth noting 
that these norms apply particularly in situations that fall between a fully-fledged armed 
conflict and civil disturbance in which the categorization of a conflict is disputed or largely 
unclear.
1629
 The Secretary General of the UN stated, ‘some argue that non-state actors should 
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 The main purpose of both IHL and HRL is protection of human beings and often share the same objectives 
and goals, Draper states that both corpora juris were ‘based in their fundamental nature upon the dignity and 
value of the individual being.’ Meron writes: ‘their basic object is to extend protection to the human person in 
all circumstances and in all types of conflict and strife.’ T. Meron, ‘Convergence of International Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights law’, in D. Warner (ed.), ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, Kluwer Law 
international, 1997, pp. 97-105, p. 101. 
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also be held accountable under international human rights law, especially in situations where 
the state structure no longer exists or where states are unable or unwilling to mete out 
punishment for crimes committed by non-state actors.’1630 For most of the twentieth century 
it was unclear whether IHRL could be applied to the conduct of states involved in armed 
conflict with some states maintaining that such situations were governed by the lex specialis 
of humanitarian law, to the exclusion of human rights law.
1631
  
 
4.6.2 The relationship between IHL and IHRL 
 
The interaction between IHRL and IHL has been debated extensively in recent years.
1632
 
There has been a growing doctrinal and jurisprudential trend to combine IHL and IHRL 
where they overlap, in order specifically, to extend the protection of civilians in armed 
conflicts irrespective of legal characterization.
1633
 Meron equates this growing trend to ‘the 
sovereignty of states and their insistence on maintaining maximum discretion in dealing with 
those who threaten their “sovereign authority” have combined to limit the reach of 
international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict.’1634 
In fact, as far as classic public international law was concerned the separation between the 
corpus juris of the law of peace and the law of war was recognized and maintained.
1635
 This 
is quite a contrast from the general discourse now in which the main focus of scholarly 
writings and general practice is the way the two bodies interact.
1636
 This is particularly true 
                                                 
1630
 UN Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1999/92? Para 13 (Report of the Secretary General on 
Fundamental Standard of Humanity, 18 December 1998); see Zegveld, ‘the Accountability of Armed 
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1631
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16321632
 There is a wealth of literature on the subject, see for example, D. Schindler, ‘Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law’, (1981-2) 31 American University Law Review, pp. 935-977; L. Doswold-Beck and S. Vite, 
,International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’, (1993) No. 293 IRRC 94-119; F. Hampson, ‘Using 
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Humanitarian Law and international Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict’, 40 Israel Law Review 
310 2007. 
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I.C.J. 131 (July 9); The Israeli Supreme Court also dealt with this issue in  HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v Prime 
Minister of Israel [2005], translated in 45 ILM 202 (2006).  
1634
 Meron, ‘International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities’, op. cit., p. 554.  
1635
 H-J. Heintze, ‘On the Relationship between Human Rights, Protection and International Humanitarian Law’, 
IRRC, December 2004 Vol. 86 No. 856, p. 789. 
1636
 It is now accepted that the strict traditional dichotomy between laws of war, implying the application of 
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‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law’, 
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for situations of internal violence where normal constitutional and other legal checks and 
balances are singularly ineffective.
1637
 However, there are those especially amongst the 
military practitioners of certain states
1638
 who argue vehemently that IHRL and IHL should 
be kept apart.
1639
 There are also prominent human rights defenders advancing good reasons 
why human rights should not apply to NSAGs.
1640
 Draper voiced opposition to any fusion or 
overlap between IHL and HRL and maintained that they were fundamentally of different 
origin, theories, nature and purpose.
1641
 Nonetheless, it seems that this traditional view is not 
shared by other scholars that referred to the apparent “fusing,”1642 “meshing,”1643 
“complementarity,”1644 “convergence,”1645 or “confluence”1646 of IHL and HRL. 
The interaction between IHL and HRL did not attract much attention until 1960s.
1647
 The 
1968 Tehran conference celebrating the twentieth anniversary of UDHR, was the first time 
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Covenant, 2nd and 3rd Periodic Reports of the United States of America, Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005); Summary 
Record of the 2380th Meeting: United States of America, at 2, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.2380 (July 27, 2006).  
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1641
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normal regime of human rights.” G.I.A.D. Draper, ‘Humanitarian Law and Human Rights’, Acta Juridica 193, 
(1979), p. 199. 
1642
 F. Rogers, ‘Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and Australia Defence Force Operation’, 18 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 1, (1999), p. 2 
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 T. Meron, ‘On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New 
Instrument’, 77 AJIL 589 (1983). 
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 R. Provost, ‘International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, Cambridge U.P., 2002; H-J. Heintze, ‘On 
the Relationship between Human Rights Protection and International Humanitarian Law’, 856 IRRC 789 (2004), 
p. 794.  
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 Vinuesa, ‘Interface, Correspondence and Convergence of Human Rights & International Humanitarian law’, 
op. cit., pp. 69-110.  
1646
 R. Q. Quentin-Baxter, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law-Confluence of Conflict?’ 9 Australian 
Yearbook of International Law 94 (1985). 
1647
 A comparison between corpora juris prompted many observers to come to the conclusion that there was a 
normative gap between the two body of law particularly in the case of situations of armed conflict where neither 
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the issue of human rights in armed conflict was raised.
1648
 This marked the end of the 
reciprocal “benign neglect” that had previously prevailed between human rights and 
humanitarian communities.
1649
 The first resolution produced by the Tehran Conference of 
1968, entitled “Respect and Enforcement of Human Rights in the Occupied Territory” calling 
upon Israel to abide by both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva 
Conventions in the occupied Palestinian territories.
1650
 This approach was reiterated by the 
General Assembly Resolution 2444 of 19 December 1968 with the same title.
1651
 The latter 
Resolution urged the UN Secretary General to draft a report on measures to be adopted for 
the protection of all individuals in situations of armed conflict.
1652
 As a result of this, the UN 
General Assembly passed a Resolution affirming ‘basic principles for the protection of 
civilian populations in armed conflict” that “fundamental human rights, as accepted in 
international law and laid down in international instruments, continue to apply fully in 
situations of armed conflict.’1653 This approach was adopted by the European Commission on 
Human Rights in the Cyprus v. Turkey (First and Second Applications) case which held that 
in belligerent operations a state was bound to respect not only the humanitarian law laid 
down in the Geneva Conventions but also fundamental human rights.
1654
 Indeed, it was 
during the 1970s that under the banner of ‘human rights in armed conflict” adopted by the 
UN, scholars began to question whether IHL is part of HRL or vice versa mainly due to the 
adoption of the two abovementioned international human rights Covenants in 1966, the 
conflicts in Vietnam, southeastern Biafra region of Nigeria and the Israeli occupation of Arab 
territory in 1967.
1655
 In fact, the main outcome of the diplomatic conference which finally 
approved the two Additional Protocols to 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1977 was to 
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incorporate fundamental human rights into the protocols in the shape of fundamental 
minimum guarantees, hence, harmonizing the two Additional Protocols with the United 
Nations Covenants.
1656
 But there is one situation in which the latter does not apply and that is 
during the state of siege or emergency on which Vinuesa notes:  
It was important to use the same language in the Protocol. This equation tends to 
eradicate the factual possibility of situations not contemplated by one legal scheme or 
the other. Their reciprocal complement is not related to equalization or fusion of norms 
but to the superimposition of the same normative content as expressed by different 
systems. In that sense, it has already been stated that fundamental rights of individuals, 
as accepted and prescribed by international law through international instruments, are 
applicable during armed conflict.
1657
  
It is significant to this study to note that the preamble of Protocol II specifically 
acknowledged the continuity of human rights application during internal armed conflicts.
1658
 
In fact, some scholars state that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and regional human rights treaties contain provisions in which states have the right 
to declare the state of emergency under Article 4 of the ICCPR
1659
 and other human rights 
treaties obligations in times of “public emergency which threaten the life of the nation,”1660 
inclusion of which clearly recognizes that IHRL applies to all situations including armed 
conflict.
1661
 This has been re-affirmed repeatedly by the United Nations Security Council, the 
UN General Assembly, the now defunct UN Human Right Commission
1662
 as well as by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of 1996 Nuclear Weapon Advisory Opinion 
which deliberated upon the interaction between IHRL and IHL. The Court observed: 
… that the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does 
not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby, 
certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for 
the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to 
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(1966), Art. 4. 
1660
 It has to be emphasised that such derogation must only be ‘to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation’ – ICCPR, Article 4(1). See also the ECHR, Article 15(1), the ACHR, and Article 27(1). However, 
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be deprived of one’s life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex 
specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of certain 
weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to 
Article 6 of the Covenant can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in 
armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. …1663  
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to deprive of one`s life applies also in hostilities.
1664
 In 
fact, the ICJ reiterated the position:  
More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights 
conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of 
provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between human 
rights and humanitarian law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may 
be exclusively matters of humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of 
human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international 
law.
1665
  
In order to answer the question put to it, the court will have to take into consideration both 
these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, 
international humanitarian law.`
1666
 For example, under Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to which Turkey is a party the High Contracting Parties have 
the right to derogate from some provisions in which `in time of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation`, but only `to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with … other 
obligations under international law`.
1667
 However, there are non-derogable rights such as the 
right to life, protection against torture, to inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to fair 
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Law’, in ‘The Right to Life’, C. Tomuschat, et al. (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, 123-151, p. 128.  
1665
 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Report (2004) 136, para. 106. 
1666
 Ibid, paras. 102-106. 
1667
 Also, the derogating state has to inform the Council of Europe of decisions and their justifications. M. 
Sassoli, `The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Conflicts`, in 
O. Ben-Naftali, ‘International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law’, Oxford U.P., pp. 34-94, 
p. 51. 
249 
 
trial and the prohibition of slavery.
1668
 For the purpose of this study it is important to consider 
that alongside binding treaty provisions there are many so-called ‘soft law’ standards of 
relevance to human rights encompassed in such as the UN General Assembly or other 
international and regional bodies.
1669
 It has been pointed out that, there exists an increasing 
soft law in the human rights field – pronouncements of international and non-governmental 
bodies, some judicial decisions and a growing part of scholarly writings that claim that non-
state actors or specifically armed groups have human rights obligations.
1670
 
  
4.6.3 The relevance of soft law (the protection of civilians) 
 
In recent years there has been a series of initiatives in the shape of various resolutions 
adopted by organs of international or intergovernmental organizations (whether of legal or 
non-legal) and reports by international organizations, most notably by the United Nations 
General Assembly which have emphasized the destructive impact of armed conflict on 
civilians pertain to the body of “soft law” or de lege ferenda (the law as it may be, or should 
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be, in the future).
1671
 In general international law it is sometimes argued that particular non-
binding instruments or documents or non-binding provisions in treaties may ultimately form a 
category which is commonly referred to as ‘soft law’.1672 These instruments are described as 
‘soft law’ because they are not directly enforceable in domestic courts and international 
tribunals.
1673
 “Soft law” is described by one scholar as ‘not per se legally binding, may well 
have a number of legally relevant effects …’1674 Shaw is of the opinion that ‘soft law’ is not 
law, he opines that ‘this terminology is meant to indicate that instrument of provision in 
question is not of itself ‘law’, but its importance within the general framework of 
international legal development is such that particular attention requires to be paid to it’.1675 
As such “soft law” operates in the grey area between international law and politics,1676 
Williamson notes that, ‘documents creating soft law include instruments subordinate to a 
treaty that are not per se binding but that support the purposes of the treaty regime …’.1677 
One of the best examples of “soft law” to subsequently influence the drafting of “hard law” 
was Article 10 of the ICCPR which was directly inspired by the Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners adopted in 1955 by the first Congress on the Prevention of Crimes 
and the Treatment of Offenders.
1678
 States, however, consider “soft law” texts as a rather 
political concept in international relations which could eventually lead to law but are not law 
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and thus only result in political consequences, in fact, according to Shelton some scholars 
distinguish hard law and soft law by emphasizing that whereas breach of a law would have 
legal consequences, breach of a political norm would result in political consequences.
1679
  
However, recently in a series of reports to the Security Council on “protection of civilians in 
armed conflict” the secretary General of the United Nations, stated that the ‘deliberate 
targeting of non-combatants’, is a key characteristic of these conflicts, which ultimately 
results in ‘civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure’. But significantly, 
the report points out that among the main instigators of this violence are ‘non-state actors, 
including irregular forces and privately financed militias’.1680 In response, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolutions 1265
1681
 and 1296
1682
 as well as adopting presidential statements 
such as S/PRST/2002/6
1683
 and S/PRST/2002/41.
1684
 The latter in particular, contains an 
“Aide Memoire” on the protection of civilian population in armed conflict that the Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) developed at the request of the Security 
Council, which is used as a practical guide and a means to facilitate its consideration in 
regard to protection of civilians in armed conflict.
1685
 While the Security Council has been at 
pains to emphasize that provisions for civilians in the course of an armed conflict will be 
dealt with on case-by-case basis taking into account the particular circumstances of each 
conflict situation, the “culture of protection” called for by the Security General through the 
adoption of the Aide Memoire in March 2002 is a living proof that this policy is taking 
root.
1686
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 Ibid.  
1686
 It is debatable, however, that some of the relevant UN resolutions can be considered binding in international 
law which particularly include UN Security Council resolutions as well as UN General Assembly resolutions 
that are unanimously adopted; Art 25 of the UN Charter imposes a duty on UN member states to ‘accept and 
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Undoubtedly, influence of “soft law” in other branches of international law such as 
environmental law is a lot more tangible than other corpuses of international law such as the 
IHL.
1687
 However in the recent years “soft law” has also had an influence on IHL in 
particular in its interaction with HRL.
1688
 As stated above, the ICRC has in recent years 
completed a major study on customary rules, the most outstanding outcome of which relates 
to the number of rules identified as customary in non-international armed conflict.
1689
 On this 
point Andreopoulos notes: 
What emerges as a common theme here is the need for identification and better 
implementation of the already existing normative framework, rather than the need for 
further codification; in this endeavor, supporting state as well as non-state actor practice 
is critical. This quest for standard setting can materialize in the adoption of a ‘soft law’ 
document, incorporating already existing norms to be used as a frame of reference for 
engagement initiatives with armed groups.
1690
  
Sassoli is of the opinion that such practical difficulties should not discourage us from looking 
into alternative ways to include NSAGs in the development of soft law standards. He notes: 
First, the relationship between any new soft law and hard law obligations of armed 
groups under the law of non-international armed conflicts would have to be clarified. 
Second, the additional soft law rules will not be the same as the hard law rules for 
states. This will lead to a situation in which both sides will not be bound by the same 
rules, which would be contrary to the principle of equality of the belligerents before 
IHL.
1691
  
                                                                                                                                                        
carry out the decisions of the Security Council …’ which clearly includes its resolutions; generally see R. 
Higgins, ‘The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations’, Oxford 
U.P., 1963, pp. 4-5. 
1687
 Cassese, ‘International Law’, op. cit., pp. 196-197. 
1688
 See  the Commentary to UN “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Repression for 
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Humanitarian Law”, Res. 2005/35 of 19 April 2005, approved by the General Assembly in 2005: UNGA Res. 
A/60/147 of Dec. 16, 2005. 
1689
 Henckaerts, et al., ‘Customary international Humanitarian Law: Rules’, op. cit., p. 447. 
1690
 Andreopoulos also makes the point that such soft law documents would increasingly be based on 
interdependence between HRL and IHL rules within the normative architecture of international law. This is 
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There are also scholars that see the best way to ensure the protection of victims of war would 
be enhanced by the use of of more ‘progressive’ methods to assess custom and encourage 
imaginative uses of soft law.
1692
 
 
4.6.4 Minimum humanitarian standard applicable to any armed conflict 
 
Eventually, it took a private initiative by a group of experts and academics in 1990, to draft 
the so-called Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, which amalgamated 
the common principles and norms that existed in both IHL and HRL into a single document. 
It declared principles “which are applicable in all situations, including internal violence, 
disturbances, tensions and public emergency.”1693 As suggested, one of the primary reasons 
for developing of the declaration was the fact that NSAGs are not party to human rights 
treaties, hence considered a major shortcoming of the law in protection of individuals in 
internal armed conflicts.
1694
 It has been noticed elsewhere that the origins of the Turku 
Declaration could be traced back to the Diplomatic Conferences which eventually produced 
the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, which incidentally 
coincided with the coming into force of ICCPR in 1976.
1695
 Inspired by this event this idea 
was originally promoted in academic discourse by Professor Theodor Meron. He deserves a 
specific mention in this regard since he was one of the first scholars to advocate a minimum 
humanitarian standard to fill in the “grey zone”1696 specifically in low-intensity conflicts 
which was neither recognized as an armed conflict nor states accepting any responsibility 
                                                 
1692
 D. Fleck, ‘International Accountability for Violations of the Jus in Bello: The Impact of ICRC Study in 
Customary International Humanitarian Law’, (2006) 11 JCSL 179, p. 185.  
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 The Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/55; text 
published (among others) in IRRC, No. 282, 1991, 330.   
1694
 Zegveld, ‘Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups’, op. cit., p. 49.   
1695
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Humanitarian Standards (1990)’, International Council of Human Rights Policy & International Commission of 
jurists Workshop, Standard Setting: Lessons Learned for the Future, Geneva, 13-14 February 2005, p. 1; for 
text: http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/91/120B. 
1696
 Asbjørn Eide, A. Rossas & T. Meron, ‘Combating Lawlessness in Grey Zone Conflicts Through Minimum 
Humanitarian Standards’, 89 AJIL 217 (1995), 217. 
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under IHRL.
1697
 It has also been referred to in the case-law of the ICTY as well as a variety 
of experts’ documents.1698  
Article 1 of the Turku declaration sets forth that minimum standards are to be applied to ‘all 
situations, including internal violence, disturbances, tensions, and public emergency’, and 
cannot be derogated from under any circumstances … whether or not a state of emergency 
has been proclaimed.’1699 Article 2 states that the standards would apply to ‘all persons, 
groups and authorities, irrespective of their legal status and without any adverse 
discrimination.’ The fundamental guarantees in the remaining articles very much mirror those 
contained in Common Article 3,
1700
 which include in Article 3 that everyone has the right to 
be recognized before the law, respect for their person, honor and conviction, freedom of 
thought, conscious and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction. Article 3 also sets out acts which are deemed 
prohibited, namely: 
a) Violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular murder, torture, mutilation, rape, as well as cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment and other outrages upon personal dignity; 
b) Collective punishment against persons and their property; 
c) The taking of hostage; 
d) Practicing, permitting or tolerating the involuntary disappearance of 
individuals, including their abduction or unacknowledged detention; 
e) Pillage; 
f) Deliberate deprivation of access to necessary food, drinking water and 
medicine; 
g) Threats or incitement to commit of the foregoing acts. 
 In Article 4 the rights of individuals under detention are set out, which compared to 
Common Article 3 are more detailed. It set forth that individuals deprived of their liberty 
shall be held in recognized places of detention; precise information regarding their detention 
                                                 
1697
 T. Meron, ‘Towards a Humanitarian Declaration in Internal Strife’, AJIL, vol. 78 (1984), pp. 859-868; in 
this regard see also L. Zegveld, ‘the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law. A comment on the Tablada case, IRRC, No. 324 (1998), pp. 505-511. 
1698
 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision of 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72. 
1699
 According to Doswald-Beck and Vite,’that determination find expression in a succession of provisions 
based alternatively on the spirit of human rights law (for example the prohibition of torture and the principle of 
habeas corpus) and on the spirit of humanitarian law (for example the prohibition on harming individuals not 
taking part in hostilities and the obligation to treat wounded and sick persons humanely), L. Doswald-Beck & S. 
Vite, ‘International Humanitarian Law & Human Rights Law’, IRRC, no. 293, March-April 1993, pp. 94-119.   
1700
 Yildiz & Breau, ‘The Kurdish Conflict: International Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Mechanism’, op. cit., 
p. 80.  
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and whereabouts, including transfers, shall be made promptly available to their family 
members and counsel or other persons having a legitimate interest in the information. The 
detained individuals according to paragraph 4(2) shall be allowed communication with the 
outside world including counsel as well as to challenge their detention before a competent 
authority, as well as the right to an effective remedy, including habeas corpus.
1701
 Some have 
described these guarantees as reminiscent of Geneva Prisoner of War Conventions, in which 
other specific human rights guarantees such as the right to life (Article 8), the right to a fair 
trial and judicial guarantees (Article 9), and right to judicial review of detention on regular 
basis (article 11) are explicit.
1702
   
Determination to develop minimum humanitarian standards has been an ongoing process that 
culminated in the Moscow Declaration of 1991 and the Budapest International Summit in 
1994, largely building upon the work done in the Turku Declaration.
1703
 On its part, the UN 
Human Rights Commission asked the Secretary General to compile an analytical report in 
conjunction with the ICRC, on the issue of fundamental rules of humanity, taking into 
account: the rules common to human rights and international humanitarian law which are 
applicable in all situations.
1704
 The purpose of the Secretary General’s report to the 1998 
Commission was not to reach firm conclusions on the topic in hand but to set out the 
framework for the future dialogue on the issue of fundamental standards of humanity.
1705
 As 
a result, a number of issues were considered ranging from common characteristics and 
patterns of human rights abuses in situations of internal violence; provisions in relation to 
derogation in IHRL; NSAG and human rights law; lack of specificity of existing human 
rights rules; the scope of application of IHL to situations of internal violence and conflict; 
customary IHL; the advantages and disadvantages of identifying fundamental standards of 
humanity. The Report focuses on the need for identifying fundamental standards of humanity 
arising from the fact that it is often situations of internal strife that pose the biggest threat to 
human dignity and freedom. It pays particular attention to the link between human rights 
abuses and ongoing violence and confrontation. However, there is a lack of unanimity on the 
applicable norms of both human rights and humanitarian law. Lastly, there are disagreements 
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1703
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 Shasthri, ‘International Humanitarian Law Relating to Non-international Armed Conflict’, op. cit., p. 217.  
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regarding the point at which internal violence reaches a threshold where upon IHL rules come 
into operation, and even when these rules manifestly do apply, it is generally acknowledged 
that they provide a bare minimum of protection.
1706
 This development was the beginning of a 
new process related to protection of victims in ‘situations of internal violence [that] pose a 
particular threat to human dignity and freedom.’1707 Consequently, the work of the United 
Nations aims at ‘strengthening the practical protection through the clarification of 
uncertainties in the application of existing standards in situations, which present a challenge 
to their effective implementation.’1708 The call for a more uniform adherence to this approach 
was reflected in the adopted Resolution during the Berlin Session of the Institute of 
International Law in 1999, on the Application of International Humanitarian Law and 
Fundamental Human Rights in Armed Conflicts in which NSAGs are involved. The 
Resolution says ‘all parties to armed conflicts in which non-state entities are parties, 
irrespective of their legal status, as well as the United Nations, and component regional and 
other international organizations have the obligation to respect international humanitarian law 
as well as fundamental human rights law.’1709  
Although applicability of human rights law to the behaviour of NSAGs remains highly 
controversial, the practice of international organizations is pointing towards increased 
accountability of those actors for human rights violations, at least at the political level. From 
a legal point of view, such accountability seems to be more accepted when NSAGs exercise 
control over territory or a segment of the population, or when core human rights norms are at 
stake.  
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4.7 NSAGs and terrorism 
 
‘The evil in the tale may be understood, if not excused, by our circumstances’1710 
 
4.7.1 Introduction 
 
Since the time immemorial, terror has been deployed as a means of warfare by states and 
non-state actors. In reality, as one commentator has noted, ‘terrorism is total war: the end 
justifies the means.’1711 Both war and terrorism are two terms referring to the phenomena of 
collective violence which according to Sassoli are used in common parlance by politicians, 
social scientists as well as lawyers in relation to the law regulating behavior in armed 
conflicts.
1712
 War is better defined in law than the phenomenon of terrorism, and ‘at least in 
law, the term inherently puts two parties on an equal footing.’1713 Nowadays, terrorism 
necessarily implies to most observers acts against states and their citizens rather than acts by 
states.
1714
 Furthermore, terrorism seems to be an integral part of contemporary armed 
conflicts and the use of terrorist tactics has become one of the main features of these 
conflicts.
1715
 This is in light of the fact that most acts of terrorism are committed against the 
persons who can grant the wishes of terrorists namely helpless civilians.
1716
 From the outset 
in regard to the contentious issue of terrorism it has to be made clear that the political objects 
of a NSAG does not justify violation of IHL committed by that group and by the same token 
using a motive of counter terrorism does not erase or mitigate the responsibility on the part of 
a state not to respect IHL. States faced with the specter of terrorism have to strike a proper 
balance between the interest of liberty and protection of security.
1717
    
Moreover, no other word in any vocabulary evokes so much emotion as “terrorism”.1718 It has 
also been noticed that even democratic countries do not escape from this predicament.
1719
 The 
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British and Spanish governments for instance have always maintained that their campaigns 
against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque Nationalist and Separatist 
Organization (ETA) have never been treated as armed conflicts and refer to them as internal 
disturbance and police operation.
1720
    
In practice, in regards to NSAGs, terrorism and guerrilla warfare may merge into each other 
since both methods of warfare are irregular.
1721
 As Perez-Gonzalez notes ‘sometimes the 
boundary between terrorist activity and acts of war authorized by the law of armed conflicts 
is blurred and on a more general level, may even contribute to difficulties in reaching a 
generally agreed definition of terrorism.’1722 As noted elsewhere, the notion of ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘terrorist’ entered political discourse in the eighteenth century by the Jacobins during the 
French revolution.
1723
 The issue of terrorism, however, since the early twentieth century has 
been synonymous with NSAGs and has become a preferred mode of resistance for such 
armed groups, culminating in the Bolsheviks seizure of power in the October Revolution 
1917,
1724
 which referred to ‘terrorism’ as a means of class struggle.1725 
It was at the end of the Second World War, which also coincided with the beginning of the 
Cold War that the debate regarding “terrorism” became mired in ideological cleavages and 
proxy violence.
1726
 The situation which ensued led to political deadlock in that made it 
impossible for the international community to find consensus in relation to outlawing 
terrorism, while creating an exception for ‘legitimate’ freedom fighters exercising their right 
of self-determination, resisting an occupying force or political opponents of dictatorial 
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regimes.
1727
 As Chomsky observed in 1991; ‘More normal pattern is for actions undertaken 
against oppressive regimes and occupying armies to be considered resistance by their 
perpetrators and terrorism by the rulers, even when they are non-violent.’1728  
 
4.7.2 Terrorist v. freedom fighter 
 
Historically, the distinction between a terrorist and a freedom fighter was decided according 
to their political standpoint and the level of recognition they were granted regionally as well 
as internationally.
1729
 It should not be forgotten that in the not so distant past many 
individuals and groups which were labelled as terrorist initially in certain quarters,
1730
 
subsequently, achieved political legitimacy and recognition.
1731
 It is worth noting that the on-
going debate about the issue of terrorists versus freedom fighters came to the fore as a by-
product of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies during the Cold War and the process of 
decolonization.
1732
 As noted above, it could be argued that in the post-1945 era organizations 
such as national liberation movements were exercising their right to self-determination 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, whereas, in many cases NSAGs operating 
today mostly in the post-modern fragmented states lack such recognition and legitimacy.
1733
 
Nevertheless, in the context of NSAGs there has to be a clear demarcation between what is 
the legitimate struggle of peoples for self-determination and terrorism.
1734
 Also, there has to 
be clear distinction between fully-fledged internal armed conflict in which organized NSAGs 
challenge the legitimacy of a state and low-intensity and sporadic violence by a small group 
of armed individuals.
1735
 In the Delalic case the Trial Chamber of the ICTY posited that ‘in 
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order to distinguish from the case of civil unrest or terrorist activities, the emphasis is on the 
protracted extent of the armed violence and the extent of the organization of the parties 
involved.’1736 Chomsky for instance uses the issue of Kosovo as an example of this idea 
where the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in a sequence of events culminating in the attack 
by the American and NATO forces upon Serbia was turned from a terrorist organization into 
freedom fighters, where upon the end of the hostilities those freedom fighters and their 
associates became terrorists again.
1737
 Another example is the Palestinian issue, where the 
Arab and Muslim world consider Hamas as freedom fighters exercising their right to self-
determination,
1738
 whereas Israel considers the Palestinian group Hamas operating in the 
Gaza portion of the Palestinian territories in particular as a terrorist organization.
1739
 
Nevertheless, this depends very much on labelling, perception and most importantly political 
considerations, as Dugard rhetorically enquires, ‘are the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) engaged 
in lawful military action or in state terror? Are the Palestinian militants and suicide bombers 
terrorists or freedom fighters?’1740  
Similarly, the detailed definition of terrorism in the 1999 Organization of African Union 
(OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism adopted by the Organization 
of African Unity, specifically excludes the ‘struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the 
principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed 
struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces.’1741 
Interestingly, it is the very freedom fighters that the EU sought to exclude in its draft 
statement from the scope of terrorism under the EU Framework Decision. The decision 
excludes ‘the conduct of those who have acted in the interest of preserving or restoring … 
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democratic values … as was notably the case in some member states during the Second 
World War.’1742 However, it has to be emphasised that such statements have not been 
adopted by the EU as binding interpretation of legislation.  
The most illustrative example of this conundrum in recent years is the case of the Afghani 
Mujahedeen forces fighting the Soviet occupiers at the height of the Cold War.
1743
 It is a 
well-known fact that their campaign during the 1980s was supported and financed covertly 
by the US government as well as being considered by the West as freedom fighters.
1744
 Upon 
getting rid of the Soviet occupying forces a sizeable portion of the Mujahedeen later formed 
the de facto government of Taliban wreaking havoc through Afghanistan and beyond.
1745
 Yet, 
once removed from power in 2001 by the US led coalition forces, however, in the eyes of the 
West mainly due to their association and harbouring of Al-Qaeda
1746
 they were branded as 
terrorists.
1747
 The new episode of this bloody conflict and its opposing views is being played 
out in Afghanistan. The question that still persists is whether the Taliban fighters are 
terrorists or freedom fighters resisting foreign occupation.
1748
 There are many other examples 
of such diversity of perceptions which exists around the globe.
1749
 However, in regards to 
freedom fighters and terrorists, Barnidge warns: ‘one must be careful not to overlook the 
political dynamic according to which acts of violence associated with particular ‘root causes’ 
continue to be glossed away, and selectively covered and condemned.’1750  
Opinions in this regard are somewhat divided. On the one hand, Schachter is of the opinion 
that this dichotomy misses the point simply because ‘… it does not mean that a person 
‘fighting for freedom’ cannot be a terrorist.’1751 Bassiouni on the other hand expresses the 
view that freedom fighters can employ terrorist means. He states: ‘While the term “terrorism” 
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clashed with the legitimacy of such a right to engage in a war of national liberation or to 
topple dictatorial regimes, it properly described the means employed to those ends.’1752    
This is the very consequence of the way in which descriptive language has been used and 
abused by sovereign states and NSAGs challenging their legitimacy.
1753
 In the past several 
decades, state actors brand many acts of insurgency on their territory as “terrorism”, which in 
turn has prompted NSAGs to label state actors’ conduct as “state terrorism”.1754 Richard 
Baxter, formerly of the International Court of Justice, stigmatizes the usage of the term and 
considers accusations of terrorism in contemporary rhetoric as imprecise, ambiguous, and 
above all serving no operative legal purposes, particularly, in such cases where crimes of 
violence or war have been committed.
1755
 His scepticism is also shared by Rosalyn Higgins 
who notes that ‘terrorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient 
way of alluding to activities, whether of states or individuals, wisely disapproved of and in 
which either the methods used are unlawful, or the targets protected, or both.’1756   
Nevertheless, due to the state-centric nature of international law, states’ efforts are generally 
aimed at criminalizing and limiting acts of violence to their domestic criminal codes.
1757
 
According to Chadwick, acts instigated by small groups and cells are rarely viewed by 
sovereign states as reaching the intensity to cross the thresholds of armed conflict regulated 
by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or the Hague Conventions of 1907.
1758
 Hence, there is a 
clear advantage on the part of NSAGs to increase the intensity of violence, enhancing the 
prospects of IHL violation and its subsequent application in such conflicts.
1759
 Consequently, 
by increasing the intensity of the conflict the NSAGs involved can distinguish themselves 
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worthy of being considered as combatants rather than mere terrorists.
1760
 On this very point 
Perez-Gonzalez opines:  
It is precisely the discrepancies over the status of certain groups in the context of an 
armed conflict or situations of occupation, described by some as liberation groups 
(guerrillas) or resistance groups and by others as terrorists, which is the sticking point 
for states in their attempts to reach an agreed definition of terrorism.
1761
 
 
4.7.3 Lack of a universal definition of terrorism in international law 
 
There are obligations imposed under international law on states to prevent and repress 
terrorism, but have failed to define it.
1762
 The lack of an overarching binding definition of 
terrorism is often cited as indication of inability of international law to deal with this 
issue.
1763
 Schachter argues that:  
This does not mean that international terrorism is not identifiable. It has a core meaning 
that all the definitions recognize. It refers to the threat or use of violence in order to 
create extreme fear and anxiety in a target group so as to coerce it to meet political (or 
quasi-political) objectives of the perpetrators. Such terrorist acts have an international 
character when they are carried out across national lines or directed against nationals of 
a foreign state or instrumentalities of that state.
1764
 
In the past the international community has made many attempts to deal with the issue of 
terrorism.
1765
 Petman highlights the perverse logic at the centre of achieving a definition for 
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terrorism as such ‘everyone tries to include one’s adversaries in the definition while keeping 
one’s allies and one’s own (actual or potential) activities outside it.’1766  
Bernard Lewis, a prominent historian and Islamist, somewhat brutally observed that the 
reason the UN and the international community at large have been impudent to develop 
measures to combat international terrorism is the fact that many of the governments 
represented in the UN achieved their authority through the use of terror and violence.
1767
 
Arendt also notes that many modern political communities were founded on violence and 
often involved ‘terrorist’ methods, thus originated in what today will be perceived as a 
crime.
1768
 Most Americans are oblivious to the fact that the use of purposeful terror for 
political ends was an integral part of the American Revolution.
1769
 It is rather obvious 
however from the state practice throughout the twentieth century that there has been a lack of 
consensus on who is a terrorist and who is a legitimate freedom fighter.
1770
 Nevertheless, as 
mentioned above, the biggest stumbling block to finalizing a universal definition of terrorism 
by the international community is the perennial argument that “one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter” has been a permanent feature of the debate regarding NSAGs.1771   
 
4.7.4 Treaty law related to terrorism 
 
The very first international instrument that concerned itself with the issue of defining 
‘terrorism’ was the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism of 16 
November 1937, adopted by the League of Nations.
1772
 As always, due to lack of consensus 
within the international community it was largely overlooked.
1773
 As a result, the 
international community settled on a twin-track approach, namely dealing both with 
particular manifestation of terrorist activity and with a general condemnation of the 
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phenomenon.
1774
 After the creation of the UN, a school of thought emerged that shied away 
from definitions that fail to simultaneously address the ‘historical, economic, social, and 
political causes underlying resort to terrorism.’1775 Indeed this view advanced by developing 
states is very much supportive of freedom fighters, which makes a basic distinction between 
their actions and the action of terrorists.
1776
 
The first concerted effort to address the issue of terrorism took place in 1972 as a result of the 
murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games, an earlier attack on an Israeli airport 
and murder of a Soviet diplomat in New York.
1777
 The Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism set 
up by the United Nations General Assembly in the first attempt since the creation of the 
United Nations was to find a unanimously accepted definition of terrorism.
1778
 With the 
Security Council beset by the Cold War power politics, and under pressure from the members 
of the Group of 77, the General Assembly rather than defining terrorism opted for a study of 
‘the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, 
frustration, grievance and despair, which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, 
including their own, to effect radical changes’.1779 According to Saul ‘the title of this agenda 
item does not assert that all terrorist acts are caused by such factors, but implied that those 
factors underlie at least some terrorist acts.’1780  
During the General Assembly debates in 1970s, there was some consensus for the view 
especially within the non-aliened states that although terrorism is illegal in some particular 
cases it may be justifiable.
1781
 During the course of these debates some states were of the 
opinion that there was a fundamental difference between terrorist actions against democratic 
regimes where institutional means of redress existed and popular upsurge by national 
liberation armies in exercise of their right to self-determination against oppressive 
regimes.
1782
 Guillaume notes that the drafters of those early conventions which attempted to 
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combat terrorism had to do so without naming it as such.
1783
 It is worth noting that the 
Western powers adopted an ambiguous attitude, in that although paying lip service to the 
inherent right of peoples to self-determination but at the same time maintaining that the end 
could never justify the means.
1784
 The political problem of fighting terrorism in the West is 
neatly illustrated by ‘the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism’ of 1977. In 
its opening article it states that certain terrorist activities shall not be regarded as ‘political 
offences’ for extradition purposes.1785 By doing so, the idea was to deactivate political 
considerations, hence, treat the so-called terrorists as common criminals.
1786
 However, it has 
been noted that this approach of ‘de-politicization’ was not maintained with consistency, as 
Article 5 of the abovementioned Convention reintroduces political consideration.
1787
 The 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) at the time featured prominently at the centre of 
this debate, the cause of which was being promoted very strongly by mainly Third World 
states.
1788
 Therefore, according to Friedrichs: ‘… These regimes demanded the exemption of 
national liberation movements from the definition of international terrorism, and called for 
the inclusion of state terrorism instead; moreover, they asked that the causes of terrorism be 
analyzed prior to measures being taken against it.’1789  
Due to such ideological clashes in the 1970s through to the 1990s over what should be meant 
by terrorism, the international community was left with no alternative but to abandon an all-
inclusive denunciation of terrorism and settled on proscribing and broadening extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over certain activities which are associated with terrorism.
1790
 At the height of the 
concern for terrorism in 1987, the UN Security Council passed a resolution in which it 
condemned terrorism in the strongest terms calling upon all nations to make every possible 
effort to overcome the scourge of terrorism.
1791
 The main emphasis of this approach was 
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upon the conclusion of a series of international conventions in regards to the hijacking of 
airplanes and abduction of diplomats as well as extending to terrorist bombings and ‘nuclear 
terrorism’.1792      
 
4.7.5 The end of the Cold War  
 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire provided the UN with a new 
impetus to renew its efforts to achieve a generally acceptable definition of terrorism, as well 
as heralding a radical change of attitude towards international terrorism.
1793
 Therefore, the 
term ‘terrorism’ reappeared again under the pressure from politicians, the media and 
NGOs.
1794
 Eventually, this culminated in a 1994 Resolution, in which the General Assembly 
reiterated its ‘unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism’.1795 
Weigend observes that the most remarkable feature of this Resolution is: ‘… the absence, for 
the first time, of any reference to peoples … legitimate struggle for freedom and 
independence’.1796   
According to an initiative at the request of the Secretary General of the UN resulting in a 
report produced by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes: ‘terrorism 
attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations: respect for human 
rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and 
nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict.’1797 Perez-Gonzalez opines that the reference 
to “rules of war that protect civilians” is a clear expression of the fact that in some cases such 
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terrorist acts take place within the confines of international, non-international armed conflict, 
or in situations of partial or total occupation of a territory by a state or another in which 
normally IHL would apply.
1798
 Nevertheless, this effort did not result in articulation of a 
universal definition of terrorism.
1799
 
The approach has been followed through subsequent documents such as the High Level Panel 
report and ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’, 
produced by the Secretary General of the UN, in which he:  
Endorses fully the High-Level Panel’s call for a definition of terrorism … in addition to 
actions already proscribed by existing conventions … intended to cause death or 
serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a 
population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain 
from doing any act.
1800
 
 
4.7.6 After 11 September 2001 attacks 
 
It has however, been argued that the attacks of 11 September 2001 upon the World Trade 
Centre has moved this process onto a higher level.
1801
 The events of 11 September 2001, 
resulted in the Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, which provided the 
UN to go one step further and adopt an ‘exceptionless’ definition of terrorism into a legally 
binding instrument, the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
1802
 
Significantly, after reference to the acts constituting offences pursuant to earlier treaties, this 
Convention provides a residual definition of terrorism as:  
Any other act intended to cause bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not 
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose 
of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.
1803
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In contrast, Article 1 of the Terrorist Bombing Convention refers neither to armed conflict 
nor to non-combatants or civilians. In fact, Article 19(2) unequivocally excludes ‘the 
activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under 
international humanitarian law’, this is in light of the fact that such activities are regulated by 
IHL.
1804
 Significantly, the Terrorist Bombing Convention does not deal with the activities of 
NSAGs in a non-international armed conflict. Hence, according to the said Convention an 
individual would be guilty of an offence if she/he: ‘… unlawfully and intentionally delivers, 
places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place 
of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system or an 
infrastructure facility.’1805 
However, the former President of ICJ Guillaume says:  
A distinction should be made between the victim that the terrorist seeks to harm, the 
target that he wishes to attain and the results he is looking to secure. Terrorism is a 
method of combat in which the victims are not chosen on an individual basis but are 
struck either at random or for symbolic effect. The goal pursued in attacking them is 
not to eliminate the victims themselves but to spread terror among the group to which 
they belong. By doing so, terrorists generally seek to compel governments or public 
opinion to some concession towards them, if only to consider their position more 
favourably.
1806
 
In spite of these developments in recent years there is a suggestion that the international 
community is divided into two camps, namely the leading Western powers such as the US 
and UK that would rather prefer to determine the issue of terrorism on case-by-case basis as 
the approach adopted in the “War on Terrorism”1807 perfectly illustrate and states favoring the 
status Quo which would prefer to tie these powers to a legal definition of terrorism in 
international law presumably without relying or involvement of IHL.
1808
 It is submitted that 
in relation to terrorism, the focus of the debate regarding NSAGs has moved onto a different 
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level. This is mainly due to the fact that many scholars and practitioners now believe that the 
debate regarding the doctrine of self-determination as the process of decolonization has run 
its course.
1809
 Additionally, in the post-9/11 era, regarding the issue of terrorism, a number of 
regional instruments condemning terrorism have also been adopted.
1810
  
 
5.7.7 Terrorism in IHL: a specific context & meaning 
 
Since the launching of the ‘war on terror’, many states engaged in internal armed conflict 
have labelled NSAGs challenging their legitimacy as ‘terrorist’.1811 According to Cassese: ‘in 
a matter of days, practically all states, … have come to assimilate a terrorist attack by a 
terrorist organization to an armed aggression by a state, entitling the victim state to individual 
self-defence and third states to act in collective self-defence.’1812 From the outset it has to be 
emphasised that IHL specifically prohibits ‘measures of terrorism’ and ‘acts of terrorism’, 
specifically when it is taking place during the course of hostilities and committed on the 
territory of one of the states affected by the conflict, the primary purpose of which is to 
spread terror in the civilian population.
1813
 In regards to NSAGs, it is in internal armed 
conflicts that a delicate balance has to be struck between IHL and anti-terrorist measures. 
Pejic notes: ‘While acts of violence against military objectives in internal armed conflicts 
remain subject to domestic criminal law, the tendency to designate them as ‘terrorist’ 
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Terrorism; the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, 2007, and the Organization of American States Inter-
American Convention against Terrorism, 2002. In addition, the Organization on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe adopted a Ministerial Declaration and Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism in 2001. 
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1813
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completely undermines whatever incentive armed groups have to respect international 
humanitarian law.’1814  
IHL has a context-dependent, specific meaning of the term “terrorism” which is based on the 
principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, particularly concerned with 
protecting civilians.
1815
 Once it has been established that a situation of armed conflict exists, 
it is rather pointless to designate atrocities directed against civilians and civilian targets as 
‘terrorist’ because such acts already amount to war crimes under international criminal 
law.
1816
 In situations of armed conflict, IHL does not provide a definition of terrorism,
1817
 
whether in international or non-international armed conflicts, but it proscribes most acts 
against civilian population and targets committed in armed conflict that generally be 
considered ‘terrorist’ if committed in peacetime.1818 As far as IHL is concerned, the meaning 
of terrorism in situations of armed conflict is more limited than many definitions of terrorism 
provided in other contexts.
1819
 Hence, ‘the IHL sense of “terrorism” is not premised on 
NSAG using explosives, hijacking aircraft, or financing groups that do so. As the IHL only 
applies in international armed conflict, belligerent occupation, or non-international armed 
conflict, it follows that terrorism in the IHL sense is restricted to these situations.’1820 The 
IHL establishes sufficiently rigorous and clear rules of conduct for identifying and 
condemning terrorism as war crimes, condemning the use of terrorist tactics has also a solid 
base in customary international law, specifically prohibiting excessive damage against those 
who are not participating in the hostilities.
1821
 Article 33 of Geneva Convention IV 1949 
contains the very term ‘terrorism’ (in relation to protection of civilians in international armed 
conflicts) and provides that ‘collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or 
of terrorism is prohibited’ against civilians and persons no longer taking part in the 
hostilities.
1822
 In the case of non-international armed conflicts Additional Protocol II in 
Article 4(2)(d) in the shape of fundamental guarantees simply extends this prohibition to such 
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armed conflicts (specifically concerning civilians and hors de combat).
1823
 It provides that 
‘acts of terrorism’ against civilians and non-combatants ‘are and shall remain prohibited at 
any time and in any place whatsoever.’ IHL also contains provisions that although the word 
‘terrorism’ is not mentioned proscribes such acts, depending on the intent, nationality of the 
perpetrator and victims and other such considerations, may be prohibited by one of the 
treaties against terrorism, for instance, the prohibition of acts of violence in Common Article 
3 directed against ‘persons taking no active part in hostilities’ would apply to some acts of 
terrorism.
1824
 In terms of prohibition of ‘spreading terror among civilians’, the Additional 
Protocol I&II provide a limited concept of terrorism in armed conflict elucidated in Article 
51(2) of Protocol I, and Article 13(2) of Protocol II. Both Articles are identical in prohibiting 
‘acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the 
civilian population’.1825 The abovementioned provisions extend the protection provided under 
the Forth Geneva Convention to civilians embroiled in international armed conflict (including 
wars of national liberation), as well as civilians in non-international armed conflicts.
1826
 
However, in both cases the most crucial consideration is the contentious issue of determining 
the threshold in the case of low-intensity, non-state violence (such as terrorism) which has to 
be reached to trigger the application of IHL.
1827
 Furthermore, Article 13(1) of the same 
Protocol translates this principle to more specific rules: ‘The Civilian population as such, as 
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited’. 
According to Kalshoven, ‘the language of the second sentence is far more specific than the 
terse reference to ‘acts of terrorism’ in Article 4(2). In effect, the sentence defines terrorism 
in the context of the protection of the civilian populations.’1828  
Therefore, in both international and non-international armed conflicts, civilians shall not be 
the object of attack, acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread 
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terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
1829
 According to the ICRC Commentary, 
violent acts in the course of an armed conflict inevitably, ‘almost always give rise to some 
degree of terror among the population and sometimes also among the armed forces’, and the 
fact that ‘attacks on armed forces are purposely conducted brutally in order to intimidate the 
enemy soldiers and persuade them to surrender’.1830 The ICRC Commentary goes on to say 
that by the virtue of Article 4(2)(d) of Additional Protocol II the distinction between 
combatants and civilians does exist implicitly in IHL of non-international armed conflict.
1831
 
The decisive element according to Gasser in identical prohibitions in Protocol I and II is the 
primary purpose to spread terror among the civilian population.
1832
 This is supported by the 
general trend in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law as well as 
some of the ICTY case-law which has applied the same approach to armed conflict regardless 
of whether an international or non-international armed conflict.
1833
  
Based upon this the ICTY in the case of Galic, convicted the commander of the Bosnian Serb 
forces for the siege of Sarajevo from 1992 to 1995, for war crimes.
1834
 The Trial Chamber 
held that a campaign of deliberately targeting besieged civilians in Sarajevo amounted to 
terrorism under Article 51(2), Additional Protocol I.
1835
 According to the Trial Chamber, 
terror was accepted to mean extreme fear, and provoking such fear had to be specifically 
intended results.
1836
 This approach is very much supported by the subsequent scholarly 
writings that have stated that the Serbian violence in Croatia (1991), Bosnia (1992), and 
Kosovo (1998-99), which included “ethnic cleansing” and “mass expulsion” of the civilian 
population, amounted to terrorism.
1837
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As noted above, there is no ‘combatant privilege in non-international armed conflict 
notwithstanding the fact that members of NSAGs may be killed,
1838
 there is no assumption 
that they fight lawfully.
1839
 Therefore, attacks by members of NSAGs on armed forces (rather 
than non-combatants) can be permitted under IHL in non-international armed conflicts, 
although they may be criminal acts under the penal law of the state concerned.
1840
  
Amnesty International in its report on the armed conflict between Israel and the southern 
Lebanese NSAG Hezbollah in 2006 considered the concepts of terrorism and spreading terror 
amongst civilian population. It suggested that the practice of leaflet dropping by the Israeli 
Defence Forces informing the civilian population of impending air strikes may have 
amounted to ‘spreading terror among the civilian population’ rather than a precaution taken 
to avoid civilian casualties.’1841 Some scholars have expressed reservation regarding this 
practice by Israel since it is all well and good to inform the civilian population of the 
imminent air strikes, but more often than not the most vulnerable section of the civilian 
populations such as the old and infirmed are not able to escape the combat zone.
1842
 In the 
opinion of the present author not only such a practice does not alleviate the suffering of 
civilians, and hence does not discharge the obligation to take precaution to prevent harm to 
civilians.
1843
 Furthermore, it has been noticed elsewhere that the choice of particular weapons 
and ammunition could also amount to evidence of spreading terror amongst the civilian 
population. The Fact-Finding Mission established by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) 
to look into violations of IHRL and IHL in the Operation Cast Lead, the armed conflict 
between the Israeli Defence Forces and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, from 27 December 2008 to 
18 January 2009, stated that the use of Flechette shells by Israel was ‘not only an attack 
intended to kill but also to spread terror among the civilian population, given the nature of the 
weapons used.’1844 By the same token the Report also stated unequivocally that the primary 
purpose of shelling civilian communities in Israel by Hamas was to ‘spread terror amongst 
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the Israeli civilian population, in violation of international law.’1845 It has to be noted that the 
aforementioned Report manages to strike a balance between the obligations by a state and a 
NSAG in treaty law regarding IHL’s specific concept of terrorism in an armed conflict which 
prohibits violation of the principle of distinction.
1846
     
 
4.8 IHRL and counter-terrorism measures 
 
Nonetheless, if a state was to deny the existence of an armed conflict in relation to a NSAG 
on its territory, then the situation comes under law enforcement paradigm ruled by IHRL.
1847
 
Moreover, the state concerned cannot simply claim that it is an internal matter and does not 
concern international law. In such a case, IHRL and national constitutional guarantees will be 
applied to the situation commonly referred to by states as counter-terrorist operations.
1848
 
IHRL in particular regulates state policies in counter-terrorism both in armed conflict and 
during periods of civil strife.
1849
 As result, it obliges states to respect and ensure general and 
specific civil and political rights as well as to respect protect, and fulfill economic, social, and 
cultural rights. As a result of these instruments states are bound by IHRL to act with due 
diligence to prevent violations of the right to life by NSAGs and accordingly regulate their 
counter-terrorism policies.
1850
 However, bearing the responsibility of protecting their citizens 
does not give the states an excuse for human rights violations which may ultimately 
tantamount to crimes against humanity.
1851
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4.8.1 States of emergency and anti-terrorism 
 
In some instances states choose to respond to threats to their national security by declaring a 
state of emergency, according to which they could derogate from certain laws, or temporarily 
suspended, in times of ‘war or public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. In recent 
times, terrorist attacks have prompted states to declare that state of emergency, as in the 
aftermath of 11 September attacks.
1852
 The US Government proclaimed state of emergency 
although no formal measure to derogate from UN International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) or any human rights treaty was made.
1853
  
Gross and Ni Aoláin, describe the mechanism of derogation as ‘the legally mandated 
authority of states to allow suspension of certain individual rights in exceptional 
circumstances of emergency of war.’1854 Most major international human rights treaties have 
some form of derogation provision, with the exception of the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples Rights (ACHPR).the other two major regional treaties, the European Convention on 
Human rights (ECHR)
1855
 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),
1856
 both 
of which permit derogations, as does the ICCPR. Indeed, there are similarities between the 
aforementioned derogation articles. Article 4(1) of ICCPR states:  
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of 
which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take such 
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social 
origin.
1857
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There are four principles regulating the state of emergency denoted in major human rights 
instruments; namely, the scope of the notion of state of emergency; the proportionality test to 
assess derogation; non-derogable rights and procedural obligations.
1858
 It has to be 
emphasised that derogations should not be the main basis of a state’s anti-terrorism policies 
and they are rarely used in Europe with the exception of the United Kingdom derogating 
from Article 5 (1)(f) of ECHR, the right to liberty and security from 2001-2004 being a 
noteworthy example.
1859
    
 
4.8.2 The scope of the notion of state of emergency 
 
There is controversy in relation to the scope of the notion of state of emergency, as to which 
body or institution has the authority to a situation of emergency.
1860
 The monitoring body of 
ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has expressed reservation regarding the erroneous 
nature of some declarations by states that do not appear to amount to a ‘public emergency 
that do threaten the life of the nation,’ falling short of articulating what conditions amount to 
the existence of state of emergency.
1861
 
In Lawless v Ireland the European Court of Human Rights defined it as: ‘an exceptional 
situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole of the population and constitutes a 
threat to the organised life of the community of which the state is composed’.1862 The danger 
must be in a way that the normal measures permitted by the Convention are proven 
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inadequate to deal with the situation.
1863
 The Lawless test sets a high threshold for a state of 
emergency, holding that states require tangible evidence of large-scale threat to their 
constitutional order. The Court extensively deliberated the conditions that would qualify as 
amounting to a state of emergency threatening the life of the nation, however, it concluded: 
‘That a state of emergency was a situation of exceptional and imminent danger or crisis 
affecting the general public, as distinct from particular groups, and constituting a threat to the 
organised life of the community which composes the state in question.’1864    
In contrast, in an earlier case the European Commission of Human Rights came to the view 
that the test in Art. 15 had not been satisfied,
1865
 despite the fact that the state had been given 
the benefit of the margin of appreciation.
1866
 This case concerned applications brought by a 
number of Scandinavian countries against the regime set up by the Greek colonels in 1967.  
The Commission held that the Greek case was different in nature, insofar as, the respondent 
state’s government seized power through a military coup d’etat on 21 April 1967 and 
subsequently suspended parts of the constitution and invoked Art 15 of the Convention.
1867
 
The Commission considered that the burden rested upon the respondent state is meant to 
show that the conditions justifying the measures of derogation through Art 15 had been and 
continued to be met.
1868
 The Commission considered three elements: the threats of a 
communist takeover; the crisis regarding the constitutional government; and the breakdown 
of public order in Greece.
1869
 In this case the Commission came to the conclusion that the 
respondent state had not satisfied the requirement that a public emergency was threatening 
the life of the Greek nation at the time of the military take over.
1870
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Nonetheless, in the case of Ireland v United Kingdom
1871
 both the Court and the Commission 
were in no doubt that the public emergency threatening the whole of nation was a reality 
based on the terrorist activities of the Irish republican Army (IRA). The Court adopted the 
application of ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, in which the Court allowed a wide ‘margin 
of appreciation’ to the national authorities in deciding ‘both on the presence of such an 
emergency and on the nature and scope of derogation necessary to avert it.’1872 This was in 
spite of the fact that, neither of the parties at the time, were able to point out the fact that, the 
threat was only limited to a particular part of the territory of the United Kingdom. This 
approach was based on the rationale that the declaration of a state of emergency was the main 
prerogative of governments which in turn have the main responsibility of protecting ‘the life 
of the nation’.1873 Consequently, by reason of their ‘direct and continuance contact with the 
pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position than 
the international judge to decide on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and 
scope of derogations necessary to avert it.’1874 The issue of derogating in times of a state of 
emergency was dealt with in the House of Lords decision of A and Others v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (2004).
1875
 Having reviewed the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights in this regard, the majority Law Lords accepted the British 
Government’s declaration as to existence of the public emergency based on the principle of 
‘demarcation of functions or … “relative institutional competence”.1876 However, Lord 
Hoffman, in his dissenting opinion expressed the view that the terrorist threat posed was 
rather negligible than to require a declaration of a state of emergency, since ‘terrorist 
violence, as serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence 
as a civil community’.1877  
The current position of the Court is set out on the case of Aksoy
1878
, where it considered the 
public emergency issue threatening the life of the nation and places the onus on each 
contracting party to assess what constitutes a public emergency and what measures to take to 
                                                                                                                                                        
fact, than merely considering the Greek government to be able to provide sufficient reason to believe that public 
emergency existed. 
1871
 Ireland v United Kingdom (App no 5310/71) (1978) 2 EHRR 25; S. Marks Civil Liberties at the Margin: the 
UK Derogation and the European Court of Human Rights, 15 Oxford JLS 69 (1995) 72, p. 81.  
1872
 Ibid, para 207. 
1873
 Bianchi & Naqvi, ‘International Humanitarian Law & Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 46. 
1874
 Ireland v United Kingdom, op. cit., para 207.   
1875
 A (FC) et al (FC) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. 
1876
 Ibid, para 29, per Lord Bingham. 
1877
 Ibid, para 96, per Lord Hoffman. 
1878
 Aksoy v Turkey, app. No. 21987/93, 79-A Eur. Comm’n H.r. Dec. & Rep. 60 (1994). 
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deal with it. So a wide margin of appreciation should be left to national authorities.
1879
 Some 
observers are of the opinion that ‘where there is an organised campaign of violence resulting 
in death at whatever low level among the security forces and civilians it is now hard to see 
how the Strasbourg authorities could avoid confirming a state’s claim that there is a public 
emergency within Article 15.’1880 Furthermore, in its General Comment on states of 
emergency, which specifically deals with Article 4 of the ICCPR, the HRC reiterated the 
need for states to consider if declaring a state of emergency outside the situation of an armed 
conflict is absolutely necessary.
1881
 
 
4.8.3 The proportionality of derogation  
 
The second precondition for a valid derogation requires that measures derogating from 
government obligations under the Convention must be proportionate and must be ‘strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation’.1882 The Human Rights Committee noted in its 
General Comment on states of emergency that ‘the mere fact that a permissible derogation 
from a specific provision may, of itself, be justified by the exigencies of the situation does not 
obviate the requirement that specific measures taken pursuant to the derogation must also be 
shown to be required by the exigencies of the situation.’1883 In the Greek case the European 
Commission of Human Rights was not satisfied that public emergency existed and the 
measures taken went beyond what the situation required.
1884
 In 1960, the Court followed the 
opinion of the commission in the Lawless case that detention without trial was justified under 
Article 15, not only were they satisfied by the measures required according to the exigencies 
of the situation but also pointed to a number of safeguards designed to prevent abuses.
1885
 
The Court in Ireland v United Kingdom, placed considerable emphasis on the margin of 
appreciation to be accorded to the state. The Court was of the opinion that the system of extra 
                                                 
1879
 In regards to the wide margin of appreciation, the Convention organs have generally been satisfied if a 
respondent government has shown some plausible basis for believing that the derogatory measures were 
necessary. 
1880
 Harris, O’Brian and Warbrick, ‘Law of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 1995, p439. 
1881
 According to General Comment no 29, ‘if States parties consider invoking article 4 in other situations than 
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legitimate in the circumstances.’ UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment no 29, States of Emergency 
(Article 4), ICCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 11, 31 August 2001, para 3. 
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 ICCPR, Art. 4; ECHR, Art. 15; IACHR, Art 27. 
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 HRC, General Comment no 29, op. cit., para 4.  
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the European Human Rights Commission’, 1 (1970-71) Human Rights Law Journal 91. 
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judicial deprivation of liberty was justified by the circumstances perceived by the United 
Kingdom between 1971 and 1975.
1886
 In contrast, it could be argued that in the case of 
Brannigan and McBride
1887
 the Court showed a greater willingness to question the 
safeguards, which the state puts in place for suspension of rights required by the Convention 
provision in respect of which the derogation is filed. This tougher stand by the Court is 
supported by its approach in the Aksoy case, in which it declined to accept that the situation 
had required the suspects to be held for 14 days without judicial intervention and noting that 
the Turkish government had failed to give any reason why judicial intervention was 
impracticable. In the Lawless case, the Court attached importance to the provision of 
safeguards against abuse, or excessive use of emergency powers and evidently adopted a 
much tougher stance to the issue.
1888
 The European Court ruled that Turkey was entitled to 
derogation from Article 5 of ECHR, which deals with the right to liberty and security of 
person, due to terrorism in the south-east (the Kurdish province), but did not justify the 
holding of the applicant in detention for the period of 14 days, without judicial control, access 
to relatives and doctors simply on suspicion of involvement in terrorist offences.
1889
 The 
Court also went on to say that the Turkish government had failed to give “detailed reasons” 
justifying the action. According to HRC:  
… The obligation to limit any derogations to those strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation reflects the principle of proportionality which is common to derogation 
and limitation powers … this condition requires that states parties provide careful 
justification not only for their decision to proclaim a state of emergency but also for any 
specific measures based on such a proclamation. If states purport to invoke the right to 
derogate from the Covenant during, for instance, a natural catastrophe, a mass 
demonstration including instances of violence, or a major industrial accident, they must 
be able to justify not only that such a situation constitutes a threat to the life of the 
nation, but also that all their measures derogating from the Covenant are strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation.
1890
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4.8.4 Non-derogable rights 
 
The third requirement of the state of emergency regime, concerns such rights that even in 
times of a state of emergency cannot be derogated upon. The ECHR, compared to other 
regional human rights instruments, provides the most limited list of such guaranteed rights, 
namely, the right to life (with the exception of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war), 
freedom from torture, slavery and protection against retrospective criminal penalties.
1891
 
Additionally, the ICCPR guarantees the right to recognition as a person before the law, the 
right to freedom of conscience and religion and the right not to be incarcerated merely on 
grounds of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.
1892
 However, the ACHR provides the 
most comprehensive list of non-derogable rights: rights of the family, right to a name, rights 
of the child, right to nationality, right to participate in government and the judicial guarantees 
essential for the protection of such rights.
1893
 Although national and international courts have 
been rather reluctant to question the existence of a state of emergency declared by states, but 
they have rather been forthright in upholding the status of non-derogable rights.
1894
 It has 
been noted elsewhere that ‘… both the European and American Courts of Human Rights have 
rejected arguments from states that killing by state forces or the use of force against suspects 
are in any way justifiable because of a situation of war or the threat of terrorism.’1895 
However, in the context of conflict and emergencies, states may opt to administrative 
detention for security reasons, in that an individual is held by executive charge without 
criminal charges being brought against the internee.
1896
 In light of the fact that the ICCPR 
does not seem to rule out the possibility that administrative detention could be lawful under 
IHL, but it is not clear whether states have to derogate in order to detain suspects under the 
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 ICCPR, Article 4(2). 
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 Bianchi & Naqvi, ‘International Humanitarian Law & Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 49. 
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ICCPR.
1897
 In contrast to the ICCPR, administrative detention is not included in the ECHR 
and it points to the need to derogate when taking such measures.
1898
 
Moreover, there is the prospect that some rights or specific elements of rights which are not 
stipulated by Article 4(2) of the ICCPR could be derogated from. Dennis has expressed 
reservation and concludes that ‘the proposition that there are other non-derogable rights in the 
ICCPR in addition to the catalogue of non-derogable rights provided in Article 4(2) of the 
ICCPR is doubtful.’1899 Hence, even though Article 4(1) of the ICCPR indicates which of the 
specific articles are non-derogable, the HRC has pointed out to state parties that there are 
some other articles from the said Covenant which would be difficult to justify derogating 
from such as Articles 14 (the right to justice and fair trial) and 25 (the right to political 
participation) of the ICCPR.
1900
 According to the HRC this indicates that ‘state parties may in 
no circumstances invoke Article 4 of the Covenant as justification for acting in violation of 
humanitarian law or peremptory norm of international law.’1901    
 
4.8.5 Other international obligations 
 
A fourth precondition of the regime of state of emergency is that the measures must be 
consistent with the state’s other international obligations. The procedural requirement is an 
important part of the derogation scheme.
1902
 The HRC has regularly impressed upon the 
requirements of Article 4(3) of ICCPR, as not a “mere formality”.1903 The HRC in its first 
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General Comment on Article 4 stated that ‘it was important that state parties, in times of 
national emergency, inform other states parties of the nature and extent of the derogations 
they have made and of the reasons therefore, and further, to fulfill their reporting obligation 
under article 40 of the Covenant by indicating the nature and extent of each right derogated 
from together with the relevant documentation.’1904  
This particular feature of ECHR has rarely been proved to be problematic in the past, 
however, in Brannigan and McBride the applicants had claimed that according to Art 4(1) of 
the ICCPR Covenant, in which, it is explicitly required that an emergency should have been 
“officially proclaimed” by the government, the applicants argued that the United Kingdom 
had never declared a state of emergency related to Northern Ireland.
1905
 The European Court 
of Human Rights considered that there was no foundation for the applicants’ argument.1906 
The Court dismissed this argument and observed that the statement of the Home Secretary to 
Parliament regarding derogation was formal in character and made the position of the 
government clear and was “well in keeping with the notion of an official proclamation.”1907 
  
                                                 
1904
 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CCPR General Comment No. 1: Article 4 
(Derogations) Adopted by the 13
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 Session of Human Rights Committee, on 31 July 1981(UN Doc. A/36/40).  
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4.9 Legality of use of force against NSAGs 
 
4.9.1 Introduction  
 
This section concentrates on the issue of legality of use of force by the two sovereign states 
of Turkey and Iran against the Kurdish NSAGs of the PKK and PJAK. By operating trans-
nationally they enjoy the safe haven of the Qandil Mountain area in the neighboring Kurdish 
populated semi-autonomous northern Iraq run by the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG).
1908
 In the last two decades the PKK and PJAK in recent years have repeatedly 
planned and launched military attacks upon Turkey and Iran from the shelter of that region. 
What is rather interesting in relation to the exercise of use of force by Turkey against the 
PKK and Iran against PJAK is the fact that over time they have made so little effort to 
rationalize their action legally nor have they in many cases informed the UN Security Council 
as required.
1909
 It is also worth noting that the observers and the international community 
have by and large been ambivalent towards their actions.
1910
 This is in quite a contrast to 
more high profile interventions in recent years such as in the case of Afghanistan (2001), Iraq 
(2003), and Israel in Lebanon (2006) which attracted a lot more publicity and legal appraisal. 
From this study’s point of view the crucial question that arises is whether an attack by a 
NSAG amounts to an armed attack since the legality of the use of force according to the UN 
Charter is only triggered if the attack is instigated by armed forces of a state. 
The use of force in the state-centric international law is the preserve of the sovereign states 
even in the twenty-first century.
1911
 Under the UN Charter and customary international law 
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the right of self-defence holds a special place in the jus ad bellum.
1912
 In fact, ‘states using 
force against another state almost invariably invoke self-defence.’1913 That is not to say that 
there is a universal agreement on its interpretation and boundaries. For instance, the US 
because of its overwhelming military capabilities has been more active in widening the 
boundaries of this right by proclaiming ‘war on terror’ in the aftermath of the 11 September 
2001 attacks upon its soil by the Al Qaeda terrorist organization.
1914
  
As previously discussed, it is non-international armed conflicts that predominate in the world 
today and the specter of inter-state conflict has been reduced to the relics of the past.
1915
 The 
use of force by private individuals in the shape of NSAGs is not new, nor is characterization 
of such groups as terrorists.
1916
 One of the most vital issues facing the international 
community is whether it is lawful for states to resort to force against NSAGs in particular 
extraterritorially under the invocation of self-defence.
1917
 Indeed, it has been argued that, this 
trend can be discerned from the implicit state practice of the individual states since the 
attacks upon the United States of 11 September 2001.
1918
  
It is true, however, that nowadays military operations of the majority of NSAGs stretches 
beyond the borders of a particular state in that they are striving to achieve their political aims. 
Such military operations raise many issues within the ambit of international law such as 
violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states attacked as well as state 
responsibility of the state that is harboring these NSAGs (willingly or not) from which the 
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NSAGs’ attacks had been launched.1919 Should there be a right to use force in self-defence 
against NSAGs particularly those launching attacks upon states from a neighboring state 
irrespective of the host state’s involvement?    
In the traditional inter-state armed conflicts, the self-defence paradigm was a clear cut 
concept, in that, army of one state would react to another state’s army either massing on its 
border or as a reaction to an act of aggression by another state.
1920
 It has been argued that the 
right of self-defence is created by and embedded in the fundamental right of states to 
survival.
1921
 Every state has an inherent right to use force in self-defence as reiterated by the 
ICJ in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: 
‘… The Court cannot lose the sight of the fundamental right of every state to survival, and 
thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its 
survival is at stake.
1922
 With the emergence of NSAGs as organizations capable of attacks 
trans-nationally allied to the ambivalence of the highest international judicial organ, the ICJ 
to this issue has resulted in scholars taking extreme stands.
1923
 On the one hand, there are 
those who believe that the right to self-defence and the use of military force only arises if 
such attacks are attributable to the host state,
1924
 or the school of thought among legal 
scholars, domestic court judgments and in few occasions by Judges (albeit in minority) in the 
ICJ in favor of broadening the scope of the use of force by states against NSAGs without 
specifying whether there is a requirement for another state’s involvement.1925 Some authors 
even believe (wrongly in the opinion of the present author) that Security Council Resolutions 
1368 and 1373, issued in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks provide states with a 
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blank cheque to take defensive action against all attacks by NSAGs.
1926
 For the purpose of 
this study and in the light of the recent events concerning the activities of NSAGs this study 
will primarily evaluate the legality of self-defence by Turkey and Iran against the PKK and 
PJAK respectively who launch trans-boundary armed attacks from northern Iraq in order to 
further a political or ideological objective.  
 
4.9.2 Background to Turkey’s cross-border operations 
 
Turkey has long claimed to have an inherent right to resort to measures which are necessary 
for its security and protection of its citizens, including use of direct force against the PKK.
1927
 
Turkey’s provinces of Sirnak and Hakkari share a 240 mile border with Iraq’s provinces of 
Erbil and Dahuk. In the last decade, the PKK has used this border region to launch attacks on 
the Eastern provinces of Turkey. Historically PKK’s sphere of activities has been across large 
portions of the Turkish borders with Iran and Syria, another 920 miles in length, sharing 
some of the operational territory with the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK). The PKK 
has operated from the safe haven of northern Iraq for the last three decades. As discussed 
above, initially due to its tangible military capability the PKK launched armed attacks from 
its bases inside the Turkish territory but used the Kurdish populated northern Iraq as a refuge 
and regrouping area. Northern Iraq became a safe haven for the PKK especially after the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces and the ensuing Gulf War which resulted in the creation of 
a de facto Kurdish entity in northern Iraq for the protection of Kurdish population of Iraq.
1928
  
Since 1983, Turkey has launched regular cross-border attacks against the PKK to disrupt its 
training camps and operation. Initially, Turkey carried out its military operations especially in 
1986 and 1987 with the consent of the Baathist regime in Iraq on the basis of cross-border 
cooperation agreements between the two states and the UK in 1926.
1929
 There were also 
reports of other cross border co-operation between Turkey and Iraq in the 1980s.
1930
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However, since the Gulf War in 1991 and because of Turkey’s support for the coalition 
forces that removed Iraq from Kuwait, Iraq became more vociferous against the Turkish 
incursions and complained repeatedly to the UN Security council on many occasions.
1931
 It 
has been noted that unlike Iraq that repeatedly registered its complaint to the UN Security 
Council, Turkey never made any effort to provide a legal appraisal for its actions to the UN 
Security Council.
1932
 Because of restriction of Iraqi sovereignty and the military measures 
imposed on northern part of its territory by the US and its allies, Iraq accused Turkey of 
taking advantage of the abnormal situation by violating its territorial integrity.
1933
 However, 
Turkey based its argument to use force on Iraq’s inability to control its northern border to 
prevent cross border attacks by the PKK.
1934
  
It was during the early 1990s that Turkey as part of its new strategy towards the PKK 
established a five-kilometer wide security zone along the Turkish-Iraqi border.
1935
 It is 
significant to point out that even after imposition of the no-fly zone in northern Iraq, Turkey 
carried out operations against the PKK with the help of the two Kurdish NSAGs of KDP and 
PUK who were concerned about the PKK establishing a permanent base in northern Iraq.
1936
      
The earlier operations against the PKK were explained by the Turkish officials as 
applications of the right of hot pursuit.
1937
 Since 1992, Turkey has annually continued this 
practice.
1938
 These military operations have ranged from isolated raids by Special Forces 
Units to several corps-sized (10,000-40,000 troops) operations involving thousands of troops. 
The first extraterritorial operation that was not based on hot pursuit took place in March 
1992, when the Turkish air force targeted the PKK camps in northern Iraq.
1939
 Turkey 
continued its military operations against the PKK training bases in northern Iraq in January 
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1994,
1940
 March 1995 and again in May and September of 1997.
1941
 However, the first major 
Turkish land offensive launched against the PKK’s positions in northern Iraq was on 20 
March 1995, code named operation Twilight.
1942
 This major military operation involved 
35,000 Turkish troops, the use of Cobra attack helicopters and F-16 jet fighters bombing 
PKK position 40 Kilometers inside the Iraqi territory.
1943
 President Tansu Çiller stated that 
the purpose of the operation was ‘to rip out the roots of the terror operations aimed at our 
innocent people.’1944 In a further statement the Turkish Premier said of the military operation 
in northern Iraq, ‘call it a hot pursuit operation. We are not against the innocent civilians. We 
will be there as long as necessary.’1945 The international community did not broadly support 
the use of force taken by Turkey in Iraq especially in light of the fact that the actions of the 
PKK could not be attributed to Iraq.
1946
 The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
condemned Turkey’s military operation in northern Iraq,1947 the European states called upon 
Turkey to immediately withdraw its troops from the Iraqi territory.
1948
 The US was the only 
state that recognized Turkey’s right to defend itself from attacks from a neighboring state, but 
similarly urged Turkey to withdraw its troops from the region.
1949
 In riposte, Turkey 
maintained that it respected Iraq’s territorial integrity and had to take action against the PKK 
since Iraq was unable to exercise authority over its northern territory to prevent such 
attacks.
1950
 In spite of Iraq’s protestation the issue was not put on the Security Council 
agenda.
1951
 The incursion of May 1997, involved 50,000 troops and 250 tanks backed by 
heavy artillery. 
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4.9.3 Background to Iran’s cross-border operations 
 
Likewise, imposition of the no-fly zone in northern Iraq provided a variety of dissident 
Iranian NSAGs with a safe haven. In the early 1990s, the Islamic regime in Iran started its 
operations against a multitude of NSAGs (including Kurdish ones) such as Peoples’ 
Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and fighters belonging to the Kurdish Democratic 
Party of Iran (KDP-I) based in northern Iraq. It is worth mentioning that PMOI and KDP-Iran 
were initially part of the armed wing of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), 
formed in 1981, as the main opposition to the theocratic regime in Iran.
1952
 In marked 
contrast to Turkey, in order to justify its excursions into northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish 
NSAGs, Iran has relied on its right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
1953
 
Iran invoked the right to self-defence against Kurdish NSAGs in northern Iraq and duly 
informed the UN Security Council: 
During the past few weeks, bands of armed and organized terrorist mercenaries have 
engaged in trans-border military attacks against and sabotage in Iranian border 
provinces … In response to these armed attacks from inside Iraq and in accordance 
with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, today, 25 May 1993, the fighter 
jets of the Islamic Republic Air Force carried out a brief, necessary and proportionate 
operation against the military basis of the terrorist group …1954 
In November 1994, Iran informed the Security Council specifying attacks by anti-government 
NSAGs originating from inside the Iraqi territory, and stated that ‘in accordance with its 
inherent right of self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran took two proportional and necessary steps.’ Prior to this, Iran had 
protested to Iraq regarding presence of PMOI and KDP-I and their hit and run raids on the 
Iranian territory.
1955
  
In the mid-1990s, Iran used the same rationale as Turkey, arguing that because of Iraq’s 
inability to exercise control over its northern part it left Iran with no alternative but to use 
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force to protect itself.
1956
 However, every time Iran invoked Article 51 and in step with its 
obligations under the UN Charter, Iran has informed the UN Security Council whenever it 
has embarked on major military operations against NSAGs in northern Iraq.
1957
 Iran’s 
extraterritorial operations against the Kurdish and other NSAGs continued well into the 
1990s. In 1999, in a letter to the Secretary General of the UN Iran stated: 
The proportionate actions by Iran, against terrorist bases and targets in Iraq which have 
been used to train terrorists and generate terrorism against Iran, have been taken in a 
discriminate manner and in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence as set out in 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations … in pursuance of this policy and in the 
exercise of its right of self-defence of the Charter, the concerned authorities of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran targeted a well-known active terrorist camp, located in the 
territory of Iraq, on 10 June 1999. This proportionate action was a necessary defensive 
measure against the perpetrators of the terrorist of the terrorist crimes that had been 
carried out against Iran and its citizens.
1958
  
As a reaction to these encroachments upon its territory, Iraq repeatedly complained to the UN 
Security Council and stated that it was not culpable for the activities of the NSAGs operating 
out of its northern territory against the Iranian regime.
1959
 In several occasions Iraq also 
accused Iran of supporting and hosting Kurdish NSAGs opposed to the Iraqi government.
1960
 
However, the Iranian government reiterated its commitment to Iraqi sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, it state: 
… Iran emphasizes that this limited and proportionate operation was carried to stop 
cross-border attacks against the Islamic Republic of Iran from the Iraqi territory … 
should not be construed as infringing the territorial integrity of Iraq. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran respects Iraq’s territorial integrity and looks forward to promoting 
friendly relations with its neighbors.
1961
 
Since 2006, Iran has faced the armed challenge of Party for a Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) 
operating from the safe haven of northern Iraq. As discussed above, PJAK is known as the 
sister organization of the PKK and part of the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (Koma 
Civakên Kurdistan, KCK). Since 2007, Iran has been reported to have targeted camps of 
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PJAK in northern Iraq.
1962
 This is a very unique situation in which Turkey and Iran two 
regional powers with their complex relations find themselves in. It is now clear that by the 
creation of KCK and the merger of its military challenge, it is now directing its military 
challenge towards both countries. In recent years, because of the closeness of the PKK and 
PJAK, Turkey and Iran have increasingly coordinated their military operations against the 
two Kurdish NSAGs.
1963
 
 
4.9.4 The prohibition of use of force by NSAGs in international law  
 
It has to be stressed that any use of force by NSAGs is unlawful in international law or any 
domestic law.
1964
 The prohibition of the use of force, as postulated in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter also extends to the use of force by NSAGs against a state.
1965
 In international law, the 
use of force by a NSAG is generally termed as indirect use of force when it is supported in 
the shape of being trained, armed, and financed by a state (host state) and is sent into another 
state (victim state) in search of achieving their aim through use of force.
1966
 It is therefore, not 
surprising that this type of force is censured in a number of documents. The Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of 
their Independence and Sovereignty provides in operative paragraph 2 that ‘…No state shall 
organize, assists, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities 
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state …’1967 Furthermore, the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations stipulates 
that ‘… Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts within another State …’ The Declaration 
elaborates and interprets the prohibition of the threat or use of force provided in Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter. Article 3(g) of the definition of aggression prescribes that the ‘… sending 
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups of irregular or mercenaries which carry out 
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acts of armed force against another State or its substantial involvement therein …’ shall 
constitute aggression. Finally, according to the Declaration on the Enhancement and 
Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International 
relations, ‘… States shall fulfill their obligations under international law to refrain from 
organizing, instigating or assisting or participating in paramilitary terrorist or subversive acts, 
including acts of mercenaries in other States, or acquiescing in organized activities within 
their territory directed towards the commission of such acts…’1968 The abovementioned 
General Assembly Resolutions are as such not binding documents on UN member states. 
Furthermore, General Assembly Resolutions are not included in the list of sources of 
international law that appears in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. However, they are not to be discarded as legally insignificant for they are considered 
to serve as material, namely, evidentiary sources of customary international law.
1969
 
 
4.9.5 The right to self-defence: procedural obligations  
 
At the outset, it must be noted that the use of force in self-defence in international law is 
regulated by both treaty law and custom. This is a point made clear by the ICJ in the first of 
the merits decisions in the Nicaragua case that ‘there can be no doubt that the issues of the 
use of force and collective self-defence raised in the present proceedings are issues which are 
regulated both by customary international law and by treaties, in particular by the United 
Nations Charter.’1970 However, the ICJ goes on to emphasize that the substantives rules on 
self-defence have their basis in customary international law are not always identical in 
content to those contained in multilateral treaties on the subject.
1971
 As a consequence, the 
present system of self-defence is a combination of pre-Charter customary international law 
position and the right stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter.
1972
 The pre-Charter 
customary international law was regulated by two conditions namely; necessity and 
                                                 
1968
 GA Res 42/22 of 1987, GOAR 42
nd
 session, sup. No 49, p. 278. 
1969
 The ICJ has in a number of cases utilized General Assembly Resolution as confirming the existence of 
opinion juris, Shaw, ‘International Law’, op. cit., p. 88; see e.g. The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons case, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 254-5; 110 ILR, p. 163. See also Western Sahara case, ICJ Reports, 
1975, pp. 31-3; The East Timor case, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 102; ILR, p. 226. 
1970
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
merits, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14, para. 34. 
1971
 Ibid, at para. 175. 
1972
 J.A. Green, ‘Self-Defence: A State of Mind for States?’ NILR LV: 181-206, 2008, p. 185. 
295 
 
proportionality, origins of which could be traced well into international legal theory.
1973
 
Nevertheless, the Caroline incident in the nineteenth century has played a pivotal role in 
regulating resort to the use of military force in self-defence in regards to customary 
international law.
1974
 Ultimately, self-defence is the only exception states can legitimately 
justify to resort to the use of force under international law without prior authorization of the 
UN Security Council.
1975
  
In the post-1945 era, the appropriate treaty law framework to deal with this issue can be 
found in Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter.
1976
 The exercise of the right to self-
defence in modern international law according to the ICJ is also regulated by two further 
preconditions not listed in Article 51, namely; the principles of necessity and proportionality 
based on customary international law.
1977
 Nonetheless, by strict reading of the term of these 
provisions, it is clear that the use of force on the international plane has traditionally been an 
inter-state phenomenon and excluded measures of self-defence against NSAGs, unless a 
certain degree of another state’s involvement were to be established.1978  
Article 2(4), prohibits any use of force by one state against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of another.
1979
 This Article has been described as one of the bedrocks of 
modern international order and is contained in the first Chapter of the UN Charter.
1980
 It sets 
out the purposes and principles of the United Nations and the majority of legal scholars 
attribute the norm contained in Article 2(4) as of  jus cogens character.
1981
 Article 2(4) states: 
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All members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
1982
 
In spite of too many violations of Article 2(4), there is a universal agreement among states 
that it continues to be binding.
1983
 The prohibition to use force is not absolute and according 
to the UN Charter there are two exceptions under which states can resort to use force. It is 
either authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII (Article 42) of the UN 
Charter or in pursuit of the inherent right to self-defence according to Article 51 of the 
Charter. This study is primarily concerned with whether there is an inherent right of states to 
take armed action against NSAGs in self-defence according to Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
There have been few occasions that collective action under Chapter VII of the Charter has 
been authorized by the UN Security Council specifically directed at NSAGs as in the case of 
Bosnian Serbs,
1984
 the UNITA organization in Angola,
1985
 and latterly in the case of the Al-
Qaeda organization based in Afghanistan.
1986
 The other exception to Article 2(4) is set out 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter which Provides: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall 
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. 
There are other conditions imposed upon states to ensure that the right to self-defence is not 
abused by the high contracting parties to the UN Charter. This is in light of the fact that, due 
to the so-called ‘until clause’ if the Security Council has taken steps to restore peace and 
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security, the right of self-defence by the state in question is suspended.
1987
 Secondly, states 
are required to report to the Security Council regarding their actions prompted by the use of 
force in self-defence and to provide it with evidence in support of their self-defence claim.
1988
 
The majority of scholars are of the opinion that failure to do so does not render the use of 
force unlawful, a position concurred by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case.
1989
 They agree, 
however, that the reporting requirement carries an evidential impact, in the sense that if a 
state were not to comply with it may indicate that it is not exercising its right to self-
defence.
1990
 State practice as will be discussed below in this regard is rather sketchy and 
proliferation of the use of force under the proviso of self-defence since the creation of the UN 
points to a prima facie disregard to the prohibition stipulated in Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
This is mainly due to the inadequacy of its preventive mechanism and its apparent 
insignificance in the realpolitik of international relations.
1991
 Nonetheless, it is worth 
mentioning that more often than not states have attempted to justify their action as exercise of 
the use of force in self-defence, which the following pronouncement by the ICJ in Nicaragua 
(Merits) case encapsulates the effect of such practice by states: 
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that 
the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such rules and that instances 
of state conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as 
breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a state acts 
in a way prima facie incompatible  with a recognized rule, but it defends its conduct by 
appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself,  then whether 
or not the state’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that 
attitude is to confirm rather than weaken the rule.
1992
 
There is no question that the above rule reinforces the validity of prohibition of the use of 
force in international law, however, it should be assessed according to the state practice prior 
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to the time of the judgment and the influence of the Cold War on such practices.
1993
 Writing 
in 1962 at the height of the Cold War, Fawcett even suggested that great powers may be 
precluded from using force in response to attacks from NSAGs, while smaller and weaker 
countries may suffer no such disability. He opines: ‘Armed bands … may constitute no threat 
at all to a powerful state but their operations may well amount to an ‘armed attack’ upon a 
militarily weak or unstable state.’1994 We should be reminded that the general debate among 
practitioners and scholars of international law regarding the use of force in that period mainly 
concentrated on the relationship between Article 2(4), the prohibition of the use of force and 
Article 51, the inherent right to self-defence purely in the context of inter-state relations.
1995
 
But it is debatable whether the abovementioned rule is still relevant in the light of the present 
state practice in the aftermath of the Cold War and the proliferation of the unilateral use of 
force implicitly practiced by states against NSAGs.
1996
 
 
4.9.6 The customary law requirement of necessity and proportionality 
 
All states are in agreement that the principles of necessity and proportionality are the basic 
core of self-defence.
1997
 The principles of necessity and proportionality are not mentioned in 
either Articles 2(4) or 51 of the UN Charter.
1998
 International law doctrine states that the use 
of force in self-defence is conditioned on these two principles and they are recognized as part 
of customary international law by the ICJ.
1999
 Moreover, these standards act as the checks and 
balances in terms of regulating states from halting or repelling of an armed attack and should 
not exceed its goal.
2000
 If the action taken by a state does not meet the above criteria then it 
would be construed as an unlawful reprisal as opposed to a lawful self-defence.
2001
 Although 
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often mentioned in tandem, the ICJ has typically applied them separately. One of the main 
prerequisites of the doctrine of necessity is that prior to the use of force every effort has been 
made for the peaceful resolution of the situation.
2002
  
The Caroline case provided guidelines as to when force could be utilized in self-defence.
2003
 
In reality the aforementioned case has been cited as one of the very first instances in which 
armed forces of a state took action against a non-state actor.
2004
 In 1837, Daniel Webster US 
Secretary of state elucidated a definition of self-defence that has subsequently evolved into 
customary international law.
2005
 Webster’s definition was based on the incident involving the 
Caroline, a US steam boat shipping supplies to Canadian insurgents fighting the British 
forces.
2006
 While the vessel was anchored within the US territorial water an armed band under 
the command of a British officer crossed the river and proceeded to set it on fire and let it 
drift over Niagara Falls. Replying to Lord Ashburton, Webster stated that the action taken by 
the British did not amount to self-defence since self-defence is only justified:  
If the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming and leaving no moment for 
deliberations. It will be for it to show, also, that … [it] did nothing unreasonable or 
excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence must be limited by 
necessity, and kept clearly within it.
2007
  
Webster was also of the opinion that Britain should have resorted to Diplomatic means rather 
than the military option which in his opinion was to be used as a last resort.
2008
 Furthermore, 
the abovementioned statement encapsulates the concept of necessity and proportionality 
regarding resorting to military force in self-defence.   
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In terms of necessity, as long as the aggressor continues its attack against the sovereign state 
the principle of necessity is swept aside, unless the UN Security Council takes action to 
remove the need for self-defence. Surely it is in the national interest of the aforementioned 
state to be able to exercise self-defence as a means of protecting itself.
2009
 This is especially 
true in relation to the involvement of a NSAG as the main aggressor and in such cases the 
very life of the nation could be imperiled. Necessity is commonly interpreted when there is 
no non-forcible alternative response possible.
2010
 This is a particularly critical criterion in the 
context of the use of force against NSAGs based in the neighboring state.
2011
 Since, it could 
be argued that in an inter-state conflict the assailed state could exhaust all diplomatic means 
and avenues prior to the use of force.
2012
 However, if one of the parties to the conflict is a 
NSAG, then such an option is not available.
2013
 Of course, as the last resort the assailed state 
can try to persuade the territorial state to prevent these attacks continuing by exercising its 
authority and safeguard its territorial integrity.
2014
 As in the case of Iraq over the last three 
decades, it has either been unable or reluctant to do so. As long as this option exists and has 
not been exploited, it could not be said that the requirement of necessity has been fulfilled.
2015
 
As Ago, Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission points out: 
The reason for stressing that action taken in self-defence must be necessary is that the 
state attacked (or threatened with immediate attack, if one admits preventive self-
defence) must not in the particular circumstances have had any means of halting the 
attack other than recourse to armed forces. In other words, had it been able to achieve 
the same result by measures not involving the use of the use of force, it would have no 
justification for adopting conduct which intervened the general prohibition against the 
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use of armed force. The point is self-evident and is generally recognized; hence it 
requires no further discussion.
2016
  
The second component of the doctrine of necessity is the requirement of immediacy 
according to which the time gap between the initial attack and the recourse to self-defence is 
reasonably short.
2017
 Immediacy means that there has to be a reasonable time lapse between 
the initial attack and the use of force in self-defence in response.
2018
 Immediacy ‘is thereby 
understood as referring to the temporal relation between the armed attack and the self-
defence response.’2019 The immediacy standard presented in the Caroline case of ‘no moment 
for deliberation’ has been described as too strict to be applied literally and it is more 
appropriate in the case of anticipatory self-defence rather than reacting after the initial armed 
attack has taken place.
2020
 It has been argued that ‘while immediacy serves as a core element 
of self-defence, it must be interpreted reasonably.’2021 State practice points to the fact that to 
take action in self-defence states may need time for deliberation as in the case of Argentine 
invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1981. Although, the UK asserted its right to self-defence 
immediately after the invasion on 02 April 1982, until the deployment of the British forces 
(due to the disance from the UK) and the beginning of the hostilities several weeks had 
lapsed.
2022
 In theory, the Security Council was empowered by the UN Charter to step in and 
prevent any possibility of any forcible self-defence. However, this has been far from the 
reality and in many occasions the UN Security Council has been reduced to a mere bye-
stander and has not been able to prevent escalation of armed conflict.
2023
 It was pointed out 
elsewhere that in the last six decades the Security Council has shown time and again a certain 
reluctance and inability to intervene and to identify the aggressor in a specific armed conflict 
mostly on the basis of political expediency.
2024
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Once forcible action in self-defence has taken place, the question that remains is what precise 
form it should take.
2025
 The proportionality criterion deals with the issue of how much force 
is permissible in self-defence even in the context of NSAGs based in the neighboring 
state.
2026
 According to international law, necessity is adjudged at the beginning of a defensive 
action whereas proportionality is observed as applying to the duration of the conflict. 
According to Gray those states that accept a right of anticipatory self-defence or self-defence 
against an accumulation of events will argue for a much wider scope of proportionality.
2027
  
Although there is no built-in geographical limitation as far as proportionality is concerned, 
actions of self-defence should be kept to the areas of attack that they are intended to 
prevent.
2028
 This issue was raised in the British response to the invasion of Falkland Islands 
by the Argentine forces that an all-out attack upon the Argentine mainland, beyond the 
primary area of the conflict by the British forces would have been disproportionate.
2029
 
Proportionality also means that the force used in self-defence should generally be 
proportionate to the gravity of the initial attack.
2030
 However, contrary to the proportionality 
standard in the IHL, ‘one must look at the force used in self-defence as a whole, rather than 
assessing each incident or attack individually’.2031 A final factor concerns the choice of 
targets of the defensive action.
2032
 According to Ruys:  
… The use of force must not only comply with the relevant rules of international 
humanitarian law (IHL), but must be adequate for the repelling of an armed attack. For 
this reason, it is not sufficient that the target is a legitimate military objective; it must 
also be connected with the force to be repelled.
2033
  
Hence, the exercise of self-defence must specifically target the source of the armed attack and 
not against the infrastructure and civilians of the state on whose territory the NSAG operates. 
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In the Oil Platform case, the US argued that the Iranian oil platforms constituted a legitimate 
target in self-defence since evidence showed that the platform collected intelligence 
regarding the passing vessels, acted as a military communication post coordinating Iranian 
Navy and served as actual bases to launch helicopter and small boat attacks on neutral 
commercial shipping.
2034
 Although, Iran admitted that some military personnel and 
equipment had been present on the platform, it stressed that their presence was a purely 
defensive measure.
2035
 However, the ICJ did not find the evidence submitted by the US 
convincing enough and held that the oil platform was not a legitimate target.
2036
 
 
4.9.7 The practice of states and the level of state support 
 
Even at the height of the Cold War there was evidence of state practice in which states 
regularly used force against NSAGs mounting cross-border guerrilla activities on their 
territory based on another state’s territory (more often than not a neighboring state).2037 The 
law of self-defence in its classical meaning only allows states to act in self-defence against 
another state or in the case of NSAGs if they are substantially involved with a state.
2038
 
Therefore, one of the most important factors of assessing the legitimacy of the use of force 
against NSAGs is the level of support granted to such organizations from the state from 
whose territory they launch their attacks. Under customary international law a state is allowed 
to defend itself against aggression emanating from the territorial sovereignty of another state 
as long as certain conditions were met. Firstly, that it is acting in self-defence; secondly, the 
attack is of grave nature (not an isolated incident); thirdly, the offending nation is complicit, 
unwilling, or unable to prevent further attacks; and finally, the attack is extensive and 
impending.
2039
 The state involvement has been categorized in three different ways.
2040
 Firstly 
the active support by a state to a NSAG which ‘aided and abetted’ them in the shape of 
providing training facilities, arming and tactical advice. This was indeed the most commonly 
used reasoning invoked by states against ‘indirect military aggression’.2041 This was the very 
justification for self-defence used by the French government when its troops attacked bases in 
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Tunisia in 1958, that it alleged were being used by insurgents to launch attacks on its colonial 
territory in Algeria during the civil war there.
2042
 Similarly, South Africa and Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) cited state support for taking measures in self-defence against bases in the 
neighboring states, which they alleged were aiding and facilitating the operations of national 
liberation movements challenging their legitimacy.
2043
  
The second category is the passive state support for NSAGs active on their territory in that 
the state concerned ‘knowingly harboring’ of armed groups, or the ‘unwillingness to prevent’ 
armed attacks.
2044
 The other known example of the alleged active support for insurgents was 
used by Israel, Portugal and the Apartheid regime in South Africa, prompting them to take 
defensive action against NSAGs operating from neighboring and other states.
2045
 A practice 
by Israel that persisted in the latter part of the twentieth century by attacking the PLO 
headquarters and alleged military bases in Tunisia in 1985,
2046
 and the first decade of the 
twenty-first century against the southern Lebanese NSAG, Hezbollah in 2006.
2047
 In 1976, 
Israel in rescuing its nationals from a hostage situation in Entebbe, Uganda, used the rationale 
that it relied on the narrow interpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as allowing it use 
of force due to the fact that the UN machinery was ineffective at the time.
2048
 Portugal 
throughout the 1960s and 70s, was accused by Guinea, Senegal and Zambia of armed 
invasions of part of their territories in what Portugal claimed its inherent right to self-defence 
against the so-called national liberation forces launching armed attacks on its colonial 
territories in Africa.
2049
 Significantly, both Israel and Portugal invariably accused the host 
states of being responsible for not preventing such armed attacks. In order to justify their 
action they felt the need to assert some degree of state involvement in the cross-border 
operations of the NSAGs concerned.
2050
  
The third level of connection between states and NSAGs relates to states that due to their 
weakness or lack of authority could not prevent their national territory from being used by 
NSAGs to launch armed attacks upon other states. It has been noticed that Israel was the first 
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state to use this legal justification as the basis for its use of armed force in self-defence 
specifically regarding her neighbors such as Lebanon in the early 1970s and 1980s, mainly 
due to a weak central Lebanese government that was unable to stop NSAGs launching armed 
attacks on Israeli territory.
2051
 Consequently, Israel asserted that if the aforementioned 
neighboring states were unable or unwilling to stop such activities, it would resort to the use 
of armed force in self-defence.
2052
 It is worth noting that since its creation in 1948, Israel has 
been beset by political controversy in some quarters within the international community 
accusing it of illegal occupation of certain territories namely the Palestinian territories under 
its control.
2053
 Israel since the 1960s and 70s has launched attacks in what it claims to be in 
exercise of its right to self-defence against military bases of NSAGs (such as inter alia the 
PLO) located in neighboring Arab states;
2054
 in particular Lebanon in 1967, and Jordan in 
1968,
2055
 the two countries Israel held responsible for not preventing armed attacks 
emanating from their territories. At the time, Israel was unanimously condemned by the 
Security Council.
2056
 Therefore, many states did not consider Israel’s claim to the use of force 
against such NSAGs as acceptable and lawful.
2057
 
The continuation of this policy by states mainly stems from the approach adopted by the ICJ 
in the Nicaragua case, in which the ICJ held that, in principle self-defence is permissible 
against irregular forces (NSAGs) in situations where there is substantial state involvement in 
the sending of those forces.
2058
 But claims by South Africa, Portugal and Israel to be acting in 
self-defence were never accepted by the UN Security Council.
2059
 South Africa also tried to 
rely on the novel doctrine of ‘hot pursuit’, a doctrine borrowed from the law of the sea in that 
it is within the rights of the coastal states to pursue a vessel guilty of offences in their 
territorial waters beyond their national jurisdiction.
2060
 Analogous to this South Africa 
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claimed the right to follow members of NSAGs into neighboring states.
2061
 The international 
community was unequivocal in rejection of this doctrine and in Resolution 568, the Security 
Council stated that it ‘denounces and reject racist South Africa’s practice of “hot pursuit” to 
terrorize and destabilize Botswana and other countries in southern Africa’. As a reaction to 
this, in line with the practice by Israel and Portugal, South Africa adopted the same argument 
that of the host states’ responsibility from whose territory NSAGs were operating from, for 
justification of its exercise of the use of force in self-defence.
2062
 Since the adoption of the 
UN Charter, it has been accepted that “armed attacks” included attacks by NSAGs for which 
states shared a certain degree of responsibility.
2063
 However, this is due to political 
considerations rather than on legal grounds, since according to Gray ‘these claims to self-
defence were undermined by the fact that the states invoking self-defence were regarded as 
being in illegal occupation of the territory they were purporting to defend.’2064  
The basis of the use of force in self-defence by Portugal on the other hand was to protect its 
colonial territories, a claim which was met with international condemnation in the light of 
Portugal’s complete breach of the doctrine of self-determination of peoples and its resultant 
process of decolonization. In the case of the Apartheid regime in South Africa not many 
states were prepared to accept her claim to self-defence because of its illegal occupation of 
Namibia and the fact that claims were made against incursions by SWAPO fighters seeking 
the liberation of Namibia.
2065
 The abovementioned examples were heavily influenced by the 
Cold War political considerations. However, in the post-Cold War period, accusations of 
active state support for NSAGs has remained the most plausible justification for the use of 
force in response to NSAGs.
2066
 Since then however, there have been many high profile 
incidences of cross-border attacks by a variety of NSAGs in the shape of irregular forces, 
which have prompted states to invoke their inherent right to self-defence according to Article 
51 of the Charter and on the basis of suffering an armed attack. 
                                                 
2061
 (1976) UNYB, p. 164; (1979) UNYB, p. 221; (1980) UNYB, p. 264; (1982) UNYB, p. 312-313; (1984) UNYB, 
p. 181; (1987) UNYB, p. 168; (1981) UNYB, p. 218; and (1986) UNYB, p. 162; see also I. Brownlie, 
‘International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands’, op. cit., p. 734.   
2062
 See E.K. Kwakwa, ‘South Africa’s May 1985 Military Incursions into Neighbouring African States’, 12 
Yale JIL (1987) 421.  
2063
 See I. Brownlie, ‘The Use of Force in Self-Defence’ (1961)37 BYBIL 245.  
2064
 Gray, ‘International Law and the Use of Force’, op. cit., p. 138. 
2065
 Namibia Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 16. 
2066
 Ruys & Verhoeven, ‘Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence’, op. Cit., p. 294.  
307 
 
In recent decades, there have been many examples of states justifying their use of force 
against NSAGs under the pretext of self-defence.
2067
 The following is evidence of the state 
practice in which the right of self-defence has been used as a pretext to justify the use of force 
in response to armed attacks instigated by NSAGs. As retaliation to the US Embassy 
Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 and in conformity with Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, the US administration launched bombing raids on a pharmaceutical plant in 
Sudan reportedley belonging to Al-Qaeda and its training camps in Afghanistan.
2068
 In 2002, 
Georgia complained to the Security Council of Russia’s attack upon its territory that it 
regarded as ‘barefaced aggression’ in violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.2069 
On its part, Russia denied such allegation, in spite of the fact that the incursions were 
independently verified by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
observers.
2070
 However, a year later, Russia also indicated that it might seek authorization of 
the UN in order to invoked Article 51 of UN Charter to take action against Chechen fighters 
based in the Pankisi Gorge, a part of the Georgian territory that the central government was 
apparently unable to exercise effective authority.
2071
   
In 2006 Israel invoked the right to self-defence as a reaction to missile attacks launched by 
Hezbollah, the NSAG based in southern Lebanon, informing the Security Council Israel 
stated that it: ‘reserves the right to act in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations and exercise of its right to self-defence when an armed attack is launched 
against a member of the United Nations.’2072 Nevertheless, it is important to point out that 
Israel in justification of its actions deemed it necessary to hold Lebanon responsible for the 
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‘Legal aspects of International Political Relations’, (1998) 52 Yearbook of the United Nations’, pp. 1209 & 
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and Sudan, 20 August 1998, in 93 AJIL (1999) 161; see also Lobel, ‘The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist 
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1998, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/155252.stm> 
2069
 See e.g. UN Doc S/2002/250, 8 March 2002; UN Doc S/2002/950, 23 August 2002; UN Doc UN Doc 
S/2002/1033; 15 September 2002; UN Doc S/2002/1035, 13 September 2002.  
2070
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Terrorist Actors’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 141, p. 154-55; Ruys, ‘Armed Attacks and Article 51 of the UN Charter’, op. 
cit., p. 465. 
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 Keesing's Record of World Events (2002) 44951-52; UN Doc S/2002/1012; UN Doc S/2002/854, 31 July 
2002; see also L. Moir, ‘Reappraising the Resort to Force: International Law, Jus ad Bellum and the War on 
Terror’, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 144. 
2072
 Identical letters dated 12 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council A/60/937-S/2006/515. 
308 
 
actions of Hezbollah on the basis that Hezbollah was part of the coalition government ruling 
Lebanon and accordingly, it was the responsibility of that state to control the activities of one 
of its coalition members.
2073
 The question of whether Hezbollah is a terrorist organization is 
of importance in the legal assessment of whether the exercise of the right of self-defence by 
Israel against that organization is legal within the current framework of international law. As 
can be observed from previous examples, the international community tends to soften its 
attitude towards self-defence if there is a clear evidence of persistent terrorist activities.
2074
 
Still, Israel opted to pin the blame firmly on the Lebanese government, a line of argument 
which provides extra credence to the approach traditionally adopted by the UN and the 
international community as a whole. In 2008 the Colombian Air Force launched an attack on 
a guerrilla camp belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) just 
inside the Ecuadorian territory under the pretext of a “legitimate exercise of self-defence”.2075 
In spite of the US guarded support for the operation, this military action by Colombia was 
censured by the majority of the Latin American countries that prompted the Organization of 
American State (OAS) to condemn it as: ‘a violation of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Ecuador and of principle of international law.’2076 It can be deduced from the 
above examples that although the ICJ has yet to address attacks instigated by NSAGs as a 
free-standing concept but the state practice points to the fact that such entities might be 
behind armed attacks, which would invoke the right to self-defence.  
 
4.9.8 State responsibility 
 
The ICJ has specifically examined the rules related to state responsibility for the activities of 
NSAGs in the Nicaragua and the Iran Hostages cases, and later by the ICTY in the Tadic 
                                                 
2073
 Indeed Hezbollah was a minority party in the Lebanese cabinet, where it held two ministerial portfolios 
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case.
2077
 In the Nicaragua case the ICJ held that a state must exercise “effective control” over 
the operation of a NSAG in order for the act of the group could be attributed to the state. 
Since even ‘financing, organizing, training, supplying, equipping’ and ‘the selection of its 
military and paramilitary targets and the planning of the whole of its operation” is not enough 
to meet the threshold.
2078
 Nevertheless, the ICTY in the Tadic case reached the conclusion 
that the “effective control” test set in the Nicaragua case was set too high as a threshold for 
holding a state responsible for acts of NSAGs. The majority in the Tadic case held that it is 
sufficient that a state has ‘a role in organizing, coordinating, or planning the military actions 
of the military group’ to be in “overall control” over these NSAGs.2079 It is worth noting that 
both “control” and the “acknowledgement” tests for state responsibility were included in the 
International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongful Acts.
2080
 According to Draft Article 8, ‘the conduct of a person or a group of 
persons shall be considered an act of a state if the person or group of persons is in fact acting 
on the specific instructions of the state or is under the direction or control of the state in 
carrying out the conduct.’ In the opinion of the ICJ the acid test is the existence of “effective” 
control or direction.
2081
 The other important point to be made is where a state explicitly 
acknowledges and adopts conduct by non-state actors as an extension of its own organs.
2082
 
The ICJ in the Iran Hostages case held that although the ‘direct’ responsibility of Iran for the 
original takeover of the US embassy in Tehran could not be proven,
2083
 but subsequent 
statements of support by the Iranian government for the hostage takers created liability on the 
part of the state. In other words, the ICJ suggested as in this case, a different possibility for 
the actions of NSAGs to be accountable to a state if the state in question acknowledges and 
adopts such actions ex post facto.
2084
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4.9.9 Can NSAGs instigate an armed attack? 
 
Nowadays, there is a considerable controversy in relation to whether attacks carried out by 
NSAGs qualify as “armed attacks” according to Article 51 of the Charter sufficient to trigger 
the right of self-defence.
2085
 In the past there were scholars who argued that the phrase 
‘armed attack’ in Article 51 ‘regardless of the source’ can only mean an armed attack 
instigated by a state.
2086
 This traditional view is encapsulated by Ian Brownlie writing in 1963 
that: 
Since the phrase “armed attack” strongly suggests a trespass it is very doubtful if it 
applies to the case of aid to revolutionary groups and forms of annoyance which do not 
involve offensive operations by the forces of a state. Sporadic operations by armed 
bands would also seem to fall outside the concept of “armed attack.2087  
In recent decades, however, the most pressing question for the international community in 
relation to legality of use of force in self-defence has been focused on the issue of cross-
border activities of NSAGs in the shape of irregular forces launching attacks from the safe 
haven of another state. The additional question that arises is what degree of state involvement 
if any is necessary for it to be considered an armed attack due to NSAGs lacking ratione 
personae in international law.
2088
 Traditionally, for a state to claim the right to self-defence, it 
must have suffered an armed attack of grave level upon its territory by another state, 
characterized by territorial intrusions, human casualties as well as considerable destruction of 
property beyond that of the use of force simpliciter.
2089
 The ICJ, held that occupation of the 
US embassy and consular premises in Tehran by the hardline Iranian students amounted to an 
armed attack,
2090
 ‘even if it is not certain that the Court intended to equate it with the term 
“armed attack” under Article 51.’2091 The ICJ in the Nicaragua case used the definition of 
aggression to acts committed by regular armed forces across an international border, but also 
‘the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
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 I. Brownlie, ‘International Law and the Use of Force by States’, p. 278-79; see also Quincy Wright, 
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which carry out acts of armed force of such gravity as to amount to (inter alia) an actual 
armed attack conducted by regular armed forces, or its substantial involvement therein’.2092 
However, the ICJ did not elucidate on the precise meaning of ‘substantial involvement.’ The 
travaux preparatoires of the resolution indicates that logistical support and a fortiori the 
harboring or tolerating of NSAG’s actions was considered inadequate.2093 In other words, the 
ICJ in the above case was primarily concerned with whether there was a state involvement 
which subsequently gives rise to the right of self-defence rather than considering a stand-
alone action of a NSAG that would amount to an armed attack. 
As discussed earlier, the language of this provision provides a clear exception to the 
proscription of Article 2(4) in which use of force is allowed in self-defence in reaction to an 
armed attack. Unlike other Articles in the UN Charter, Article 51 does not stipulate 
specifically the nature of the entity that commits the offending armed attack and the fact that 
it should necessarily be a state.
2094
 Hence, it could be argued that by implication an armed 
attack could be perpetrated by NSAGs.
2095
 Moreover, there is also nothing in the travaux 
preparatoires of the charter to indicate that meaning of ‘armed attack’,2096 nor does the text 
of Article 51 limit the extent of “armed attacks” to the acts of state agents.2097 It has been 
argued by some that due to the predominance of inter-state conflicts and the state-centric 
nature of international law this may have seemed to the drafters of the Charter as self-evident 
in 1945.
2098
 With the two World Wars as the backdrop, the drafters envisaged large-scale 
attacks by the regular forces of one state against another rather than attacks by NSAGs.
2099
 
Undoubtedly, the most important aspect of Article 51 is that, for a state to act in self-defence 
it must have suffered (or some argue about to suffer) an armed attack upon its territory.
2100
 
The notion of an armed attacked according to the Charter has been interpreted as a 
qualitatively grave use of force. In the Nicaragua case the ICJ has famously distinguished 
between ‘less grave’ and ‘the most grave form of the use of force’. In the context of Article 
51.
2101
 This is also apparent from the reference of the ICJ to the definition of aggression, 
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adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974,
2102
 that the ICJ regarded as ‘to reflect 
customary international law’2103, and used it as a benchmark to establish the existence of an 
armed attack.
2104
 Consequently, gravity of the conflict has to reach a de minis threshold 
stipulated in Articles 2 and 3(g) of the aforementioned definition of aggression, an approach 
justified in the light of state practice.
2105
 According to Gray ‘states do not today challenge the 
view that actions by irregulars can constitute armed attack; the controversy center on the 
degree of state involvement that is necessary to make the actions attributable to the state and 
to justify action in self-defence in particular cases’.2106  
As discussed earlier, there exists a school of thought that an armed attack can only take place 
if instigated by a state and the right to self-defence can only be invoked by an attack by a 
state or the NSAG acting on behalf of one.
2107
 This view was propagated by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case in which it held that there has to be a correlation between an armed attack 
instigated by a NSAG and its involvement with a state rather than dealing with the issue of an 
armed attack initiated by a NSAG as a free-standing concept. The decision in the Nicaragua 
case has subsequently been heavily criticized mostly by Anglo-Saxon scholars who regretted 
the fact that the Court limited the permitted self-defence to cases where the NSAG had been 
sent by another state hence leaving afflicted states no room for protection.
2108
  Further, in the 
opinion of the present author it is not safe to rely completely on the Nicaragua judgment 
since the ICJ in that case was concerned inter alia with the support of the Sandinista regime 
for the rebels fighting the El Salvador government and to what degree this involvement with 
the rebels amounted to an armed conflict, thus, triggering the right to self-defence against 
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Nicaragua.
2109
 However, in regard to legality of use of force against NSAGs, the position 
maintained by the ICJ is understandable since as the very bastion of international law as a 
positivist legal system basically about the relations of states, perhaps it considers allowing the 
use of force against non-state actors without any other state’s connection as providing states 
with a carte blanch to use force against such entities more liberally. Indeed, this conservative 
approach has been criticized even by certain Judges within the ICJ.
2110
 
 Following its decision in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ has considered the concept of armed 
attack, in the case of Oil Platforms,
2111
 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC 
v Uganda),
2112
 and in brief and obscure passage in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
Consequences of a Wall on the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
2113
 In the latter, the ICJ 
adopted a very conservative approach in dealing with the issue of self-defence and kept clear 
of the most controversial issues in relation to NSAGs.
2114
 Nevertheless, the ICJ in the 
Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Palestinian 
Territory reiterated that ‘Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent 
right of self-defence in the case of an armed attack by one state against another state’.2115 
This line of reasoning was maintained albeit with less clarity by the ICJ in the case of 
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda
2116
 in which the Court again was principally 
considering whether the armed attacks could be attribute to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and once it reached a negative conclusion, it did not deal with the potential claim of 
self-defence against NSAGs.
2117
 It held: 
… The Court finds that the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of a right of 
self-defence by Uganda against DRC were not present. Accordingly, the Court has no 
need to respond to the contentions of the Parties as to whether and under what 
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conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defence against 
large-scale attacks by irregular forces.
2118
    
However, correctly in the opinion of the present author Judge Higgins in her separate opinion 
in the Advisory Opinion on the Wall notes that ‘there is with respect, nothing in the text of 
Article 51 that thus stipulates that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is 
made by a state.’2119 A similar line of argument was also expressed in the separate opinion of 
Judge Kooijmans and in the Declaration of Judge Buergenthal in which they expressed their 
disappointment in the manner in which the Court was unable to come to terms with the fact 
that indeed armed attacks can be perpetrated by NSAGs.
2120
 Their position on this issue is 
also shared with a considerable number of scholars who are of the opinion that based on the 
factual evidence in recent decades an armed attack could be perpetrated by NSAGs and as a 
result invoking the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
2121
 In his 
dissenting judgment in DRC v. Uganda Judge Kooijmans lamented the fact that the ICJ 
maintained the same line of reasoning that claims of self-defence can only be examined if 
there is a connection (directly or indirectly) to a state. This approach according to him was 
rather erroneous since: 
… If attacks by the irregulars would, because of their scale and effects, have had to be 
classified as an armed attack had they been carried out by regular armed forces, there is 
nothing in the language of Article 51 of the Charter that prevents the victim state from 
exercising its inherent right of self-defence … If armed attacks are carried out by 
irregular bands from such territory against a neighboring state, they are still armed 
attacks even if they cannot be attributed to the territorial state. It would be unreasonable 
to deny the attacked state the right to self-defence merely because there is no attacker 
state, and the Charter does not so require. 
In this regard, it is clear that the approach adopted by Judge Kooijmans is a fair reflection of 
the reality supported by state practice.
2122
 In recent decades many states have resorted to 
extraterritorial use of force under the pretext of self-defence against NSAG operating from 
the safe haven of another state. The aforementioned Caroline case which set the parameters 
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of the right of self-defence under customary international law has been described as one of 
the first examples of attack instigated by a non-state entity. As Greenwood opines:  
... The famous Caroline dispute, itself shows that an armed attack need not emanate 
from a state. The threat in the Caroline case came from a non-state group of the kind 
most would call terrorist today. The United States was not supporting the activities of 
that group and certainly could not be regarded as responsible for their act. Yet, in the 
correspondence or in the subsequent reliance on the Webster formula on self-defence is 
it suggested that this fact might make a difference and that the Webster formula might 
not apply to armed attacks that did not emanate from a state.
2123
  
It is quite apparent that even in the pre-Charter era the concept of self-defence as reaction to 
armed attacks perpetrated by NSAGs were recognized by states.
2124
 Already in the Security 
Council in Resolutions 405 and 419 (1977) has referred to ‘an act of armed aggression’ 
instigated by mercenaries against the state of Benin, without alluding to any state 
involvement.
2125
 Article 1 of the Abuja Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, adopted 
by the African Union specifically refers to aggression committed by the ‘non-state actors’.2126 
More recently, another important development in this regard is the adoption at the ICC 
Review Conference in Kampala in June 2010 of a resolution, amending the ICC Rome 
Statute by rendering explicit the ‘Element of Crime’ of the ‘crime of aggression’ and by 
identifying the different ways in which the International Criminal Court could in principle 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime.
2127
 This also brings us to the issue of customary 
international law in relation to necessity, proportionality and immediacy (‘instant, 
overwhelming’, ‘no moment for deliberation’) as well as unavailability of other means 
(‘leaving no choice of means’) are clearly imbedded in the Caroline formula of self-
defence.
2128
 Higgins thus encapsulates the problem facing the challenge of dealing with 
NSAGs on their doorstep:  
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By adopting the unsatisfactory definition in the General Assembly aggression resolution, and 
proclaiming it customary international law, the Court appears to have selected criteria that are 
operationally unworkable. When a state has to decide whether it can repel incessant low-
intensity irregular military activity, does it really have to decide whether that activity is the 
equivalent of an armed attack by a foreign army-and anyway, is not any use of force by a 
foreign army entitled to be met by sufficient force to require it to withdraw? Or is that now in 
doubt also? Is the question of the level of violence by regular forces not really an issue of 
proportionality, rather than a question of determining what is an ‘armed attack?2129 
 
4.9.10 Self-defence against armed attacks by NSAGs after the September 11 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the defining moment which dispelled any lingering doubts 
concerning application of Article 51 of the UN Charter to NSAGs was the unanimous outrage 
of the international community in the wake of the abhorrent attacks of 11 September 2001 on 
the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
2130
 The atrocities were committed by the Al Qaeda 
terrorist organization operating within Afghanistan under the protection of its de facto 
government of Taliban.
2131
 Consequently, the aforementioned terrorist attacks led to a 
fundamental reappraisal of the law on self-defence especially in relation to NSAGs.
2132
 In 
spite of some backtracking by some traditionalist observers,
2133
 it cannot be denied that even 
those who regard as problematic the categorization of terrorist action quo an armed attack 
(within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter) would have to concede that the 
response of the international community to 9/11 has had a lasting influence on customary 
international law.’2134 In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1368 (2001)
2135
 and in Resolution 1373 (2001),
2136
 in which it is unequivocally 
reaffirmed ‘the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter’, without specifically mentioning the expression “armed attack”.2137 The significance 
of Security Council Resolution 1368 is that for the first time, it implicitly affirmed the right 
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of self-defence in response to terrorist attacks.
2138
 Moreover, the North Atlantic Council 
(NATO) invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that ‘attacks on one or 
more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered against them all.’2139 This 
was followed by the Organization of American States (OAS) which according to the 1947 
(Rio de Janeiro) Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance stated that ‘these terrorist 
attacks against the United States of America are attacks against all American States.’2140 Both 
the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
accepted that the 11 September attacks amounted to an armed attack, giving the US the right 
to react in self-defence.
2141
 As a reflection of unanimity within the international community 
Russia, China and Japan all gave their unreserved support to military action.
2142
 Of course, 
the US invoked the right of self-defence in Article 51 of the Charter as the legal basis for its 
military operation Enduring Freedom against Al-Qaeda and its patron the Taliban the de 
facto government of Afghanistan, asserting:  
‘In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right to individual and 
collective self-defence, United States armed forces have initiated actions designed to 
prevent and deter further attacks on the United States. These actions include measures 
against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan.’2143  
As a consequence, the emerging debate is now somewhat erroneously concentrated on the 
right of self-defence by states (mainly the US and its allies) against transnational armed 
individuals (namely Al-Qaeda) who were seemingly being harbored by the so-called rogue 
states such as Afghanistan and Sudan and in recent years with no specific abode.
2144
 Because 
of the nature and structure of Al-Qaeda as a NSAG this can be described as a very unique 
situation that cannot be replicated by any other NSAGs around the world. It is submitted that 
the events of 11 September 2001, committed by a unique trans-national organization namely 
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Al-Qaeda without a permanent base anywhere has provided a false perception regarding this 
vital issue.
2145
 It is worth mentioning that the vast majority of UN members expressed their 
support for the military operation.
2146
 Buoyed by this development, many states in recent 
years have taken advantage of an apparent assumption that there has been a broadening of the 
right of self-defence against NSAGs which launch cross-border attacks and are engaged in 
military operation against them.
2147
 
As observed above, the international community in the past has shied away from addressing 
the legality of the use of force against NSAGs particularly based in a neighboring state as 
free-standing concept. In spite of the ambiguous language of Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
purely ‘private’ attacks have been excluded from its remit.2148 The ICJ on its part has so far 
adopted a restrictive approach to the issue. In fact, the highest Court in the world as we have 
observed has passed over many opportunities in recent cases to address the issue at hand. In 
the Nicaragua case, the ICJ acquiesced that Article 51 did apply as long as there existed a 
close nexus between the NSAGs with a state. However, in light of recent state practice as it 
has developed in the last quarter of a century and considerable number of military 
interventions against NSAGs support, a more liberal interpretation of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter is given.
2149
 It has been observed that undeniably:  
If we look inter alia at the US interventions in Afghanistan (1998 and 2001) and Sudan 
(1998), the Israeli intervention in Lebanon (2006) and the Turkish intervention in 
northern Iraq (2007-8), or at the opinio juris expressed by states such as the US, Russia, 
Australia, France, the Netherlands, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Iran, it is difficult to avoid 
the impression that both state practice and opinio juris have undergone important shifts 
since 1986, and especially since 2001.
2150
   
It is important to point out that even in occasions that states claim to have the right to self-
defence against NSAGs somewhat curiously insist on establishing a link between the NSAG 
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and the state on whose territory the defensive measure has taken place.
2151
 Even more 
powerful states such as the US who exercise the doctrine of self-defence more readily are 
perfectly aware that ultimately they would have to find a connection between the harboring 
state and the NSAG based on its territory. Likewise, Israel in its conflict against Hezbollah 
made it absolutely clear that it held Lebanon ultimately responsible for the NSAG’s 
aggression upon its territory.
2152
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Conclusion   
 
The aim of this study has been to outline and analyse the current legal framework of 
international law which endeavours to regulate the military activities of non-state armed 
groups (NSAGs), specifically in regards to Kurdish NSAGs since the end of World War I. It 
had as its main aim to establish whether the legal framework was sound in theory and applied 
in practice. It is the belief of the present author that the use of the Kurdish microcosm has 
provided a beneficial tool to illustrate any shortcomings or achievements of international law 
in dealing with NSAGs. A number of conclusions can be ascertained from the above analysis 
and a number of recommendations have been made thereon.   
 
Until the nineteenth century the Kurds had been divided between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Persian Empires of Safavi and Qajar, all of which were known for their ethnic pluralism. The 
aforementioned empires ruled their Kurdish populations through a feudal system and a chain 
of semi-independent principalities. Since the end of World War I, the collapse of Ottoman 
Empire and the creation of the modern Middle East the Kurdish issue has been a permanent 
feature of international relations. The genesis of the Kurdish problem is traced back to 1920 
Treaty of Sevres in which the Great Powers gave assurances to the Kurdish population of the 
former Ottoman empire of having the opportunity to establish their own independent state. 
Owing to the rise of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Treaty of Sevres was never ratified. By the 
time the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 (replacing the Treaty of Sevres) was ratified there were 
no provisions for an independent Kurdish state and the aspirations of achieving their right to 
self-determination were no longer attainable.  
 
Hence, the Kurds found themselves under the hegemony of three nationalistic and militaristic 
regimes in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. The Kurds had to assimilate to a single identity imposed 
upon them. As a consequence of living under such regimes the Kurds had no legal 
recognition or protection according to the respective constitutions of those states. The Kurds 
were denied not only the right to establish an independent state, but to achieve even a 
measure of autonomy over their language and culture was a clear manifestation of denial of 
their right to self-determination, even within the existing borders. It is important to point out 
that the main obstacle in achieving a united Kurdistan has been the apparent division within 
different Kurdish communities spread over the three sovereign states. Over the last hundred 
years this disunion has been reinforced by the borders of their host states. The failure of 
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international law to accommodate Kurdish self-determination has resulted in continuous state 
repression, manifesting itself at times in systematic and gross violations of human rights.    
 
In particular, the Kurdish population of Turkey suffered the harshest treatment under the 
Kemalist regime. The suppression of the Kurdish identity in Turkey has been a lot more 
virulent than experienced by the Kurds in Iraq and Iran. Inevitably, such suppression of 
Kurdish identity resulted in major armed revolts in the pre-1945 period in which the Kurds 
rose up against the authoritarian regimes resulting in many thousands of civilian casualties 
and forced mass migration of Kurdish populations. In some instances, which have been 
highlighted by the study, the actions taken by the states, tantamount to ethnic cleansing and 
genocide of the Kurdish population. Ever since, the concept of armed conflict has been 
synonymous with the Kurds and their relationship with their host states.  
 
In the period prior to 1945 such armed revolts against central administrations were purely 
internal matters for the sovereign states and not the concern of international law. It is 
significant to point out that at the time in spite of their political and historical differences the 
three sovereign states worked in unison to thwart any Kurdish ambitions. The Treaty of 
Saadabad of 1937 is a manifestation of this unanimity between the states to ensure co-
operation in tackling Kurdish armed revolts.  
 
The study has established that prior to the creation of the United Nations and codification of 
international law in 1945, the sovereign states under consideration took military action 
against the Kurds with impunity. In the period prior to 1945, Kurdish NSAGs were based on 
hierarchical tribal structure invariably led by a prominent figurehead at the helm but crucially 
devoid of any clear political agendas.  
 
In contrast, the Kurdish groups in the post-1945 era were at least in name left-wing but still 
organized heavily on tribal basis. The failure to establish a state by the Kurdish Mahabad 
republic of 1945-46, proved to the Kurds that in step with so many other NSAGs around the 
world they had to develop a political agenda as well as maintaining their military capabilities. 
As a consequence, they became much more organized structurally and politically. This is of 
great relevance since the end of World War II, NSAGs globally and in Kurdistan in 
particular, have been the most significant and prevalent non-state actors in contemporary 
politics and armed conflict. This manifested itself in the emergence of organizations such as 
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KDP and PUK in Iraq, KDP-I in Iran and in the latter part of the twentieth century the PKK 
in Turkey and its affiliate PJAK in Iran. All the above-mentioned organizations now pursue a 
dual strategy of political and military agendas.  
 
The post-1945 era also heralded the emergence of the Cold War. At the height of the Cold 
War Kurdish NSAGs in Iraq and Iran were reduced to mere pawns in the super powers chess 
game. Both the Soviet Union and the United States pursued a policy of covert support and 
sponsorship for Kurdish NSAGs in some case pitting them against one another.   
 
In order to trace the development of traditional international law in relation to NSAGs the 
concepts of rebellion, insurgency and belligerency were examined. Recognition of 
belligerency was the very first mandatory application of humanitarian standards to be applied 
to internal armed conflicts. Traditionally, the limited regulations of non-international armed 
conflicts were based on non-intervention in domestic jurisdiction of states in particular where 
their national sovereignty and political authority was at stake.  
 
However, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were the first international law instruments to 
specifically deal with ‘armed conflicts not of an international character’. Through Common 
Article 3, it substantially revised the formalistic and de jure approach of the recognition of 
belligerency, replacing it with a modern legal system to regulate the conduct of hostilities in 
both international and non-international armed conflict. Common Article 3, a somewhat 
minimalistic measure to deal with such conflicts, was the very by-product of this process. 
This was in spite of the recommendation of the International Committee of Red Cross in 
1948 to adopt a single definition of armed conflict upon which the whole corpus of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) would be applicable, regardless of the dichotomy 
between international and non-international armed conflicts.  
 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 famously did not define ‘armed conflict’. Under the 
Geneva Conventions, an international armed conflict arises between ‘two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties’. According to Article 2, the Conventions are limited to application in 
war and armed conflict. Consequently, the existence of an armed conflict to this day depends 
very much by the facts on the ground rather than on a formal definition. Moreover, there is no 
independent body that could impartially determine the legal nature of an armed conflict, 
whether it is of international, non-international or merely a situation of civil disturbance.  
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This study has endeavoured to ascertain whether the so-called ‘internal’ armed conflicts 
involving Kurdish NSAGs frequently defy designation as purely internal matters. It is 
concluded that almost all of the armed conflicts taking place between the Kurdish NSAGs 
and their host states have been internal armed conflicts. This is significant since the very 
nature of the armed conflict in question determines the application of IHL. In other words, 
the conflicts in Kurdistan were purely civil wars in spite of the transnational nature of 
Kurdish NSAGs activities.  
 
It is still a striking feature of internal armed conflicts and situations of lower intensity of 
internal strife that states enjoy the discretion of criminalizing both recourse to force and the 
conduct of hostilities by NSAGs. It is submitted that such NSAGs are heavily reliant on 
assistance of another state and without such support would not be able to survive. For years 
the PKK was supported, financed and harboured by Syria. Otherwise, it could not have been 
able to engage the Turkish army for such a long period. There is no question that all the 
Kurdish NSAGs under consideration have also enjoyed popular support within the 
communities they operate in. However, since the defeat of the PKK militarily in the middle 
of 1990s and its resort to urban terrorist tactics its popular support has somewhat dwindled.    
 
The last twenty years has witnessed the law regulating internal armed conflict going through 
a remarkable revolution. Another major development in this regard is the recognition of 
serious violations of IHL amount to war crimes. This breakthrough came about as a result of 
the end of the Cold War and recognition by the international community that the commission 
of serious violations of humanitarian norms in internal armed conflicts entail individual 
criminal responsibility. This is mainly due to the significant contribution made by 
international judicial institutions such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and ultimately by virtue of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is still some ambiguity surrounding the precise 
determination of an internal armed conflict, it is submitted that a consolidated definition of 
internal armed conflict has taken shape. There is no question that in an internal armed 
conflict, Common Article 3 and customary law principles regulate internal armed conflicts 
within a state. In contrast, Additional Protocol II has not as yet attained customary status and 
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because of its high threshold of applicability and non-ratification by some of the major 
military nations such as the United States, Russia and Israel, it can be argued that the Protocol 
has lost its importance. Furthermore, none of the states of Turkey, Iraq and Iran have ratified 
the Additional Protocols. For Additional Protocol II to apply to situations of armed conflict of 
non-international nature the state on whose territory the armed conflict is taking place should 
have ratified it. The prerequisite of holding a part of the state’s territory by the NSAG makes 
Additional Protocol II doubly difficult to adhere to. In fact, there are not many NSAGs 
around the globe that can satisfy this criterion. For example, there is no doubt that at the 
height of the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army in the late 1980s and 1990s the 
intensity of conflict reached the threshold stipulated in Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions. Therefore, because of its customary status in international law both parties to 
the conflict were bound by Common Article 3. On the other hand, because of Turkey’s non-
ratification, Additional Protocol II did not apply to the conflict. In contrast, in relation to the 
on-going conflict involving the PKK and PJAK in Turkey and Iran respectively, the intensity 
of armed action does reach the level of internal armed conflict, therefore, the conflict would 
be regulated by international human rights law (IHRL) and Turkish and Iranian criminal 
justice systems. 
 
In general, all of the Kurdish NSAGs claim that their armed struggle is the exercise of their 
right to self-determination. The right of people to self-determination is enshrined in 
international law by virtue of the UN Charter. The issue of exercising the right to self-
determination is of great significance since according to Article 1(4) of the Protocol I the 
wars of liberation are now internationalized. If that is the case, combatants are no longer 
considered as terrorists as long as they comply with IHL and they are exercising their right to 
self-determination. Therefore, Protocol I decriminalizes acts that could have previously been 
considered as terrorism. Indeed, it is to the benefit of NSAGs in general to convince the 
international community that the on-going armed conflict is either internationalized or 
international in nature, and therefore IHL applies in its entirety. It is the finding of this study 
that the issue of the exercise of the right to self-determination and its resultant wars of 
national liberation do not apply to the Kurdish NSAGs engaged in conflicts against the 
sovereign states under consideration. This is in light of the fact that none of the states 
concerned are practicing colonial domination, or are alien occupiers or racist regimes.  
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Although the right to self-determination is established in international law and theory, it is 
argued that with the near ending of decolonization processes, the right to self-determination is 
no longer internationally supported. However, recent events in East Timor and Kosovo prove 
that the most important factor in achieving the right to self-determination is whether the 
people in question can garner the support of the international community and more 
importantly the permanent members of the UN Security Council by not making use of their 
veto right. This is the kind of support that the Kurds have never enjoyed.  
 
Since the creation of the United Nations and the codification of international law, IHRL has 
had profound influence on international law in general and the laws of war in particular. The 
maxim of hominum causa omne ius constitutum (all law is created for the benefit of human 
beings) encapsulates the very raison d’etre of IHRL and IHL. It was utilized by the ICTY in 
the Tadic Jurisdiction decision to indicate the influence of international human rights 
standards upon IHL. This approach is also backed by state practice highlighting the 
complementary and mutually reinforcing nature of IHRL and IHL. The framework of IHRL 
which has been analysed in this work applies at all times even in situations of armed conflict. 
However, should the circumstances amount to an armed conflict then the instruments of IHL 
can affect the interpretation and obligations of IHRL.  
 
There is an undoubted convergence between IHRL and IHL in which IHRL acts as a gap-
filler in those areas not regulated by IHL, particularly in the case of non-international armed 
conflicts. Although there is uncertainty regarding the relationship between IHL and IHRL, it 
is generally accepted that problems of application and interaction caused by overlapping of 
the two paradigms are decided by the maxim of lex specialis. It is widely believed that in 
times of armed conflict IHL is Lex specialis vis-à-vis IHRL. This maxim is best illustrated in 
situations of internal armed conflict in which one must apply the rule that provides the 
optimum level of protection for combatants and civilians alike.  
 
The manifestation of the importance of IHRL is the role played by human rights 
organizations in contemporary armed conflicts particularly in relation to internal armed 
conflict. The pivotal role played by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the very 
guardian of promotion and protection of human rights globally, is of particular significance. 
In recent decades, the UNHRC has been active in promoting the protection of civilians in 
contemporary armed conflicts. Another organization of note is the European Court of Human 
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Rights which in recent years has been very active in interpretation and application of IHL to 
internal-armed conflicts including the conflict in southeast Turkey.  
 
It is worth noting that human rights law has more advanced procedural safeguards for the 
protection of individual rights than humanitarian law, especially in regards to the right to an 
individual remedy. Since Turkey accepted in 1990 the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights to hear individual claims, the European Court of Human Rights has found 
Turkey guilty of many violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The fact that Turkey is bound by the ECHR provides an effective remedy for its Kurdish 
populations to exploit beyond the domestic legal system. Of course, such a remedy is not 
available to the Kurds in Iran and Iraq since those states are not party to the ECHR, nor are 
they availed such legal recourse under public international law.         
 
In recent years, the issue of terrorism has dominated the international political discourse. Yet, 
in condemning terrorism as unjustifiable, some states vehemently maintain that some 
violence in pursuit of just causes are justifiable and does not constitute terrorism. Even some 
developing states are of the opinion that in pursuit of a just cause all possible means are 
justified. The uncertainty in regards to the issue of terrorism stems mainly from inability of 
the international community to arrive at a universally accepted definition of terrorism. 
Whereas ‘inner core’ of terrorism, such as indiscriminate attacks upon civilians can never be 
justified, the ‘outer core’ of terrorism, such acts that would not be contrary to IHL if 
committed by state armed forces in armed conflict can be more susceptible to justification.  
 
Prior to the PKK’s armed campaign against the Turkish state none of the Kurdish NSAGs in 
the three states under consideration resorted to urban terrorist tactics. This modus operandi is 
now favoured by many such NSAGs faced with much superior state armed forces. As a 
result, the blurring of the dividing line between armed conflict and other forms of violence 
highlights the difficulty of maintaining a distinction between terrorism and genuine armed 
conflict. Therefore, it has become a very difficult task to distinguish between what is justified 
violence and isolated terrorist acts. This issue was in sharp focus particularly in the aftermath 
of the terrorist attacks upon the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 
and its resultant ‘global war on terror’.  
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Where politician and the media refer to the ‘global war on terror’, this can be misleading 
since the term ‘war’ is used to emphasise the political importance of counter-terrorism, rather 
than referring to any specific international or non-international armed conflict. It is submitted 
that the use of criminal justice system to prevent terrorism is not a ‘war’ to which IHL 
applies. In reality, in the aftermath of the launch of ‘global war on terror’, states more readily 
brand any NSAG as terrorist regardless of their cause and legitimacy. The best example of 
this trend is that both the PKK and its Iranian affiliate PJAK are listed as proscribed 
organizations by the European Union, NATO and US State Department. It has to be 
acknowledged that the listing of these organizations took place in the aftermath of 11 
September 2001 attacks mainly due to the political pressure from the US and its ally Turkey. 
It is the belief of the present author that if the international community is not to become 
complicit in repression of legitimate political resistance, a more coherent and comprehensive 
definition of terrorism by international community would go a long way to make a clear 
distinction between illegitimate violent terrorism and legitimate armed resistance.      
 
The extraterritorial use of force by a state against a NSAG based in another state raises a 
number of legal issues. In recent years, both Turkey and Iran have launched attacks upon 
military bases allegedly belonging to the PKK and PJAK in northern Iraq. However, neither 
of the states in recent years has informed the UN Security Council a pre-requisite of article 51 
of the UN Charter. This is quite a departure from previous practice by Iran. In fact, during the 
1980s and 1990s, Iran expressly invoked self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter as a 
justification and regularly informed the UN Security Council of its armed reprisals against 
Kurdish NSAG based in northern Iran. In contrast, Turkey has never expressly invoked 
article 51 in relation to its operations in northern Iraq.  
 
It has to be stated that the situation in northern Iraq is a very unique one. This is where the 
PKK and PJAK launch their attacks on the Turkish and Iranian territories. Turkey and Iran 
maintain that it is within their right to defend their respective territories from what they 
describe as terrorist attacks. In recent years, Turkey and Iran have stressed their 
determination to take measures to protect their legitimate security interest, defending their 
borders and protecting their citizens from attacks from the aforesaid NSAGs. The most 
significant aspect of these operations is that the international community has refrained from 
condemning Turkey and Iran for these actions which clearly violates the sovereignty of Iraq. 
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In fact, Turkey a member of NATO in many occasions has been supported by the US for its 
anti-terrorist operations against the PKK.  
 
In general, according to international law it is illegal for a state to use force against another 
state even if the territory of the latter has been used by a NSAG to attack the former. Forcible 
use of force against another state violates the fundamental prohibition on use of force set out 
in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Unless, it could be established that the sending state has 
aided and abetted the NSAG in preparation and commissioning of the attack, the afflicted 
state cannot rely on the right to self-defence according to Article 51 of the UN Charter. This 
view is supported by a series of judgments handed down by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). However, the customary rules regarding the use of force against NSAG based in the 
territory of another state have developed in a different direction. The study has established 
that there is now an emerging international state practice that allows sovereign states to act in 
self-defence in response to attacks, even if these attacks are committed only by NSAGs 
particularly bases in another state.  
 
The emergence of this process was very much in evidence in the aftermath of the Operation 
Enduring Freedom in 2001, especially in regard to the universal support it received from the 
international community. Therefore, it is safe to assume that in light of the state practice and 
opinio juris, there is extensive evidence that there is a clear tendency to allow states to act in 
self-defence in response to attacks instigated by a NSAG. This deduction does not mean that 
no connection has to be established between the state using force in self-defence and the state 
the NSAG is using as a hideout. This link according to recent state practice is required by the 
condition of the law of self-defence. It serves to demonstrate that the harbouring state is 
either unable or unwilling to stop the NSAG launching attacks upon the victim state. 
Therefore, it becomes a necessity for the victim state to take action in order to protect itself. 
Recent state practice also offers some indication regarding the level of gravity that an attack 
must reach to trigger the right of self-defence and the proportionality of the action in self-
defence.        
 
As discussed above, in recent years in countering the collective threat of the PKK and PJAK, 
Turkey and Iran have co-ordinated their military operations in northern Iraq. It is submitted 
that Iran’s military action in northern Iraq violates the territorial integrity of Iraq and it is 
deemed as illegal. This conclusion is based on the fact that there has never been any armed 
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conflict between Iranian armed forces and PJAK (the PKK affiliate), nor has there been an 
accumulation of attacks upon the Iranian territory instigated by PJAK which could trigger the 
right of self-defence. In contrast, as previously established in the study, in regards to Turkey 
and the PKK there has been concentrated military activities between the aforesaid parties in 
southeast Turkey since early 1980s as well as constant accumulation of attacks by the PKK 
upon the Turkish territory in recent years on regular basis. Turkey in many occasions in the 
past has demanded cooperation from the Iraqi central government and the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) to stop the PKK violation of Turkish territorial sovereignty. However, 
such cooperation has never been forthcoming either due to inability or in some case 
reluctance of the Iraqi government or KRG to intervene in such matters.  
 
There is no question that in regards to the classical international law, the Turkish military 
interventions in northern Iraq since the start of hostilities with the PKK have violated the 
territorial integrity of Iraq. Nevertheless, this study has established that there is an on-going 
shift in customary practice which enables the attacked states to take proportionate military 
action against military bases belonging to the NSAG on the basis of the doctrine of necessity. 
It cannot be overstated that compliance with the necessity and proportionality criteria remains 
of pivotal importance. In regards to the gravity criterion, it confirms that even successive 
minor use of force, linked by the same aggressive intention may be accumulated and regarded 
as a single use of force. 
 
The common denominator of any armed conflict is that they are fought by human beings who 
ultimately bear the brunt of such conflicts. What this study has argued for is that the 
confluence of customary law and treaty international law does create the groundwork for a 
more uniform application of IHL. According to the Nuremburg Tribunal, the laws that govern 
armed conflict ‘are not static, but by continual adaptation follow the needs of a changing 
world.’2153 The interpretation of IHL should be guided inter alia by its main object and 
purpose, the protection of victims of armed conflict. There are considerable policy arguments 
in favour of the approach that international law should no longer make the distinction 
between international and non-international armed conflicts. Furthermore, it is submitted that 
a uniform application of IHL would go a long way in completing the process of humanization 
of the law of war. There are considerable barriers to achieve this, the most significant being 
                                                 
2153
 Trial of Major War Criminals before the international Criminal Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 
October 1946, vol. I, p. 221.  
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the status and treatment of participants under IHL. However, the biggest barrier to overcome 
is to convince sovereign states to adopt such an approach resulting in further compromise of 
their national sovereignty. 
 
Recent developments in state practice and legal opinion signify the blurring of the distinction 
between international and non-international armed conflicts and the rules applicable to each, 
signifying a move away from a state-centred approach towards greater concern for the 
individual. The Appeal Chamber in the Tadic Decision on the Defence Motion for the 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction stated that the distinction between international and non-
international armed conflicts ‘was losing its value as far as human beings were 
concerned’.2154 It is submitted that while international law can safeguard the legitimate 
interest of states, it should also concentrate its efforts on protection of those who are not 
taking part in the hostilities. There are factors that have contributed to the gradual blurring of 
the distinction between customary international rules governing international conflicts and 
those of internal conflicts. Unquestionably, two factors have contributed greatly to this 
important development in IHL, namely; the increase in number of civil conflicts globally and 
the universal influence of human rights standards.  
 
It is submitted that as the case of the Kurdish microcosm clearly illustrates, for some time the 
international/non-international dichotomy in IHL has proved susceptible to political 
manipulation since no state would ever admit that an armed conflict exists on its territory. 
Even, during some of the bloodiest conflicts between the Kurds and their host states this 
recognition has never been forthcoming. Eradication of the aforesaid dichotomy and 
application of a single law of armed conflict will therefore be essential in providing greater 
humanitarian protection during internal armed conflict. This would require acquiescence and 
commitment on the part of sovereign states. Although reciprocity has been at the centre of the 
historical development of IHL, it is no longer the case, particularly in relation to internal 
armed conflicts. It is the humanization of the law regulating non-international armed conflict 
that serves to limit to great extent human sufferings. Although the concept of sovereignty in 
international law remains supreme, but it is undeniable that by doing so the international 
community would signal its willingness to add political will to human rights rhetoric.    
 
                                                 
2154
 Prosecutor v. Tadic, op. cit., at para. 97. 
331 
 
Bibliography 
 
Case-Law 
 
International Case-Law  
 
Abella v Argentina, Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 271, OEA Ser. 
L/V/II.98, Doc. 6 Rev. (1998), (La Tablada Case). 
Aksoy v Turkey, app. No. 21987/93, Judgement of 18 December 1996; 23 EHRR 533. 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia), Judgement on Merits, 26 February 2007, reprinted in 
(2007) 46 ILM 188-310.  
Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), ICJ Reports, 1950, ICJ Rep. 266.  
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd (Belgium v. Spain), 1970, ICJ Rep. 3. 
Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, Judgement of 18 December 1996; (1997) 23 
EHRR 533. 
Çakici v Turkey, Application No 23657/94. [1999] ECHR 43. 
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), Merits, Judgment, 2005, ICJ Rep. 116. 
Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995, ICJ Rep. 90.   
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activity in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), Judgment (Merits), 1984, ICJ Rep. 392. 
Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v US), Judgment 2003, ICJ Rep. 161. 
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), 1980 
ICJ Rep. 3-46.. 
Corfu Channel case, (The United Kingdom v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep. 4. 
Denmark v Turkey, Application No 34382/97, Decision on Admissibility of 8 June 1999.  
Ertak v Turkey, Application No 20764/92, Judgment of 9 May 2000, Reports of Judgment 
and Decisions 2000-V.  
Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951, ICJ Rep. 116. 
Friendly Settlement, Judgment of 5 April 2000, 39 International Legal Materials (2000) 788.  
Greek case (App no 3321/67; 3322/67; 3323/67; 3344/67) (1969) 12 YB 1 ECHR, para 32. 
Ipek v Turkey, application No 25760/94, Judgment of 17 May 2004. 
332 
 
Ireland v United Kingdom, Application No 5310/71, Judgment of 18 January 1978, 2 EHRR 
25. 
Isayeva v Russia, Application No. 57950/00, Judgment of 24 February 2005, 41 EHRR 38. 
Kunarac, Appeal Chamber ICTY, (IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1 – A), para. 57. 
Kurt v Turkey, Application No 24276/94, Judgment of 25 May 1998, [1998] 27 EHRR 373. 
Lawless v Ireland, Application No. 332/57, Judgments of 1 July 1960, 1 EHRR 15. 
Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory opinion, 2004, ICJ Rep. 163. 
Libya/ Chad Case, Territorial Dispute, 1994, ICJ Rep. 6.  
McCann et al v United Kingdom, Application No. 18984/91, ECHR 27 September 1995 paras 
194, 200-01. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), 
Judgement (merits), 1986, ICJ Rep. 14. 
Namibia (Advisory Opinion), 1971, ICJ Rep. 16. 
North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Fed. Rep. Germany v. Denmark; Fed. Rep. Germany v. 
Netherlands), 1969, ICJ Rep. 43. 
Nuclear Weapon Advisory Opinion (Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat of Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, 1996, ICJ Rep 1. 
Ocalan v Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, Judgement of 12 March 2003. 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4), Trial Chamber Judgment, 2 September 1998. 
Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber) 10 
July 2008.  
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, ICTY, Apeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment of 15 
July 1999. 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutary appeal 
on Jurisdication, 2 October 1995, reprinted in 35 ILM 32. 
Prosecutor v. Galić (IT-98-29-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 5 December 2003. 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-96-1-A, Trial Judgment (1 June 2001). 
Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72 (E), 25 May 2004. 
Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and Brima Bazzy Kamara, SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Case No. 
SCSL-2004-16-AR72E, 13 March 2004.   
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgement, para 91 (Dec. 6, 1999).  
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, 20 February 2001, 16 
November 1998. 
333 
 
Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber), 25 June 
1999. 
Reparation of injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion (1949) 
4 ICJ Rep. 174. 
Tas v Turkey, Application No. 24396/94, Judgment of 14 November 2000.    
The application by PKK and KNK v Council of the European Union, Case C-229/05P, ECR 
I-439, Judgement of 18 January 2007. 
Timurtas v Turkey, Application No 23531/94, Judgment of 13 June 2000, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2000-VI. 
Western Sahara Case (Advisory opinion), 1975 ICJ Rep. 12. 
Yoyler v. Turkey, application No 26973/95, Judgment of 24 July 2003.   
Zambrano Velez v Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No 166 (4 July 2007) paras 84-85, 96, 101.  
 
National Case-Law 
 
Germany 
 
Mykonos Urteil [Mykonos Judgment], Urteil des Kammergerichts Berlin vom 10. April 1997 
[Judgement of the Court of Appeal of Berlin on April 10, 1997], OLGSt Berlin, (1) 2 StE 
2/93 (19/93). <http://www.kammergericht.de/entscheidungen/Strafsenate/1_StE_19-93.pdf>. 
(hereinafter Mykonos Judgment). 
 
Israel 
 
Israel Supreme Court, sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeals, Srur et al v, The State of Israel 
(Judgment) Crim Appeal 8780/06, 8984/06 (20 November 2006) (Israel, Supreme Court 
sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeals). 
Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al v The Government of Israel  (the target 
Killing Case) HCJ 769/02 (13 December 2006).  
Israel Supreme Court, HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v Prime Minister of Israel [2005], HJC 7957, 
translated in 45 I.L.M. 202 (2006).  
 
 
334 
 
United States 
 
US Supreme Court, Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
US Supreme Court, Williams v Bruffy (1877), 96 US 176.  
People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran v US Department of State, 183 F.3d 17 (DC Cir. 
1999); NCRI v US Department of State, 251 F.3d 192.   
 
United Kingdom 
 
Government of the Republic of Spain v SS Arantzazu Mendi [1939] A.C. 256. 
Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and Others ex parte Pinochet, House of Lords, 
judgment of 24 March 1999 [1999] 2 All ER 102. 
A v Home Secretary [2003] 1 All ER 816. 
A and Others v  Home Secretary [2004] UKHL 56 (Belmarsh Case).  
 
International Treaties and Instruments 
 
1899 – Hague Declaration I (entered into force 4 September 1900, expired 4 September 
1905). 
 
1907 – Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 
October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910, in (1908) 2 AJIL Supp 90), annexed 
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Cutoms of War on Land. 
 
1907 – Hague Declaration XIV (entered into force 1907). 
 
1920 - Treaty between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Sèvres), 10 August 1920, 
Treaty Series, No. 11 (1920)’ (Cmd. 964), 113 British and Foreign State Papers 652. 
 
1923 - Treaty of Lausanne, signed by the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, 
Romania, and the ‘Serbo-Croat-Slovene’ on one part and Turkey on the other, 24 July 1923, 
LN Treaty Series, Vol. 28, 1924, p. 13. 
 
335 
 
1926 - Treaty between the United Kingdom and Iraq regarding the Duration of the Treaty of 
10 October 1922, Baghdad, 13 January 1926; 123 British Foreign and State Papers446; 
‘Treaty Series, No. 10 (1926)’ (Cmd. 2662). 
 
1927 - ‘Neighbourly Relations” of the Treaty between the UK, Iraq and Turkey Regarding 
the Settlement of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq’, singed at Angora (Ankara) 5 June  
 
1926, provided for a various obligations for cross-border incidents but does not stipulate any 
right of hot pursuit. See the text reproduced in AJIL vol. 21, no. 4, Oct 1927, pp. 136-143. 
 
1928 - General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-
Briand Pact), 27 August 1928, 94 LNTS 57.    
 
1929 - Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies 
in the Field (27 July, 1929), 47 Stat. 2074, 118 LNTS 303.  
 
1933 – Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1934) 165 LNTS 19; 28 AJIL 
Supp 75. 
 
1945 - Charter of the United Nations, adopted 26 June 1945, 3 Bevans 1153. 
 
1948 - Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 
December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951, 78 UNTS 277.  
 
1948 - Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, in UNGA 
Resolution 217A (III) (1948). 
 
1949 - Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
 
1949 - Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949, 75 UNTS 85, entered into force 21 
October 1950. 
 
336 
 
1949 - Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force 1950.  
 
1949 - Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force 21 October 1950.  
 
1950 - European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom 
(ECHR), Rome, 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, 213 UNTS 222. 
 
1954 - Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
entered into force May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. 
 
1960 - Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UNGA 
Resolution 1514 (XV) 14 December 1960.  
 
1963 - Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board of Aircraft, 
adopted 14 September 1963, entered into force 4 December 1969, 704 UNTS 219.  
 
1966 - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171. 
 
1966 - International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3. 
 
1969 - International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
entered into force, 4 Jan. 4, 1969. 660 UNTS 195. 
 
1969 - American Convention on Human Rights; Packed of San Jose, Costa Rica’ adopted 22 
November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978, 1144 UNTS 143. 
 
1970 - General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations 1970, GA Res. 2625 (xxx) UN GAOR, Supp. No. 28, UN Doc. A/8028 
(1970). 
337 
 
 
1970 - Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, adopted 16 
December 1970, entered into force 14 October 1971, 860 UNTS 105. 
 
1973 - Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
adopted 23 September 1971,  entered into force 26 January 1973, 974 UNTS 177. 
 
1973 - Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted 14 December 1973, entered into 
force 20 February 1977, 1035 UNTS 1035. 
 
1975 - Treaty Concerning the State Frontier and Neighbourly Relations between Iran and 
Iraq, Baghdad, 13 June 1975, 1017 United Nations Treaty Series 54. 
 
1977 - Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 7 December 1978.  
 
1977 - Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol II), 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609, entered into force 7 December 1978. 
 
1980 - Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted 3 March 1980, 
entered into force 8 February 1987, 1456 UNTS 101. 
 
1981 - African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 ILM 58(1982), entered into force October 21, 1986. 
 
1988 - Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, adopted 24 February 1988, entered into force 6 August 1989, 
974 UNTS 177. 
 
1988 - Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992, 1678 UNTS 303.  
338 
 
 
1996 - Protocol on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices, (amended Mines Protocol), 3 May 1996, 35 ILM 1206 (1996). 
 
1997 - International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997, UN Doc 
A/RES/52/164 Annex; 37 ILM 249 (1997).      
 
1997 - Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997, 36 ILM 1507. 
 
1977 - Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted 15 December 1997, 
entered into force 23 May 2001, in UNGA Resolution 52/164 (1997).  
 
1998 - Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 
1998, reprinted in: ILM, vol. 37, 1998, 999 
 
1999 - Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural 
property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 26 March 1999, 38 ILM 769. 
 
1999 - International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’, adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations according to resolution 54/109 of 9 
December 1999, entered into force on 10 April 2002, 39 ILM 270 (2000).  
 
2002 - EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002/475/JHA) [2002] OJ L164/3, 
adopted 22 June 2002, entered into force 22 June 2002. 
 
2005 - Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted 13 April 2005, 
not yet in force, in UNGA Resolution 59/290 (2005).  
 
2005 - The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, adopted 16 May 
2005, entered into force 1 December 2009, ETS No 196. 
 
 
 
339 
 
Other International & Governmental Documents 
 
1863 - Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, 
General Order 100, War Department, Adjutant General’s Office (Washington, April 24, 
1863). 
 
1900 - ‘Rights and Duties of Foreign Powers as Regards the Established Governments in case 
of Insurrection’, adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1900.   
 
1947 - International Committee of Red Cross, ‘Report on the work of the Preliminary 
Conference of National Red Cross Societies for the study of the Conventions and of various 
problems relative to the Red Cross, Geneva, April 14-26, 1947 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_report-1947.pdf>. 
 
1948 - CIA Report, ‘the Kurdish Minority Problem’, Copy No. 41 (8/12/1948) 
<http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000258376/DOC_0000258376.pdf>. 
 
1925 - League of Nations Council Decision Relating to the Turco-Iraq Frontier, Geneva, 16 
December 1925, LN Doc. A.17.1932.VII (League of Nations Official Journal, 7
th
 year, No. 2 
(Feb. 1926) 191-192). 
 
1968 – Human Rights in Armed Conflict, Resolution XXXIII adoted by the International 
Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 12 May 1968. 
 
1973 - The Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling against 
Colonial , Alien and Racist Ragimes (General Assembly Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) of 12 
December 1973.   
 
1974 - Official records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development 
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977, 
Volumes 5-6, CDDH/SR.10. 
 
1980 - Ago, R., ‘the internationally wrongful act of state, source of international 
responsibility (part 1)’ Addendum to the 8th report on state responsibility by the Special 
340 
 
Rapporteur, 32
nd
 session of the ILC (1980); UN Doc A/CN.4/318/Add. 5-7 (extract from the 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1980, Vol. II(I). 
 
1987 - The Position of the United States ‘On Current Law of War Agreements: Remarks of 
Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, United States Department of State, January 22, 
1987’, 2 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 460 1987.  
 
1990 – Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 
adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crimes and the 
Treatment of Offenders, Vavana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990, Resolution 45/166 
of 18 December 1990 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/firearms.htm>. 
 
1990 - ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’, Paris, 19-21 November 1990, 30 ILM 190 
(1991). 
 
1991 - Letter Dated 2 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United 
States Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/22435 
 
1991 - Letter Dated 5 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United 
States Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/22451. 
 
1991 - The Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards (Turku: Abo Akademi 
University Institute for human Rights, 1991) UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/55; the text of the 
Declaration is appended to T. Meron and A. Rosas, ‘A Daclaration of Minimum 
Humanitarian Standards’ (1991) 85 AJIL 375. 
 
1992 - US Congress, Senate, Mass killings in Iraq: hearing before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 102
nd
 Congress, first session, March 19, 1992. 
 
1993 - Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to paragraph 1-2 of SC Resolution 808 
(1993), UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993. This report was approved by the SC Resolution 827 
(1993). 
 
341 
 
1993 - Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (adopted 8 
May 1993, in UNSC Resolution 827, 32 ILM 1192 (1993).  
 
1993 - Letter, dated 25 May 1993, from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, UN Doc S/25843. 
1994 - Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (adopted 8 November 1994, 
in UNSC Resolution 955 (1994), 33 ILM 1602 (1994). 
 
1994 - Note verbale dated 20 July 1994 from the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq at Tehran; 21 
August 1994, UN Doc S/1994/983. 
 
1994 - Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (adopted 8 November 1994, 
in UNSC Resolution 955 (1994), 33 ILM 1602 (1994). 
 
1995 - Letter dated 24 July 1995 from the Charge D'affaires of the Permanent Mission of 
Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/1995/605.  
1995 - Letter dated 12 July 1995 from the Charge D'affaires of the Permanent Mission of 
Libyan Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, UN Doc S/1995/566.  
 
1996 - ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Part III), in 
ILC Report (48 Session, 1996) UN Doc A/51/10. 
 
1996 - Letters dated 27 June 1996 from the Charge D'affaires of the Permanent Mission of 
Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc S/1996/479. 
 
1997 - Letters dated 14 June 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council, UN 
Doc S/1997/461. 
 
342 
 
1997 - Letters dated 16 July 1997 from the Charge D'affaires of the Permanent Mission of 
Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc S/1997/552. 
 
1997 - ‘Letter from the US President Bill Clinton to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate’, 23 September 1997 
<clinton6.nara.gov>. 
 
1998 - President Bill Clinton, Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist 
sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 20 August 1998, in 93 AJIL (1999) 161. 
 
1998 - Letter dated 20 August 1998, from the Permanent Representative of the United States 
of America to the United States to the President of the Security Councul, S/1998/780. 
 
1998 - US Department of State, ‘US Welcomes Turkey-Syria Agreement’, Press Statement 
by James Rubin, 22 October 1998. 
 
1999 - Report by the United Nations Secretary General on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflicts (S/1999/957) 08 September 1999 
<www.un.int/canada/html/s1999957.htm>.  
 
1999 - International Committee of Red Cross, ‘Holding Armed Groups to International 
Standards: An ICRC contribution to the research project of International Council on Human 
Rights Project (ICHRP)’, ICRC, 1999. 
 
1999 - Letter dated 12 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, UN Doc S/1999/781. 
 
1999 - The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Kosovo/Kosova, 
as seen as told: An analysis of the human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification 
Mission, October 1998 to June 1999 (OSCE, Warsaw, 1999) 
<http://www.osce.org/item/17755.html>.     
 
343 
 
1999 - Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict (S/1999/1265) 17 September 1999 <www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm>. 
 
2000 - Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict (S/2000/1296) 19 April 2000 <www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm>.  
 
2001 - Report by the United Nations Secretary General on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflicts (S/2001/331) 30 March 2001 
<www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/sgrep01.htm>.  
 
2001 - ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of states for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, 
International Law Commission, 53
rd
 Session (2001) arts 4-11 (extract from the ‘Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session’, Official Records of 
the General Assembly, 56
th
 session, supp no 10 (A/56/10), chap IV.E.1, November 2001). 
 
2001 - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Statement by the North Atlantic 
Council, 2001, 40 ILM 1267 (2001). 
 
2001 - Organization of American States (OAS): Resolution on Terrorist Threat to the 
Americas, 2001, 40 ILM 1273 (2001). 
 
2001 - International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility of State for 
Internationally wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56
th
 Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10(SUPP)(Dec. 12, 2001). 
 
2001 - UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Protection and promotion 
of Human Rights (53
rd
 Session), Terrorism and Human Rights: Progress Report by Special 
Rapporteur Ms K. Koufa, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31, 27 June2001 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c22538,459a87252,3d5a2cd30,0,UNSUBCOM,,.
html>. 
 
2001 - UN Human Rights Committee (2001) General Comment No 29 States of Emergency 
(Article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 11, 31 August 2001 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,GENERAL,HRC,,453883fd1f,0.html>. 
344 
 
 
2001 - President G.W. Bush, ‘Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain 
Terrorist Attacks’, 14 September 2001, 
<www.Whitehouse,gov/news/release/2001/09/20010914-4.html>.  
 
2001 - Letter dated 7 October 2001 from John Negroponte the Permanent Representative of 
the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, UN Doc. S/2001/946. 
 
2002 - ICRC Report, ‘Terrorism and International Law: Challenges and Responses: the 
Complementary Nature of Human Rights Law, international Humanitarian Law and Refugee 
Law’, Geneva, 2002.    
 
2002 – ‘White House Press Secterary announcement of President Bush’s determination of 
legal status of Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees, Statement by the White House Press 
Secretary Ari Fleischer, 7 February 2002 
<http://www.state.gov/s/l/38727.htm>. 
 
2002 - UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and follow up to the World Conference on Human Rights, pursuant to 
General Assembly Resolution 48/141, E/CN.4/2002/18, 27 February 2002. 
 
2002 - Annual Report 2002, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,IACHR 
‘Regarding the Situation of the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Decision on 
Precautionary Measures’, 12 March 2002 <http://www.cidh.org/resolutions/Resolution%202-
11%20Guantanamo.pdf>. 
 
2002 - Statement by the President of the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians In 
armed Conflict (S/PRST/2002/6) and Annexed “Aide Memoire”, 15 March 2002 
www.un.org/Docs/sc/report/2002/sgrep02.htm>.   
 
2002 - Kellenberger, J., ‘International Humanitarian Law at the Beginning of the 21st 
Century, Addressed to 26
th
 Roundtable on Current problems of International Humanitarian 
345 
 
Law’, San Remo, 5 September 2002 
<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5e2c8v>.  
 
2002 - Report by the United Nations Security General on Women, Peace and Security, 
S/2002/1154, 16 October 2002 < http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/S-2002-1154-E.pdf>. 
 
2002 - UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Aspects of the 
War against Terrorism, Second Report of Session 2002-03, 24 October 2002 < 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/196/196.pdf>.   
 
2002 - Statement by the President of the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians In 
armed Conflict (S/PRST/2002/41) 20 December 2002 
<www.un.org/Docs/sc/statements/2002/prst2002.htm>.   
 
2003 - ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Conflicts’, Report Prepared by the International Committee of Red Cross, 28th International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 2-6 December 2003 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5vll65.htm>. 
 
2004 - US Department of State, Iraq: Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 25 
February 2004 <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27928.htm>. 
 
2004 - US State Department, Iraq: Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 25 February 
2004 <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27928.htm>. 
 
2004 - US Department of State, ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003’, April 2004 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31912.pdf>. 
 
2004 - The ICRC, Report of the Second Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities, the ICRC and the TMC Asser Institute, the Hague, 25-26 October 2004 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/2004-07-report-dph-2004-icrc.pdf>. 
 
2005 - US Department of State, ‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2004: 
Turkey’, 28 February 2005 <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41713.htm>.  
346 
 
 
2005 - In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 
Report of the UN Secretary General, UN, G.A., doc. A/59/2005, 21 March 2005 
<http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap3.htm>.  
 
2005 - US Department of State, ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2004’, Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2005 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf>. 
 
2005 - Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary 
General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September; Geveva, 25 January 
2005, para. 159. Available at <http://www.ohchr.org/english/darfur.htm>. 
 
2005 - Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, Summary 
Report, Geneva, ICRC and the Asser Institute, Geneva, 23-25 October 2005 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/2005-09-report-dph-2005-icrc.pdf>.  
 
2006 - Identical letters dated 12 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council 
A/60/937-S/2006/515. 
 
2008 - Fifth Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, Geneva, 
Summary Report, International Committee of Red cross and the Asser Institute, Geneva, 5-6 
February 2008.    
 
2008 - International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), Opinion Paper, ‘How is the Term 
“armed conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, March 2008 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf>.  
 
2008 - US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, 30 April 2009 
<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2008/>. 
 
347 
 
2008 - Fourth Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, Geneva, 
Summary Report, ICRC and the Asser Institute, Geneva, 27-28 November 2006 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/2006-03-report-dph-2006-icrc.pdf>.  
 
2009 - Melzer, N., Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian law, International Committee of Red Cross, May 2009 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf>. 
 
2009 - Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/48, 15 September 2009 (Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict), endorsed by  
 
2010 - US Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism 2009, August 2010 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf >. 
 
2010 - ‘PKK/KONGRA-GEL’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
< http://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk_kongra-gel.en.mfa>. 
 
2011 - US Department of State, ‘Iraq’ 7 April 2011 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. 
 
2012 - ‘UK-Turkey Relations and Turkey’s Regional Role’, Twelvfth Report of Session 
2010-2012, Published by the United Kingdom Parliament, 20 March 2012 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/1567/1567.pdf>.  
 
Miscellaneous, NGO Documents, News and other Organizations 
 
Douglas J. Feith, ‘Law in the Service of Terror: the Strange Case of the Additional Protocol’, 
The National Interest, No. 1 (Fall 1985).  
 
L. Whitman, Helsinki Watch Report, Destroying Ethnic Identity: the Kurds of Turkey 
(Helsinki Watch Report, March 1988). 
 
348 
 
Report of a Medical Mission to Turkish Kurdistan by Physicians for Human Rights, Wind of 
Death: Iraq’s Use of Poison Gas against its Kurdish population, 1989 
<www.phrusa.org/research/iraq/winds.html>. 
 
Hitchens, C.,‘the Struggle of the Kurds’, National Geographic Magazine, August 1992, pp. 
32-60. 
 
Middle East Watch Report, Genocide in Iraq: the Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (Human 
Rights Watch, 1993) Appendix B, ‘the Perpetrators of Anfal: a Road-Map to the Principal 
Agencies and Individuals’ <www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/APPENDIXB.htm>.  
 
Helsinki Watch, ‘War Crimes in Bosnia Herzegovina: UN Cease-Fire Won’t Help Banja 
Luka’, Vol. II, New York, 1 June 1994 < 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,HRW,,BIH,,45cb0ca52,0.html>. 
 
Amnesty International Report, Iran: “Mykonos” Trial Provides Further Evidence of Iranian 
Policy of Unlawful State Killings, 10 April 1997 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/015/1997/en/103b4ccf-ea83-11dd-b05d-
65164b228191/mde130151997en.pdf>. 
 
Amnesty International Report, Turkey: Human Rights Denied (London: Amnesty 
International, 1988). 
 
Human Rights Watch, “Chemical Ali” in his own words, an abbreviated version: Human 
Rights Watch transcripts of audio tapes, July 1993 
<http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/iraq/chemicalali.htm>. 
 
Human Rights Watch, Joost Hiltermann, ‘Bureaucracy of Repression: the Iraqi Government 
in its Own Words’, February 1994 <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/iraq/>. 
 
Human Rights Watch Report: ‘Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in 
Turkey’, 1995 <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Turkey.htm#P167_13484>. 
 
349 
 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Establishing an International Criminal Court: Major 
Unresolved Issues in the Draft Statute (International Criminal Court Briefing Series 1998), 
Vol. 1, No. 1, Section IV <http://www.iccnow.org/documents/LCHRUnresolvedIssues.pdf, 
Section IV>. 
 
‘Clinton Defends Military Strikes’, BBC, 20 August 1998, available at: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/155252.stm>. 
  
‘Turkey Makes Demands of Syria’, BBC, 7 October 1998 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/186565.stm>. 
 
‘The Story of Öcalan’s Arrest’, BBC, 28 May 1999, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/283189.stm>. 
 
 ‘The Story of Ocalan Arrest’, BBC, 28 May 1999 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/283189.stm>. 
 
‘PKK Ends War with Turkey’, BBC, 9 February 2000 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/636729.stm>.  
 
Burkay, K., ‘the Kurdish Question; its history and present situation’, 2001 
<http://www.kurdistan.nu/english/eng_kurdish_question.htm>. 
 
PKK becomes KADEK, 15 April 2002, see <http://www.kurdistan.org/current-
update/kadet.html>. 
 
‘Ends and Means: Human Rights Approaches to Armed Groups’, International Council on 
Human Rights Policy, August 2000 < 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/6/105_report_en.pdf>. 
 
‘Kurdish Rebels Abandon Truce’, BBC, 2 September 2003 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3200907.stm>. 
 
350 
 
Henkaerts, J-M., ‘Binding Armed Opposition Groups through Humanitarian Treaty Law and 
Customary Law’, 27 (Spring 2003) Collegium 123 
<http://www.coleurope.eu/template.asp?pagename=pub_collegium>.    
 
2004 - McDonald, A., ‘The Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and the Principle 
of Distinction and Protection from the Increased Participation of Civilians in 
Hostilities’Spotlight (April 2004) 
<http://www.asser.nl/default.aspx?site_id=9&level1=13337&level2=13379>. 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Forced Displacement and Arabization of Northern Iraq’, August 2004 
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/4.htm>. 
 
2005 - Scheinin, M., ‘Turku/Åbo Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards (1990)’, 
International Council of Human Rights Policy & International Commission of jurists 
Workshop, Standard Setting: Lessons Learned for the Future, Geneva, 13-14 February 2005 
<http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/91/120B>. 
 
Human Rights Watch Report, “Still Critical” Prospects in 2005 for Internally Displaced 
Kurds in Turkey, March 2005 Vol. 17, No. 2(D).  
 
P. Policzer, ‘Neither Terrorists nor Freedom Fighters’, Armed Groups Project, Working 
Paper 5, University of Calgary, March 2005 
<http://www.armedgroups.org/sites/armedgroups.org/files/AGP_Working_Paper_5_-
_Policzer__March_05_.pdf>.  
 
Abdullah Öcalan, ‘the Declaration of Democratic Confederalism’, 02 April 2005 
<http://www.kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=10174>. 
 
Ould Mohamedou, M.M., ‘Non-Linearity of Engagement: Transnational Armed Groups, 
International Law and Conflict between Al-Qaeda and the United States’, Harvard Program 
on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict research, July 2005 <http://www.hpcrresearch.org>.    
 
K.W. Watkin, ‘Warriors without Right? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the 
Struggle over Legitimacy’, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict research, Harvard 
351 
 
University, Occasional Paper series, Winter 2005 
<http://www.hpcr.org/pdf/occasionalpaper2.pdf>. 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Letter to Minister Aksu Calling for the Abolition of the 
Village Guards’, 7 June 2006 <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/06/07/turkey-letter-
minister-aksu-calling-abolition-village-guards>. 
 
J. Brandon, Iran’s Kurdish Threat: PJAK’, (The Jamestown Foundation) 15 June 2006 
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=805&tx_ttne
ws%5BbackPid%5D=181&no_cache=1>. 
 
Amnesty International USA, ‘Israel/Lebanon: Israel and Hezbollah must Spare Civilians: 
Obligations under International Humanitarian Law of the Parties to the Conflict in Israel and 
Lebanon’, 25 July2006, (AI Index: MDE 15/070/2006). 
 
Kirgis, F.L., ‘Some Proportionality Issues Raised by Israel’s Use of Armed Force in 
Lebanon’ (ASIL Insight, 17 August 2006) <http://www.asil.org/insights060817.cfm>. 
 
Seymour Hersh, “The Next Act: id a damaged Administration less likely to attack Iran?” The 
New Yorker, 27 November 2006. 
 
Associated Press, ‘Turkey bolsters forces along Iraqi border: US cautions against action 
outside coalition’, 8 March 2007. 
 
Project Ploughshares, Armed Conflict Report 2007, (providing the Current on-going 
conflicts), Summer 2007, Vol 28, No. 2 
<http;//www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-TitlePageRev.htm#Preface>. 
 
The Anfal Trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal (formerly the Iraqi Special Tribunal), tried Ali 
Hassan al-Majid and two defendants, Sultan Hashem Ahmad and Hussein Rashid Mohamad, 
were convicted of genocide and related charges and sentenced to death. See BBC, 24 June 
2007, Timeline: ‘Anfal Trial’ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5272224.stm>.  
 
352 
 
‘Kurdish leader seeks help to topple the regime’, Washington Times, 4 August 2007 
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/4/kurdish-leader-seeks-us-help-to-topple-
regime/>. 
 
A.L. Butters, Why is Iran shelling Iraq? 20/08/2007, Time World, 20 August 2007 
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1654449,00.html>. 
 
Ali Ozcan Nihat, ‘PKK Recruitment of Female Operatives’, Global Terrorism Analysis, the 
Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 4, Issue 28, September 11, 2007. 
 
Muller, M. & Linzey, S., ‘the Internally Displaced Kurds of Turkey: On-going Issues of 
Responsibility, Redress and Resettlement’, Kurdish Human Rights Project, BAR Human 
Rights Committee of England and Wales’, September 2007 
<http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/docs/bhrckhrp/ResponsibilityReport.pdf>. 
 
Pam O’Tool, ‘Profile: the PKK’, BBC, 15 October 2007 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7044760.stm> .   
 
G. Jenkins, PKK Changes Battlefield Tactics to Force Turkey into Negotiation (The 
Jamestown Foundation), 24 October 2007 
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4494>. 
 
F. Hyland, ‘Provision to Turkey of US Intelligence on PKK Highlights Policy Shift’, 7 
November 2007 
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4520>. 
 
Katzman, K., ‘The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq’, CRS Report for Congress, Order No 
RS22079 (The Library of Congress, 5 February 2008).  
 
Suzan Fraser, Associated Press, “Turkey, Iran launch coordinated attacks on Kurds”,  5 June 
2008 <www.ap.org>. 
 
Omer Taspinar, ‘Turkey’s Middle East Policies: between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism, 
Carnegie Papers, No 10, 23 September 2008 
353 
 
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar_final.pdf>. 
 
Ross Wilson, the US Ambassador to Ankara denied those allegations, 30 June 2008 
<www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/12/AR2007091201133.html>. 
 
‘FARC Aura of Invincibility Shattered’, BBC, 01 March 2008, available at: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7273320.stm>. 
 
T. Waisberg, ‘Colombia’s use of force against non-state actors’, ASIL Insight No. 17, 22 
August 2008 www.asil.org/insights080822.cfm; 1 March 2008. 
 
‘Colombia’s cross-border strike on FARC irks neighbors’, Christian Science Monitor, 3 
March 2008, available at <www.csmonitor.com/2008/0303/p04s02-woam.html>. 
 
‘Mandela taken off US terror list’, 1 July 2008 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7484517.stm>.  
 
Amnesty International Report, ‘Iran: Human Rights Abuses against the Kurdish Minority’, 
Amnesty International 2008 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE13/088/2008/en>. 
 
Human Rights Watch, Iran: Freedom of Expression and Association in the Kurdish Regions’, 
January 2009 < http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iran0109_web.pdf>. 
 
‘History of PKK in Turkey’, Hürriyet Daily News, 14 September 2009 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=history-for-the-pkk-in-
turkey-2009-09-14>. 
 
Germany Rejects Iran Request for Extradition, Radio Free Europe, 09 March 2010 
<http://www.rferl.org/content/Germany_Rejects_Iran_Extradition_Request/1979051.html>. 
 
Marko Milanovic, ‘What Exactly Internationalizes an Internal Armed Conflict?’ 7 May 2010, 
EJIL: Talk, available at: <http://www.ejiltalk.org/what-exactly-internationalizes-an-internal-
armed-conflict/>. 
 
354 
 
‘Iran hangs the leader of the Jundullah Sunni militant, blamed for a string of attacks on its 
elite revolutionary guards’, BBC, 20 June 2010 < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10359415>. 
 
A. Christie-Miller, ‘the PKK and the Closure of Turkey’s Kurdish Opening’, MERIP, 4 
August 2010 <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero080410>. 
 
‘Iran blames ‘terrorist attack’ on Kurdish separatists’, the Christian Science Monitor, 22 
September 2010 <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0922/Iran-
blames-terrorist-attack-on-Kurdish-separatists>. 
 
C. Zambelis, ‘The Factors behind Rebellion in Iranian Kurdistan’, Combating Terrorism at 
West Point, 1 March 2011 <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-factors-behind-rebellion-in-
iranian-kurdistan>. 
 
Stephen Farrell et al., ‘with the PKK in Iraq’s Qandil Mountains’, 5 January 2011, the New 
York Times <http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/with-the-p-k-k-in-iraqs-qandil-
mountains/>. 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Arrests Expose Flawed Justice System’, 01 November 2011 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/01/turkey-arrests-expose-flawed-justice-system>. 
 
‘Iranian authorities demanding action against the leader of PJAK in Germany’, BBC Persian, 
25 July 2011 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2011/07/110725_l03_pjak_salehi_moslehi.shtml?s>. 
 
Zaman Today, ‘Karayilan injured in Iranian operation’, 12 October 2011 
<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-259654-karayilan-injured-in-iranian-operations-report-
says.html>. 
 
‘Iran and Turkey vow to strengthen Cooperation against terrorism’, Today’s Zaman, 21 
October 2011 
<http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=260548>.  
 
355 
 
‘Turkey and Iran Collaborating against Kurdish Rebels’, 21/10/2011, BBC 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15407142>. 
 
Turkey ‘Ergenekon Plot’: Ex-Army Chief Basbug on Trial, BBC, 26 March 2012 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17510436>. 
 
Books 
 
Abi-Saab, G., ‘Conflicts of a Non-international Character’, in ‘International Dimensions of 
Humanitarian Law’, UNESCO, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988.   
Abi-Saab, R., ‘Humanitarian Law and Internal Conflicts: The Evolution of Legal Concern’, 
in ‘Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead’ edited by Delissen and 
Tanja, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1
st
 ed., 1991. 
Abrahamian, E., ‘Iran between Two Revolution’, Princeton U.P., 1982.  
Abrahamian, E., ‘the Iranian Mojahedin’, Yale U.P., Reprint Edition, 1992. 
Adamson, D., ‘The Kurdish War’, Allen & Unwin, 1964.  
Ahmad, F., ‘the Making of Modern Turkey, Routledge, 1993.  
Ahmed, M.H. (ed.), ‘the Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism’, Mazda Pub., 2006.   
Alexander, Y. & Brenner, E.H., ‘Turkey, Terrorism, Civil Rights, and the EU’, Routledge, 
2008. 
Alexander, Y., Browne, M.A. & Nanes A.S., (ed.), ‘Control of Terrorism: International 
Documents’, New York: Crane-Russak, 1979. 
Alexandrov, S.A., ‘Self-Defence against the Use of Force in International Law’, Kluwer Law 
International, 1996.  
Algar, A., ‘Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Mizan Press, 1980. 
Allain, J., ‘International Law in the Middle East: Closer to Power than Justice, Ashgate, 
2005. 
Alston, P. (ed.), ‘Non-State Actors and Human Rights’, Oxford U.P., 2005.  
Alston, P. (ed.), ‘The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal’, Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1992; Buergenthal, T., ‘International Human Rights in a Nutshell’, 
St. Paul: West Publishing, 1995. 
Alston, P., ‘International Human Rights Law in Context: Law, Politics, Morals’, Oxford U.P., 
3
rd
 ed., 2007. 
356 
 
Altug, Y.M., ‘Turkey and some Problems of International Law’, Yenilik Basimevi: Istanbul, 
1958.   
Andreopoulos, G.J., ‘On the Accountability of Non-State Armed Groups’, in ‘Non-State 
Actors in Human Rights Universe, Kumarian Press, 1
st
 ed., 2006. 
Anghie, A., ‘Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law’, Cambridge 
U.P., 2004. 
Arai-Takahashi, Y., ‘the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of ECHR’, Intersentia Publishers, 2002. 
Arend, A.C. & Beck, R.J., ‘International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the Charter 
Paradigm’, Routledge, 1993. 
Arendt, H., ‘On Revolution’, Penguin Books, 1990.. 
Arfa, H., ‘the Kurds: an Historical and Political Study’, Oxford U.P., 1966. 
Arnold, R. & Quenivet, N., (ed.), ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: 
Towards a New Merger in International Law’, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008.  
Asbjørn Eide, the Laws of War and Human Rights: Differences and Convergences’, in 
Studies and Essays in Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles, Christopher 
Swinarski (ed.), the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998.  
 Ashton, N. & Gibson, B., ‘the Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives’, Routledge, 
2012.  
Atabak, T. & Zurcher, E.J., ‘Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernisation under Ataturk & 
Reza Shah, 1918-1942, I.B. Tauris, 2004.  
Aziz, M.A., ‘The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism & National Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan’, 
Tauris, 2011.  
Banks, W.C., ‘New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetrical Warfare’, 
Columbia U.P., 2011. 
Barkey, H.J. & Fuller, G.E., Turkey’s Kurdish Question (New York, NY: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1998.  
Barkey, H.J., ‘Turkey and the PKK: A Pyrrhic Victory?’, in R.J. Art & L. Richardson, 
‘Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past’, US Institute of Peace 
Press, 2006. 
Barkley, H.J. & Fuller, G.E., Turkey’s Kurdish Question (New York: Rowan and Littlefield 
Publishers, 1998). 
Barnidge, R.R., ‘Non-State Actors and Terrorism: Applying the Law of State Responsibility 
and the Due Diligence Principle’, TMC Asser Press, 2008. 
357 
 
Bassiouni, M.C. (ed.), ‘Legislative History of the statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Legislative History, 1994-2000’, Transnational Publishers, 2005.  
Bassiouni, M.C., ‘Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations’, in ‘Values and 
Violence: Intangible Acts of Terrorism’, Wayne McCormack (ed.), Springer, 2008.    
Baty, T. & Morgan, J.H., ‘War: Its Conduct and legal Results’, Murray, 1915. 
Baxter, R.R., ‘Jus in Bello interno: the Present and Future Law’, in ‘Law and Civil War in the 
Modern World’, John N. Moore (ed.), The Johns Hopkins U.P., 1974.   
Beit-Hallahmi, B., ‘the Israel Connection: Whom Israel Arms and Why’, I.B. Tauris, 1988.  
Bennett, G.H., ‘British Foreign Policy of the Curzon Period: 1919-1924’, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 1995.  
Best, G., ‘War and Law: Since 1945’, Oxford U.P., 1st ed., 1994.  
Bianchi, A. & Naqvi, Y., ‘International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism’, Oxford & 
Portland, 2011.   
Bill, J.A., ‘The Eagle and the Lion: the Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations’, Yale U.P., 
1988.  
Black, R.E. & Falk, R.A. (ed.,), 1971, p. 89; Dietrich Schindler, ‘State of War, Belligerency, 
Armed Conflict, in ‘The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict’ 3, Antonio 
Cassese (ed.,), Oceana Publications, 1979. 
Bloomfield, R.J. (ed.), ‘Regional Conflict and U.S. Policy: Angola and Mozambique’, 
Reference Publications, 1988; H.A. Kitchen (ed.), “Angola, Mozambique, and the 
West”, Greenwood Publishing, 1987.    
Bouchet-Saulnier, F.,  et al., ‘the Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law’, Laura Brau (trans. & 
ed.,), Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.  
Bowett, D.W., ‘Self-Defence in International Law’, Manchester U.P., 1958. 
Bozarslan, H., ‘Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919-
1925), in A. Vali (ed.), Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, Costa Mesa, 
CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003.  
Brill, S.L., ‘The World Deployed: US and Soviet Military Intervention and Proxy Wars in the 
Third World since 1945’, in R.W. Clawson (ed.), ‘East-West Rivalry in the Third 
World’, Wilmington, 1986. 
Bromley, S., ‘Rethinking Middle East Politics’, Texas U.P., 1994. 
Brownlie, I., ‘International Law and the Use of Force by States’, Oxford UP, 1963.  
Brownlie, I., ‘Principles of Public International Law’, 7th ed., Oxford U.P., 2008. 
358 
 
Brown-Scott, J., ‘the Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference: Translations of the 
Official Texts, vols. 1-5, Oxford U.P., 1920-21.  
Buchheit, L.C., ‘Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-determination’, Yale U.P.    
Bull, H., ‘Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics’, Palgrave, 3rd ed., 2002. 
Bulloch, J. & Morris, H., ‘the Gulf War its Origins, History and Consequences’, Methuen, 
1989.    
Burke, J., ‘Al-Qaeda: The Story of Radical Islam’, Penguin Books, 1st ed. 2004. 
Burrell, R.M., Iran Political Diaries, 1881-1965, vols 1-4, 6, 10-11, London Archives 
Editions, 1997. 
Campos, J.H., ‘The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power’, 
Ashgate, 2007. 
Capie, D. & Policze, P., ‘Keeping the Promise of Protection: Holding Armed Groups to the 
Same Standard as States’, The Armed Groups Project, British Columbia U.P., 2004.  
Carabott, P. & T.D. Sfikas (ed.), ‘The Greek Civil War: Essays on a Conflict of 
Exceptionalism and Silence’, Ashgate Publishing, 2004.   
Cassese, A., ‘Human Rights in a Changing World’, Temple U.P., 1990. 
Cassese, A., ‘Human Rights in Internal Strife: Their International Protection’, Cambridge 
U.P., 1987. 
Cassese, A., ‘International Criminal Law’, in ‘International Law’ M. D. Evans (ed.), Oxford 
U.P., 2003, pp. 721, 750.  
Cassese, A., ‘International Criminal Law’, Oxford U.P., 2nd ed., 2008.     
Cassese, A., ‘International Law’, Oxford U.P., 2nd ed., 2004. 
Cassese, A., ‘Self-Determination of Peoples: a Legal Reappraisal’, Cambridge U.P., 1998.  
Cassese, A., ‘The International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia and the 
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law’, in ‘The United Nations and 
International Humanitarian Law’, Paris: Pedone, 1996.  
Cassese, A., ‘Wars of National Liberation and Humanitarian Law’ in ‘Studies and Essays on 
International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles: in honour of Jean Pictet’, 
Swinarski, C., (ed.), International Committee of Red Cross, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1984.  
Castellino, J., ‘International Law and Self-Determination’, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1st 
ed., 2000. 
Castren, E., ‘Civil War’, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia (Helsinki), 1966.  
359 
 
Cayci, C., ‘Countering Terrorism and International Law: The Turkish Experience’ in 
‘International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operation’, H. 
Langholtz, B. Kondoch, (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003, pp. 333-348. 
Chadwick, E., ‘Self-Determination, Terrorism and the International Humanitarian Law of 
Armed Conflict’, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1st ed., 1996. 
Chaliand, G. & J.-P. Rageau, J-P., ‘A Starategic Atlas: Cooperative Geopolitics of the 
World’s Powers, trans. By T. Bennet, Harper Collins, 1983, p. 62.  
Chaliand, G., ‘Iranian Kurds under Ayatollah Khomeini’, in ‘a People without a Country’, in 
G Challiand (ed.) ‘A People Without a Country: the Kurds and Kurdistan’, Interlink 
Press, 1997, pp. 211-213. 
Chaqueri, C., ‘the Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920-21: Birth of the Trauma’, 
Pittsburgh U.P., 1994. 
Charountaki, M., ‘the Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International Relations in the Middle 
East’, Routledge, 2011, p. 36. 
Chesterman, S. (ed.), ‘Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance’, 
United Nations U.P., 1
st
 ed., 2005. 
Cho, S., ‘Applicability of International Law to Internal Armed Conflicts’, PhD Thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 1996, p. 13. 
Chomsky, N., ‘9-11’, Seven Stories Press, 2001. 
Chomsky, N., ‘International Terrorism: Image and Reality’, in ‘Western State Terrorism’, 
Alexander George (ed.), Polity Press, 1991.  
Ciment, J., ‘The Kurds: States & Minority in Turkey, Iraq & Iran, New York, 1996. 
Clapham, A., ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors’, Oxford U.P., 2006. 
Cleveland, W.L., ‘A History of Modern Middle East’, Westview Press, 3rd ed., 2004.  
Climbala, J.S., ‘Politics of Warfare’, Penn State Press, 2004, p. 51; see also R. Van Dijk 
(ed.), ‘Encyclopedia of the Cold War’, Taylor & Francis, 2008.  
Coates, A., “Is the Independent Application of jus in bello the Way to Limit War?” in “Just 
and Unjust Warriors: the Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers”, Rodin, D. Shue, H., 
(ed.), Oxford U.P., 2008. 
Coker, C., ‘War and the 20th Century: A Study of War and Modern Consciousness’, 
Michigan U.P., 1994.  
Cornell, E., ‘Turkey in the 21st Century: Opportunities, Challenges, Threats’, Curzon Press, 
2001, p. 120. 
360 
 
Corten, O., ‘The Law Against War: Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary 
International Law’, (trans by C. Sutcliffe), Hart, 2010. 
Cottam, R., ‘Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study’, University of Pittsburgh, 
1988, pp. 95-109; K.  
Cottam, R.W., ‘Nationalism in Iran’, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979.  
Crawford, E., ‘The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed 
Conflict’, Oxford U.P., 2010, p. 30. 
Crawford, E., ‘the Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed 
Conflict’, Oxford U.P., 2010. 
Crawford, J., ‘the Creation of States in International Law’, 2nd ed., Oxford U.P., 2006  
Crawford, J., ‘the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries 387 (2001). 
Crawford, J., ‘the Right to Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and 
Future’, in Peoples’ Rights’ P. Alston (ed.) Oxford U.P., 2001.  
Cullen, C., ‘the Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian 
Law’, Cambridge U.P., 2010. 
Cuny, F., ‘Northern Iraq: One Year Later (Carnegie Endowment, Washington, DC, 1992), p. 
15.  
Danilenko, G.M., ‘Law-Making in the International Community’, Kluwer Publishing, 1993. 
De Wet, E., ‘The Chapter VII Powers and the United Nations Security Council’, Hart 
Publishing, 2004; see also  
Dersimi, N., ‘Kurdistan Tarihinde Dersim’ (Dersim in the History of Kurdistan), Aleppo, 
1952. 
Detter, I., ‘The Law of War’, Cambridge U.P., 2nd ed., 2000, p.43. 
Dhokalia, R.P., ‘Codification of Public International Law’, Manchester U.P., 1970.   
Diener, A.C., ‘Borderlines and Borderlands: Political Oddities of the Edge of the Nation 
State’, Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p. 113. 
Dinstein, Y., ‘The Conduct of Hostilities under Law of International Armed Conflict’, 
Cambridge U.P., 2004.   
Dinstein, Y., ‘The War on Terrorism’ in ‘International Legal Dimension of Terrorism’, P. A. 
Fernandez-Sanchez (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 241-252.  
Dinstein, Y., ‘War, Aggression and Self-Defence’, Cambridge U.P., 2005.  
Donnelly, J., ‘International Human Rights’, Boulder, Westview Press, 1993. 
361 
 
Donohue, L., ‘Counter-terrorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom 1922-
2000’, 1st ed., Irish Academic Press, 2001.    
Draper, D.I.A.D., ‘Wars of National Liberation and War Criminality’, in ‘Restraints on War: 
Studies in the Limitations of Armed Conflict’, Howard, M. (ed.), Oxford U.P., 1979.   
Driver, E. J. R., ‘Kurdistan and the Kurds’, London: Royal Anthropological Institute, 1919, p. 
75.  
Dugard, J., ‘The Problem of the Definition of Terrorism in International Law’, In “September 
11, 2001: A turning Point in International and Domestic Law”, Paul Eden & Therese 
O’Donnell (ed.), Transnational Publishers, 2005. 
Eagleton, W., ‘The Kurdish Republic of 1946’, Oxford U.P., 1963.  
Eccarius-Kelly, V., ‘the Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom’, Praeger Security 
International, 2010.  
Edmonds, C.J., ‘Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 
1919-1925’, Oxford U.P., 1957.  
Eller, J.D., ‘From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: an Anthropological Perspective on 
International Ethnic Conflicts, Michigan U.P., 1999. 
Emir Celadet Ali, Bedirxan, Bir KÜRT Aydinindan Mustafa Kemal’e Mektup, Istanbul: Doz 
Yayinlari 1992. 
Emrullah Uslu, ‘the Transformation of Kurdish Political Identity in Turkey: Impact of 
Modernization, Democratization and Globalization’, Pro-Quest Publishing, 2011. 
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law Vol. I, North-Holland, 2001. 
Entessar, N., ‘Kurdish Ethnonationalism’, Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1992.  
Entessar, N., ‘Kurdish Politics in the Middle East’, Lexington, 2009. 
Ergil, D., ‘PKK: the Kurdish Workers’ Party’, in M. Heiberg et al, ‘Terror, Insurgency, and 
the State: End Protracted Conflicts’, Pennsylvania U.P., 2007, 322-356. 
Esenwein, G.R., ‘The Spanish Civil War: A Modern Tragedy’, Routledge. 
Everest, L., ‘Oil, Power and Empire: Iraq and the US Global Agenda’, 4th ed., 2004. 
Eyffinger, A., ‘The 1899 Hague Peace Conference: the Parliament of Men’, Springer, 1st ed., 
1999. 
Falk, R.A., ‘Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in International 
Aspects of Civil Strife’, 
Falk, R.A., ‘Legal Order in a Violent World’, Princeton U.P., 1968.   
Farer, T.J., ‘The Laws of War 25 Years after Nuremberg’, INT. Conciliation, No. 538, 
(1971).  
362 
 
Farouk-Sluglett, M. & Sluglett, P., ‘Iraq since 1958: from Revolution to Dictatorship’, 
Tauris, 2001. 
Finkel, C., ‘Osman’s Dream: the History of Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923’, John Murray 
Publishers, 2006, p. 502. 
Firmage, E.B., ‘The War of National Liberation and the Third World’, in ‘Law and Civil War 
in the Modern World’, John N. Moore (ed.), The Johns Hopkins U.P., 1974. 
Fischer, H., ‘the Status of Unlawful Combatants’ in W.P. Heere (ed), Terrorism and the 
Military: International Legal Implications (Asser: The Hague, 2003). 
Fischer, L., ‘the Soviets in the World Affairs: a History of Relations between the Soviets and 
the Rest of the World’, Vintage Books, 1960, 1:391-92.  
Fleck, D. (ed.), ‘The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict’, Oxford U.P., 2nd 
ed., 2008, p. 16; Hugo Grotius, ‘The Laws of War and Peace (De Jure belli ac Pacis), 
New Translation, Published for classic club by W. J. Black (1949). 
Fowler, M. & Bunck, J. ’Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and 
Application of the Concept of Sovereignty’, Pennsylvania State U.P., 1995.  
Fraleigh, A., ‘Algerian Revolution as a Case Study in International Law’ in ‘the International 
Law of Civil War’, R.A. Falk (ed.), The John Hopkins Press, 1st ed., 1971, pp. 179-
243. 
Franck, T., ‘Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks, Cambridge 
U.P., 2002, p. 63.  
Franck, T., ‘Fairness in International Law and Institutions’, Oxford U.P. 1995. 
Frank, T., ‘Post-Modern Tribalism and the Right to Secession’, in C. Brölmann et al. (ed.), 
‘Peoples and Minorities in International Law’, Brill Academic Publishers, 1993.   
Friedel, F., Francis Lieber: Nieteenth Century Liberal, Baton Rouge: Louisiana U.P., 1
st
 ed., 
1947.  
Fujita, H., ‘Application of International Humanitarian Law to internal Armed Conflicts’, in 
T.L.H. McCormack, Fuller, G.E., ‘the New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal 
State in the Muslim World’, US Institute of Peace Press, 2008, 89. 
Galeotti, M., ‘Afghanistan: the Soviet Union’s Last War’, Routledge, 2001. 
Gardam, G.J., ‘Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States’, Cambridge U.P., 
2004. 
Gardam, J.G., ‘Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian law’, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993.  
363 
 
Gasser, H-P., ‘Negotiating the 1977 Additional Protocols: was it a waste of time’, in 
‘Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour of Frits 
Kalshoven’, Kalshoven, Delissen et al. (ed.), Kluwer Publishers, 1991. 
Gazzini, J., ‘Some International Aspects of the Chinese Civil War’, J. Conflict Security Law, 
1996; 1: 141- 159; Gazzini, T., ‘The Changing Rules in the use of Force in 
international law’, Manchester U.P., 2005. 
Gellner, E., ‘Encounter with Nationalism’, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, pp. 81-91. 
Ghani, C., ‘Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: from Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Rule’, I.B. Tauris, 
2000, P. 386. 
Ghareeb, E., ‘The Kurdish Issue’, in S.C. Inati (ed.) ‘Iraq: Its History, People and Politics’, 
Prometheus Books, 2003, p. 168.  
Ghareeb, E., ‘The Kurdish Question in Iraq’, Syracuse U.P., 1981. 
Ghassemlou, A-R., ‘Kurdistan and the Kurds’ (London: Collets Holdings, 1965), pp. 13-14. 
Ghassemlou, A-R., ‘Kurdistan in Iran’, in G. Chaliand (ed.) translated by Michael Pallis, 
‘People without a Country: the Kurds and Kurdistan’, Zed Press, 1980.  
Gökalp, Z., ‘Principles of Turkism’(Ankara, 1920, trans. Robert Devereux, Leiden, 1968).  
Goldstone, R.,  et al., ‘International Terrorism: Legal Challenges and Responses’, a Report by 
the International Bar Association’s Task Force on International Terrorism, 
Transnational Publishers, 2003.  
Gowlland-Debbas, V., ‘Collective Security Revisited in Light of the Flurry over UN Reform: 
An International Law Perspective’, in ‘Conflicts, Security and Cooperation: Liber 
Amicorum Victor-Yves Ghebali’, V. Chetail (ed.), Bruylant: Bruxelles, 2007, pp. 251-
278.    
Gowlland-Debbas, V., ‘the Right to Life and the Relationship between Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law’, in ‘The Right to Life’, C. Tomuschat, et al. (ed.), Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2010.  
Graham, K., ‘The Security Council and Counter-Terrorism: Global and Regional Approaches 
to an Elusive Public Good’, Terrorism & Pol. Violence 37, 55 (2005). 
Gray, C., ‘International Law and the Use of Force’, 3rd ed., Oxford U.P., 2008, p. 37-8.  
Green, L., ‘The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict’, Manchester U.P., 3rd ed., 2008.    
Greenberg, E.V., ‘Law and the Conduct of the Algerian Revolution’, op. cit., see also ‘the 
ICRC and the Algerian Conflict’, (International Committee of Red Cross Pamphlet, 
1962).  
Greenspan, M., ‘Modern Law of Land Warfare’, University of California, 1st ed., 1959.  
364 
 
Greenwood, C., ‘A Critique of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949’, 
In H. Durham, & L.H. McCormack (ed.), ‘The Changing Face of Conflict and the 
Efficacy of International Humanitarian Law’, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999. 
Greenwood, C., ‘International Humanitarian Law (Laws of War)’ in ‘The Centennial of the 
First International Peace Conference: Reports and Conclusions’ edited by Frits 
Kalshoven, Kluwer Law International, 1
st
 ed., 2000.  
Greenwood, C., ‘Self-Defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict’ in Y. 
Dinstein, (ed.), International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of 
Shabtai Rosenne (1989).   
Greenwood, C.J., ‘Customary Law Status of 1977 Additional Protocols’ in ‘Humanitarian 
Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honor of Frits Kalshoven’, 
Delissen, A.J.M. and Tanja, G.J. (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1
st
 ed., 1991.  
Grewe, W.G., ‘The Epochs of International Law’, translated by Michael Byers, Walter de 
Gruyter, Revised edition, 2000, p. 709.  
Grey, C., ‘International Law and the Use of Force’, 3rd ed., Oxford U.P., p. 114. 
Guéhenno, J-M., ‘The End of Nation-State’, (translated by Victoria Elliot), University of 
Minnesota Publishing, 1995. 
Gunter, M.M., ‘Historical Dictionary of the Kurds’, scarecrow Press, 2011. 
Gunter, M.M., `the Kurds and Future of Turkey`, St. Martin`s Press, 1997, p. 6; Chaliand, a 
People Without a Country’, op. cit., p. 250.  
Gunter, M.M., ‘the Kurdish Question and International law’ in ‘the Kurdish Conflict in 
Turkey’, St. Martin’s Press, 2000, p. 32-33. 
Gunter, M.M., ‘the Kurds Ascending: the Evolving solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq 
and Turkey’, Palgrave McMillan, 2008.  
Gürbey, G., ‘the Development of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey since the 
1980s’, in R. Olson (ed.), ‘the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s’, the U.P. 
of Kentucky, 1996. 
H. Lauterpacht, Elihu. Lauterpacht (ed.), ‘International Law, V. 5, Disputes, War and 
Neutrality, parts IX-XIV: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht‘, 
Cambridge U.P., 2004. 
H.B. Wheaton, H.B., ‘International Law’, London, 1944 (7th English ed., by A.B. Keith).   
H.F. Spirer, H.F., ‘Accounting for Human Rights Violations by Non-State Actors’, in ‘Non-
State Actors in the Human Rights Universe’, G. Andreopoulos & Z.F. Kabasakal-Arat 
(ed.), Kumarian Press, 1
st
 ed., 2006. 
365 
 
Hale, W.M., ‘Turkish Politics and the Military’, Routledge, 1993, p. 232.   
Halliday, F., Can We Write Modernist History of Kurdish Nationalism’, in F.A. Jabar & H. 
Dawod (ed.), ‘The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics’, SAQI Publishing, 2006, pp.11-
12.  
Halperin, M.H.,  et al, “Self-Determination in the World Order: Guidelines for US Policy”, 
Prentice Hall & IBD, 1
st
 ed., 1992. 
Hamid Hamidi, ‘Ghomiyat va Ghomiyatgarayi dar Iran (Nations and Nationalisms in Iran), 
Tehran: New Publishers, 1990. 
Hannum, A., ‘Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: the Accommodation of 
Conflicting Rights’, Pennsylvania U.P., 1990, p. 183.   
Hannum, H. (ed.), ‘Guide to International Human Rights Practice’, Pennsylvania U.P., 1992. 
Hardi, C., ‘the Anfal Campaign against the Kurds: Chemical Weapons in the Service of Mass 
Murder’, in R. Lemarchand (ed.), ‘Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial and 
Memory’, Pennsylvania U.P., 2011, 106-122, p. 107.  
Harding, L., ‘Russia end anti-terrorism operation in Chechnya’, the Guardian, 16 April 2009. 
Harmon, C.C., ‘Terrorism Today’, Routledge, 2nd Edition, 2007, p. 119.  
Harris, D.J., ‘Cases and Materials on International Law’, Sweet and Maxwell, 6th ed., 2004. 
Harris, O’Brian and Warbrick, ‘Law of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 2009. 
Hassanpour, A. & Shahrzad Mojab, ‘Kurdish Diaspora’, in ‘Encyclopaedia of Diaspora: 
Immigrant and Refugee Culture Around the World’, Vol. 2, pp. 214-223. 
Hay, W.R., ‘Two Years in Kurdistan: Experience of a Political Officer 1918-1920’, Sidgwick 
& Jackson Ltd., 1921, pp. 13-34. 
Henderson, C., ‘The Persistent Advocate and the Use of Force: the Impact of the United 
States upon the Jus ad Bellum in the Post-Cold War Era’, Ashgate, 2010. 
Henkin, L. (ed.), ‘The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’, Columbia U.P., 1981. 
Hensel, H., (ed.) the Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary Use of 
Military Force’, Ashgate, 2005. 
Higgins, N., ‘Regulating the Use of Force in Wars of National Liberation: the Need for a 
New Regime’, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010. 
Higgins, R., ‘Internal War and international Law, in Vol. 3, Falk, R.A. & Black, C.E. (ed.) 
‘The Future of International Legal Order’, Princeton U.P., 1972.  
Higgins, R., ‘International Law and Civil Conflict’, in ‘International Regulations of Civil 
Wars’, Evan Luard (ed.), New York U.P., 1st ed., 1972. 
366 
 
Higgins, R., ‘Problem and Process: International Law and How We Use it’, Oxford: 
Clarendon Publications, 1
st
 ed., 1994. 
Higgins, R., ‘Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it’, Clarendon Press, 
1995.   
Higgins, R., ‘the Attitude of Western States Toward Legal Aspects of the Use of Force’ in A. 
Cassese (ed.), the Current Legal Regulations of the Use of Force’, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1986. 
Higgins, R., ‘The Development of International law Through the Political Organs of the 
United nations, Oxford university P., 1963.  
Higgins, R., ‘The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations’, Oxford U.P., 1963. 
Higgins, R., ‘The General international Law of Terrorism’, in Higgins & Flory (ed.), 
‘Terrorism and International Law’, Routledge, 1997. 
Hillenbrand, C., ‘the Crusades: Islamic Perspectives’, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, P. 594. 
Hills, A., ‘Warlords, Militia and Conflict in Contemporary Africa: Re-Examination of 
Terms’, ‘Small Wars and Insurgencies’, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 35-51;  
Hobsbawm, E., ‘Age of Extremes, London: Abacus, 1994, p. 67. 
Hobsbawm, E., ‘Nations and Nationalism Since 1780’, Cambridge U.P., 1st ed., 1990. 
Hoffman, R., ‘Non-State Actors as the New Subjects of International Law’, Berlin 1999.  
Hoffman, S., and Fidler, P., ‘Rousseau on International Relations’, Oxford U.P., 1st ed., 1991.  
Holms, R., ‘Falkland War (1982)’ in the Oxford Companion of Military History, Oxford 
U.P., 2004. 
Holsti, K.J., ‘The State, War, and the State of War’, Cambridge U.P., 1996. 
Howard, M., ‘the invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Relations’, Yale 
U.P., 2001, pp. 103-104.   
Howard, M., ‘War in European History’, Oxford U.P., 2001.    
Ighbal-Ashtiyani, A., ‘Tarikh-e-Iran (the History of Iran), Behzad Publications, 2nd ed., 2003. 
Ignatieff, M., ‘The Warriors’ Honour’, Vintage Publications, 1st ed., 1999.  
Ishay, M., ‘The History of Human Rights: from Ancient Times to the Globalization Era’, 
University of California Press, 2
nd
 ed., 2008, pp. 63-116.  
Ismet G.Ismet, `The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992)`, Turkish 
Daily News Publications, 1992. 
367 
 
Ismet Sheriff Vanly, ‘Kurdistan in Iraq’, in G. Chaliand (ed.), ‘People without a Country: the 
Kurds and Kurdistan’, in G. Challiand (ed.), ‘A people without a Country: the Kurds 
and Kurdistan’, Interlink Press, 1997, pp. 139-166.   
Izady, M.R., ‘The Kurds: A Concise Handbook’, Taylor & Francis Publishers, 1992, p. 13-
21.  
J.E., Bond, ‘The Rules of Riot: the Internal Conflict and the Law of war’, 1st ed., Princeton 
U.P., 1974.
  
Jennings, R. & Watts, A. (ed.) ‘Oppenheim’s International Law (Peace)’, 9th ed., Vol. I, part 
1, Longman, London, 1996. 
Jewell, T.  & Steele, J. (ed.), ‘Law in Environmental Decision Making: National, European, 
and International Perspectives’, Oxford U.P., 1998. 
Jones, J.R.W.D., ‘The Practice of International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda’, Transnational Publishers, 1997. 
Jongerden, J., ‘the Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: an Analysis of Spatial Policies, 
Modernity and War’, Brill, 2007, p. 14-15. 
Joseph, J., ‘The Nestorians and their Muslim Neighbours: A Study of Western Influence on 
their Relations’, Princeton U.P., 1961.  
Junod, S-S, ‘ICRC, Commentary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (Geneva: ICRC, 1987).   
Kaldor, M., ‘New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era’, Stanford U.P., 1999. 
Kalshoven, F. & Zegveld, L., ‘Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to 
International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC (Geneva), 1st ed., 2001.  
Kalshoven, F., ‘Applicability of Customary international Law in Non-international Armed 
Conflict’ in ‘Current Problems in international Law: Essays on U.N. Law and the Law 
of Armed Conflict’, Cassese (ed.), A.G. Giuffre, Milano, 1975.  
Kalshoven, F., ‘Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Methods and Means of Warfare’, the 
Gulf War of 1980-1988: the Iran-Iraq War in International Legal Perspective’, 1992. 
Karsh, E., ‘The Iran-Iraq War’, Rosen Publishing, 2008. 
Kasravi, A., Tārikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran (History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution), 
in Persian, Negah Publication, 2003.  
Keijzer, N., ‘Terrorism as a Crime’, in W. P. Heere (ed.), Terrorism and the Military: 
International Legal Implications, TMC Asser, 2003. 
Kelsen, H., ‘Principles of International Law’, Rinehart & Co., 1st ed., 1952.  
368 
 
Kendal Nezan, ‘A Survey of the History of the Kurds’, Collected Contributions and 
Messages (Paris: Kurdish Institute of Paris, March 1992). 
Khaduri, M., ‘War and Peace in the Law of Islam’, The Law Book Exchange Ltd., 1st ed., 
2006. 
Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law’, Cambridge U.P., 1st ed., 1st 
ed., 2001..   
Kinnane, D., ‘The Kurds and Kurdistan’, Oxford U.P., 1964. 
Kirisci, K. & Winrow, G., ‘the Kurdish Question and Turkey: an Example of Trans-State 
Ethnic Conflict’, Routledge, 1997. 
Kohen, M.G., ‘Secession: International Law Perspective’, Cambridge U.P., 1st ed., 2006. 
Kooijmans, P., ‘In the Shadow-land Between Civil War and Civil Strife’, in ‘Humanitarian 
Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honor of Frits Kalshoven, A. 
Delissen and G. Tanja, (ed.), Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1
st
 ed., 1991. 
Kotzsch, L., ‘The Concept of War in Contemporary History and International Law’, Geneva: 
Librairie, 1956.  
Krasner, S., ‘Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy’, Princeton U.P., 1999, p. 227.  
Kreyenbroek, P.J. & Sperl, S.,  (ed.), ‘The Kurds: a Contemporary Overview’, Routledge, 
1992. 
Kuperman, A.J., ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, in M. Goodhart (ed.), ‘Human Rights: Politics 
& Practice’, Oxford U.P., 2009, p. 338. 
Kwakwa, E.K., ‘The International Law of Armed conflict: Personal and Material Fields of 
Application’, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992. 
L. Condorelli, L., ‘War Crimes and Internal Conflicts in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court’, in ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to 
Impunity’, M. Politi & G. Nesi (ed.), Ashgate: Dartmouth, 1998. 
L. Oppenheim, L. & Lauterpacht, H., ‘International Law: a Treatise’ (London: Longman, 
1952) vol. II. 
La Haye, E., ‘War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict’, Cambridge U.P., 2008. 
Lachs, M., ‘War Crimes, an Attempt to Define the Issue’, London: Stevens, 1945.  
Laizer, S., ‘Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf War’, Zed Books, 1996. 
Lalonde, S., Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, The Role of Uti Possidetis, 
McGill-Queen’s U.P., 1st ed., 2004.  
Lamberti-Zanardi, P., ‘Indirect Military Aggression’ in A. Cassese, ‘the Current Legal 
Regulations of the Use of Force’, Kluwer Academic: London, 1986.  
369 
 
Lambton, A.K.S., ‘Landlords and Peasants in Persia’, I.B. Tauris, 1991, 2nd ed., P. 291. 
Lassa, F.L., ‘Oppenheim, International Law’, 7th ed. (edited by) Hersch Lauterpacht (London 
1952), vol. II. 
Lauterpacht, H. & Lauterpacht, E., ‘International Law: Being the Collected papers of Hersch 
Lauterpacht’, Cambridge U.P., 1977.  
Lauterpacht, H., ‘recognition in international law’, Cambridge U.P., 1947.  
Lawrence, T., ‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom: Complete 1922 Oxford Text’, J&N Wilson, 
London, 2004.  
Levy, B.S., & Sidel, V.W., ‘War and Public Health’, Oxford U.P., 1997.  
Levy, L., ‘War in the Modern Great Power System’, Lexington: Kentucky U.P., 1st ed., 1983. 
Lewis, B., ‘Palestinians and the PLO: A Historical Approach’, Commentary, ABD-CLIO, 
1975, p. 48.  
Lewis, P., ‘Not just Governments Make war and Peace’, New York Times, 28 November 
1998.  
Lietzau, W., ‘Combating Terrorism: The Consequences of Moving from Law Enforcement to 
War’ in D. Wippman & M. Evangelista (ed.), ‘New Wars, New Laws: Applying the 
Laws of War in 21
st
 Century Conflicts’, Transnational Publishers, 1st ed., 2005, p. 41.  
Lokman I. Meho, ‘the Kurds and Kurdistan: a Selective and Annotated Bibliography’, 
Greenwood Press, 1997.   
Loukaidēs, L.G., ‘The European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Essays’, Brill, 
2007.    
Lubell, N., ‘Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors’, Oxford U.P., 2011. 
Lyon, A.J. & Ucarer, E.M., ‘Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict: Kurdish Separation in Germany and 
the PKK’, R. Koslowski (ed.) ‘International Migration and Globalization of Domestic 
Politics’, Routledge, 2005. 
Malanczuk, P., ‘Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law’, Routledge, 7th ed., 
1997. 
Mallison, W. & Mallison, ‘the Concept of Public Purpose Terror in International Law: 
Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction of human and Material Values’, in 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Terrorism and Political Crimes’, Charles Thomas 
Publishers, 1975.     
Manafy, A., ‘the Kurdish Political Struggles in Iran, Iraq and Turkey: a Critical analysis’, 
U.P. of America, 2005. 
370 
 
Marcus, A., ‘Blood and Belief: the PKK & the Kurdish Fight for Independence’, New York 
U.P., 2009. 
Mardin, S., Türk Modernlesmesi, Makaleler 4, Istanbul, Iletisim Yayinevi, 1991. 
McCormack, T. & Tilbury & Triggs, G.D., (eds.), ‘A Century of War and Peace: Asia-Pacific 
Perspectives on the Centenary of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference (The Hague, 
Kluwer International, 2001).      
McCoubrey, H. & White, N.D., ‘International Law and Armed Conflict’, Aldershot & 
Vermont: Dartmouth Publishing, 1992. 
McCoubrey, H. & White, N.D., ‘International Organizations and Civil War’, Dartmouth 
Publishers, 1
st
 ed., 1995. 
McCoubrey, H., ‘Humanitarian Provisions in Non-International Armed Conflict’, in 
‘International Humanitarian Law: the Regulation of Armed Conflict’, Dartmouth 
Publishing, 1990.  
McCoubrey, H., ‘International humanitarian Law: Modern Developments in the Limitation of 
Warfare’, 2nd ed., Ashgate, Dartmouth.  
McDowall, D., ‘A Modern History of the Kurds’, I.B. Tauris, 3rd Revised Edition, 2007. 
McDowall, D., ‘the Kurds, Minority Rights Group Report No. 23, rev, ed., 1985.  
McDowall, D., ‘The Kurds: a Nation Denied’, Minority Rights Group (1 August 1991),  
McNair, A.D. & Watts, A.D., ‘The Legal Effects of War’, New York: Cambridge U.P., 4th 
ed., 1966. 
McWhinney, E., ‘The United Nations and a New World Order for a New Millenium: Self-
Determination, State Succession, and International Humanitarian Intervention’, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000. 
Meho, L.I. & Maglaughlin, K.L. (ed.), ‘Kurdish Culture & Society: An Annotated 
Bibliography’, Greenwood Press, 2001. 
Meho, L.I., ‘The Kurds and Kurdistan: A General Background’, in L.I. Meho & K.L. 
Maglaughlin (ed.), ‘Kurdish Culture and Society: An Annotated Bibliography’, 
Greenwood Press, 2001. 
Meiselas, S., ‘Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History’, the University of Chicago Press, 2nd 
edition, 1997.  
Melzer, N., ‘Target Killing in International Law’, Oxford U.P., 2008 
Menashari, D., ‘Khomeini Policy towards Ethnic and Religious Minorities’, in M.J. Esman & 
I. Rabinovich (ed.) ‘Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle east’, Cornell 
U.P., 1988. 
371 
 
Meron, T., ‘Convergence of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights law’, in D. 
Warner (ed.), ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, Kluwer Law international, 
1997. 
Meron, T., ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms in Customary Law’, Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 1989. 
Meron, T., ‘The Humanization of International Law’, Brill, 2006. 
Mettraux, G., ‘International Crimes and the ad hoc tribunals’, OUP: Oxford, 2005 
Miller, D.M., ‘The Origin, Development and Negotiation of the Additional Protocol II on 
Non-International Armed Conflicts’, in Report International Symposium of the 
Netherlands Red Cross, The Hague. 
Mishra, H.B., ‘Terrorism: Threat of Peace and Harmony’, Authors Press, India, 1999.   
Mockaitis, T.R., ‘the New Terrorism: Myth and Reality’, Praeger Publishers, 2006.  
Moir, L., ‘Non-International Armed Conflict and Guerrilla Warfare’, in ‘International 
Criminal Law’, Vol. I: Sources, Subjects and Contents”, M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008.  
Moir, L., ‘Reappraising the Resort to Force: International Law, Jus ad Bellum and the War on 
Terror’, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 144. 
Moir, L., ‘The Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, 1st ed., Cambridge U.P., 2002. 
Moran, D. & Keegan, J. (ed.), ‘Wars of National Liberation’, Harper Collins Publishing, 
2006.   
Münkler, W., ‘New Wars’, Polity, 2004. 
Myers, M.S. & Feliciano, F.P., ‘Law and Minimum World Public Order: the Legal 
Regulation of International Coercion’, Yale U.P., 1961.    
N. Entessar, N., ‘Kurdish Politics in the Middle East’, Lexington Books, 2009.  
Natali, D., ‘the Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey and Iran’ 
(Syracuse U.P., 2005. 
Neamatollah, Nojumi, ‘The Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, 
and the Future of the Region’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.  
Neff, S., ‘War and the Law of Nations: a General History’, Cambridge U.P., 2000.  
Neilson, K., ‘The Foreign Office and the Defence of Empire: 1919-1939’, in G. Kennedy 
(ed.), ‘Imperial Defence: the Old World Order: 1856-1956’, Routledge, 2008, pp. 30-
49. 
Norton-Moore, J., et al., ‘Law and the Civil War in the Modern World’, Johns Hopkins Press, 
1974.  
372 
 
Nussbaum, A., ‘a Concise History of the Law of Nations’, McMillan, 1954. 
O’Ballance, E., ‘Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970’, Faber & Faber, 1973. 
O’Leary, B. et al., ‘the Future of Kurdistan in Iraq’, Pennsylvania U.P., 2005. 
O’Shea, M.T., ‘Trapped Between the Map and Reality: Geography and Perceptions of 
Kurdistan’, Routledge, 2004. 
Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977), 
17 Volumes (Berne: Federal Political Department, 1978). 
Oglesby, R.R., ‘Internal War and the Search Normative Order’, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, p. 
11.  
Oliver, R., ‘Turkey Today: a European Country?’, Anthem Press, 2005, p. 170. 
Olson, R., ‘the Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism & the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925’, 
University of Texas Press, 1989, p.1. 
Olson, R., ‘Turkey’s Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, 1991-2000: the Kurdish 
and Islamist Question’, Mazda Publishing, 2001. 
Oppenheim, L.P., ‘International Law’, ed. H. Lauterpacht, 7th ed., Longmans Green, 1952.  
Ostovar, A.P., ‘Guardians of the Islamic Revolution Ideology, Politics, and the Development 
of Military Power in Iran (1979-2009)’, Proquest, 2011, p. 51. 
Ozerdim, S., Ataturk Devrimi Kronolojisi [Chronology of Ataturk’s Reforms] (Ankara, 
1996).
 
Özoğlu, Hakan, ‘Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing 
Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries’, State University of New York Press, 2004, p. 
122. 
Patel-King, F. & S. Swaak-Goldman, S., (ed.) ‘The Applicability of international 
Humanitarian law to the ‘War against Terrorism’”, in Hague Yearbook of 
International Law, J.G. Lammers (ed.), Martinus Nijhofff Publishers, 2004.  
Pejic, J., ‘Status of Armed Conflict” in “Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law”, Wilmshurst, E. and Breau, S. (ed.), Cambridge 
U.P., 1
st
 ed., 2007. 
Pejic, J., “’Unlawful/Enemy Combatants’: Interpretation and Consequences”, in 
‘International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines’, M. Schmitt & J. 
Pejic, (ed.,), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1
st
 ed., 2007, 335-355.   
Pelletiere, S.C., ‘the Kurds: the Unstable Element in the Gulf’, Westview Press, 1984, pp. 57-
61. 
373 
 
Perez-Gonzalez, M., ‘Combating Terrorism: An International Humanitarian Law 
Perspective’, in ‘International Legal Dimension of Terrorism’, P-A. Fernandez-
Sanchez (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009.    
Perritt, H.H., ‘Kosovo Liberation Army: the Inside Story of an Insurgency’, University of 
Illinois Press, 2008. 
Perry, J.R., ‘Karim-Khan Zand: A History of Iran, 1747-1779’, Chicago U.P., 1979. 
Petrasek, D., ‘Ends and Means: Human Rights Approaches to Armed Groups 3’ (2000); C. 
Holmqvist, ‘Engaging Non-State Actors in Post-Conflict Settings’, in ‘Security 
Governance and Post-Conflict Peace-building’, A. Bryden H. Hanggi (eds.), 2005.   
Philips, D.L., `Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Workers Party`, 
National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 15 October 2007.  
Philpott, D., ‘Revolution in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations’, 
Princeton U.P., 2001.  
Pictet, J.S., Commentary of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva, 
ICRC 1956). 
Polk, W.R., ‘Understanding Iran: Everything you Need to Know, From Persia to the Islamic 
Republic, from Cyrus to Ahmadinejad’, Palgrave-McMillan, 2009. 
Pollack, K.M., ‘Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness’, Nebraska U.P. , 2004. 
Pollack, K.M., ‘the Persian Puzzle: the Conflict between Iran and America’, Random House, 
2004.  
Poulantzas, N.M., ‘The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law’, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2
nd
 ed., 2002. 
Poulton, H., ‘Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish 
Republic’, New York U.P., 1997.  
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, Part I, art. 1(4), see also D. 
Kay, ‘The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations the UN Political Process’, 
International Organization, 21 (1967). 
Prunhuber, C., ‘the Passion & Death of Rahman the Kurd: Dreaming Kurdistan’, iUniverse, 
2011.   
Quaye, C.O., ‘Liberation Struggle in International Law’, Temple U.P., 1991.  
Raic, D., ‘Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination’, Martinus Nijhoff, 2002;  
Randelzhofer, A., ‘Article 2(4)’ in B. Simma (ed.), ‘The Charter of the United Nations, A 
Commentary’, Oxford U.P., 1994. 
374 
 
Ranjeva, R., ‘Peoples and National liberation Movements’ in ‘International Law: 
Achievements and Prospects (ed. M. Bedjaoui), Paris, 1991. 
Reisman, W.M., ‘Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision’ in ‘Law and 
Civil War in the Modern world’, John Norton Moore (ed.), The Johns Hopkins U.P., 
1
st
 ed., 1974.   
Rich, P.B., ‘Warlords in international Relations’, Palgrave Macmillan, 1st ed., 1999.  
Riedel, E.H., ‘Recognition of Insurgency’ In Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), ‘Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law’, Vol. IV, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2000. 
Ritter, S., ‘Target Iran: the Truth about the White House’s Plan for Regime Change’, Nation 
Books, 2007, p. 196.  
Robertson, A. & Merrills, J., ‘Human Rights in the World’, Manchester U.P., 1989. 
Rodley, N.S., ‘Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights Standards?’ in 
Mahoney & Mahoney (ed.), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century (1993), 
Kluwer Publishers, 1993. 
Roger, A.V.P., ‘Law on the Battlefield’, Manchester U.P., 2nd ed., 2004. 
Romano, D., ‘the Kurdish Nationalist Movement’, Cambridge U.P., 2006, pp. 183-4. 
Roosevelt, K., ‘Countercoup: the Struggle to Control of Iran’, McGraw-Hill, 1979.  
Rosas, A., ‘The Legal Status of Prisoners’ of War: a Study in International Humanitarian 
Law Applicable in Armed Conflict’, (the Finish Academy of Science and Letters, 
Helsinki), 1976.. 
Rosen, S.J. & Frank, R., ‘Measures against International terrorism’, in D. Carlton & C. 
Schaerf (ed.), ‘International Terrorism and World Society’, London: Croom Helm, 
1975. 
Rosenne, S., ‘An International Law Miscellany’, Springer, 1st ed., 1993.  
Rositzke, H., ‘The CIA Secret Operations: Espionage, Counter-espionage and Covert 
Action’, Boulder, 1977, pp. 109-110. 
Rotberg, R., ‘When States Failed: Causes and Consequences’, Princeton U.P., 1st ed., 2004. 
Roth, B.R., ‘Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law’, Oxford U.P., 1999.   
Rousseau, J-J., On Social Contract, Book 1, Ch. 4, in Rousseau’s Political Writings 84, bk. 1, 
Ch. 4, p. 90, Alan Ritter & Julia Bondanella (ed.), 1988. 
Russell, R.B., ‘A History of the United Nations Charter’, Washington DC, The Brookings 
Institution, 1958, pp. 810-813.   
Ruys, T., ‘Armed Attacks and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law 
and Practice’, Cambridge U.P., 2010.  
375 
 
Rwelamira, M.R., ‘The Significance and Contribution of the Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 1949’, pp. 227-236, in C. Swinarski (ed.), ‘Studies and Essays 
on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles’, In Honor of Jean Picet, 
ICRC, Geneva, 1984.  
Safrastian, A., ‘Kurds and Kurdistan’, the Harvill Press, 1948.  
Salibi, K.S., ‘Crossroads to civil war: Lebanon, 1958-1976’, Delmar: Caravan Books, 1st ed., 
1976. 
Salinas-Burgos, H., ‘The Application of International Humanitarian Law as Compared to 
Human Rights Law in Situations Qualified as Disturbances and Tensions, Or Public 
Emergency, with Special Reference to War Crimes and Political Crimes’, in F. 
Kalshoven and Y. Sandoz (eds.), ‘Implementation of International Humanitarian law’ 
(Boston, Matinus Nijhoff, 1989). 
Sandoz, Y., et al. (ed.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987).  
Sands, P., ‘Principles of International Environmental Law’, Cambridge U.P., 2nd ed., 2003. 
Sassoli, M. & Bouvier, A., ‘How Does Law Protect in War?’, International Committee of 
Red Cross, 1999, p. 208. 
Sassoli, M., ‘The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types 
of Armed Conflicts`, in O. Ben-Naftali, ‘International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law’, Oxford U.P., 2011. 
Saul, B., ‘Defining Terrorism in International Law’, Oxford U.P., 2006.  
Schabas, W., ‘International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute’, Oxford 
U.P., 2010.  
Schabas, W., ‘The UN International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone’, Cambridge U.P., 2006. 
Schachter, O., ‘International law in Theory or Practice’, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991, 
p.401. 
Schachter, O., ‘The Lawful Use of Force by a State against Terrorists in another Country’, In 
‘Terrorism and Political Violence: Limits & Possibilities of Legal Control’, Henry H. 
Han (ed.), Oceana Publishers, 1993.   
Scharf, M.P., ‘Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial 
since Nuremberg’, Carolina U.P., 1997. 
Schiff-Berman, P. (ed.), ‘The Globalization of International Law’, Ashgate Publishing, 1st 
ed., 2005.    
376 
 
Schmitt, M.N., ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict’ in H. 
Fischer (ed), Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection: Festshrift fur Dieter 
Fleck (Berlin, BWV, 2004).  
Schmitt, M.N., ‘Responding to Transnational Terrorism under Jus ad Bellum: a Normative 
Framework’, in Schmitt & Peijc (eds.), ‘International law and Armed Conflict: 
Exploring the Faultlines’, Martinus Nijhoff, 2007.   
Schmitt, M.N., ‘the Impact of High and Low-Tech Warfare on Principle of distinction’ in R. 
Arnold & P-A Hildbrand (eds), International Humanitarian Law and the 21
st
 
Century’s Conflicts: Changes and Challenges (Lausanne, Edis, 2005). 
Serefettin Turan, ‘Yuzyilda Osmanli Imparatorlugunun idari taksimati (Administrative 
boundaries of the 17
th
 Century Ottoman Empire) Attaturk Universitesi, 1961, Yilligi, 
(Ankara, 1963), pp. 205-07 cited in M. Kendal, ‘the Kurds under the Ottoman 
Empire’, G. Chaliand (ed., translated by Michael Pallis), ‘People without a Country: 
the Kurds and Kurdistan’, Zed Press, 1980, p. p. 22.  
Şerefhan, Şerefname,:  Kürt Tarihi, Translated by Emin N. Bozaraslan, (Istanbul: Yontem 
Yay, 1975). 
Service, R., ‘Trotsky: a Biography’, Macmillan, 2009. 
Seybolt, T.B., ‘Humanitarian Intervention: the Conditions for Success and Failure’, Oxford 
U.P., 2007.   
Shahnameh, edited By Jalal Khaliqi-Mutlaq (New York Bibliotheca Persica, 1987). 
Shasthri, V.S., ‘International Humanitarian Law Relating to Non-international Armed 
Conflict’, in ‘International Humanitarian Law: An Anthology’, Lexis-Nexis 
Publication, 2009. 
Shaw, M.N., ‘International Law’, Cambridge U.P., 6th ed., 2008. 
Shelton, D., ‘Soft Law’, in ‘Routledge International Handbook’, D. Armstrong (ed.), 
Routledge, 2009. 
Short, M. & McDermott, A., The Kurds, 3
rd
 ed., (London, Minority Rights Group, March 
1977), p. 6.  
Shultz, R.H. & Farah, D., I.V. Lochard, ‘Armed Groups: a Tier-One Security Priority’, 
Occasional Paper 57, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy 
Colorado, 2004.  
Sieghart, P., ‘The International Law of Human Rights’, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983.    
Simma, B., ‘Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary’, Vol. I., Oxford U.P., 2nd ed., 
2002.   
377 
 
Simon, R.S., ‘The Imposition of Nationalism on a Non-Nation State: the Case of Iraq during 
the Interwar Period, 1921-1941’, J. Jankowski & I. Gershoni (ed), Rethinking Arab 
Nationalism in the Middle east, Columbia U.P., 1997.  
Simons, G., ‘Iraq: from Sumer to Saddam’, St. Martin’s Press, 2nd ed., 1994. 
SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford U.P., 
2011. 
SIPRI Yearbook, ‘armament, disarmament and international security’, Oxford U.P., 2005 and 
2006. 
Slaughter, A-M., ‘A New World Order’, Princeton U.P., 2004. 
Sluglett, P., ‘Britain in Iraq: Contriving King & Country, 1914-1932’, Ithaca Press, 1976. 
 Sluiter, G. & Klip, A., ‘Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals. 2: the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 1993-1998’, Antwerpen: 
Intersentia, 2001. 
Smolansky, O.M. & Smolansky, M.B., ‘the USSR and Iraq: the Soviet Quest for Influence’, 
Durham, N.C., 1991, pp. 117-27.  
Solis, G.D., ‘The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War’, 
Cambridge U.P., 2010. 
Stansfield, G.R., ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy’, 
Routledge, 2010, p. 76. 
Stark, J.G., ‘An Introduction to international Law’, Butterworth, 5th ed., 1963, p. 145. 
Stubbins-Bates, E., ‘Terrorism and International Law: Accountability, Remedies, and 
Reform, a Report of the IBA Task Force on Terrorism’, Oxford U.P., 2011. 
Suter, K., ‘an International Law of Guerrilla Warfare’, Frances Pinter Publishers, 1984.  
Szyliowicz, J.S., ‘Education and Modernisation in the Middle East, Ithaca, NY: Cornel U.P., 
1973. 
Taheri, A., ‘the Persian Knight: Iran under the Khomeinist Revolution’, Encounter Books, 
2009.  
Tammes, A.J.P., ‘Soft Law’, in ‘Essays of International & Comparative Law in Honour of 
Judge Erades’, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983. 
Taspinar, O., ‘Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in 
Transition, Routledge, 2005. 
Thirlway, H., ‘The Sources of International Law’, in ‘International Law’, M. Evans (ed.), 2nd 
ed., 2006. 
378 
 
Thurer, D., ‘Self-Determination’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, vol. IV (Amsterdam, North Holland, 2000).      
Tilleman, H.K., ‘International Conflict since 1945: A Bibliographic Handbook of Wars and 
Military Interventions’, Boulder, Co: Westview, 1st ed., 1991. 
Tomuschat, C., ‘Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World’, in Modern Law of Self-
Determination”, C. Tomuschat (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1st ed., 1993, 1-20. 
Totten, S. & Parsons, W.S., (ed.), ‘Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness 
Accounts’, Routledge, 3rd ed., 2008. 
Trapp, K.N., ‘State Responsibility for International Terrorism’, Oxford U.P., 2011.  
Toynbee, A., Survey of International Affairs, 1925, vol. I: the Islamic World Since the Peace 
Settlement (London: Oxford U.P., 1927). 
Trapp, C., ‘A History of Iraq’, Cambridge U.P., 2000, pp. 30-76; for the League of Nations 
Mandate system see: N. Bentwich, ‘the Mandate System’, Longmans, 1930. 
Tugrul Ansay & D. Wallace, Jr. (ed.), ‘Introduction to Turkish Law’, Kluwer Law 
International, 5
th
 ed., 2004. 
Tursan, H., ‘Democratization in Turkey: the Role of Political Parties’, Inter-University Press, 
2004.  
UK Ministry of Defence ‘the Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict’, Oxford U.P., 2004. 
Vali, A., ‘Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism’, Mazda Publication, 2003. 
Van Bruinessen, M., ‘Aghas, Sheikhs, and State: the Social and Political Structures of 
Kurdistan, Zed Books, 1992. 
Van Creveld, M., ‘The Rise and Decline of the State’, Cambridge U.P., 1st ed., 1999. 
Van Creveld, M., ‘The Transformation of War’, Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991.  
Van den Wijngaert, C., ‘the Political Offence Exception to Extradition: the Delicate Problem 
of Balancing the Rights of the Individual and the International Public Order’, Kluwer 
Law International, 1980.   
Van-Bruinessen, M., ‘Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in 
Turkey (1937-38) and the Chemical War against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)’, in G.J. 
Andreopoulos (ed.), Conceptual and Historical Dimensions of Genocide’, 
Pennsylvannia U.P., 1994. 
Vanderlippe, J.M., ‘the Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inonu and the Formation of the 
Multi-Party System, 1938-50’, New York State U.P., 2005. 
379 
 
Veuthey, M., ‘A Survey of International Humanitarian Law  in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts: 1949-1974’ in M. Cherif Bassiouni, (ed.), International Terrorism and 
Political Crimes (Springfield, Charles C. Thomas, 1975). 
Villiger, M.E., ‘Customary International Law and Treaties’, Brill, 1985. 
Von Clausewitz, C., ‘On War’, Penguin Classics, 3rd ed., 1982. 
Von Hebel, H. & Robinson, D., ‘Crimes in the Jurisdiction of the Court’ in ‘the International 
Criminal Court: the Making of the Rome Statute’, R.S. Lee (ed.), Brill, 1999. 
Wadie Jwaideh, ‘The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development’, Syracuse 
U.P., 2006, pp. 11-12. 
Walker, W.L. & Grey, F.T., ‘Pitt Cobbett’s Leading Cases on International Law’, 5th ed., 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1937, vol. II.  
Ward, S.R., ‘Immortal: a Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces’, Georgetown U.P., 
2009. 
Watkin, K., ‘21st Century Conflict and International Humanitarian Law”, in “International 
Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Fault-lines”, Schmitt M., and 
Pejic, J., (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1
st
 ed., 2007.    
Watkins, K., ‘21 Century Conflicts and International Humanitarian Law: Status Quo or 
Change?’, in ‘International law of Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines’, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2007.  
Weber, M., ‘Political Writings’, Peter Lassman & Ronald Speirs (ed.), Cambridge U.P., 
1994. 
Wehrey, F., et al., ‘the Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corp’, Rand Corporation, 2009. 
Werle, G., ‘Principles of International Criminal Law’, TMC: Asser Press, 2005.  
Westad, O.A., ‘Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the 
Chinese Civil War’, Columbia U.P., 1993. 
Whisker, J.B., ‘The Militia’, Edwin Mellen Press, 1st ed., 1992.  
Wilkinson, A. & Steward, A., ‘Contemporary Research on Terrorism’, Aberdeen U.P., 1987. 
Wilkinson, P., ‘Terrorism and the Liberal State’, Macmillan, London, 1977, p. 48; Van 
Krieken, P. (ed.), ‘Terrorism and International Legal Order’, Asser Press, 2002.   
Wilson, H., ‘International Law and the Use of force by National Liberation Movements’, 
Oxford U.P., 1988. 
Wolfrum, R. & Röben, V., ‘Developments of International Law in treaty-Making’, Springer, 
2005. 
380 
 
Wright, Q., ‘A Study of War’, Chicago U.P., 2nd ed., 1965.    
Wyden, P., ‘The Passionate War: the Narrative History of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39, 
Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983.  
Xenophon, ‘The Persian Expedition’, Penguin, 1984.  
Yassemi, R., Kurds va payvastegi-e Nejadi va Tarikhi-e Uo (the Kurds and His Racial & 
Historical Bonds), Tehran: Amir Kabir Publications, 1984. 
Yildiz, K. & Blass, T., ‘The Kurds in Iraq: the Past, Present and Future’, Pluto Press, 2004. 
Yildiz, K. & Breau, S., ‘the Kurdish Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and Post-
Conflict Mechanism’, Routledge, 2010. 
Yildiz, K. & Breau, S., ‘the Kurdish Conflict: International Humanitarian and Post-Conflict 
Mechanism’, Routledge, 2010.  
Yildiz, K. & M. Muller, M., The European Union and Turkish Accession: Human Rights and 
the Kurds (London: Pluto Press, 2008). 
Yildiz, K. & Muller, M., `The European Union and Turkish accession: Human Rights and the 
Kurds`, Pluto Press, 2008. 
Zabih, S., ‘Iran since the Revolution, Johns Hopkins U.P., 1982.  
Zahar, A. & Sluiter, G., ‘International Criminal Law: a Critical Introduction’, Oxford U.P., 1st 
ed., 2007.    
Zurcher, E-Z., ‘Turkey: a Modern History’, I.B. Tauris, 3rd ed., 2004. 
 
Articles 
 
A. Aust, A., ‘Counter-Terrorism: a New Approach’, 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law (2001) 285, p. 290-291.  
Abi-Saab, G., ‘Wars of National Liberations in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols’, 165 
Recueil de Cours, IV, 366-445 (1979). 
Abramovitz, M. & Barkey, H.F., ‘Turkey’s Transformers: the AKP Sees Big’, 88 Foreign 
Affairs 118 2009.   
Aldrich, G.H. & Chinkin C.M., (ed.), ‘Symposium: the Hague Peace Conferences’ 94 AJIL 
(2000), pp. 1-98. 
Aldrich, G.H., ‘Comments on the Geneva Protocols’ 320 IRRC 31 October 1997.  
Aldrich, G.H., ‘Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’ (1996) 90 AJIL 64.   
381 
 
Aldrich, G.H., ‘Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions’, 85 AJIL 1 (1991), pp. 6-7.  
Aldrich, G.H., ‘The Laws of War on Land’, AJIL (2000) 42, p. 59. 
Allen, R.G., et al., ‘Refining War, Civil Wars and Humanitarian Controls’ (1996) 18 HRQ 
747, p. 763.  
Alvarez, J.E., ‘Nuremberg Revisited: the Tadic Case’ (1996) 7 EJIL 245-264. 
A-M. Slaughter, A-M. & Burke-White, W., ‘An International Constitutional Moment’, 
Harvard ILJ 2 (2002). 
Amerasinghe, C.F., ‘History and Sources of the Law of War’, 16 Sri Lanka JIL 263 2004.  
Antonopoulos, C., ‘Force by Armed Groups as Armed Attacks and Broadening of Self-
Defence’, NILR, LV: 159-180, 2008. 
Antonopoulos, C., ‘The Turkish Military Operation in Northern Iraq of March-April 1995 
and the International Law on the Use of Force’, 1 Journal of Armed Conflict Law 33 
1996. 
Armstrong, A.J., ‘Mercenaries and Freedom Fighters: The Legal Regimes of the Combatant 
under Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)’, 30 JAG J. 
125 (1978). 
Asbjørn Eide, A. Rossas & T. Meron, ‘Combating Lawlessness in Grey Zone Conflicts 
Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards’, 89 AJIL 217 (1995), 217. 
Bal, I. & Laciner, S., `Ethnic terrorism and the Case of the PKK: Roots, Structure, Survival, 
and Ideology`, Ankara Paper 9, 2004, 1-83, p. 24. 
Bar-Yaacov, N., ‘Some Aspects of Prisoner-Of-War Status according to the Geneva Protocol 
I of 1977’, 20 Israel Law Review 243 1985.  
Bassiouni, M.C., ‘Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy oriented Assessment’, 
43(1) Harv. ILJ. 83, (2002).   
Bassiouni, M.S., ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed 
Conflict by Non-State Actors’, the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 
98, No. 3, 2008, pp. 711-810, p. 749.  
Baxter, R.R., ‘A sceptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism’, 7 Akron Law Review 380 
(1974), p. 381.  
Baxter, R.R., ‘Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic conference 
on Humanitarian Law’, 16 Harv. ILJ 1 1975.  
Baxter, R.R., ‘Modernizing the Laws of War”, 78 Military Law Review 165 (1978), p. 172. 
382 
 
Baxter, R.R., ‘So-called‘ Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs’ (1951) 
BYIL 323, p. 328.  
Baxter, R.R., ‘The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful Use of Force Under the Charter’ 
(1968) 62 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 68. 
Baxter, R.R., ‘Treaties and Custom’, Recueil des cours, 129 (1970, Vol. 1). 
Beard, J.M., ‘America’s New War on Terror: the Case for Self-Defence under International 
Law’, 25 Harvard Journal of Law & Policy (2002) 559-590, p. 4.  
Becket, J., ‘The Greek Case before the European Human Rights Commission’, 1 (1970-71) 
Human Rights  91. 
Ben-Naftali, O., ‘A Judgement in the Shadow of International Criminal Law’ (2007) 5 JICJ 
322. 
Berkey, C.G., ‘International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-Determination for 
Indigenous Peoples’, 5 Harv. Human Rights Journal 65 1992, p. 78. 
Best, G., ‘Peace Conferences and a Century of Total War: the 1899 Hague Conference and 
What came Next’, 75 International Affairs (1999) No. , pp. 619-634. 
Boisard, M., ‘On the probable influence of Islam on western public and international law’, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 11, 1980, pp. 429-50. 
Bolukbasi, S., `Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad, and the regionalization of Turkey`s Kurdish 
secessionism`, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 14, No. 4 (Summer 
1991): pp. 16-19.  
Bond, J.E., ‘Internal conflict and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions’ (1971) 48 Denver 
Law Journal 263. 
Bond, J.F., ‘Application of the Law of War to Internal Armed Conflicts’, (1973) 3 Georgia. 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 345.   
Bothe, M., ‘Article 3 and Protocol II: Case Studies of Nigeria and El Salvador’, 31 American 
University Law Review 899 1981-82.  
Bothe, M., ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law: Some Reflections on the ICRC 
Study’, YIHL, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 143-178. 
Boyle, A., ‘Some Reflections on Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’, 48 ICLQ (1999), pp. 
901-913. 
Brilmayer, L., ‘Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation’, 16 Yale JIL, 
1991, 177.  
Brilmayer, L., ‘Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation’, 16 Yale JIL, 
1991, 177. 
383 
 
Brownlie, I., ‘International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands’, (1958) 7 ICLQ 712.  
Brownlie, I., ‘International Law and the Use of Force by States Revisited’, 1 Chin. JIL 
(2002), pp. 1-19. 
Brownlie, I., ‘The Use of Force in Self-Defence’ (1961)37 BYIL 245.  
Bruderlein, C., ‘Custom in International Humanitarian Law’, IRRC, No. 283, November-
December 1991.    
Bugnion, F., ‘Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Non-International Armed Conflicts’, (2003) 6 
YIHL 168. 
Burgers, J.H., ‘The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of Human Rights Idea in the 
Twentieth Century’, 14 HRQ 447 (1994). 
Carnahan, B. M., ‘Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the 
Principle of Military Necessity’, 92 AJIL 213 1998. 
Carrillo-Suarez, A., ‘Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in International Humanitarian 
Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict’, 15 American University International 
Law Review 4 (2002).  
Cassese,  A., ‘Terrorism is also Disrupting some Crucial Legal Categories of International 
Law’, 12 EJIL (2001) 993. 
Cassese, A., ‘On Some Merits of the Israeli Judgement on Targeted Killings’, JICJ, 339. 
Cassese, A., ‘Terrorism is also Disrupting some crucial Legal Categories’, (2001) 12 EJIL 
993. 
Cassese, A., ‘The Geneva Protocols of 1977 and Customary International Law’, 3 UCLA 
Pacific Basin Law Journal (1984), 55. 
Cassese, A., ‘the International Community’s Legal Response to Terrorism’ (1989) 38 ICLQ 
589. 
Cassese, A., ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law’, JICJ 4 
(2006), 933-958. 
Cassese, A., ‘The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International 
Armed conflict’, 30 ICLQ 416 1981. 
Castellino, J., ‘Territorial Integrity and the right to Self-Determination: An Examination of 
the Conceptual Tools’, 33 Brook. JIL 503 2007-2008.   
Castren, E., ‘Recognition of Insurgency’, 5 Indian JIL 433 (1968), pp. 445-446.   
Cerone, J., ‘Jurisdiction and Power: the Intersection of Human Rights Law & the Law of 
Non-International Armed Conflict in an Extra-territorial Context’, 40 Israel Law 
Review 396, 2007, p. 399-400. 
384 
 
Charney, J.I., ‘the Use of Force against Terrorism and International Law’, 95 AJIL (2001) 
835, p. 836. 
Cherkasov, A & Lokshina, T., ‘Chechnya: 10 Years of Armed Conflict’, 16 Helsinki Monitor 
143 2005. 
Chinkin, C.M., ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’ 
(1989) 38 ICLQ 850.  
Clapham, A., ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors (2006); Clapham, ‘Human 
Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations’, 88 IRRC (2006) 491. 
Crawford, J., ‘ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court’, 89 AJIL (1995), pp. 
404-416.  
Cullen, A., ‘Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in 
International Humanitarian Law’, 183 Military Law Review 66 (2005), pp.91-92.  
Davis, G. B., ‘Doctor Francis Lieber’s Instructions for the Government of Armies in the 
Field’, 1 AJIL 13 January and April 1907. 
Dennis, M., ‘Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially to Detention of 
Combatants and Security Internees: Fuzzy Thinking All Round? ILSA J of Int’l & 
Comp Law 495 (Spring 2006), pp. 478-79.  
Derriennic, J-P., ‘Les Guerre, Civiles, Presses de Sciences Pô’, Paris, 2001, cited in Jean-
Jacques Fresard, ‘The Roots of Behavior in War: A Survey of the Literature’, ICRC, 
October 2004.  
Devlin, R.F., ‘Laws Centaurs: An Inquiry into the Nature and Relation of Law, State and 
Violence’, 27 Osgood Hall Law Journal 219 (1989). 
Dhokhalia, R.P., ‘Civil War and International Law’ (1971) 11 Indian JIL, 219.  
Dinstein, Y., ‘the Geneva Protocols: A Step Forward or Backward?’ 33 Yearbook of World 
Affairs 265 (1979). 
Dörmann, K., ‘the Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants”’, IRRC March, 
2003, vol. 85, No. 849, 45-74.   
 Doswald-Beck L. & Vite, S., ‘Origins and Nature of Human Rights Law and Humanitarian 
Law’, 293 IRRC 95, 112 (1993), p. 95-119. 
Draper, G.I.A.D., ‘Humanitarian Law and Human Rights’, Acta Juridica 193, (1979), p. 199. 
Draper, G.I.A.D., ‘Humanitarian Law and Internal Armed Conflicts’, 13 Georgia. Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 253 1983, pp. 268-272. 
Draper, G.I.A.D., ‘Implementation and Enforcement of Geneva conventions’, 1 Receuil des 
cours 1979 III, p. 26. 
385 
 
Draper, G.I.A.D., ‘The Enforcement of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional 
Protocols of 1977’ in Recuei des cours de l’Academie de droit international de la 
haye, volume 164, 1979-III.  
Draper, G.I.A.D., ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949’ (1965-i) 114 Recueil des Cours 63. 
Droege, C., ‘The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and international Human 
Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict’, 40 Israel Law Review 310 2007. 
Dugard, J., ‘International Terrorism and the Just War’, 12 Stanford Journal of  International 
Studies 21 (1977). 
Duguid, S., ‘The Politics of Unity: Hamidiye Policy in Eastern Anatolia’, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 9/2, 1973, pp. 139-155.   
Edmonds, C.J., ‘Kurdish Nationalism’, Journal of Contemporary History, 6, no. 1 (1971), p. 
87. 
Edmunds, S.F., ‘The Laws of War: Their Rise in the Nineteenth Century and Their Collapse 
in the Twentieth’, 15 Virginia Law Review 321 1928-29. 
Elder, D.A., ‘The Historical Background of Common Article 3of the Geneva Convention of 
1949’, 11 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 37 1979. 
Elphinston, W.G., ‘Kurds and the Kurdish Question’ Journal of the Royal Central Asian 
Society 35, Part 1 (Jan. 1948), pp. 38-51, p. 44. 
Entessar, N., ‘The Kurdish Mosaic of Discord’, Third World Quarterly 11, no. 4 (October 
1989) 86. 
Eskander, S., ‘Britain’s Policy in Southern Kurdistan: the Formation and the Termination of 
the First Kurdish Government, 1918-1919’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 
(2000), 27(2), 139-163, p. 150. 
Farer, T., ‘Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Towards a Definition of International 
Armed conflict’, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 37 (1971).  
Fawcett, J.E.S., ‘Intervention in International Law: A Study of Some Recent Cases’, 103 
RECUEIL DES COURS 343, 363 (1962). 
Fawcett, L., ‘Down but not out? The Kurds in International Politics’, Review of International 
Studies (2001), 27, 109-118.  
Fearon, J. & Laitin, D., ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War’, 97 Am Pol Sci R 75 (2003).  
Fleck, D., ‘International Accountability for Violations of the Jus in Bello: The Impact of 
ICRC Study in Customary International Humanitarian Law’, (2006) 11 JCSL 179.  
Fleck, D., ‘International Humanitarian Law after September 11: Challenges and the Need to 
Respond’, YIHL, Vol. 6, December 2003, pp. 41-71.   
386 
 
Forsyth, D.P., ‘Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International 
Armed Conflict’, 72 AJIL 274 1978. 
Forsythe, D.P., ‘The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law: Some 
Observations’, 69 AJIL 77 1975. 
Franck, T. & Lockwood, B., ‘Preliminary Thoughts Towards an international Convention on 
Terrorism’, 68 AJIL (1974), p. 69.  
Franck, T., ‘Editorial Comments: Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense’, 95 AJIL 893, 840 
(2001). 
Franck, T., ‘Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defence’, 95 AJIL (2001) p. 839. 
Franck, T., ‘The emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, AJIL 86(1992), p.46. 
Franck, T., ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by 
States’, 64 AJIL (1970) p. 809. 
Frank, T., ‘Editorial Comment: Terrorism and the Right of Self-defence’, 95 AJIL 839 
(2001), p. 840.   
Frank, T., ‘What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq’ 97 AJIL (2003) p. 607. 
Freedlander, R.A., ‘Terrorism and International Law: What is Being Done?’ 8 Rutgers 
Camden Law Journal 384 1976-1977, p. 384.  
Friedlander, R.A., ‘Terrorism and National Liberation Movements: Can Rights Derive from 
Wrongs?’ 13 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 281 1981, p. 286. 
Friedrichs, J., ‘Defining the International Public Enemy: The Political Struggle behind the 
Legal Debate on International Terrorism’, LJIL Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 69-
91. 
Gaeta, P., ‘the Armed Conflict in Chechnya before the Russian Constitutional Court’, EJIL 
(1996) 563-570.  
Gardam, J.G., ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’ 87 AJIL (1993) 391. 
Gardner, A.M., ‘Beyond Standards before Status: Democratic Governance and Non-State 
Actors’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 34(3), 2008, pp. 531-552. 
Gasser, H-P., ‘A Measure of Humanity in Internal Disturbances and Tensions: Proposal for a 
Code of Conduct’ (1988) 262 IRRC 38, p. 38.   
Gasser, H-P., ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Non-international 
Armed Conflict: Joint Venture or Mutual Exclusion?’, German Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 45, 2002, pp. 149-162. 
Gasser, H-P., ‘International Humanitarian Law’, in H. Haug (ed.), Humanity for all: the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Haupt, 1993), p. 491.  
387 
 
Gasser, H-P., ‘Prohibition of Terrorist Acts in International Humanitarian Law’ [July-August 
1986] 68 (253) IRRC 200. 
Glennon, M.J., ‘the Emerging Use of Force Paradigm’, 11 JCSL (2006) p. 309, at pp. 310-
311.   
Goldie, L.F.E., ‘Profile of a Terrorist: Distinguishing Freedom Fighters from Terrorists’, 14 
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, 1987, pp. 125-139.  
Gomulkiewicz, R.W., ‘International Law Governing Aid to Opposition Groups in Civil War: 
Resurrecting the Standards of Belligerency’, 63 Washington Law Review 43. 
Gorelick, R.E., ‘Wars of National Liberation: Jus Ad Bellum’, 11 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 71 
1979. 
Graham, D.E., ‘The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War: A Victory for Political 
Causes and Return to the ‘Just War’ Concept of the Eleventh Century’, 32 Wash. & 
Lee L. R. 25 (1975).   
Gray, C. & Olleson, S., ‘The Limits of the Law on the Use of Force: Turkey, Iraq and the 
Kurds’, Finish Yearbook of International Law 354 (Vol. XII, 2001), p. 371. 
Gray, C., ‘Bosnia Herzegovina: Civil War or Inter-State Conflict? Characterization and 
Consequences’, 67 BYIL 1996, 155.  
Gray, C., ‘From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force in Iraq’, EJIL, 
(2002), 1-19. 
Gray, C.D., ‘from Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force against Iraq’, 
13 EJIL (2002) 1. 
Green, F., ‘Fragmentation in Two Dimensions: The ICJ’s Flawed Approach to Non-State 
Actors and International Legal Personality’, 9 Melb. JIL 47 2008, p. 49.  
Green, J.A., ‘Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in 
Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defence’, 14 Cardozo 
Journal of International & Comparative Law (2006), p. 429. 
Green, J.A., ‘Self-Defence: A State of Mind for States?’ NILR LV: 181-206, 2008, p. 185. 
Green, L., ‘Strengthening Legal Protection in Internal Conflicts: Low Intensity Conflict and 
the Law’, 3 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 493 (1997), p. 503.  
Greenberg, E.V., ‘Law and the Conduct of the Algerian Revolution’, 11 Harv. ILJ 37 1970. 
Greenwood, C., ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case’, 7 EJIL 265, 278 
(1996). 
Greenwood, C., ‘International Law  and Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, 
and Iraq’ (2003) 4 San Diego International Law Journal 7. 
388 
 
Greenwood, C., ‘International Law and the ‘War against Terrorism’, 78 International Affairs, 
301 (2002), p. 314.   
Greenwood, C., ‘Terrorism and Humanitarian Law: the Debate over Additional Protocol I’, 
19 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights (1989), pp. 187-207. 
Greenwood, C., ‘the Concept of War in Modern International Law’, 36 ICLQ, 1987, 293-294. 
Greenwood, G., ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al 
Qaeda, and Iraq’, 4 San Diego International Law Journal 7, 17 (2003). 
Greig, D.W., ‘Self-Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?’ 40 
ICLQ (1991) p. 366. 
Gross, L., ‘The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948’ 42 AJIL., p. 20. 
Gross-Stein, J., ‘Proxy wars: How superpowers end them: the diplomacy of war termination 
in the Middle East’, 35 International Law Journal, 478 1979-1980. 
Guillaume, G., ‘Terrorism and International Law’, 53 ICLQ 537 (2004), p. 539. 
Gunter, M.M., ‘a de facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, 
1993, pp. 295-319.  
Gunter, M.M., ‘Civil War in Kurdistan: KDP and PUK conflict’, Middle East Journal, 50:2 
(1996:Spring), p. 225.  
Gutierrez-Posse, H.D.T., ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and 
International Criminal Law’, IRRC, Vol. 88, No. 861, March 2006, pp. 65-86. 
Hadji, P.S., ‘The Case for Kurdish Statehood in Iraq’, 41 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 514 2009, p. 519. 
Halberstam, M., ‘the Right of Self-Defence once Security council Takes Action’ (1996) 17 
Michigan Journal of International Law 229. 
Hampson, F., ‘Using International Human Rights Machinery to Enforce the International 
Law of Armed Conflicts’, (1992) 31 Revue de droit militaire et de droit de la guerre 
119-142. 
Hansen, M.A., ‘Preventing the Emasculation of Warfare: Halting the Expansion of Human 
Rights Law into Armed Conflict’, 194 Military Law Review 1 2007.  
Hargrove, J.L., ‘the Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-
defense’ (1987) 81 AJIL 135, p. 139. 
Harris, G.A., ‘Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds’, Annals of the American Academy of Political 
& Social Science, Vol. 433, Ethnic Conflict in the World Today (Sep., 1977), 112-
124.  
389 
 
Hayes-Parks,W.,  ‘Air War and the Law of War’, 32-1 Air Force Law Review (1990), 1, p. 
143. 
Heath, K.D., ‘Could we Have Armed the Kosovo Liberation Army?, the New Norms in 
Intervention in Civil War’, 4 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Affairs 251 1999-2000.   
Heintze, H-J., ‘On the Relationship between Human Rights, Protection and International 
Humanitarian Law’, IRRC, December 2004 Vol. 86 No. 856, p. 789. 
Henckaerts, J-M., ‘Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to 
the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict’, 45 IRRC 
(2005) No. 857, pp. 175.  
Henkin, L., ‘The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated’ AJIL 544 
(1971) 544. 
Heper, M., ‘the State, the Military and Democracy in Turkey’, Jerusalem Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 3(1987), 52-64.  
Hoffman, M.H., ‘State Practice, the Customary Law of War and Terrorism: Adopting Old 
Rules to Meet New Challenges’, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 34, 2004, p. 
233. 
J.R. Crowley Program, ‘Justice on Trial: State Security Courts, Police Impunity, and the 
Intimidation of Human Rights Defenders in Turkey’, Fordham International Law 
Journal, Vol. 22(5), 1999, Article 9, p. 2131. 
Jackson, J.H., ‘Sovereignty-Modern: a New Approach to an Outdated Concept’, AJIL 782 
2003.    
Janse, D., ‘International Terrorism and Self-Defence’, (2006) 36 Israel Yearbook of Human 
Rights 149. 
Jennings, R., ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases’, (1938) 32 AJIL 82. 
Jessop, P.G., ‘The Spanish Rebellion and International Law’, 15 Foreign Affairs 260 1936-
1937. 
Johnson, D.H.N., ‘the Legality of Modern Forms of the Aerial Warfare’, Royal Aeronautical 
Society Journal, August, 1968. 
Kahn, S.G., ‘Private Armed Groups and World Order’ (1970) 32 NYIL, pp. 32-37.   
Kaikobad, K.H., ‘Some Observations on the Doctrine of the continuity and Finality of 
Boundaries’, 54 BYIL, 1983, p. 119.  
Kelly, M.J., ‘the Tricky Nature of Proving Genocide against Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi 
Special Tribunal’, 38 Cornell ILJ 983 (2005). 
390 
 
Kelson, H., ‘Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the United 
Nations’ (1948) 42 AJIL 783-796. 
Kemal Kirişci, ‘Turkey and the Kurdish Safe-Haven in Northern Iraq’, Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Spring 1996, 21-39. 
Keskin, F., ‘Turkey’s Trans-Border Operations in Northern Iraq: Before and After the 
Invasion of Iraq’, Research Journal of International Studies, (2008), volume 8, 59-72, 
p. 61.  
Kinacioglu, M., ‘A Response to Amos Guiora: Reassessing the Parameters of Use of Force in 
the Age of Terrorism’, JCSL (2008), Vol. 13 No. 1, 33-48. 
Kirchner, S., ‘Third-party Liability for Hezbollah Attacks against Israel’, German Law 
Journal, Vol. 7(9) (2006), pp. 777-84.  
Klabber, J., ‘Rebel With a cause? Terrorists and Humanitarian Law’ EJIL (2003), Vol. 14 
No. 2, pp. 299-312.  
Klabbers, J.K., “The Redundancy of ‘Soft Law’”, 65 Nordic JIL (1996), p. 172.  
Kleffner, K., ‘From ‘Belligerents’ to ‘Fighters’ and Civilians Directly Participating in 
Hostilities – on the Principle of Distinction in Non-International Armed Conflicts One 
Hundred Years after the Second Hague Peace Conference’, NILR (2007), 54:315-336. 
Kolb, R., ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law: a Brief History of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
1949 Geneva Conventions’, 324 IRRC 400 (1998), pp.409-419. 
Koskenniemi, M., ‘National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 
Practice’ (1994) 43 ICLQ, p. 241. 
Kraemer, J.L., ‘Apostates, Rebels and Brigands’, Israel Oriental Studies 10 (1980): 34-73. 
Kravetz, D., ‘The Protection of Civilians in War: The ICTY’s Galic Case’ (2004) 17 LJIL 
521. 
Kuntz, J.L., ‘Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations’ (1947) 41 AJIL 872-879. 
Kunz, J.L., ‘The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent Necessity for Their 
Revision’, 45 AJIL 1951. 
Kwakwa, E.K., ‘South Africa’s May 1985 Military Incursions into Neighbouring African 
States’, 12 Yale JIL (1987) 421.  
La Rosa, A.M. & Wuerzner, C., ‘Armed Groups, Sanctions and the Implementation of 
International Humanitarian Law’, IRRC, Vol. 90, No. 870, June 2008, pp. 327-341, p. 
341.  
391 
 
Label, J., ‘The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: the Bombing of Sudan and 
Afghanistan’, Yale JIL 24 (1999), 537. 
Lacina, B., Gleditsch N.P. & B. Russett, B., ‘The Declining Risk of Death in Battle’ 
International Studies Quarterly (2006) 50, 673-680. 
Lauterpacht, E., ‘The Legal Irrelevance of the ‘State of War’ (1968) 62 Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law 68. 
Lauterpacht, H., ‘the Limits of the Operation of the Law of War’, 30 BYIL (1953) 206, p. 
240.  
Levie, H.S., ‘History of the Law on Land’, IRRC No. 838.   
Little, D., ‘The United States and the Kurds: a Cold War Story’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 
Vol. 12, No. 4, Fall 2010, pp. 63-98. 
Lobel, J., ‘The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: the Bombing of Sudan and 
Afghanistan’ (1999) 24 Yale JIL 537.  
Lobel, J. & Ratner, M., ‘Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorization to Use 
Force, Cease-fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime’, 93 AJIL (1999) 124. 
Lootsteen, Y.M., ‘the Concept of Belligerency in International Law’, (2000) Military Law 
Review, p. 114. 
Loverman, C., ‘Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention’, Journal of Conflict, 
Security and Development, Vol. 2, No. 3, December 2002. 
Lubell, N., ‘Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict’, IRRC, vol. 87, 
no. 860, December 2005, p. 748.  
Lytle, S., ‘Robespierre, Danton, and the Levee En Masse’, The Journal of Modern History, 
vol. 29-30, 1957, pp. 325-337.  
Malanczuk, P., ‘the Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention’, 2 EJIL (1991) 114, pp. 118-19. 
Mango, A., ‘Atatürk and the Kurds’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, Seventy-Five 
Years of the Turkish Republic (Oct., 1999), p. 19. 
Marks, S., Civil Liberties at the Margin: the UK Derogation and the European Court of 
Human Rights, 15 Oxford JLS 69 (1995) 72, p. 81.  
Matas, D., ‘Armed Opposition Groups’, 24 Manitoba Law Journal (1997) 621. 
Matheson, M.J., ‘Remarks’, 2 American University Journal of International Law & Policy 
425-26. 
Mathews, J., ‘Power Shift: An Essay on Realism, Reality and the Future of International 
Relations’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76 (1997), 50. 
392 
 
McCormack, T., ‘International law and the Use of Chemical Weapons in Gulf War’, 
California western International Law Journal, Vol. 21, 1990-91. 
McDougal, M.S. & Reisman, W.M., ‘The Prescribing Function: How International Law is 
Made’, 6 Yale Studies in World Public Order, 1980, p. 249. 
McGoldrick, D., ‘the Interface between Public Emergency Powers’, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law (2002) 2(2): 380-429.  
McIlmail, T., ‘No-Fly Zones: the Imposition and Enforcement of Air Exclusion Regimes 
over Bosnia and Iraq’, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Journal, Vol. 17, 1994, p. 48. 
Menon, P.K., ‘Subjects of Modern International Law’, in Hague Yearbook of International 
Law, Vol. 3, Springer, 1991. 
Meron, T.,  ‘The Continuing Role of Custom in Formation of International Humanitarian 
Law’, (1996) 90 AJIL246.  
Meron, T., ‘Francis Lieber’s Code and Principles of Humanity’, 36 Columbian Journal of 
Transnational Law 269 1998. 
Meron, T., ‘International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities’, AJIL, pp. 554-577, (1999).  
Meron, T., ‘Is International Law Moving Towards Criminalization?’ 9 EJIL (1998), pp. 18-
31 
Meron, T., ‘On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need 
for a New Instrument’, 77 AJIL 589 (1983). 
Meron, T., ‘the Continuing Role of Custom in International Humanitarian Law’, 90 AJIL 
(1996) . 
Meron, T., ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, 94 AJIL (2000), 239, p. 243.  
Meron, T., ‘The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I’, AJIL 678 
1994. 
Meron, T., ‘Towards a Humanitarian Declaration in Internal Strife’, AJIL, vol. 78 (1984), pp. 
859-868. 
Meron, T., ‘War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law’, 88 AJIL 
(1994) 78. 
Meyer, M.A., ‘Liability of POWs for Offences Committed Prior to Capture: Astiz Affairs’, 
32 ICLQ 948 (1993). 
Migliorino, L., ‘International Terrorism in the United Nations Debates’, Italian Yearbook of 
International Law (1976), II, 102.  
393 
 
Milanovic, M., ‘Lessons for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the War on Terror: 
Comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Target Killing Case’ (2007) 866 IRRC 373. 
Minorsky, V., ‘the Tribes of Western Iran’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of 
Great Britain and Ireland, 75(1/2) (1945): p. 76. 
Moir, L., ‘Grave Breaches and Internal Armed Conflict’, JICJ 7 (2009), 763-787, p. 767. 
Moir, L., ‘The Historical Development of Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts prior to 1949’, 47 ICLQ (1998) p. 337.  
Momtaz, D., ‘The Minimum Humanitarian Rules Applicable in periods of Tension and 
Internal Strife’ (1998) 324 IRRC 455. 
Momtaz, D., ‘War Crimes in Non-International Conflicts Under the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court’, YIHL, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 177-192. 
Moore, J.M.N., ‘the Secret War in Central America and the Future of the World Order’ 
(1986) 80 AJIL 43. 
Morgenthau, J., ‘Positivism, Functionalism and International Law’, (1940) 34 AJIL 260. 
Murphy, S.D., ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’, 
96 AJIL (2002) p. 237. 
Murphy, S.D., ‘Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter’, 43 Harv. ILJ 41, p. 50. 
Murray, C., ‘The 1977 Protocol and Conflict in South Africa’, 33 ICLQ 462 (1984). 
Mushkat, R., ‘Who May Wage War? An Examination of an Old/New Question’, 2 American 
University Journal of International Law & Policy 97 (1987), p. 109. 
Mutlu, S., ‘Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: a Demographic Study’, International Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 28 (1996), pp. 518-19. 
Myjer, E.P.J. & White, N.D., ‘the Twin Towers Attack: an Unlimited Right to Self-
Defence?’, 7 JCSL 5, pp. 7-9 (2002). 
Myles, E., “’Humanity’, ‘Civilization’ and the ‘international Community’ in the Late 
Imperial Russian Mirror: Three Ideas topical for Our Days”, 4 Journal of History of 
International Law 310 (2002). 
Myren, R., ‘Applying International Law of War to Non-International Armed Conflicts: Past 
Attempts and Future Strategies’ (1990) 37 NILR 367.  
Newton, M.A., ‘Inside Look at the Anfal Trial’, Nashville Bar Journal, Sept. 2006, at 8-9, 
17-18. 
Newton, M.A., ‘the Anfal Genocide: Personal Reflections and Legal Residue’, 40 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnatlantic Law 1523 2007. 
394 
 
Noone, G.P., ‘The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to the WW II’, 47 Naval 
Law Review 176 2000;  
Nurick, L., ‘The Distinction Between Combatants and Non-Combatants in the Law of War’, 
39 AJIL 680. 
O’Brien, W.Y., ‘The Jus in Bello in Revolutionary War and Counter-Insurgency’, 18 Vir. 
J.I.L., 193-242 (1978). 
O’Connell, M.E., ‘Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors through a Global War on 
Terror?’, 43 Columbian Journal of Transnatlantic Law 435 2004-2005. 
O’Connell, M.E., ‘Reshaping Dogs of War’, AJIL 446, 2003, p. 454.  
O’Donnell, D., ‘International Treaties against Terrorism and the Use of Terrorism during 
Armed Conflict and by Armed Forces’, IRRC, Vol. 88, No. 864, December 2006, 863. 
Olson, R., ‘The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 1991-1995: from the Gulf 
War to Incursion into Iraq’, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 
19(1)(Fall 1995), p.2. 
Orford, A., ‘The Destiny of International law’ (2004) 17 LJIL 441, 459. 
Ozuglo, H., ‘’Nationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman – Republican Era’, 
International Journal of Middle East studies, 33 (2001), 383-409, p. 383. 
Paulus A. & Vashakmadze M., ‘Asymmetrical War and the Notion of Armed Conflict: a 
Tentative Conceptualization’, IRRC, Vol. 91 No. 873 March 2009. 
Paust, J., ‘Dr Francis Lieber and the Lieber Code’, 95 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc.112 2001. 
Paust, J., ‘the Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond’, 35 
Cornell J.I.L. (2002), p. 534.      
Petman, J., ‘Evil in International Law’, 5(4) INT’L L. FORUM DROIT INT’L, 236 (2003), p. 
237.  
Petty, K.A., ‘Veiled Impunity: Iran’s Use of Non-State Armed Groups’, 36 Denver Journal of 
International Law & Policy 191 2007-2008, p. 193. 
Pfanner, T., ‘ Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and 
Humanitarian Action, IRRC, vol. 87, No. 957, March 2006, pp. 149-174.   
Plattner, D., ‘The Penal Repression of Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 278 IRRC 409, 414 (1990).  
Provost, R., ‘International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, Cambridge U.P., 2002; H-
J. Heintze, ‘On the Relationship between Human Rights Protection and International 
Humanitarian Law’, 856 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 789 (2004), p. 794.  
395 
 
Pustogarov, V.V., ‘The Martens Clause in International Law’, 1 Journal of History of 
International Law 125 1999. 
Quentin-Baxter, R.Q., ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law-Confluence of Conflict?’ 9 
Australian Yearbook of International Law 94 (1985). 
Reisman, M.W., ‘Criterion for the lawful Use of Force in International law’, (1984-85) Yale 
JIL, pp. 279-285. 
Reisman, W.M. & Armstrong, A., ‘The Past and Future of Preemptive Self-Defence’, 100 
AJIL (2006) P. 525. 
Reydams, L. ‘A la guerre comme a la guerre: patterns of armed conflict, humanitarian law 
and new challenges’, IRRC, Vol. 88, No. 864 December 2006, p. 732. 
Reydams, L., ‘A la guerre comme a la guerre: patterns of armed conflict, humanitarian law 
response and new challenges’, IRRC, vol. 88, No. 864 December 2006. 
Robert, G.B., ‘The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional 
Protocol I’, 26 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 109 1985-1986. 
Robinson, D. & Von Hebel, H., ‘War Crimes in International Conflicts: Article 8 of the ICC 
Statute’, YIHL, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 193-209, p. 195. 
Rogers, A.P.V., ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’, YBIHL, Vol. 7, 2004, pp. 3-34. 
Rogers, F., ‘Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and Australia Defence Force Operation’, 
18 University of Tasmania Law Review 1, (1999), p. 2 
Rogoff, M.A. & E. Collins Jr,. E.,  ‘The Caroline Incident and the Development of 
International law’, (1990) 16 Brook. JIL 493. 
Röling, B.V.A., ‘the Legal Status of Rebels and Rebellion’, 13 Journal of Peace Research, 
1976. 
Rona, G., ‘International Law Under Fire: Interesting Times for International Humanitarian 
Law: Challenges from ‘War on Terror’, 27 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (2003) 
55-70. 
Ronen, Y., ‘Israel, Hezbollah, and the Second Lebanon War’, YIHL, Vol. 9, 2006, pp. 362-
393.   
Ronzitti, N., ‘The Expanding Law of Self-Defence’, JCSL 11:3 (2006), 343-359, p. 344.   
Ronzitti, N., ‘Wars of National Liberation: A Legal Definition’, 1975, the Italian Yearbook of 
International Law, 192-205. 
Roosevelt, A., ‘the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad’, Middle East Journal 1, no. 3 (July 1947), 
p. 248.   
396 
 
Rosenstock, R.,  ‘The Declaration of Principles of International law concerning Friendly 
Relations: A survey”, 65 AJIL 713 (1971).  
Ruben, A.P., ‘The Status of Rebels under the Geneva Conventions of 1949’ 21 ICLQ 472 
1972, p. 474.  
Rubin, M., ‘Are Kurds a Pariah Minority?’, 70 Social Research, 295 (2003). 
Ruys, T. & Verhoeven, S., ‘Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence’, 10 
JCSL, p. 289. 
Ruys, T., ‘Crossing the Thin Blue Line: An Inquiry into Israel’s Recourse to Self-Defense 
against Hezbollah’, 43 Stan. JIL 265 (2007), p. 290. 
Ruys, T., ‘Quo Vatis Jus Ad Bellum?: A Legal Analysis of Turkey’s Military Operations 
against the PKK in Northern Iraq’ 9 Melb. JIL 334 2008. 
Saad Eskander, ‘Britain’s Policy in Southern Kurdistan: the Formation and Termination of 
the First Kurdish Government, 1918-19, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 27, No. 2, 2000: 129-63, p. 142.   
Sandoz, Y., ‘International Humanitarian Law in the 21st Century’ (2003) 6 YIHL 14.  
Sarkees, Meredith, ‘the Correlates of War Data on War: an Update to 1997’, 18 Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 123 (2000). 
Sassoli, M., ‘Terrorism and War’, JICJ, vol. 4, No. 5, 959-981, (2006), p. 959. 
Saul, B., ‘Attempts to Define ‘Terrorism’ in International Law’, NILR, LII: 57-83, 2005, p. 
58.  
Saul, B., ‘Definition of “Terrorism” in the UN Security Council: 1885-2004’, 4(1) Chin. JIL, 
141, (2005), p. 152.  
Saul, B., ‘The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism’, 4 JICJ, 2006, p. 78.  
Schachter, O., ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implication for International Law’, 
(1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 7.      
Schachter, O., ‘the Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force’ (1985) 10 Yale JIL 291, p. 292.  
Schachter, O., ‘the Lawful Use of Force by a State against Terrorist in Another Country’, 19 
IYHR 209, 216 (1989).   
Schachter, O., ‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’, 82 Mich. LR 1620, 1983-84, pp. 
1620-1621. 
Schachter, O., ‘The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements’, Editorial 
Comment (1977) 71 AJIL 296. 
Schindler, D., ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, (1981-2) 31 American University Law 
Review pp. 935-977. 
397 
 
Schindler, D., ‘International Humanitarian Law and Internationalized Internal Armed 
Conflicts’ (1982) 22 IRRC 255. 
Schindler, D., ‘International Humanitarian Law: Its Remarkable Development and its 
Persistent Violation’, 5 Journal of History of International Law’, 165-188 (2003).  
Schindler, D., ‘the Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocols’, (1979) 163(II) Recueil des cours 117. 
Schmitt, M.N., ‘Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law’, 62 Air Force 
Law Review 1 2008. 
Schmitt, M.N., ’Pre-emptive Strategies in international Law’ (2003) 24 Mich JIL 513.  
Schmitt, M.N., Garraway C.H.B. and Dinstein, Y., ‘The Manual on the Law of Non-
International  Armed conflict with Commentary’, Y. Dinstein & F. Domb (eds.), 
Israel Yearbook of Human Rights (Special Supplement), Vol. 36, Martinus Nijhoff, 
2006, p. 6. 
Schondorf, R.S., ‘The Target Killing Judgement’, (2007) JICJ 301.     
Schreuer, C., ‘The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International 
Law?’ (1993) 4 EJIL 447. 
Schrijver, N., ‘Responding to International Terrorism: Moving the Frontier of International 
law for “Enduring Freedom”’ (2001) 48 NILR 271-291.  
Shaw, M. N., ‘The Status of National Liberation Movements in International Law’, 5 
Liverpool Law Review, 1983. 
Shepard, W. S., ‘One Hundredth Anniversary of the Lieber Code’, 21 Military Law Review 
157 1963. 
Shiryaev, Y., ‘The Right of Armed Self-Defence in International Law and Self-Defence 
Arguments used in the Second Lebanon War’, 3 ACTA SOCIETATIS (2007/2008) 80-
97, p. 89. 
Sick, G., ‘Iran: Confronting Terrorism’, the Washington Quarterly, 26(4) autumn 2003, p. 86. 
Simpson, P.J., ‘Learning to Live with NGOs’, Foreign Policy, Vol. 112 (1998), 82. 
Sivakumaran, S., ‘Binding Armed Opposition Groups’, ICLQ vol. 55, April 2006, pp. 369-
394, p. 371.  
Smith, C., ‘Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as a Minimum Standard in 
International Humanitarian Law’ 13 Israel Law Review 168 2005.    
Sofaer, A.D., ‘Terrorism and the Law of War’, 64 Foreign Affairs 901 (1986), p. 912.  
Sofaer, D., Legal Advisor, United States Department of State, January 22, 1987, 2 American 
University Journal of International Law & Policy 460 1987. 
398 
 
Sorel, J-M., ‘Some Question about the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight against 
Financing’, EJIL, (2003), Vol. 14 No. 2, 365-378, p. 367. 
Sornarajah, M-C., ‘“Terrorism” Not Useful for Analyzing Random violence’ (1999) 03 ASIL 
Proceedings 79.  
Spieker, H., ‘The International Criminal Court and Non-International Armed Conflict’, 13 
LJIL, 395-425 (2000). 
Stahn, C., “’jus ad bellum’, ‘jus in bello’ … ‘jus post bellum’? – Rethinking the Concept of 
Armed Forces, 17 EJIL 921 (2007), p. 922. 
Stewart, J.G., ‘Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian 
law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict’, IRRC June 2003 Vol 85 No 
850, p. 315. 
Strebel, H., ‘Martens Clause’, III Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, pp. 326-327. 
Sundhya Pahuja, ‘The Post-coloniality of International Law’, Harv. ILJ, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2005, 
p. 5. 
Suter, K., ‘Human Rights in Armed Conflicts’, XV Military Law and Law of War Review 
(1976), p. 395. 
Tams, C.J., ‘Swimming with the Tide, or Seeking to Stem it? Recent ICJ Rulings on the Law 
of Self-Defence’, Revue Québécoise de Droit International, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 275-
290, 2005, p. 289.   
Teson, F.R., ‘Collective Humanitarian Intervention’, Michigan JIL, Vol. 17, 1995-96, p. 344. 
Thurer, D., ‘The “failed State” and International Law’, 81 IRRC 1999, p. 731. 
Tierney, J.J., ‘Terror at Home: the American Revolution and Irregular Warfare’, 12 Stanford 
journal of International Studies 1 1977, p. 2. 
Tomuschat, C., ‘Obligations Arising for States against their Will’, Recueil des Cours, No. 
241, Vol. IV/1993, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1994, p. 195. 
Trainin, I.P., ‘Question of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War’ 40 AJIL 534 1946. 
Trapp, K.N., ‘Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right to Self-Defence 
against Non-State Terrorist Actors’, ICLQ Vol. 56, pp. 141-156, January 2007, p. 141. 
Turlington, T., ‘the Settlement of Lausanne’, AJIL, 18, no. 4, Oct 1924, 702. 
Tyner, R.J., ‘Wars of National Liberation in Africa and Palestine: Self-Determination for 
Peoples or for Territories’, 5 Yale Studies of World Public Order, 234, 1978-79.  
Van Bruinessen, M., ‘Between Guerrilla War and Political Murder: the Workers Party of 
Kurdistan’, MERIP Middle East Report, No. 153 (July-August 1988), 40-46, p.43.  
399 
 
Van Bruinessen, M., ‘the Kurds between Iran and Iraq’, Middle East Report (July-August 
1986) 14-27. 
Van Steenberghe, R., ‘Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-State Actors in the Light 
of Recent State Practice: a Step Forward?’, LJIL, 23 (2010), pp. 183-208. 
Vinuesa,R.E.,  ‘Interface, Correspondence and Convergence of Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian law’, YIHL, Vol. 1, 1998, pp. 69-110, p. 71. 
Warbrick, C. & Rowe, P., ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia: the Decision 
of the Appeals Chamber on the Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadic 
Case’, 45 ICLQ 691 (1996). 
Warbrick, C., ‘the Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq’, ICLQ 40(2) (1991): 482-492. 
Watkin, K., ‘Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation 
in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance’, 42 New York University Journal of 
International Law & Policy 641 (2010), p. 655. 
Watkin, K.W., ‘Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflict in the 21 Century’, 1 
Israel Defence Forces Law Review 69 2003.  
Wedgwood, R., ‘Responding to Terrorism: the Strike’s against Bin Laden’, 24 Yale J.I.L. 
(1999), p. 564.  
Weigend, T., ‘The Universal Terrorist: the International Community Grappling with a 
Definition’, JICJ 4 (2006), 912-932, p. 919. 
Werner, W.G., ‘Self-Determination and Civil War’ 6 JCSL 171 2001. 
Westermann, W. L., ‘Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansionism’, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 24, 1945-46, pp. 675-686. 
Whelan, A., ‘Self-Determination and Decolonization: Foundations for the Future’ (1992) 3(4) 
Irish Studies in International Affairs 25. 
Whelan, A., ‘Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement’, ICLQ, vol. 43, 
1994, pp. 99-115. 
Williamson, R.L., ‘Hard Law, soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some 
Compliance Hypotheses’, 4 Chicago JIL 59 (2003), p. 63.  
Willmott, D., ‘Removing the Distinction between International and Non-International Armed 
Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2004) 5 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 196.  
Wright, Q., ‘Changes in the Conception of War’, 18 AJIL 755 1924. 
Wright, Q., ‘Intervention, 1956’, 51 AJIL 257, 271 (1957); FOG OF LAW, p. 542. 
Wright, Q., ‘The Mosul Dispute’, AJIL, vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul. 1926), pp. 153-164. 
400 
 
Wright, Q., ‘The Outlawry of War and the Law of war’ 47 AJIL 356, 1953, p. 365.   
Yavuz, M., ‘Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fetullah Gülen, the Virtue Party 
and the Kurds’, SAIS Review, Johns Hopkins U.P., 19(1) (1999): p. 124. 
Yoo, J., ‘Transferring Terrorists’, 79 Notre Dame Law Review 1183, (2004), p. 1197. 
Zegveld, L., ‘the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law. A comment on the Tablada case, IRRC, No. 324 (1998), pp. 505-
511. 
Zimmermann, A., ‘the Second Lebanon War: Jus ad bellum, jus in bello and issue of 
Proportionality’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 11, 2007, 99-
141, P. 106. 
 
 
 
 
 
